

Korea Affirmative

Korea Affirmative	1
South Korea Affirmative Case Overview.....	2
Plan Text	4
Affirmative Case	5
Affirmative Case	6
Affirmative Case	7
Affirmative Case	8
Affirmative Case	9
Affirmative Case	10
Affirmative Case	11
Affirmative Case	12
Affirmative Case	13
Affirmative Case	14
Affirmative Case	15
***Korean War Advantage Evidence Extensions.....	16
U.S. Withdrawal Solves Escalation.....	17
High Risk of War.....	18
High Risk of War.....	19
Nuclear North Korea Leads to U.S. Military Strikes	20
Strikes Bad – Full Scale War	21
Strikes Bad – Full Scale War	22
Strikes Bad - War.....	23
Strikes Bad - Destroys Seoul.....	24
Strikes Bad – China / ROK.....	25
Withdrawal Causes Chinese Involvement.....	26
China Solves North Korean Conflict	27
China Solves North Korean Conflict	28
China Solves North Korean Conflict	29
Hegemony Collapsing.....	30
Withdrawal Doesn't Cause War/Instability	31
Withdrawal Doesn't Cause War/Instability	32
Withdrawal Doesn't Cause War/Instability	33
Withdrawal → Denuclearization.....	34
Withdrawal → Denuclearization.....	35
Withdrawal → Denuclearization.....	36
***Military Modernization Advantage Evidence Extensions	37
Free Riding Now	38
Link Extensions	39
Link Extensions	40
***Answers to Negative Arguments.....	41
US-South Korea Relations Answers	42
US-South Korea Relations Answers	43

South Korea Affirmative Case Overview

This year's resolution asks affirmatives to limit military and/or police presence in one of six countries. The affirmative case in this file focuses on South Korea and argues that the United States should phase out its military presence in South Korea.

This file takes evidence from Doug Bandow, Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute, and other scholars to argue that U.S. military support of South Korea represents wasteful and unnecessary government spending and threatens U.S. interests.

South Korea has been the beneficiary of U.S. military support under unusual circumstances. While many of the other nations listed in the resolution such as Iraq and Afghanistan rely on the U.S. military out of economic necessity, South Korea enjoys a robust economy, with plenty of the infrastructure and technological capabilities to maintain a strong and modern military force. South Korea is an excellent example of a country that has the resources to provide for its own defense, but does not have the incentive to do so because the United States funds the country's security.

Bandow argues that because of its huge deficits, the United States cannot sustain its level of military involvement worldwide. Moreover, U.S. presence in the region emboldens both North Korea and may lead to serious confrontations that could be avoided. North Korea asserts that U.S. presence makes its nuclear arsenal necessary.

Affirmatives can argue that South Korea should modernize its military and provide for its own security. They can argue that this will create a better defense structure, deescalate a crisis with North Korea and lessen the financial burdens of sustained U.S. intervention.

History of U.S. Military Support of South Korea

U.S. combat troops first occupied Korea following the surrender of the Axis powers in WWII in 1945. Three months later the commander of the occupation, General John Reed Hodge, declared war on the communist party. Five years later a civil war erupted when the North invaded the South. Millions lost their lives in the conflict. An armistice ended the fighting in 1953, but the war technically never ended. A peace agreement was never signed. Later that year, South Korea and the United States signed the R.O.K-U.S. Mutual Security Agreement, and the United States established a troop presence of 50,000 at military bases near Seoul. During the Cold War, U.S. policymakers prioritized security relationships that would isolate, or curb the expansionary power of communist ideology. The United States viewed communist North Korea as a major threat to the region.

The Korean War is one of the longest-running conflicts in the world. American troops arrived in South Korea in September 1945 and over 25,000 of them still remain there today. Nearly 60 years after the end of the fighting, the U.S. military remains in South Korea, holding the line against the enemy, with a new war possible at any moment. Currently the United States has 19,755 Army troops, 274 Navy troops, 8,815 Air Force troops and 242 Marines stationed in South Korea.

With the fall of the Soviet Union in 1989, North Korea found itself increasingly isolated and without strong international support. In the 1990s, North Korea's positioning grew more aggressive, and the country began to develop nuclear technology as a way of *saber-rattling* which was met by the United States increasing its level of military support for South Korea.

The affirmative plan phases out U.S. military presence in South Korea. The case discusses two main advantages to the plan.

Advantage Overviews

The first advantage affirmatives using this plan can claim is preventing a war on the Korean peninsula. Bandow argues that within the next several years, the United States will be forced to make significant reductions to its foreign military presence because of the recent economic recession and the growing U.S. deficit. He asserts that the U.S. government should do this sooner rather than later because he believes that war on the peninsula is inevitable if the U.S. remains.

The affirmative case isolates two reasons why a removal of the U.S. military from South Korea would deescalate the conflict between North and South Korea. First, evidence in this file suggests that removal of the U.S. military presence is a critical prerequisite for China to take a more active role in the region and push for Korean reunification. We have included evidence to help you argue that China's role could soothe tensions between the two nations. Second, affirmatives can argue that U.S. troop removal would cause North Korea to denuclearize their arsenal. Pyongyang has pointed to U.S. troop levels in South Korea as the driving factor behind their nuclear program, claiming that such a large military presence along their border is adequate justification for establishing a nuclear deterrent.

The second major advantage the case claims is South Korean military modernization. The evidence included makes the argument that South Korea's ability to free-ride on the United States provides a disincentive for South Korea to modernize its own domestic military which invites Chinese aggression. South Korea enjoys a robust economy, with plenty of the infrastructure and technological capabilities to maintain a strong and modern military force. Affirmatives can argue that the United States is simply unnecessary to their defense; South Korea has the resources to fill the gap left by a U.S. withdrawal. This fact will make it extremely difficult for negative teams to generate any substantial offense.

*****Plan Text*****

Plan: The United States federal government should substantially phase out its military presence in South Korea.

Affirmative Case

Advantage 1 is Korean war:

The United States can no longer afford to be the global hegemon – U.S. withdrawal is inevitable over the long-term.

Bandow 10

[Doug Bandow, senior fellow at the Cato Institute. A former special assistant to President Reagan, he is the author of Foreign Follies: America's New Global Empire, "Bankrupt Empire" ,4/19/10
http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=11701]

The United States government is effectively bankrupt. Washington no longer can afford to micromanage the world. International social engineering is a dubious venture under the best of circumstances. It is folly to attempt while drowning in red ink. Traditional military threats against America have largely disappeared. There's no more Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact, Maoist China is distant history and Washington is allied with virtually every industrialized state. As Colin Powell famously put it while Chairman of the Joint Chiefs: "I'm running out of enemies. . . . I'm down to Kim Il-Sung and Castro." However, the United States continues to act as the globe's 911 number. Unfortunately, a hyperactive foreign policy requires a big military. America accounts for roughly half of global military outlays. In real terms Washington spends more on "defense" today than it during the Cold War, Korean War and Vietnam War. U.S. military expenditures are extraordinary by any measure. My Cato Institute colleagues Chris Preble and Charles Zakaib recently compared American and European military outlays. U.S. expenditures have been trending upward and now approach five percent of GDP. In contrast, European outlays have consistently fallen as a percentage of GDP, to an average of less than two percent. The difference is even starker when comparing per capita GDP military expenditures. The U.S. is around \$2,200. Most European states fall well below \$1,000. Adding in non-Pentagon defense spending — Homeland Security, Veterans Affairs, and Department of Energy (nuclear weapons) — yields American military outlays of \$835.1 billion in 2008, which represented 5.9 percent of GDP and \$2,700 per capita. Max Boot of the Council on Foreign Relations worries that the increased financial obligations (forget unrealistic estimates about cutting the deficit) resulting from health-care legislation will preclude maintaining such oversize expenditures in the future, thereby threatening America's "global standing." He asks: Who will "police the sea lanes, stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, combat terrorism, respond to genocide and other unconscionable human rights violations, and deter rogue states from aggression?" Of course, nobody is threatening to close the sea lanes these days. Washington has found it hard to stop nuclear proliferation without initiating war, yet promiscuous U.S. military intervention creates a powerful incentive for nations to seek nuclear weapons. Armored divisions and carrier groups aren't useful in confronting terrorists. Iraq demonstrates how the brutality of war often is more inhumane than the depredations of dictators. And there are lots of other nations capable of deterring rogue states. The United States should not attempt to do everything even if it could afford to do so. But it can't. When it comes to the federal Treasury, there's nothing there. If Uncle Sam was a real person, he would declare bankruptcy. The current national debt is \$12.7 trillion. The Congressional Budget Office figures that current policy — unrealistically assuming no new spending increases — will run up \$10 trillion in deficits over the coming decade. But more spending — a lot more spending — is on the way. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac remain as active as ever, underwriting \$5.4 trillion worth of mortgages while running up additional losses. The Federal Housing Administration's portfolio of insured mortgages continues to rise along with defaults. Exposure for Ginnie Mae, which issues guaranteed mortgage-backed securities, also is jumping skyward. The FDIC shut down a record 140 banks last year and is running low on cash. Last year the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation figured its fund was running a \$34 billion deficit. Federal pensions are underfunded by \$1 trillion. State and local retirement funds are short about \$3 trillion. Outlays for the Iraq war will persist decades after the troops return as the government cares for seriously injured military personnel; total expenditures will hit \$2 trillion or more. Extending and expanding the war in Afghanistan will further bloat federal outlays. Worst of all, last year the combined Social Security/Medicare unfunded liability was estimated to be \$107 trillion. Social Security, originally expected to go negative in 2016, will spend more than it collects this year, and the "trust fund" is an accounting fiction. Medicaid, a joint federal-state program, also is breaking budgets. At their current growth rate, CBO says that by 2050 these three programs alone will consume virtually the entire federal budget. Uncle Sam's current net liabilities exceed Americans' net worth. Yet the debt-to-GDP ratio will continue rising and could eventually hit World War II levels. Net interest is expected to more than quadruple to \$840 billion annually by 2020. Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke says: "It's not something that is ten years away. It affects the markets currently." In March, Treasury notes commanded a yield of 3.5 basis points higher than those for Warren Buffett's Berkshire Hathaway. Moody's recently threatened to downgrade federal debt: "Although AAA governments benefit from an unusual degree of balance sheet flexibility, that flexibility is not infinite." In 2008, Tom Lemmon of Moody's warned: "The underlying credit rating of the U.S. government faces the risk of downgrading in the next ten years if solutions are not found to our growing Medicare and Social Security unfunded obligations." This is all without counting a dollar of increased federal spending due to federalizing American medicine. The United States faces a fiscal crisis. If America's survival was at stake, extraordinary military expenditures would still be justified. But not to protect other nations, especially prosperous and populous states well able to defend themselves. Boot warns: "it will be increasingly hard to be globocop and nanny state at the same time." America should be neither. The issue is not just money. The Constitution envisions a limited government focused on defending Americans, not transforming the rest of the world. Moreover, if Washington continues to act as globocop, America's friends and allies will never have an incentive to do more. The United States will be a world power for

decades. But it can no afford to act as if it is the only power. America must begin the process of becoming a normal nation with a normal foreign policy.

Affirmative Case

A Korean conflict is coming now – nuclear deterrence fails.

Chung 6/1/2010 – Visiting Professor at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Relations (RSIS), Nanayang Technological University (Chong Wook, 2010, “The Korean Crisis: Going Beyond the Cheonan Incident,” http://www.cfr.org/publication/22205/us_policy_toward_the_korean_peninsula.html)

After a month-long investigation, the Seoul government announced that the ship was hit by a torpedo launched from a North Korean submarine. The evidence it produced included the tail part of the torpedo recovered from the bottom of the sea where the ship sank. President Lee Myung-bak, demanding the North's apology, announced a series of measures suspending all inter-Korea cooperation except in the humanitarian area. North Korea, which earlier denied its involvement, immediately cut off almost all land, air and sea lines of communications with the South. It warned that any violation was to be dealt with by the wartime laws. It also placed its armed forces on special alert. The two Koreas appear to be heading for a serious military confrontation. Another factor that adds to the severity of the current crisis is the nuclear capability of the North. Pyongyan is believed to have fissionable materials enough for up to ten plutonium bombs. Its two nuclear tests so far reinforced the possibility of all-out military flare-up involving nuclear weapons. The nuclear logic could certainly apply for deterring a war, but North Korea has proven that the rational logic of deterrence may not necessarily hold. Such is the risk of dealing with a desperate country whose brinkmanship tactics often defy the strategic calculus of its neighbors. The drastic decline in the South Korean stock market is indicative of how the situation is perceived. Despite all these ominous developments, however, premature pessimism is not advisable.

The situation with North Korea may escalate and draw the United States into nuclear conflict.

Hayes, 06 - Professor of International Relations, RMIT University, Melbourne; and Director, Nautilus Institute, San Francisco (Peter, “The Stalker State: North Korean Proliferation and the End of American Nuclear Hegemony” 10/4, <http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/0682Hayes.html>)

If as I have suggested, the DPRK has become a nuclear ‘stalker state’ that seeks to redress past wrongs and use nuclear leverage to force the United States to treat it in a less hostile and more respectful manner, then the United States will have to ask itself whether continued isolation and pressure on the regime is more likely, or less so, to ameliorate stalking behaviours in time of crisis, when the risk of nuclear next-use becomes urgent. Like a repeat offender, the DPRK is likely to continue to use nuclear threat to stalk the United States until it achieves what it perceives to be a genuine shift in Washington’s attitude. Unlike an individual who stalks, there is no simple way to lock up a state that stalks another with nuclear threat. Currently, the United States has no common language for discussing nuclear weapons with the North Korean military in the context of the insecurities that bind the two sides together at the Demilitarized Zone. Continued rebuffing of Pyongyang’s overtures may lead to more ‘nuclear stalking’ – that is, the development of creative and unanticipated ways of using nuclear threats, deployments, and actual use in times of crisis or war. There are no grounds to believe that the DPRK will employ a US or Western conceptual framework of nuclear deterrence and crisis management in developing its own nuclear doctrine and use options. Indeed, US efforts to use ‘clear and classical’ deterrent threats to communicate to North Koreans that ‘if they do acquire WMD, their weapons will be unusable because any attempt to use them will bring national obliteration’ – as Condoleezza Rice put it in her Foreign Affairs essay in 2000 – serve to incite the DPRK to exploit this very threat as a way to engage the United States, with terrible risks of miscalculation and first-use on both sides.

Affirmative Case

North Korean nuclear use will lead to catastrophe – it destroys the ozone layer, global agriculture, the economy, and the global nonproliferation regime.

Hayes and Green, 10 - *Victoria University AND **Executive Director of the Nautilus Institute (Peter and Michael, “-“The Path Not Taken, the Way Still Open: Denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia”, 1/5, <http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/10001HayesHamalGreen.pdf>)

The consequences of failing to address the proliferation threat posed by the North Korea developments, and related political and economic issues, are serious, not only for the Northeast Asian region but for the whole international community. At worst, there is the possibility of nuclear attack¹, whether by intention, miscalculation, or merely accident, leading to the resumption of Korean War hostilities. On the Korean Peninsula itself, key population centres are well within short or medium range missiles. The whole of Japan is likely to come within North Korean missile range. Pyongyang has a population of over 2 million, Seoul (close to the North Korean border) 11 million, and Tokyo over 20 million. Even a limited nuclear exchange would result in a holocaust of unprecedented proportions. But the catastrophe within the region would not be the only outcome. New research indicates that even a limited nuclear war in the region would rearrange our global climate far more quickly than global warming. Westberg draws attention to new studies modelling the effects of even a limited nuclear exchange involving approximately 100 Hiroshima-sized 15 kt bombs² (by comparison it should be noted that the United States currently deploys warheads in the range 100 to 477 kt, that is, individual warheads equivalent in yield to a range of 6 to 32 Hiroshimas). The studies indicate that the soot from the fires produced would lead to a decrease in global temperature by 1.25 degrees Celsius for a period of 6-8 years.³ In Westberg's view: That is not global winter, but the nuclear darkness will cause a deeper drop in temperature than at any time during the last 1000 years. The temperature over the continents would decrease substantially more than the global average. A decrease in rainfall over the continents would also follow...The period of nuclear darkness will cause much greater decrease in grain production than 5% and it will continue for many years...hundreds of millions of people will die from hunger...To make matters even worse, such amounts of smoke injected into the stratosphere would cause a huge reduction in the Earth's protective ozone.⁴ These, of course, are not the only consequences. Reactors might also be targeted, causing further mayhem and downwind radiation effects, superimposed on a smoking, radiating ruin left by nuclear next-use. Millions of refugees would flee the affected regions. The direct impacts, and the follow-on impacts on the global economy via ecological and food insecurity, could make the present global financial crisis pale by comparison. How the great powers, especially the nuclear weapons states respond to such a crisis, and in particular, whether nuclear weapons are used in response to nuclear first-use, could make or break the global non proliferation and disarmament regimes. There could be many unanticipated impacts on regional and global security relationships⁵, with subsequent nuclear breakout and geopolitical turbulence, including possible loss-of-control over fissile material or warheads in the chaos of nuclear war, and aftermath chain-reaction affects involving other potential proliferant states. The Korean nuclear proliferation issue is not just a regional threat but a global one that warrants priority consideration from the international community.

Affirmative Case

U.S. withdrawal solves – two reasons

a) China –

Removing U.S. troops is a prerequisite to genuine Chinese support for Korean reunification

Van Nguyen, 9 - freelance writer based in Sydney, Australia. His articles have been published in OpEdnews, Asia Times Online and Foreign Policy Journal (Peter, "U.S. bases are obstacle to Korean reunification," UPI Asia, 10/13, http://www.upiasia.com/Security/2009/10/13/us_bases_are_obstacle_to_korean_reunification/1193/)

The United States believes that if the North collapsed, China would have to back reunification to demonstrate that it is a responsible player in regional cooperation. But in order to get the Chinese to endorse the plan, the United States would have to give up its strategic military bases in South Korea and order a complete withdrawal of U.S. troops from the region. Both Koreas have been constantly eyed by foreigners due to their geostrategic value in Northeast Asia. For China, Japan and the United States, the Koreas have provided a buffer zone for more than half a century since the end of the Korean War. The Korean peninsula is also seen as a predetermined battlefield if war breaks out between China, the United States and Japan. This would leave the warring states relatively untouched, as the three nations could avoid hitting each other's territories, which would escalate the conflict and make it difficult for all parties to disengage for fear of losing face. But both Koreas would have to face the brunt of a full-scale war. For China, protecting North Korea means keeping the United States and its allies from encroaching on its border. China would rather maintain the status quo than accept a reunified Korea under South Korean administration. Therefore, China will do its best to stabilize North Korea and rebuild its political structure in line with Chinese interests. China might be forced to accept a reunified Korea if it wants to maintain an international image as a peace-promoting country. However, unless it gets some kind of security guarantee without losing the strategic balance in the region, there is little incentive for it to allow reunification to take place unchallenged. Since the end of the Korean War the United States has maintained a large military contingent in South Korea to deter an invasion attempt by the North. The U.S. military presence keeps China's ambitions in check and in the bargain offers Japan some security, as the Japanese fear reprisals from the Chinese for atrocities committed during World War II. Besides, China's growing economic and military clout has increased the necessity for a military presence in South Korea. However, U.S. military bases in South Korea could pose the greatest obstacle to a peaceful reunification of the Koreas. Even a unified Korea might not want the U.S. military, as reunification would make the objective of providing deterrence against the North redundant. A U.S. military base in a united Korea would only strain ties with China, as it would be difficult to explain why it was required if the North Korean threat no longer exists. Also, millions of North Koreans have a deeply embedded resentment against the United States and are highly suspicious of its geopolitical moves in the region. Many believe that the South Korean government is a puppet of the United States. Stationing troops in Korea after reunification would only reinforce this belief. This would create a deep rift within the Koreas and threaten to derail the reunification process. The complete withdrawal of all U.S. military bases and personnel from the Korean peninsula should follow after a timetable has been set, allowing the new Korea to handle its own security. The question is, will the United States pull out all its troops in order to allow the peaceful reunification of the Koreas? The United States has been dreading a scenario in which its military bases in South Korea could come under threat. The United States may not withdraw its troops, as that would leave a strategic vacuum. It would risk losing influence over Korea to China, whose economy is touted to race ahead of that of the United States. Although complete U.S. withdrawal would be ideal, an alternative would be to allow China to set up bases in the northern part of Korea, similar to Kyrgyzstan allowing Russia and China to set up bases to ease their concerns over the U.S. military presence. This would have its challenges, however, and might increase the chances of military confrontation. But regardless of the implications and consequences, the United States will hesitate to remove its bases. China would probably ask for a U.S. troop withdrawal as a precondition to the reunification of the two Korea's under a liberal and democratic government.

Affirmative Case

Chinese involvement is key to preventing North Korean collapse and East Asian War Bandow 10

[Doug Bandow, senior fellow at the Cato Institute. A former special assistant to President Reagan, he is the author of Foreign Follies: America's New Global Empire, "Taming Pyongyang" ,5/3/10
http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=11739]

Second, the United States, South Korea and Japan must develop a unified approach to China built on the sinking of the Cheonan. Even if the North is blameless, the incident demonstrates that the status quo is dangerous. Just one irresponsible act from the unpredictable DPRK could trigger a new devastating conflict. And if Pyongyang is guilty, the risk could not be clearer. Until now the PRC has viewed the status quo as beneficial: the DPRK remains a friendly buffer state; a North Korean atomic bomb would not be directed at China; the United States and ROK must perennially go hat-in-hand to Beijing to beg for its assistance in dealing with the North. In contrast, applying substantial political and economic pressure on Pyongyang would risk breaking the bilateral relationship and might spark a violent collapse, unleashing a flood of refugees. The PRC has said little about the Cheonan incident. The foreign ministry called the sinking an "unfortunate incident." Beijing's ambassador in Seoul reaffirmed his nation's commitment to peace and stability. The allied pitch should be simple. As noted earlier, the risks of war are obvious and catastrophic. But even if peace survives, today's badly misgoverned DPRK might implode of its own accord, even without Chinese pressure. There is a possibility of violent collapse, given the North's impending leadership transition and apparent signs of public dissatisfaction, which would have significantly negative consequences for Beijing. And if Seoul eschews military retaliation, the North's ongoing nuclear program combined with warlike provocations would place increasing pressure on the South and Japan to develop countervailing arsenals. Beijing should take the lead in forging a new, active policy designed to both denuclearize the Korean peninsula and promote political and economic reform in the North. In fact, a Chinese commitment to take a much more active role might help convince Seoul to choose nonviolent retaliation for the Cheonan's sinking. Although few people expect the Koreas to end up at war, the risk is real. And unacceptable. The incident should impel a serious rethinking of the current U.S.-ROK alliance as well as the strategy for involving China in the North Korean issue.

Affirmative Case

b) North Korean denuclearization –

U.S. troop withdrawal is key to denuclearizing North Korea

Bandow 09

[Doug Bandow, senior fellow at the Cato Institute. A former special assistant to President Reagan, he is the author of Foreign Follies: America's New Global Empire, "Bipolar Pyongyang " ,8/9/09
http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=10523]

Secretary Clinton should invite the DPRK to send an envoy to Washington. (Enough supplicants have gone to Pyongyang.) The agenda would be to develop the parameters for any bilateral talks. The administration should indicate that it is willing to discuss most any issue, but genuine negotiations could be conducted only in a multilateral context—if not the six-party talks per se, then in an ongoing, parallel framework. The reason is simple: the North's nuclear program, accentuated by Pyongyang's predictable brinkmanship, is the principal barrier to improvement of the DPRK's relations with the United States, as well as North Korea's neighbors. In response, Washington should indicate that it is prepared to work with the other parties to develop a comprehensive program to promote stability, security and prosperity for the Korean peninsula. The solution must be both regional and consensual. Washington should indicate that it has no intention of imposing a solution on other nations. During this period the administration should work with Seoul and the new Japanese government to craft a package that includes: a peace treaty, a nonaggression pact, phased U.S.-troop withdrawal, mutual diplomatic recognition, an end of sanctions, membership in international organizations, and bilateral and multilateral aid. In return, the North would agree to forgo nuclear weapons and long-range missiles, fully dismantle its existing nuclear facilities, relinquish all nuclear materials and accept intrusive inspections. The need for the latter is even more evident after Pyongyang's claim to be in the final stages of uranium enrichment. If true, that gives the lie to the regime's lengthy denial that it possessed such a capability. In return for bountiful benefits from engagement, the DPRK must agree to a process that ensures no more unpleasant surprises for its neighbors and America. Washington, South Korea and Tokyo should simultaneously work together to encourage more intensive Chinese involvement. With increasing pessimism in Beijing that North Korea will agree to give up its nuclear potential, the allies should suggest that the People's Republic of China closely coordinate its policy with theirs for one last serious attempt to resolve the nuclear crisis through negotiation. In essence, Pyongyang's three antagonists would provide the carrots while its ally would wield the stick. If the DPRK chose to obstruct and obfuscate, it would demonstrate that it does not desire a diplomatic solution. In that case, Beijing should support—and, more importantly, enforce—an enhanced sanctions regime. China also should consider using whatever influence it has within the North to encourage more responsible behavior and/or better leadership. To ease the PRC's concerns over the prospect of inadvertently sparking a North Korean implosion, the United States, South Korea and Japan should emphasize that the situation today is dangerously unstable, despite the fact that Pyongyang is in its manic phase. Should the result of Chinese pressure be social collapse, the three allies would contribute financially. Moreover, both Washington and Seoul should promise that there would be no American military presence in a reunified Korea.

Affirmative Case

South Korea is free-riding – the country’s defense spending is tiny

Bennett 10 (Bruce, Senior Policy Analyst – RAND Corporation, “S. Korea’s Military Capability ‘Inadequate’”, Chosun Ilbo, 1-29, http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2010/01/29/2010012900705.html)

An American academic says **South Korea's military capabilities are inadequate** to handle a North Korean invasion or other North Korean military action or regime collapse there. In an article entitled "Managing Catastrophic North Korea Risks," Bruce Bennett, a senior policy analyst at the RAND Corporation, said South Korea could face a crisis if it fails to enhance its military capabilities through modernization of equipment and personnel capable of using and maintaining it. **He cited** South Korea's **outdated weapons, inadequate military budget, and reduced conscription period as the rationale** for his claim. Many major South Korean weapon systems "are very old, such as M48 tanks and F-5 aircraft originally designed and produced three decades or more ago," he said. **By contrast, "the U.S. military spends some 16 times as much as the [South Korean] military on equipment acquisition** each year despite the U.S. forces having only twice as many personnel. U.S. military research and development spending is some 50 times" South Korean spending each year. He said that **the South Korean military budget "has been too small to acquire key military capabilities.** Thus few [South Korean] soldiers have GPS to identify their own or adversary locations with accuracy, making precision battlefield attacks difficult and increasing the potential for friendly fire. But in civilian life, many soldiers have GPS in their cars." He pointed out that South Korea and the United States have worked together for almost 60 years "to deter and defeat North Korean military threats. But while the United States remains ready to assist" South Korea, Seoul's security is ultimately **Seoul's** responsibility and it **"must take the lead."** South Korea's military budget is inadequate for "assuring the security of the Korean people from North Korea's catastrophic threats," he added.

Affirmative Case

Advantage 2: South Korean Military Modernization

The affirmative plan alters defense investments and causes conventional modernization – deters Chinese aggression

Bandow 9 (Doug, Senior Fellow – Cato Institute and Robert A. Taft Fellow – American Conservative Defense Alliance, “A Tattered Umbrella”, National Interest, 6-16, <http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=21606>)

South Korea’s foreign minister reports that Washington plans to guarantee his nation’s defense against a nuclear-armed North Korea in writing. The promise reportedly will be formalized when South Korean President Lee Myung-bak visits the United States this week. It’s a bad idea.

Washington should be shedding defense responsibilities, not increasing them. More than a half century after the Korean War, **the Republic of Korea (ROK) remains surprisingly dependent on America.** It’s as if the United States was cowering before the Mexican military, begging its friends in Europe for help. **In fact, the ROK requires no assistance to defend itself from conventional attack.** The so-called Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (**DPRK) has a strong numerical military advantage** over the South: about 1.1 million personnel under arms, compared to fewer than seven hundred thousand for Seoul. Pyongyang also has impressive numbers of other weapons, including more than four thousand tanks and roughly eighteen thousand artillery pieces. **However, most of the North’s equipment is decades old,** a generation or two behind even that of the long-gone Soviet Union. Training is minimal and many of the DPRK’s military personnel perform construction and similar tasks. The Korean peninsula’s rugged geography favors defense. Putting thousands of antiquated tanks backed by hundreds of thousands of malnourished soldiers on the move south would create a human “turkey shoot” of epic proportions. **Anyway, the ROK’s numerical inferiority is a matter of choice, not an immutable artifact of geography. In its early years the South’s resources were sharply limited. But today, South Korea is thought to have upwards of forty times the North’s GDP. Seoul also possesses a substantial industrial base, sports high-tech expertise and enjoys a sterling international credit rating.** The ROK’s population is twice that of the North. **South Korea could spend more than the equivalent of North Korea’s entire economy on defense if the former wished. But it hasn’t wished to do so, preferring to rely on Washington instead.** The time for subsidizing wealthy allies has long passed. **The financial crisis makes it imperative that the United States return to such nations responsibility for their own defense. Undoubtedly an American withdrawal would result in a far-reaching debate among South Koreans over how much they felt threatened by the North and how much they believed necessary to spend in response. But that is precisely the debate they should have had years ago.** The prospect of a nuclear North Korea obviously is more frightening than even one with ample numbers of artillery pieces targeting the city of Seoul. But there is little reason to believe that the North has any deliverable weapons at this point. Given present course, that time is likely, but not certain, to come. However, **South Korea has time to prepare. Rather than relying on America for its protection, Seoul should invest in missile defense and enhance its air-defense capabilities. The South also should consider creating a conventional deterrent:** the ability to respond to a nuclear strike by eliminating the Kim regime. **That means developing potent offensive missile and air attack capabilities.** (Japan, despite its quasi-pacifist constitution, should do the same.) **Such forces would help fulfill a second function: deter an aggressive China,** if Beijing ever changed its policy from the oft-repeated “peaceful rise” to a more belligerent stance. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has much to gain from stability in East Asia and has worked to assure its neighbors of its peaceful intentions. However, the future is unknowable. **The best way for Beijing’s neighbors to ensure China’s rise is peaceful is to maintain armed forces sufficient to deter the PRC from considering military action. Such a “dual use” capability would benefit the United States as well. The objective would not be a high-profile attempt at containment, but a low-profile capacity for deterrence, relieving Washington of any need to intervene.** Most important, **America should not reflexively extend its “nuclear umbrella”** in response to the future possibility of a nuclear North Korea. Doing so would inevitably deepen American involvement in regional controversies, potentially turning every local dispute into an international crisis.

Affirmative Case

Chinese rise makes multiple regional conflicts inevitable – only ROK conventional deterrence solves

McDevitt 8 (Michael, Rear Admiral – US Navy (Ret.), Center for Naval Analyses, “Asian Military Modernization: Key Areas of Concern”, 6-4, <http://www.iiss.org/conferences/global-strategic-challenges-as-played-out-in-asia/asias-strategic-challenges-in-search-of-a-common-agenda/conference-papers/fourth-session-an-asian-arms-race/asian-military-modernization-key-areas-of-concern-michael-mcdevitt/>)

Military modernization goes on continuously throughout Asia and not every modernization activity by any given country is an area of concern, or presages an arms race. Quite the contrary, as adding systems/capabilities that are clearly defensive in nature, or are carefully bounded in quantity and quality, **can actually contribute to stability**. In an ideal world, if every country were able to defend itself from aggression by its neighbor, stability would be the result. Arguably, what is taking place in Southeast Asia can be considered “stability inducing” modernization in that it improves defenses without becoming a threat to its neighbors. Much of the modernization is oriented toward maritime capabilities—especially systems useful for the surveillance and policing of EEZ’s and for the protection of commercial shipping. Maritime patrol aircraft, air defense enhancements—including fighters, small frigate or patrol craft-sized warships -- land based radar surveillance sites and diesel submarines all fit within this category. Similarly in Northeast Asia, the **Republic of Korea’s** ongoing **introduction** of a modest but capable blue-water navy **does not threaten any of its larger neighbors**; it is evident however, that like much of the rest of Asia, ROK economic health is increasingly dependent on trade, most of which travels by sea. As a result, Seoul has determined it has a requirement to look after its maritime interests without having to depend upon the US Seventh Fleet or its neighbors. This means that ROK decision-makers, who are not experienced in things maritime and are “embedded” in what has been an army-dominated military culture, have been willing to make the not inconsiderable investments necessary to build a modest blue water navy. What this suggests about **the ROK’s** long term plans or worries raises many interesting questions that are, however, beyond the scope of this essay. The **modernization** itself should not be considered an area of concern because it **is not destabilizing**. Another category of modernization relates to offensive weapons systems; systems unambiguously designed to attack and not to defend. This category of modernization is normally undertaken for two reasons: either to deter a neighbor or potential foe from attacking or harming one’s interests, or to prepare for aggression against a neighboring state. In Asia, there are a number of situations in which the offensive capability of the weapons system is not in doubt. Cyber warfare is an emerging problem. In the episodes where it has actually been used, either by organized militaries or by non-state sponsored hackers, it should be considered an offensive capability. Accurate conventionally tipped ballistic missiles and land attack cruise missiles are clearly offensive systems, as are the airwings of attack aircraft carriers, significant amphibious assault capability, long range bombers and certain categories of land based fighter aircraft. **Today** for instance, **China uses the threat of a massive missile attack to deter Taiwan from declaring de jure independence**. North Korea uses missiles to deter attack by threatening US bases in Japan and throughout South Korea. The US posture in East Asia is largely offensive in nature, designed to be able to attack in retaliation, and as a result, deter countries that may threaten US allies and friends. There is but one obvious example of a capability being put in place to attack and seize another “country,” and that is the case of the PLA’s continuing efforts to put in place the systems and capabilities necessary to capture Taiwan. Because China claims that Taiwan is a renegade province and is an internal Chinese sovereignty issue, it naturally rejects arguments that modernization aimed at a successful capture is offensive in nature. But the reality remains that capabilities useful for the Taiwan mission are also useful in any campaign against a Taiwan-sized island. On the Korean peninsula it is less clear whether the forward postured North Korean Army is in place so it can attack the South, or whether it is in its current posture to defend against an attack from the South. At the June 2008 Shangri-la Dialogue, the new ROK Minister of Defense explicitly offered the judgment that it was an offensive posture. This is a case in which transparency is lacking, and I suspect that Pyongyang prefers this ambiguity since it is a powerful deterrent to any offensive action by the US against its nuclear weapons program. Military modernization associated with these two situations clearly falls into the category of “areas of concern,” although efforts to mitigate the negative impacts of these modernizations have been going on for some time. In the case of Korea, the South has made adequate defensive preparations, so much so that the US is confident enough in the ROK Army that it is not balking at turning over responsibility for defense against an invasion; the US role will, over the next few years, transition to backstopping the ROK army with US air and naval power. In the case of Taiwan, the Chinese threat to use force has been a feature of the Asian security scene for over 50 years. What is different today is that Beijing’s threat is actually credible. It is credible in the sense that it can militarily “punish” Taiwan. It can “bombard” Taiwan with hundreds of missiles, but is not yet able to capture Taiwan. In this situation, it is the combination of the willingness of the people of Taiwan to endure a bombardment, with efforts being taken by the Taiwan authorities to “harden” key facilities against bombardment, and the threat of US intervention in the defense of Taiwan that has sustained stability. Obviously, it is the state of the cross-strait political relationship that will determine whether in the future Beijing would actually be willing to “pull the trigger.” Today, for the first time this decade, the political situation could be characterized as hopeful. While categorizing these systems/capabilities is relatively straightforward, more and more modern weapons systems are designed to be multi-role. In these cases, they can be used to either attack or defend—they are not purely offensive or purely defensive. Multi-role aircraft are perhaps the best example. The aircraft’s role is determined by what weapons they are fitted to employ, what avionics software package is installed and what training regimen the aircrew has received. In cases where the nature of certain potentially threatening weapons systems is unclear, officials charged with defense responsibilities have to weigh the trade-off between a country’s military capability versus its intentions. That is why issues of transparency are intimately linked with assessments of modernization. This brings me to a third way in which modernization can have an impact on stability. This is the circumstance created when a country fields defensive capabilities to assure its defenses

Affirmative Case

but in so doing puts the security of its near neighbors in jeopardy. Political scientists call this a security dilemma. Arguably this is **what is going on today between China, the United States and its Northeast Asian neighbors and US allies—Japan, the ROK and Taiwan**. This **is an area of great concern**. Alliance-Based Security Architecture Has Worked Well For almost 50 years, Asia's security environment has been stable and relatively predictable. After the 1953 armistice that ended combat in Korea, Asia's security environment quickly settled into a unique balance of power, in which the continental powers of the Soviet Union and the PRC were "balanced" by the US-led coalition of Asian littoral powers. There are a number of reasons why stability persisted, but arguably the most important one is that a real military balance existed.[1] The military capability of each side was effectively limited to its domain—the continent or the oceans. Each side was able to militarily "trump" any attempt by the other side to intrude in a militarily significant way into its domain.

The USSR and the PRC were safe from invasion, thanks to their large armies, vast territories and nuclear weapons. US friends and allies were safe from invasion and maritime blockade thanks to US air and sea power which was constantly "in play" because of alliance obligations. Modernizing China Is Changing the Continental-Maritime Strategic Balance Throughout China's long history, its strategic orientation could be categorized as continental and hence its strategic tradition—its way of thinking about and framing strategic issues—has been largely focused on land war. Today, however, the risk of cross-border aggression is no longer a serious security concern for Beijing. The combination of adroit Chinese diplomacy within a contextual framework of globalization, international norms of behavior that eschew cross-frontier aggression and the deterrent value of nuclear weapons have substantially lowered the likelihood of cross-boarder aggression. The threat of invasion, the primary worry of Chinese or indeed most Eurasian strategists for many centuries, has all but disappeared. As globalization proceeds economic growth is increasingly dependent on trade, most of which is carried in containers loaded on ships. As a result, security on the high seas is becoming a growing preoccupation for countries that historically were not strategically focused on the maritime domain. The ROK has already been mentioned; the PRC is also in the midst of this evolving strategic zeitgeist. While its land frontiers are secure, **Beijing faces a host of outstanding sovereignty claims and unresolved strategic issues that are maritime in nature**. Specifically:

Taiwan is an island. It is the combination of Taiwan's air defense and the threat of intervention by the US military (primarily the US navy) that effectively keeps the Taiwan Strait a moat rather than a highway open to the PLA. Perhaps as strategically significant as Taiwan to a PLA planner is the geostrategic reality that the PRC's economic center of gravity is on its east coast, which, because it is a "seaboard," is extremely vulnerable to attack from the sea—a military task the United States is uniquely suited to execute. **Territorial disputes with Japan over islands and seabed resources in the East China Sea remain unresolved and with price of oil continuing to soar, the economic stakes become more serious, and represent a potential flash point where Sino-Japanese interests are contested**. (Although the recent Sino-Japanese summit may lead to fair compromise.) The point here is that the entire issue is maritime in nature. **Unsettled territorial disputes, and their concomitant resource issues, remain with respect to the Spratly Islands and the South China Sea**. Again, this problem is maritime in nature. China's entire national strategy of reform and opening depends largely upon maritime commerce—i.e., trade. The PRC's economy is driven by the combination of exports and imports which together account for almost 75% of PRC GDP. This trade travels mainly by sea. Finally, there is the issue of energy security—or, as President Hu Jintao characterized it, China's "Malacca dilemma." It has become commonplace to observe that the PRC will increasingly depend upon foreign sources of oil and natural gas, most of which come by sea, and must pass through the Indonesian straits to reach China. Finally, Beijing's primary military competitor is the United States, which is the world's foremost naval power and which, as it has for the past 50 years, maintains a significant naval presence on "China's doorstep." Should the PRC elect to use force to resolve either reunification with Taiwan or outstanding maritime claims, the US is the one country that could militarily deny success. All of these factors, plus China's historic experience since the 1840's, have generated a "demand signal" that has caused China to field weapons systems and capabilities that can protect its maritime approaches. This in turn means that China is introducing an element of military competition into the maritime region that has been the preserve of the United States and its allies for the past half-century because it is beginning to have the effect of upsetting the five-decade-old balance of power between continental and maritime powers that has been so successful in preserving stability in the region. What is China Doing? Specifically, China is putting in place a credible way to deny access to US forces by knitting together broad area ocean surveillance systems, a large number of submarines, land based aircraft with cruise missiles, and ballistic missile systems that can target ships on the high seas. The operational objective is to keep US naval power as far away from China as possible in case of conflict. It closely resembles the operational concept that the Soviet Union, another continental power attempting to protect its maritime approaches, had in place by the end of the Cold War.

According to the latest US Defense Department report to the US Congress on military power, **key elements of China's capability are still apparently in the testing stage**. If however, they succeed in introducing a credible anti-ship ballistic missile and an associated surveillance and targeting system that are coupled with other proven conventional capabilities such as quiet, conventionally powered submarines, **China will introduce a destabilizing element into the regional military balance**. By working to achieve security on its maritime frontier, Beijing is creating a dynamic that, as its maritime security situation improves, will make the security environment for Japan, Taiwan and potentially South Korea, worse because a central element of its strategy is to keep US power as far away from East Asia as possible. The US interests and obligations depend on sustained access to East Asia, whereas China's off-shore strategy is increasingly aimed at denying that access. The United States has characterized China's approach as "anti-access," because if successfully executed, it could deny the US the ability to operate its naval and air forces as it pleases along the littoral of East Asia. In effect, for good and sensible strategic reasons, China and the United States are pursuing two mutually contradictory approaches: access denial versus assured access. This is a serious issue. Concluding Thoughts This suggests **the military balance and concomitant modernization of forces in East Asia will be in a constant state of evolution as the US and its allies work to preserve existing advantages as new Chinese capabilities enter the PLA—rising on the same tide as it were**. As a result, military to military engagement between the US military and the PLA, while necessary and appropriate, will tend to be colored with elements of suspicion or concern as each side participates in what could be termed a "capabilities competition." Even with the prospect of a much less tense cross-strait relationship, Beijing has not yet persuaded itself that it can afford to "take its finger off the trigger" when it comes to Taiwan. Until the threat of military force is removed from the table, each side will work to deter the other when it comes to the use of force over Taiwan. This will fuel the capabilities competition.

Affirmative Case

Escalation of this conflict is likely – this could lead to a full-scale U.S.--China nuclear war

Dodge 5 (Paul, Department of Defense and Strategic Studies – Missouri State University, “China’s Naval Strategy and Nuclear Weapons: The Risks of Intentional and Inadvertent Nuclear Escalation”, Comparative Strategy, 24(5), December, p. 415-416)

In the summer of 2005, Chinese Major-General Zhu Chenghu threatened the United States with nuclear attack, stating that, “If the Americans draw their missiles and position-guided ammunition on to the target zone on China’s territory, I think we will have to respond with nuclear weapons.”¹ It should be noted that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) **considers Taiwan to be PRC territory, as well as** the territorial waters surrounding the island, its exclusive economic zone, those of the Senkaku (Diaoyutai Islands), **and virtually the entire South China Sea** and its islands. To be successful in any military effort to acquire Taiwan or any of its many other territorial ambitions, the PRC realizes that it must be able to deter U.S. military intervention. The idea is to convince the United States and the world that China is both capable and, more importantly, *willing* to inflict grievous casualties on U.S. forces, even at the cost of heavy economic, diplomatic, and military losses to the PRC. **Efforts** toward this end **have been manifested** over recent years **in the form of** greatly increased military spending, the acquisition of weapons designed specifically to attack U.S. naval forces, the development of new strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, and the formation of **a naval warfighting strategy that emphasizes asymmetric attacks** on high-value U.S. assets and personnel. The July statement from General Zhu is of course among the most visible of these efforts. One wonders why General Zhu was not fired or even sternly reprimanded by his military and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) superiors for such a statement at an official press conference. In truth, it is but the latest in a string of bellicose remarks by high-ranking Chinese military officials designed to convince the U.S. policymaking, intelligence, and military communities that **China is ready to escalate to the use of nuclear weapons** should it become necessary. Classic deterrence, after all, dictates that an enemy can only be deterred through the combination of capability and credibility. However, when considered in the context of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and Navy (PLAN) strategy to take on the United States in a naval and aerial conflict, **China’s strategy to deter can be seen as a recipe for inadvertent nuclear escalation**. Put simply, this piece argues that China’s warfighting doctrine is misguided, unrealistic, and dangerous. It is misguided because it places a great deal of focus on attacking U.S. aircraft carriers, which in reality are likely to be far more difficult to find, track, and attack than the Chinese realize. It is unrealistic because the vast majority of Chinese naval and air forces, which comprise the backbone of its conventional force options, are likely to be annihilated by American standoff weapons, advanced aircraft, and vastly superior attack submarines. Most important of all, the way in which China has mated **its nuclear strategy** to its conventional warfighting strategy **is extremely dangerous because it makes nuclear war with the United States far more likely**. There are several reasons why this is the case. **First, China’s** acquisition of **advanced** foreign **weaponry**, its expectation that the United States will back down at the first hint of casualties, and its belief that nuclear weapons can act as a force multiplier all threaten to **lower the nuclear threshold and cause a deterrence failure** vis-à-vis U.S. forces in the region. Lulled into a false sense of security, China may act on its irredentist policies when it should be deterred by superior U.S. forces and slim chances for victory. Second, Chinese capabilities are actually very modest, meaning they are only suitable for combat against other regional states. When faced with a first-rate power, China’s forces will suffer heavy attrition. Finally, **the loss of these forces**, including high-value naval combatants, aircraft, and early warning assets, **will cause China’s conventional strategy to collapse, leaving only nuclear options**. At this point, the PRC will be left with only two real choices and find itself at a strategic “fork in the road.” On one hand, it can de-escalate, sue for peace, or otherwise accept defeat. On the other, it can fall back on the nuclear aspect of its doctrine. Enormous domestic, economic, and political pressures will make the choice of the former a very difficult one for the PRC leadership. The latter choice entails either early nuclear usage to avoid anticipated casualties, or later use in a desperate effort to cause massive U.S. casualties, aid PLAN conventional forces, or tip the tactical balance in China’s favor. This analysis first examines the conventional aspects of China’s naval strategy and its preoccupation with anti-carrier tactics. Nuclear weapons are closely integrated with conventional forces in this strategy, and both play a crucial role in threatening high-value U.S. assets. The discussion then turns to the real-world difficulties China would face while attempting to track and attack an aircraft carrier battlegroup. Similarly, the vital role of U.S. attack submarines in defeating China’s anti-access strategies will be detailed. While these sections explore why China’s anti-carrier and sea denial strategies are unlikely to succeed, they also highlight just a few of the many reasons why China’s forces would stand little real chance against U.S. forces in the foreseeable future. Finally, these factors will be analyzed in the context of **theories of inadvertent escalation**. Originally formulated in reference to late ColdWar conflict scenarios, these ideas **are greatly germane to any future Sino-U.S. conflict**. It is only through the exploration of the impacts of U.S. offensive and defensive actions, as well as the concomitant attrition of conventional forces, that the full escalatory dangers of Chinese warfighting strategy may be revealed.

*****Korean War Advantage Evidence Extensions**

U.S. Withdrawal Solves Escalation

Any conflict would be confined to the Korean Peninsula if the United States withdraws from the region.

Bandow '96 – Robert A. Taft Fellow at the American Conservative Defense Alliance and a Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute (Doug, TRIPWIRE; Korea and U.S. Foreign Policy in a Changed World, pg. 8-10)

Military Dangers More important is the military risk of U.S. security ties. Although the American commitment probably helps deter North Korean aggression, it ensures that the United States will be involved if hostilities should recur. Indeed, the 37,000 U.S. soldiers are a tripwire that makes intervention automatic. Although the risk of war seems slight at the moment—in late 1995 famine in the North and political scandal in the South did raise tensions—the consequences would be horrific. And the possible acquisition by North Korea of atomic weapons increases the potential costs exponentially. If a conflict erupted, perhaps over the nuclear issue should the current agreement with Pyongyang break down, the American troops would become nuclear hostages. There are obviously times when the nation must risk war. But this is not one. There are no vital American interests at stake that warrant such a risk. The mere fact that the United States fought in Korea nearly 50 years ago does not mean it should prepare to do so again; the best way of honoring the sacrifice of so many soldiers in that war is to ensure that no Americans will be forced to fight and die in a similar future conflict. That is not to say that Washington has no interests at stake on the peninsula—the U.S.-South Korean cultural and economic ties are real, though modest—but they do not warrant a security guarantee and troop presence. In any case, America no longer needs to provide a military commitment to secure its interests. South Korea is now fully capable of defending itself. So, why is Washington risking the lives of U.S. soldiers in Korea? Put bluntly, would it dramatically affect American interests if war broke out on the peninsula and produced the worst-case scenario— a North Korean conquest of the ROK? Since the Korean War killed an estimated 1 million Koreans and Kim Jong Il's regime is the last best replica of Stalinist totalitarianism, such a conflict and outcome would obviously be tragic.²¹ But tragedy alone is not sufficient to warrant U.S. intervention, otherwise America would have invaded the USSR and, later, China to stop mass murder greater than that which occurred in Nazi Germany. America would also have occupied Angola, Bosnia, Burundi, Liberia, Sudan, and a host of other smaller hellholes around the globe. While moral concerns tug at our hearts, they are not enough to warrant committing 260 million Americans to war, risking unknown amounts of treasure and numbers of lives. In the case of Korea, we should ask, would U.S. security be seriously affected by a war (assuming no American tripwire was present to automatically trigger U.S. involvement)? No Threat to America The answer is no. Kim Jong Il's forces would pose no credible military threat to the United States. And, unlike the situation in 1950, a successful North Korean attack, highly unlikely given the South's capabilities, would be unconnected to a larger, hegemonic international threat to America. A united communist Korea would lack the wherewithal even to threaten its closest neighbors, China and Russia. Given the low quality of the North's military, and Pyongyang's economic travails, as well as the intensified international isolation that would greet the DPRK as a result of renewed aggression, even the unlikely worst-case scenario would be a tragedy confined to the Korean peninsula. A victorious North Korea would face insurmountable difficulty developing the military capability to intervene overseas, against, say, Japan. Pyongyang's possible possession of nuclear weapons would rightly frighten Tokyo, but the lat-ter's development of a countervailing weapon, while unsettling to its neighbors, would deter any adventurism.

High Risk of War

Risk of war in Korea is high.

Bandow, 10 - senior fellow at the Cato Institute. A former special assistant to President Reagan, he is the author of *Foreign Follies: America's New Global Empire* (Doug, "An Unstable Rogue", 4/6, <http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=23144>)

In late March an explosion sunk a South Korean warship in the Yellow Sea. After his government downplayed the likelihood of North Korean involvement, the South's defense minister now says a mine or torpedo might have been involved. A torpedo would mean a North Korean submarine actively targeted Seoul's aging corvette. The Republic of Korea's president, Lee Myung-bak, has attempted to dampen speculation by announcing his intention to "look into the case in a calm manner." But the possibility that Pyongyang committed a flagrant and bloody act of war has sent tremors through the ROK. Seoul could ill afford not to react strongly, both to protect its international reputation and prevent a domestic political upheaval. All economic aid to and investment in the North would end. Diplomatic talks would be halted. Prospects for reconvening the Six-Party Talks would disappear. Moreover, Seoul might feel the need to respond with force. Even if justified, such action would risk a retaliatory spiral. Where it would end no one could say. No one wants to play out that scenario to its ugly conclusion. The Yellow Sea incident reemphasizes the fact that North Korean irresponsibility could lead to war. Tensions on the Korean peninsula have risen after President Lee ended the ROK's "Sunshine Policy"—which essentially provided bountiful subsidies irrespective of Pyongyang's behavior. Nevertheless, the threat of war seemingly remained low. Thankfully, the prospect of conflict had dramatically diminished over the last couple of decades. After intermittently engaging in bloody terrorist and military provocations, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea seemed to have largely abandoned direct attacks on South Korea and the United States. Now we are no longer sure. Even if the DPRK was not involved in the sinking, only prudence, not principle, prevents the North from engaging in armed instances of brinkmanship. And with Pyongyang in the midst of a leadership transition of undetermined length, where the factions are unclear, different family members could reach for power, and the military might become the final arbiter, the possibility of violence occurring in the North and spilling outward seems real. Such an outcome would be in no one's interest, including that of China. So far the People's Republic of China has taken a largely hands-off attitude towards the North. Beijing has pushed the DPRK to negotiate and backed limited United Nations sanctions. But the PRC has refused to support a potentially economy-wrecking embargo or end its own food and energy subsidies to North Korea. There are several reasons for China's stance. At base, Beijing is happier with the status quo than with risking North Korea's economic stability or the two nations' political relationship. Washington doesn't like that judgment. However, changing the PRC's policy requires convincing Beijing to assess its interest differently. The Yellow Sea incident could help. Apparently North Korean leader Kim Jong-il is planning to visit China. Speculation is rife about the reason: to request more food aid, promote investment in the North, respond to Beijing's insistence that the DPRK rejoin the Six-Party Talks or something else? South Korea should propose its own high level visit to the PRC. The foreign ministers of both nations met in Beijing in mid-March and issued a standard call for resumption of the Six-Party Talks. But the ROK should press further, backed by the United States. Despite China's preference for avoiding controversy, the status quo is inherently unstable. Doing nothing is worse than attempting to force a change in the North's nuclear policies or ruling elites. Even under the best of circumstances there is no certainty about what is likely to occur in North Korea. Politics in Pyongyang resembles succession in the Ottoman court, involving not only varying factions but different family members. A weaker Kim Jong-il is less able to impose his will on the military or hand over power to his youngest son, as he apparently desires. Although the DPRK's governing structures so far have proven surprisingly resilient, it's impossible to ignore the possibility of an implosion, military coup or messy succession fight. If North Korea continues to develop nuclear weapons, its actions could trigger two equally explosive responses: a military attack by the United States or decisions by South Korea and Japan to build nuclear weapons in response.

High Risk of War

War likely now –North Korean instability

Snyder '10 – Director of The Asia Foundation's Center for US-Korea Policy and Adjunct Senior Fellow for Korean Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations (Scott A., June, "The Cheonan Reckoning," http://www.cfr.org/publication/22363/cheonan_reckoning.html)

The effects of the escalatory measures taken thus far are equivalent to the removal of the guardrails from a twisting mountain highway: the road itself is actually no more dangerous than before (i.e., both Koreas are equally committed to avoiding a full-scale military conflict, since North Korea knows that full-scale escalation would be suicidal while South Korea cannot afford the devastation), but the probability and potential costs that might occur in the event of miscalculation or risk-taking are considerably higher. Is the Pyongyang regime stable? The incident has fed a steady stream of speculation regarding North Korea's internal stability and the potential internal challenges to managing a leadership succession from Kim Jong-Il to his third son, Kim Jung-Un. It is plausible to imagine a link between the sinking of the Cheonan and the succession, but such a connection will be impossible to prove given the limits of our knowledge of Pyongyang's court politics. More importantly, the Cheonan incident provides an opportunity for deeper evaluation of North Korea's increasingly bleak mid-to-long-term prospects. The near-universal perception of Kim Jong Il as representing an unstable, unpredictable, financially-troubled leadership focused short-term survival measures further tilts the focus of discussion toward crisis management and away from diplomacy, despite the reluctance of Beijing in particular to take up instability issues as an agenda item for official discussion with the US, Japan and South Korea. The gap between simple leadership succession difficulties and a full-scale collapse of the North Korean system may be bigger than many analysts have anticipated. The temporary uncertainties surrounding succession are difficult to differentiate from early signs of instability that might affect regime viability. More importantly, North Korea's neighbors are likely to have differing views regarding regime stability and the potential thresholds for intervention to stabilize the situation. For instance, if one views signs of instability in the context of a leadership succession as temporary and manageable, one might be more likely to emphasize a passive response, but signs of a prolonged and contested leadership succession might suggest to some the need for proactive efforts to restore stability or to actively pursue Korean reunification.

U.S. presence in Korea increases the likelihood of conflict

Bandow '00

[Doug Bandow, senior fellow at the Cato Institute. A former special assistant to President Reagan, he is the author of Foreign Follies: America's New Global Empire, "Leave Korea to the Koreans", 5/21/00 http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=4694]

Korea has for 50 years been one of America's most dangerous military commitments. Today the United States maintains 37,000 soldiers as a tripwire to ensure involvement should war again break out between the two Koreas. Indeed, there is no place else in the world where Americans are more likely to be involved in a conflict. The United States would win any war, but it would not be a bloodless victory, like that over Serbia.

Nuclear North Korea Leads to U.S. Military Strikes

Continued failure of talks will increase pressure on Obama to strike North Korea – even optimists concede the result would be horrendous.

Bandow, '9

[Doug, senior fellow at the Cato Institute, specializing in foreign policy and civil, "Time to Tell Irresponsible Allies No Thanks" Reason, 2-26-9, <http://reason.com/archives/2009/02/26/starting-the-second-korean-war>]

What to do about North Korea was a major topic during Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's recent trip to South Korea and China. The North remains predictably unpredictable. If the Korean peninsula has gone a few weeks without a crisis, expect Pyongyang to create one. So it has been with the advent of the Obama administration. Angry over the Bush administration's failure to offer sufficient inducements, the North announced that it was halting plans to dismantle its nuclear program. Irritated with Seoul's new hard-line towards North Korea, Pyongyang declared all agreements with the Republic of Korea to be inoperative. Now the North apparently is preparing to stage a missile test. Secretary Clinton called the latter "unhelpful," as if Dear Leader Kim Jong Il was a valued negotiating partner. The government in Seoul responded with a yawn and Secretary Clinton indicated her desire for continued negotiations. But the **latest emanations from Pyongyang have caused some policymakers to advocate confrontation.** Philip **Zelikow**, late of the Bush State Department, **suggests war.** This isn't the first time that U.S. officials have proposed sending in the bombers. The Clinton administration apparently came close to ordering military strikes before former President Jimmy Carter's dramatic flight to Pyongyang. And Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.) has spent years pondering the possibility of preventive war against the so-called Democratic People's Republic of Korea. **It was never a good idea, but the pressure for military action may grow.** Selig **Harrison** of the Center for International Policy recently traveled to the DPRK, where he **was told that existing supplies of plutonium had been "weaponized."** He argues that the U.S. "can tolerate a nuclear-armed North Korea that may or may not actually have the weapons arsenal it claims," but others would put the military option back on the table. **Zelikow goes even further. He says:** "whatever the merits of Harrison's suggestion when it comes to North Korea's nuclear weapons, **the United States should not accept Pyongyang's development of long-range missiles systems,** which can be paired with an admitted nuclear weapons arsenal, as still another fait accompli." In his view, Washington should warn the North to stand down; if the DPRK failed to comply, the U.S. should take out the missile on its launch pad. Why? Zelikow contends that "the North Korean perfection of a long-range missile capability against the United States, Japan, or the Republic of Korea would pose an imminent threat to the vital interests of our country." To rely on deterrence, he adds, would be a "gamble." **Obviously no one wants the North to possess nuclear weapons** or missiles of any kind. **However, North Korean threats against the ROK and Japan are not threats against America's vital interests.** Japan is the world's second ranking economic power and the South has roughly 40 times the GDP and twice the population of the North. **Sooner rather than later they should be expected to defend themselves.** Washington is busy enough dealing with its own geopolitical problems in the midst of an economic crisis. Moreover, nothing in the North Korean regime's behavior suggests that Dear Leader Kim Jong Il is any less amenable to deterrence than were Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong. **Kim may be many things, but there is no indication that he is suicidal.** Rather, he likes his virgins in the here and now. **Of course, it would be better not to have to rely on deterrence. But a preventive strike would be no cakewalk.** If there is insanity at work on the Korean peninsula, it is the assumption that **Kim** would do nothing if his nation was attacked by the U.S. He might choose inaction, but more likely **would see such a strike as the prelude to regime change. In that case the results of the Iraq war would impel him to act first rather than await invasion. America and South Korea would win any war, but the costs would be horrendous.** Moreover, the DPRK could easily initiate a more limited tit-for-tat retaliation. The South's capital of Seoul lies within easy range of Scud missiles and massed artillery. **Even the "optimists" who believe that Seoul could be protected by massive military strikes** along the Demilitarized Zone **talk about holding casualties to under 100,000.** Imagine Pyongyang announcing a limited bombardment in response to the U.S. action, combined with the promise of a ceasefire if the ROK blocked any further American response. **Washington's Asian policy would be wrecked along with Seoul.** Despite the vagaries of dealing with the North, it is not the first bizarrely brutal and secretive regime with which the U.S. has dealt. Forty-some years ago there was China. The unstable Mao regime, atop a country convulsed by the bloody Cultural Revolution, was developing nuclear weapons. National Review editor William F. Buckley and New York Sen. James Buckley both pressed for a preventive attack on Beijing's nascent nuclear program. The Johnson administration considered proposals for such an assault. The arguments were similar as those made today regarding North Korea: An unpredictable regime, the uncertainty of deterrence, and the relative ease of attack. It's impossible to know what the world would have looked like had Washington struck, but China likely would have moved closer to the Soviet Union and become more resolutely hostile to the U.S. Restraint almost certainly was the better part of valor. So, too, with North Korea today. Of course, Washington still should work with the DPRK's neighbors in an attempt to persuade Pyongyang to abandon both its missile and nuclear ambitions. **Even more important, though, would be to turn the problem of North Korea over to the surrounding states.** To the extent that the North threatens anyone, it is South Korea and Japan. **China and Russia** are unlikely direct targets, but still **have good reason to prefer a stable and peaceful Korean peninsula.** Thus, the U.S. should withdraw its 29,000 troops from the ROK, where they are vulnerable to military action by Pyongyang. Then North Korea would be primarily a problem for the ROK, China, Japan, and Russia. And the U.S. need not worry about the latest North Korean gambit.

Strikes Bad – Full Scale War

Attacking North Korea doesn't solve-it will result in global nuclear war

Bandow 03

[Doug Bandow, senior fellow at the Cato Institute. A former special assistant to President Reagan, he is the author of Foreign Follies: America's New Global Empire, "N. Korea Is No Place to Apply Iraq 'Lessons'", 4/22/03 http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=6020]

When Undersecretary of State John R. Bolton said North Korea should "draw the appropriate lesson from Iraq," the meaning was clear: The United States might send in the Marines. The administration apparently believes that its hard-line stance led to the three-way talks among North Korea, China and the U.S. planned for later this week. And if the talks bog down or blow up, Bolton's statement implies that war again will be an option. But we should know clearly what we may provoke, and it isn't a limited, quick, low-casualty Iraqi-style conflict. Where North Korea is concerned, even a limited military strike almost certainly means full-scale war on the Korean peninsula, with massive casualties and widespread devastation. The North is thought to possess one or two nuclear weapons or at least has reprocessed enough plutonium to make them. More important, it has cheated on the 1994 Agreed Framework, which froze its nuclear program, and it also has taken a series of increasingly provocative steps. North Korea probably chose the current path for a mixture of reasons. Its putative nuclear capability is the only reason other nations pay any attention to an otherwise bankrupt, irrelevant state. So far the nuclear option also has been useful in eliciting bribes, such as fuel oil shipments and financial aid. Moreover, developing a nuclear arsenal may be the surest route to ensuring that the U.S. does not attack. A decade ago, many American policymakers and pundits blithely talked about military options for destroying the Yongbyon reactor and other North Korean nuclear facilities. Many people, apparently including President Bush, seem to be making the same calculations again. It is not surprising that policymakers in Seoul, within easy reach of North Korean artillery and Scud missiles, have a different perspective. Officials in Beijing, Moscow and Tokyo also worry about radioactive fallout, missile attacks, refugee flows, economic turmoil and regional chaos. Even among the countries in the region most vulnerable to a North Korea with nuclear weapons, there is no constituency for war. South Korea is particularly adamant. As President Roh Moo Hyun said, "For Washington, their prime interest lies in getting rid of weapons of mass destruction to restore the world order, but for us it's a matter of survival." Some advocates of military action predict that Pyongyang would not retaliate against a blow to its nuclear facilities. Others propose coupling such a military strike with the use or threat of tactical nuclear weapons against the North's conventional forces. But to attack and assume the North would not respond would be a wild gamble. A military strike might not get all of Pyongyang's nuclear assets, and hitting the reprocessing facility and spent fuel rods could create radioactive fallout over China, Japan, Russia or South Korea. Moreover, given the official U.S. policy of preemption, designation of the North as a member of the "axis of evil" and the Iraq war, Pyongyang might decide that even a limited military strike was the opening of a war for regime change. In that case, it would make sense to roll the tanks. An account by a high-ranking defector, Cho Myung Chul, is particularly sobering. In analyzing Iraq's defeat in the 1991 Gulf War, North Korean military officials concluded that Baghdad was too defensive. Cho related the North Korean view as: "If we're in a war, we'll use everything. And if there's a war, we should attack first, to take the initiative." He estimates the chances of general war at 80% in response to even a limited strike on Yongbyon. Unfortunately, "everything" is a daunting force: In addition to a large army, the North possesses long-range artillery and rocket launchers, up to 600 Scud missiles and additional longer-range No Dong missiles. And it has developed a significant number and range of chemical and perhaps biological weapons. Estimates as to the number of casualties run to more than 1 million. Also possible would be a limited retaliatory strike against the United States' Yongsan base in the center of Seoul. The Seoul-Inchon metropolis includes roughly half of South Korea's population, about 24 million people, and is the nation's industrial heartland. Pyongyang is thought to be able to fire up to 500,000 shells an hour into Seoul. Washington could hardly afford not to respond to an attack on Yongsan, yet retaliation would probably lead to general war. Such a scenario might threaten civilian control of the military in Seoul; the perception that South Koreans died because the U.S. acted against the wishes of the Roh administration might create a decisive split between Seoul and Washington. Dealing with North Korea could prove to be one of the most vexing challenges for this administration. Military action does not offer a simple solution but rather portends a real war of horrific destructiveness.

Strikes Bad – Full Scale War

**Even the most limited military action may kill millions and is not guaranteed to succeed.
Bandow, '3**

[Doug, senior fellow at the Cato Institute. A former special assistant to President Reagan, “Wrong War, Wrong Place, Wrong Time Why Military Action Should Not Be Used to Resolve the North Korean Nuclear Crisis” CATO Foreign Policy Briefing, No. 76, <http://www.cato.org/pubs/fpbriefs/fpb76.pdf>]

To attack on the assumption that the North would not respond would be a wild gamble. Some advocates of military action have proposed that an attack on Yongbyon be coupled with a nuclear ultimatum and even tactical nuclear strikes on North Korean artillery and troop emplacements.⁴⁷ But **a military strike might not get all of P'yongyang's nuclear assets; the North Koreans favor underground facilities, which might prove difficult to destroy.** even with newer, more destructive bombs. Warns Joshua Muravchik: “the North Koreans have also built underground nuclear reactors, plutonium reprocessing plants, and uranium enrichment facilities—and who knows what else?”⁴⁸ Moreover, **hitting the reprocessing plant** and spent fuel rods **might also create radioactive fallout that could drift over China, Japan, Russia, and South Korea.** That would be a high price to pay for an unsuccessful strike. Most **important, warns Stanley Kurtz** of the Hudson Institute, “The true disaster for the United States would be a strike against North Korea that does **anything less than** successfully intimidate its military capacity. Short of rapid and **total success, we face the deaths of hundreds of thousands, even millions,** of South Koreans.”⁴⁹ Yet **U.S. military action would virtually force P'yongyang to respond militarily. The North's response could come in two forms: full scale war, or limited retaliatory attacks.** Given the formal U.S. policy of preemption, and the designation of the North as a member of the “axis of evil,” P'yongyang **might decide that a military strike on its nuclear facilities was evidence of America's determination to destroy the Kim Jong-il government.** the opening phase of a war for regime change. Indeed, it is obvious that P'yongyang fears, and has considered the possibility of, an American attack.⁵⁰ The North explicitly threatened in early February 2003 that “a surprise attack on our peaceful nuclear facilities” would “spark a total war.”⁵¹ That is precisely what most analysts predicted would happen during the previous crisis in 1994. Gen. Gary **Luck, U.S. commander in Korea, observed: “If we pull an Osirak, they will be coming South.”**⁵² Bill Taylor, formerly of West Point and the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and who met with Kim Il-sung and other senior leaders in the early 1990s, believes: **“faced with a major military strike on its territory, the North Korean leadership will respond with everything it has against Americans and our allies.”**⁵³ South Korean Defense Minister Lee Jun says simply: “If America attacks North Korea, war on the Korean peninsula will be unavoidable.”⁵⁴ **An account by a high-ranking North Korean defector,** Cho Myung-chul, **is particularly sobering.** In analyzing Iraq's defeat in the (first) Gulf War, North Korean military officials concluded that Baghdad was too defensive. **Cho characterized the North's approach, growing out of the lessons learned from Iraq: “If we're in a war, we'll use everything. And if there's a war, we should attack first, to take the initiative.” Cho estimates the chances of general war at 80 percent in response to even a limited strike on Yongbyon.**⁵⁵ Unfortunately, **“everything” is a daunting force:** in addition to an army of more than a million soldiers, the North possesses long-range artillery and rocket launchers, deploys up to 600 Scud missiles and additional longer-range No Dong missiles, and has developed a significant number and range of chemical and perhaps biological weapons.⁵⁶ **Estimates of the number of likely casualties from a full-scale North Korean attack exceed one million.**⁵⁷

Strikes Bad - War

Any strikes will escalate to full scale war and crush U.S.-ROK cooperation.

Bandow, '2

[Doug, a Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute and a former Special Assistant to President Reagan, "A New Policy for a New Millenium: America's Relationship to South and North Korea" The ICAS Lectures, Spring Symposium, 2-14-2002, <http://www.icasinc.org/2003/2003w/2003wdx.html>]

Irrespective of who is to blame, what is to be done? It is not surprising that policymakers in Seoul, within easy reach of North Korean artillery and Scud missiles, have a different perspective on coercion. Beijing, Moscow, and Tokyo also worry about radioactive fallout, missile attacks, refugee flows, economic turmoil, and regional chaos. **Some advocates of military action say don't worry, that Pvyongyang would choose not to retaliate in order to save itself. But such an attack would destroy the prestige of the regime. Moreover, the North might decide that a military strike was the opening phase of a campaign to remove it. In that case, it would make sense to roll the tanks.** This is how the North is threatening to respond to any U.S. strike: "total war" and its own preemptive strike. **A high-ranking defector, Cho Myung-chul, estimates the chances of general war at 80 percent in response to even a limited strike on the North's Yongbyon facilities. Most likely would be a limited but devastating retaliatory strike centered against the Yongsan facility in Seoul. Retaliation could easily lead to a tit-for-tat escalation that would be difficult to halt short of general war. The perception that South Koreans died because the U.S. acted against the wishes of the Roh government would create a divisive, and perhaps decisive, split between Seoul and Washington.**

Strikes Bad - Destroys Seoul

Any strike against North Korea will politically and economically destroy Seoul.

Bandow, '9

[Doug, senior fellow at the Cato Institute. A former special assistant to President Reagan, "Forgetting Pyongyang" National Interest Online, May 27, http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=10250]

In any case, Washington has few options. **The U.S. military could flatten every building in the** Democratic People's Republic of Korea **(DPRK), but even a short war would be a humanitarian catastrophe and likely would wreck Seoul, South Korea's industrial and political heart. America's top objective should be to avoid, not trigger, a conflict.** Today's North Korean regime seems bound to disappear eventually. **Better to wait it out, if possible.**

Strikes Bad – China / ROK

Military solution threatens to kill hundreds of thousands and makes cooperation with China and the ROK impossible.

Bandow, '3

[Doug, senior fellow at the Cato Institute. A former special assistant to President Reagan, “Wrong War, Wrong Place, Wrong Time Why Military Action Should Not Be Used to Resolve the North Korean Nuclear Crisis” CATO Foreign Policy Briefing, No. 76, <http://www.cato.org/pubs/fpbriefs/fpb76.pdf>]

But **a military strike is the least desirable** of a range of unpalatable policy choices. **An attack** on North Korea **is likely to result in a full retaliatory response** by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, **which would threaten the lives of hundreds of thousands of South Koreans, as well as the nearly 37,000 Americans** stationed **on the peninsula. Even a successful attack could spread nuclear fallout throughout East Asia. Finally, a unilateral U.S. attack that destabilized the peninsula could upset relations with China and South Korea.** Rather than adopting the most dangerous course of action as a first resort, **the United States should instead take the opportunity to reduce its threat profile** in the region **by focusing** on multilateral diplomatic **efforts that place primary responsibility for resolving the crisis on those regional actors most threatened by the North Korean nuclear program.**

Withdrawal Causes Chinese Involvement

The plan solves—Chinese involvement

Carpenter, 6 - *vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute (Ted, "Nuclear Neighbors Might Thwart N. Korea," Chicago Sun Times, 11/11, http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=6772)*

Instead of putting a leash on Japan and South Korea, U.S. officials should inform Pyongyang -- and Beijing -- that if the North insists on wielding nuclear weapons, Washington will urge Tokyo and Seoul to make their own decisions about whether to acquire strategic deterrents. The mere possibility that South Korea and Japan might do so would come as an unpleasant surprise to both North Korea and China. The United States does not need to press Tokyo and Seoul to go nuclear. That would be inappropriate. It is sufficient if Washington informs those governments that the United States would not object to their developing nuclear weapons. In addition, the United States needs to let Seoul and Tokyo know that we intend to withdraw our military forces from South Korea and Japan. In an environment with a nuclear-armed North Korea, those forward-deployed forces are not military assets: they are nuclear hostages. Faced with a dangerous, nuclear-capable neighbor and a more limited U.S. military commitment to the region, Japan or South Korea (or both) might well decide to build a nuclear deterrent. Although the Japanese public seems reluctant to go down that path, the attitude in South Korea is different. A public opinion poll taken shortly after Pyongyang's nuclear test showed that a majority of respondents believed South Korea should develop a deterrent of its own. The prospect of additional nuclear weapons proliferation in northeast Asia obviously is not an ideal outcome. But offsetting the North's looming illicit advantage may be the best of a bad set of options. Moreover, the real danger arising from proliferation is when repulsive rogue states such as North Korea get such weapons, not when stable, democratic countries such as Japan and South Korea do so in self-defense. If the North had to deal with nuclear neighbors, whom it could not so easily intimidate, it might have to abandon its current provocative course. Indeed, Pyongyang might face the prospect of confronting more prosperous adversaries that could easily build larger and more sophisticated nuclear arsenals than it could hope to do. Kim's regime might then conclude that keeping the region non-nuclear would be more productive. Even if it does not do so, a nuclear balance of power in the region would likely emerge instead of a North Korean nuclear monopoly. The prospect of a nuclear-armed Japan is also the one factor that might galvanize the Chinese to put serious diplomatic and economic pressure on Pyongyang to give up its nuclear ambitions. Washington Post columnist Charles Krauthammer expresses that thesis starkly: "We should go to the Chinese and tell them plainly that if they do not join us in squeezing North Korea and thus stopping its march to go nuclear, we will endorse any Japanese attempt to create a nuclear deterrent of its own. . . . If our nightmare is a nuclear North Korea, China's is a nuclear Japan. It's time to share the nightmares." Even if one does not embrace Krauthammer's approach, the reality is that if the United States blocks the possible emergence of a northeast Asian nuclear balance, it will be stuck with the responsibility of shielding non-nuclear allies from a volatile, nuclear-armed North Korea. More proliferation may be a troubling outcome, but it beats that scenario.

China Solves North Korean Conflict

Increasing Chinese involvement in North Korea will create a peaceful solution – it's the only way to avoid war or North Korean collapse

Bandow, '10 - senior fellow at the Cato Institute. A former special assistant to President Reagan, he is the author of *Foreign Follies: America's New Global Empire* (Doug, "Taming Pyongyang", 5/3, <http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=23336>)

Second, the United States, South Korea and Japan must develop a unified approach to China built on the sinking of the Cheonan. Even if the North is blameless, the incident demonstrates that the status quo is dangerous. Just one irresponsible act from the unpredictable DPRK could trigger a new devastating conflict. And if Pyongyang is guilty, the risk could not be clearer. Until now the PRC has viewed the status quo as beneficial: the DPRK remains a friendly buffer state; a North Korean atomic bomb would not be directed at China; the United States and ROK must perennially go hat-in-hand to Beijing to beg for its assistance in dealing with the North. In contrast, applying substantial political and economic pressure on Pyongyang would risk breaking the bilateral relationship and might spark a violent collapse, unleashing a flood of refugees. The PRC has said little about the *Cheonan* incident. The foreign ministry called the sinking an "unfortunate incident." Beijing's ambassador in Seoul reaffirmed his nation's commitment to peace and stability. The allied pitch should be simple. As noted earlier, the risks of war are obvious and catastrophic. But even if peace survives, today's badly misgoverned DPRK might implode of its own accord, even without Chinese pressure. There is a possibility of violent collapse, given the North's impending leadership transition and apparent signs of public dissatisfaction, which would have significantly negative consequences for Beijing. And if Seoul eschews military retaliation, the North's ongoing nuclear program combined with warlike provocations would place increasing pressure on the South and Japan to develop countervailing arsenals. Beijing should take the lead in forging a new, active policy designed to both denuclearize the Korean peninsula and promote political and economic reform in the North. In fact, a Chinese commitment to take a much more active role might help convince Seoul to choose nonviolent retaliation for the Cheonan's sinking. Although few people expect the Koreans to end up at war, the risk is real. And unacceptable. The incident should impel a serious rethinking of the current U.S.-ROK alliance as well as the strategy for involving China in the North Korean issue.

China Solves North Korean Conflict

North Korea is totally dependent on China --- Chinese sanctions would change North Korean behavior.

Noland and Haggard '09 (Marcus Noland and Stephan Haggard, 6/12/2009. Senior Fellow at both the East-West Center and the Peterson Institute for International Economics; and professor at UC San Diego's Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies. "Economic Shifts Critical for North Korea Sanctions," East West Center, <http://www.eastwestcenter.org/news-center/east-west-wire/economic-shifts-critical-for-north-korea-sanctions/>)

A second, and apparently contradictory, observation is that despite the recent anti-reformist turn and the constraints of the second nuclear crisis, North Korea has in fact become more economically open. However the political geography of North Korea's trade has shifted quite fundamentally. Trade with Japan has virtually collapsed as Tokyo moved toward a virtual embargo. Trade with Europe stagnated following the onset of the nuclear crisis, and trade, investment and particularly aid from South Korea fell sharply following the inauguration of Lee Myung-bak. At the same time, the North's dependence on China for trade has grown dramatically, far outstripping trade with other partners. In addition, North Korea has also sought out other partners who do not pose sanction risks, or with whom North Korea's nuclear and missile interests are aligned -- most notably Iran, Syria, and potentially Egypt. What implications does this economic story have for the development of sanctions in response to North Korea's nuclear activities? The first relates to the question of the regime's intentions. It is virtually impossible for outsiders to be confident that they understand the inner workings of North Korean decision-making, but it is nonetheless important to ask whether military and diplomatic signals are aligned with other developments in the North Korean political economy. If the North Korean leadership had been pursuing a reformist path since the onset of the crisis - however gradually - it would have constituted an important signal that the country was open to economic inducements. However, the evidence on this score is not comforting. The North Korean economy is indeed becoming more open, but the leadership remains highly ambivalent about this development, and, as a result, has shown little interest in economic carrots. To the contrary, the willingness to terminate the U.S. food aid program, the government's behavior with respect to Kaesong and the ongoing meddling in the border trade shows a regime that is either indifferent, or actively hostile, towards economic engagement. Another implication has to do with the political geography of North Korea's external economic relations. An unintended consequence of the crisis has been to push North Korea into a closer economic relationship with China and other trading partners that show little interest in political quid-pro-quo, let alone sanctions. Put differently, North Korea appears to have rearranged its external economic relations to reduce the risk that traditional sanctions would work. As a result, however, China has become even more central to any effective sanctions effort. The North's very high level of dependence on China raises little doubt that Beijing could exercise influence on Pyongyang if it chose to do so. But as the North Korean leadership understands very well, the Chinese leadership faces its own risks in pushing North Korea to the edge, including further escalatory moves on North Korea's part or the prospect that, if pressed too hard, the North could collapse into a failed state located right at China's doorstep.

China Solves North Korean Conflict

China can promote peace and stability in the region.

Bandow 10

[Doug Bandow, senior fellow at the Cato Institute. A former special assistant to President Reagan, he is the author of *Foreign Follies: America's New Global Empire*, "Engaging China to Maintain Peace in East Asia" 5/25/10, http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=11845]

How to maintain the peace in East Asia? Washington must engage the PRC on both issues. America's relationship with Beijing will have a critical impact on the development of the 21st century. Disagreements are inevitable; conflict is not. China is determined to take an increasingly important international role. It is entitled to do so. However, it should equally commit to acting responsibly. As the PRC grows economically, expands its military, and gains diplomatic influence, it will be able to greatly influence international events, especially in East Asia. If it does so for good rather than ill, its neighbors will be less likely to fear the emerging superpower. Most important, responsible Chinese policy will diminish the potential for military confrontation between Beijing and Asian states as well as the U.S. In return, Washington should welcome China into the global leadership circle if its rise remains peaceful and responsible. American analysts have expressed concern about a Chinese military build-up intended to prevent U.S. intervention along the PRC's border. But the U.S. cannot expect other states to accept American dominance forever. Any American attempt to contain Beijing is likely to spark — predictably — a hostile response from China. Instead, Washington policymakers should prepare for a world in which reciprocity replaces diktat. The U.S. could encourage Chinese responsibility by adopting policies that highlight the importance of the PRC's role in promoting regional peace and stability. Such an approach is most needed to deal with the Korean peninsula and Taiwan. For instance, Beijing could play a critical role in restraining and ultimately transforming the North. So far the PRC has declined to apply significant pressure on its long-time ally. In fact, North Korea's Kim Jong-il recently visited China, presumably in pursuit of additional economic aid and investment. His quid pro quo might have been a professed willingness to return to the Six-Party nuclear talks. But few analysts believe there is much chance of a nuclear deal whether or not these negotiations proceed — and almost certainly no chance unless the PRC is prepared to get tough with the North, including threatening to cut off generous food and energy shipments. To encourage Beijing, Washington should suggest that China would share the nightmare if an unstable North Korea expands its nuclear arsenal. The North's nuclear program would yield concern even in the best of cases. But the so-called Democratic People's Republic of Korea is no best case. The regime started a war in 1950 and engaged in terrorism into the 1980s. Pyongyang has cheerfully sold weapons to all comers. Worse, today it appears to be in the midst of an uncertain leadership transition. If North Korean forces sank the South Korean vessel, then either Kim Jong-il is ready to risk war or has lost control of the military, which is ready to risk war. The Obama administration should indicate to the PRC that Washington will face sustained pressure to take military action against the North — which obviously would not be in Beijing's interest. Should the DPRK amass a nuclear arsenal, the U.S. would have no more desire than China to be in the middle of a messy geopolitical confrontation, especially one that could go nuclear. Thus, Washington would not be inclined to block decisions by the ROK and Japan to create countervailing nuclear arsenals. Just as the prospect of a North Korean bomb worries the U.S., the possibility of a Japanese nuclear capacity would unsettle the PRC. Should China take the tough, even risky (from its standpoint) steps necessary to moderate or transform Pyongyang, Washington should promise to reciprocate. The DPRK poses the greatest threat to regional peace and security. Eliminate it, and eliminate the principal justification for a U.S. military presence in East Asia. Most obvious would be a promise not to maintain American bases or troops in the Korean peninsula, whether united or divided. Pulling back units from Japan would also be warranted.

Hegemony Collapsing

The United States must cut international commitments because of its massive deficits.

Bandow 09

[Doug Bandow, senior fellow at the Cato Institute. A former special assistant to President Reagan, he is the author of *Foreign Follies: America's New Global Empire*, "Kim's Atom Project", 12/11/09
http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=11044]

In short, Washington spends what it spends not to defend America but to maintain the ability to attack and overpower other nations — that's what "primacy," as Donnelly put it, really means. This perspective is reflected in oft-voiced concerns over Beijing's ongoing military expansion. As Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr. of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments observes: "China's People's Liberation Army is aggressively developing capabilities and strategies to degrade the U.S. military's ability to project power into the region." He did not express fear that China is planning aggression against America. Rather, he believed Beijing is hoping to prevent intervention by America. Addressing the first is a vital U.S. interest. Avoiding the second is not. Moreover, it will be far less expensive for countries like China to deter an American attack than for America to preserve the ability to attack countries like China. The cost of the latter will only grow over time. Terrorism remains a pressing security threat. However, terrorist attacks, such as 9/11, though horrid, do not pose an existential danger. Al-Qaeda is no replacement for Nazism and Communism, nuclear-topped ICBMs, and armored divisions. Nor is traditional military force the best way to combat terrorism. International cooperation, improved intelligence, judicious use of Special Forces abroad, and smarter use of police forces at home will work far better in far more cases. Indeed, foreign intervention often promotes terrorism, rather like swatting a hornet's nest. The Reagan administration's misguided intervention in the Lebanese civil war is one of many examples. America's military spending is determined by its foreign policy. The Wall Street Journal editorialized that "We learned on 9/11 that three percent [of GDP] isn't nearly enough to maintain our commitments and fight a war on terror." That's true, but irrelevant. America's commitments are a matter of choice, and the question is whether they make sense. They don't. The second issue is whether more money on the military would better prevent terrorism. It wouldn't. In its 2010 budget justification the Department of Defense announced: "It is not enough to possess military forces capable of deterring or responding to aggression. Rather it is vital that the United States be a force for good by engaging with and helping to positively shape the world." Shaping the world might prove helpful, but that does not mean it is "vital"; engagement is good, but military force is not the only form of engagement. Any international involvement must balance costs and benefits. Adjusting commitments would allow a vastly different, and less expensive, force structure. The U.S. could make significant cuts and still maintain the globe's strongest and most sophisticated military — and one well able to defend America and Americans. Cutting commitments is an imperative for anyone committed to limited government. War is the ultimate big government program, the "health of the state," as social critic Randolph Bourne put it. The world is a dangerous place, but not all dangers are created equal and not all dangers must be confronted by America. The U.S. has global interests, but most are not worth going to war over. When the Constitution authorizes the federal government to "provide for the common defense," it means America's defense, not that of well-heeled allies and failed Third World states. Even Defense Secretary Robert Gates acknowledges that "resources are scarce" at a time of massive deficits. Washington must reconsider its priorities. That means cutting back on the U.S. government's role abroad as well as at home. American primacy is bound to diminish. Deciding in what way and at what rate should be made by Washington, not forced by events.

Withdrawal Doesn't Cause War/Instability

U.S. withdrawal is safer in the long run

Bandow 01

[Doug Bandow, senior fellow at the Cato Institute. A former special assistant to President Reagan, he is the author of Foreign Follies: America's New Global Empire, "Needless Engagements", 5/24/01
http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=1260]

While continuing Pax Americana would probably be safer (at least in the short term) for Washington's legion of client states and dependents, it would not be safer for America. Distancing the United States from entanglement in local and regional squabbles would leave this country more secure. More robust democratic powers in the region could deter would-be aggressors, and U.S. military withdrawal would reduce the likelihood that America would be drawn into future crises. Washington's forced departure from the Philippines led the United States to adopt a program of "places not bases," focusing on ready access to military facilities rather than on permanent deployments. A similar approach could replace security guarantees elsewhere in Southeast Asia.

Withdrawal Doesn't Cause War/Instability

U.S. presence isn't key to power projection or regional stability –South Korea can fill-in and deter any aggression

Bandow '96 – Robert A. Taft Fellow at the American Conservative Defense Alliance and a Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute (Doug, TRIPWIRE; Korea and U.S. Foreign Policy in a Changed World, pg. 63-4)

In fact, the ROK doesn't even come up to the standard of an important interest—one that would materially affect America but not threaten its survival as an independent republic. Examples of that sort of interest include the maintenance of open sea lanes and Western Europe's independence, for instance. In contrast, the preservation of a midsized trading partner surrounded by competing great powers in a distant region is not strategically important.²² (Obviously, for the South Koreans their survival is not only important but vital; the fact that it is vital to them does not automatically make it vital or even important to us, however.) Rather, the ROK is what Cato's Ted Galen Carpenter calls a peripheral interest, one of many "assets that marginally enhance America's security but whose loss would constitute more of an annoyance than a serious setback."²³ U.S. officials obviously reject such an assessment; they often portray South Korea as an advanced base for America, allowing the projection of U.S. power into East Asia. But traditional arguments about how deployments in Korea constrained the Soviet Union obviously no longer apply.²⁴ Creative policymakers have had to look elsewhere for justification; for example, Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke went so far as to contend that the loss of Korea "would be the end of our position in the entire Pacific."²⁵ William Gleysteen, former U.S. ambassador to the ROK, said the alliance contributes "importantly to the regional balance of power."²⁶ Similarly, Heritage Foundation president Edwin Feulner once called the Mutual Defense Treaty "a linchpin for stability in the entire Northeast Asian region."²⁷ In 1990 Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney warned that a U.S. withdrawal would be followed by a power vacuum. As a result, "there almost surely would be a series of destabilizing regional arms races, an increase in regional tensions, and possibly conflict."²⁸ In early 1995 the U.S. Department of Defense made much the same pitch, promising to maintain the alliance "even after the North Korean threat passes . . . in the interest of regional security."²⁹ None of those arguments suggests that any vital American interests are at stake. Thus, the most obvious reason to threaten to go to war does not apply to Korea. Rather, America's second most important and costly commitment (after Europe) is rooted in the more nebulous concept of regional "stability." But the "stability" argument fails to distinguish between U.S. influence in East Asia and a defense commitment to the ROK. The latter is not necessary for the former. First, the Mutual Defense Treaty yields America little benefit. As noted earlier, while a commitment to defend Seoul from North Korea helps stabilize the peninsula, the benefits of doing so accrue mostly to the ROK and to a lesser degree to neighboring nations. The advantages to America, based on proximity, if nothing else, are much more modest. Second, a militarily stronger South Korea, the probable consequence of a U.S. withdrawal, would promote regional stability almost as much as could the U.S. presence, by deterring aggression by not only Pyongyang but also by China, Japan, or Russia. (Those nations will always be able to outdo even a united Korea militarily, but the latter could make the prospect of war too expensive for any of them to seriously contemplate.) At the same time, it is hard to imagine even a more powerful Korea being in a position to threaten any of its major neighbors. Useless Troop Presence The U.S. troop presence in the ROK offers America little advantage. One infantry division in Korea would play no useful role in any conflict with, say, China. Nevertheless, Joseph Nye, assistant secretary of defense for international security, argues that pre-positioning equipment "is a terrific force multiplier" allowing one to "add tremendous additional capability in a very short time."³⁰ U.S. access to South Korean bases—which actually would not require a permanent troop presence—might be useful in a full-scale war in the region, but it is hard to imagine what interests would warrant U.S. participation in such a conflict. An attack on Manchuria in retaliation for China's sinking of a Filipino warship off the Spratly Islands? An expedition to help Japan forcibly wrest the Kuril Islands from Russia? Further, that kind of U.S.-ROK cooperation would depend, not on past American support, but on shared interests at the time the conflict erupted. Seoul might be reluctant to join in a military crusade against a neighboring power or powers, however much it currently enjoys being defended by Washington. After all, South Korea has to live with China, Japan, and Russia while Washington can leave whenever it chooses. Moreover, it would be hard to preserve an isolated forward outpost like the ROK in any serious conflict; in 1950 Pentagon planners worried that the United States could maintain military superiority on the peninsula only by using atomic weapons on Siberia if the USSR entered the Korean War.³¹ In short, using Korea as an advance military outpost could prove to be more costly and less beneficial than currently assumed. Moreover, neither an infantry division nor bases in the ROK are likely to do much to suppress nationalistic sentiments and conflicts throughout the region. If Vietnam, the Philippines, and China slide toward war over the Spratly Islands, only an American threat to intervene, not the mere U.S. presence in Korea, is likely to deter them. Yet there is precious little evidence either that America is better able to solve regional problems than are the parties involved or that the United States has sufficient interests to warrant military action in response to the few problems that might spin out of control. The United States might have been the key to regional stability 40, 30, and even 20 years ago. That it was even 10 years ago is doubtful, and that it is today is very unlikely indeed.

Withdrawal Doesn't Cause War/Instability

U.S. defense presence in South Korea is useless for regional stability

Bandow, 8 - senior fellow at the Cato Institute. A former special assistant to President Reagan, he is the author of Foreign Follies: America's New Global Empire (Doug, "Seoul Searching", 11/11, <http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=20218>)

Other advocates of the alliance make the "dual use" argument, that American forces stationed on the Korean peninsula are useful for purposes other than defending South Korea. But an army division and assorted other forces have little useful role in promoting regional stability, whatever that means in practice (invading Burma or preventing the dissolution of Indonesia?). And minimal ROK support for other U.S. objectives, such as providing a small troop contingent to a safe sector of Iraq (which Seoul plans on withdrawing by year's end), is not worth today's one-sided alliance.

The U.S.-ROK alliance is irrelevant to regional stability

Bandow, 5 - senior fellow at the Cato Institute. A former special assistant to President Reagan, he is the author of Foreign Follies: America's New Global Empire (Doug, "Seoul Searching", The National Interest, Fall, lexis)

Some alliance advocates, however, are vigorously re-imagining the rationale for retaining U.S. forces on the Korean Peninsula. Advocates of a permanent U.S. occupation talk grandly of preserving regional stability and preparing for regional contingencies. Some South Koreans do so as well: Kim Sung-ban of the Institute on Foreign Affairs and National Security argues that "Even in the absence of a military threat from North Korea", the alliance should be revamped "to focus on promoting stability in Northeast Asia." Yet it is difficult to spin a scenario involving real war between real countries. No general East Asian conflict, other than a possible China-Taiwan confrontation, seems to be threatening to break out. The region is no longer the focus of global hegemonic competition. All of the major regional powers benefit from peace; none has significant and growing differences with other major powers. Nor is it clear how unexplained "instability", as opposed to widespread conflict, would harm the global economy and thus U.S. interests. Only if nations throughout East Asia essentially collapsed--an unlikely event in the extreme--would there be substantial harm to America and other countries.

Troops in South Korea are irrelevant to regional stability, preventing terrorism or drug trafficking

Bandow, 5 - senior fellow at the Cato Institute. A former special assistant to President Reagan, he is the author of Foreign Follies: America's New Global Empire (Doug, "Seoul Searching", The National Interest, Fall, lexis)

In response, some supporters of America's position in South Korea suggest using forces stationed there to intervene in local conflicts and civil wars. However, a commitment to defend "stability" in East Asia implies a willingness to intervene in a score of local conflicts revolving around border disputes, ethnic divisions and other parochial squabbles. Of course, Washington refused to use force against Indonesia over East Timor; it is not likely to intervene in inter-communal strife in the Moluccas or independence demands in Aceh or Irian Jaya. The greatest threats to regional stability come from within weak if not outright failed states: insurgency and corruption in the Philippines, democratic protests and ethnic conflict in Burma, economic, ethnic, nationalistic and religious division in Indonesia. Most of these problems are not susceptible to solution via U.S. military intervention--nor is it clear why the Mutual Defense Pact between Seoul and Washington is required. Advocates also fall back on a familiar litany of transnational threats such as terrorism, piracy, drug trafficking and infectious diseases to justify the continued existence of the alliance. One wonders, however, how stationing troops in Korea helps to combat the spread of aids, or whether the Air Force is preparing to bomb opium fields in Burma. Piracy is a major problem, but not only is there no reason that the regional powers--including South Korea, Singapore, Australia, Japan and Indonesia--cannot deploy more ships and other assets to cope with this threat, U.S. ground forces based in Korea cannot patrol the Malacca Strait. Terrorism, meanwhile, is best combated by accurate intelligence and special forces, not thousands of conventional forces configured to repel a land assault.

Withdrawal → Denuclearization

Withdrawing troops is a necessary prerequisite to North Korea denuclearizing its arsenal.

Synder 12/30 – Director of The Asia Foundation's Center for US-Korea Policy and Adjunct Senior Fellow for Korean Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations (Scott A., 2009, "Can the North Korean "Peace Offensive" Drive a Wedge in the U.S.-ROK Alliance?" <http://sitrep.globalsecurity.org/articles/091230529-can-the-north-korean-peace-off.htm>)

Following Ambassador Stephen Bosworth's December 8-10 visit to Pyongyang, he declared that the two sides had reached a "common understanding with the DPRK on the need to implement the six party joint statement and to resume the six party process." The North Korean foreign ministry spokesman affirmed Bosworth's statement, but mentioned the negotiation of a peace agreement, normalization of relations, and economic and energy assistance as the main items of the talks. During private meetings in November, the North Koreans described the need for a change in the U.S. "hostile policy" through the negotiation of a permanent peace treaty to replace the armistice as a higher priority than denuclearization. Chosun Ilbo worries in a December 11th editorial following the Bosworth visit that North Korea's intent is to break the U.S.-ROK alliance and insist on the withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea. If this is the North's motive, can such a strategy work? Since the early 1990s and the establishment of separate but parallel dialogues between the United States and North Korea (over nuclear issues) and inter-Korean relations (over potential peninsular reconciliation), there have been worries that North Korea might attempt to exploit these channels by creating a wedge in U.S.-ROK alliance cooperation. But the alliance is the main factor in the emergence of U.S.-ROK-DPRK triangular relations that has limited North Korea's capacity to improve one relationship while neglecting the other. Effective U.S.-ROK alliance cooperation makes the two countries' relationships with North Korea parallel and interactive: progress in one is likely to require progress in the other while a failure to improve one relationship will act as a limiting factor constraining the development of the other. This dynamic has proven to be true during the past two decades. The negotiation of the U.S.-DPRK Geneva Agreed Framework in the mid-1990s was greeted with skepticism by the Kim Young Sam administration, especially as the North Koreans responded negatively to South Korean policy following the death of Kim Il Sung. But the implementation of the Agreed Framework and South Korea's central role in the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization ultimately created a new channel for inter-Korean relations, contributing to an easing of inter-Korean tensions in the late 1990s. In turn, the establishment of the inter-Korean summit in 2000 proved to be a catalyst for North Korea to reach out to the United States by sending Cho Myung-rok, Vice Chairman of the National Defense Commission, to Washington and to enable Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to visit Pyongyang at the end of the Clinton administration. However, a negative turn in U.S.-DPRK relations with the inauguration of the Bush administration created constraints on Kim Dae Jung in his pursuit of a second inter-Korean summit. Ultimately, inter-Korean relations were constrained by a chill in the U.S.-DPRK relationship. Although Roh Moo-hyun was able to have a second inter-Korean summit at the end of 2007, South Korea was ultimately constrained in its attempts to promote inter-Korean economic cooperation at Kaesong by the necessity of coordination on nuclear issues with the United States through the six party talks. With the inauguration of the Lee Myung-Bak administration, there was speculation that North Korea might again follow a policy of focusing on the United States while marginalizing South Korea (tongmi bongnam); however, the pattern described above reveals that U.S.-ROK alliance coordination imposes real limits on the capacity of North Korea to pursue progress in one relationship while trying to marginalize the other. Developments in 2009 appear to confirm the limits of the ability of North Korea to pursue progress in one relationship while marginalizing the other. The early part of 2009 was marked by the simultaneous deterioration in inter-Korean relations and rising tensions in U.S.-DPRK relations resulting from North Korea's missile and nuclear tests. Likewise, North Korea's "charm offensive" of the second half of 2009 has been dual-pronged: former President Clinton's mission to Pyongyang to secure the release of American journalists re-opened DPRK efforts to engage with the United States, while North Korea released a South Korean held for months at Kaesong during Hyundai Asan Chairperson Hyun Jung-eun's visit to Pyongyang in mid-August. Such a convergence in the momentum of North Korea's respective relationships with the United States and South Korea suggests that any North Korean effort to exploit differences between the United States and South Korea is being minimized. However, North Korea still resists Lee Myung-bak's efforts to place denuclearization on the agenda of the inter-Korean relationship while focusing on U.S. 'hostile policy' as an opening to place peace on the U.S.-DPRK diplomatic agenda prior to denuclearization. Some observers see Pyongyang's focus on peace as a direct challenge to the U.S.-ROK alliance, since the establishment of a permanent peace regime on the Korean peninsula would arguably obviate the need for the alliance or for U.S. troops on the peninsula. However, precisely because these issues are at the core of the alliance, it is unimaginable that such issues could be taken up absent the closest of consultation between the United States and South Korea, further tying together prospects of improvements in both U.S.-DPRK and inter-Korean relations. From the perspective of the United States, progress on denuclearization, peace, and normalization of relations is increasingly connected, as Ambassador Bosworth implied in Seoul immediately following his visit to Pyongyang. Ambassador Bosworth's dialogue with North Korea--and his deepened regional consultations with allies and friends--underscores the necessity of regional cohesion as a core element of the Obama administration's current approach to North Korea. Arguably, any progress in the U.S.-DPRK relationship and in inter-Korean relations is likely to be mutually reinforcing.

Withdrawal → Denuclearization

Withdrawing troops is key to denuclearization

Bandow 02

[Doug Bandow, senior fellow at the Cato Institute. A former special assistant to President Reagan, he is the author of Foreign Follies: America's New Global Empire, "Confronting the Korean Bomb", 10/25/02
http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=4214]

The potential of a North Korean nuke is disturbing, but not worth another crisis. Of course, no one wants the so-called Democratic People's Republic of Korea to have a nuclear weapon. Yet there is nothing sinister in its efforts: Pyongyang possesses a decaying economy and starving population. Most of its allies have defected to South Korea. The North has lost the inter-Korean competition. Other than nuclear weapons, there is no reason for any country to pay attention to the DPRK. Indeed, the only way Pyongyang soon may be able to defend itself against a South with 40 times the GDP, twice the population, and vast technological edge is nuclear weapons. The West's main goal, then, should be to play out the Korean end game. Every day the peace is maintained is a day closer to the end of a communist DPRK. The 1994 agreement was a worthy try. Today the critics are legion, but none of them ever offered a serious alternative. Sanctions against the world's most isolated regime? They were likely neither to win China's support nor to affect the DPRK's behavior. Even worse were proposals for military strikes, which would likely have ignited another war. Although the allies would win, South Korea could lose her capital, Seoul, which lies near the Demilitarized Zone. That would be a frightful price to pay. No one knows for sure what Pyongyang is up to. Maybe it realized that it had been caught. Maybe it believes that it can wring more concessions out of the Western powers. In any case, Washington should take a low profile. South Korea and Japan are currently negotiating with the DPRK; they should demand compliance with past accords before more aid flows to the North. Pyongyang's relations with China are already strained. The latter needs to explain that it will be far less cooperative if North Korea is destabilizing the region. Moscow, with improving ties to the North, should be encouraged to weigh in as well. The United States should reverse its past treatment of the DPRK. For years, Washington did not deign to notice the North's existence. But when Pyongyang ostentatiously began its nuclear program, America promised aid, trade and recognition. Now the Bush Administration should treat North Korea with studied indifference, noting that its behavior is of far greater interest to its neighbors and that America intends to follow their lead. Without fanfare, Washington should suspend all aid, humanitarian and other. Then it should tell the North that when the latter begins to behave in a more positive fashion, agreeing to dismantle its nuclear operation and allow in outside inspectors, for instance, that official recognition, trade, membership in international organizations and the like will follow. Even the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the South, which are no longer needed for the latter's defense. Should the DPRK continue to behave belligerently, however, there will be nothing to negotiate. No threats. No table pounding. Just calm discussion. For too long the North has been convinced by the feverish Western reaction that its nuclear program was the only means to win respect from and squeeze more money out of its adversaries. The United States and its allies need to communicate that Pyongyang will receive favorable attention only by becoming a responsible regional player. North Korea's announcement is bad news. But both South Korea and Japan, the countries most affected, have reacted more with anger than fear. Indeed, they worry more about an American overreaction than a North Korean attack. Instead of leading another international crusade, Washington should try an alternative strategy - devolving responsibility on other regional players. North Korea is a pitiful, bankrupt, desperate nation that poses no threat to America. Leave containment up to its neighbors.

Withdrawal → Denuclearization

U.S. withdrawal would stabilize the peninsula

Bandow 91

[Doug Bandow, senior fellow at the Cato Institute. A former special assistant to President Reagan, he is the author of Foreign Follies: America's New Global Empire, "Defusing the Korean Bomb", 12/16/91
http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=1539]

Moreover, Washington should indicate its readiness to phase its forces out of the South, a move that Pyongyang has persistently demanded.[27] In fact, a troop pullout is long overdue, given Seoul's ability to provide for its own defense. The ROK's advantages over North Korea are objectively overwhelming: 11 times the GNP, the fastest economic growth rate in Asia, a dramatic technological lead, unencumbered access to international credit markets, and twice the population.[28] The South is fully capable of overtaking the DPRK militarily if it chooses, and it is more likely to do so if it can no longer rely on American assistance. Indeed, the Nixon administration's limited troop withdrawals in the early 1970s spurred the higher South Korean defense outlays that are now carrying the ROK past Pyongyang militarily. If the North really desires peace, as it claims, it could match an American withdrawal by accepting international inspection of its nuclear facilities, pulling its forces back from their advanced positions along the DMZ, and demobilizing some units. Then, no major South Korean defense hikes would be necessary. Instead, the two Koreas could negotiate a gradual reduction in both nations' forces complemented by further increases in cooperation and trade (building on the modest increases of the past year) followed perhaps by eventual reunification. But the American troops should be withdrawn regardless of North Korea's response, given the South's evident ability to create a military capable of deterring the DPRK. The carrot for the North is that concrete actions on its part-- particularly compliance with the NPT, which would demonstrate a genuine commitment to dCtente--would both speed up the U.S. withdrawal and forestall a South Korean military buildup. Although the ultimate goal of American disengagement would not be in doubt, the timing of that disengagement would reflect conditions on the peninsula.

The U.S. should remove troops in order to make North Korea more likely to negotiate over its nuclear weapons

Bandow 99

[Doug Bandow, senior fellow at the Cato Institute. A former special assistant to President Reagan, he is the author of Foreign Follies: America's New Global Empire, "Hugs for Pyongyang", 10/4/99
http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=4998]

Over the long term Washington should disentangle itself from Northeast Asia. The United States should step back, leaving Seoul and Tokyo to take the lead in dealing with the North. More important, Washington should develop a phased withdrawal program for its troops, and terminate the defense treaty when the pullout is complete. The ROK should then challenge the North to respond positively by demobilizing some army units and withdrawing some advanced forces from the Demilitarized Zone. The South's private message should be more blunt: negotiate for serious arms reduction, or face a crushing arms race (including missile development) which North Korea cannot win. And the ROK and Japan should expand security cooperation that, despite some recent positive steps, remains minimal. Pyongyang's expressed willingness to back off its planned missile test offers only a temporary respite in a continuing game of international chicken. The United States should begin shifting responsibility for security in Northeast Asia onto its allies, who benefit the most from stability. The Cold War is over; it is time to terminate America's obsolete Cold War deployment in Korea.

*****Military Modernization Advantage Evidence Extensions**

Free Riding Now

-- Obama hasn't done anything to stop South Korean free-riding

Carpenter 9 (Ted Galen, Vice President for Defense and Foreign Policy Studies – Cato Institute, “Grading Obama”, Foreign Policy, 11-2, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/11/02/grading_obama?page=0,3)

Grading a president's foreign policy after only nine months in office is an inherently tentative and speculative enterprise. But President Barack **Obama has taken enough actions to warrant at least preliminary grades in several categories.** Iraq: a gentleman's C. He has continued the policy of a phased withdrawal of U.S. troops agreed to by Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki and President George W. Bush during the final months of the Bush administration. A faster withdrawal would be advisable, but at least the United States appears to be on its way out of that unnecessary and mismanaged war. Afghanistan: F. The president was too hasty with his initial decision to send additional troops. He is now in danger of compounding that error by agreeing to Gen. Stanley McChrystal's plan to send even more troops. The United States has drifted into an open-ended nation-building mission in an extremely unpromising arena. By escalating the U.S. commitment, Obama is moving in precisely the wrong direction. Iran: B. Obama had the courage to reach out to Iran. Only time will tell whether his diplomatic initiatives will get positive results, but his effort to date is superior to the bankrupt policies of previous administrations. At least there are now promising talks on the thorny nuclear issue. **East Asia: C. The president has avoided doing anything rash with regard to the North Korean nuclear problem.** On the other hand, **he has done little to get Japan and South Korea to become more serious about their own defenses and stop free-riding on U.S. security efforts.** Relations with China remain reasonably cordial, though the president's imposition of tariff duties on Chinese tires was a needless affront.

-- South Korea is free-riding – U.S. defense causes underinvestment in conventional forces

Carpenter and Bandow 4 (Ted Galen, Vice President for Defense and Foreign Policy Studies – Cato Institute, and Doug, Senior Fellow – Cato Institute, The Korean Conundrum: America's Troubled Relations with North and South Korea, p. 101-102)

Thus, **America's military presence** and the subsequent "mutual" defense treaty **invited ROK free-riding at the start, given the disparity in power of the two signatories.** Such behavior was not only expected but arguably justified. **By underinvesting in the military** and focusing on economic development, **Seoul set the stage for the eventual financial miracle** that has transformed South Korea into a major international economic power. But once that transformation was under way, it was time to increase the ROK's defense burden and decrease America's responsibility. That never happened. Shocked outrage greeted President Jimmy Carter's proposal to remove most U.S. troops, and that proposal eventually died. Carter's successor, Ronald Reagan, reaffirmed the one-way U.S. commitment. Year after year of record economic growth did nothing to change American policy under presidents George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton. Only pressure from the war on terrorism has prompted President George W. Bush to reconfigure, and perhaps finally reduce, Washington's force presence. **South Korea is one of America's most obvious security free-riders.** The ROK vastly outstrips its northern antagonist, possessing about 40 times the GDP, enjoying a vast technological edge, and sporting a large economic presence around the globe. The South also has twice the population of the DPRK, is friendly with every major international and regional power, in contrast to the erratic North, and long ago won the diplomatic contest throughout the Third World. However, argues Peter Huessey of GeoStrategic Analysis, a defense consulting firm, "the ROK's population, GDP and per capita income are all irrelevant to its defense."² That is true only in the sense of the South's military capabilities today. It says nothing about its potential defense capabilities. Moreover, simply citing the North's quantitative lead, 1.1 million to 686,000 armed services personnel, for instance (as defenders of the U.S. commitment to South Korea typically do), does not say much about actual combat capabilities either.¹ In any case, **the existing personnel and materiel imbalance is not inevitable,** some immutable aspect of geography on the Korean peninsula. **Rather, it results from past ROK free-riding. Seoul's failure to invest heavily in defense today to close the gap reflects current free-riding. The South can do so only because it relies on the U.S. presence as a supplemental deterrent to North Korean aggression. That the relationship is beneficial to the ROK is obvious. That it is in America's interest is not.**

Link Extensions

Umbrella creates psychological dependence that crushes South Korean morale – makes effective military policy impossible

Sik 6 (Cheong Woo, Representative – Civil Network for a Peaceful Korea, “ROK-U.S. Alliance: More Harm Than Good”, 4-4, http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?at_code=321054)

Thirdly, there is also an invisible cost. Namely, we have to consider the psychological factor that the ROK-U.S. alliance has on the Korean military and Korean elite groups. These individuals' belief that it is America that salvaged Korea from the debris of the Korean War and it is America that is the almighty superpower in the world has led to their almost blind dependence on America. It is particularly noticeable in two aspects. One is the so-called notion that "without America, Korea can do nothing." The other is their addiction to the advanced American weapons. The psychological reliance on the U.S. has paved the way for their obsequious willingness to accept the American demands in an irrationally desperate desire to keep the alliance. Unfortunately, it fundamentally nipped in the bud the South Korean military's plans of forming its own independent defense strategy. Marveling at the state-of-the-art American weaponry, these Koreans also began to display a pathological envy syndrome. Instead of thinking "how to make better use of our own arms," Korean military elites are now more inclined to think "how can we get those glitzy weapons that America has?" This is like a child who hangs out with another boy from a rich family background and starts to beg his parents to buy him the expensive toys that his rich friend has without considering his family's economic situation. This obsessive dependence on and kowtowing to what America stands for is widespread among many South Korean elites and military personnel. This irrational reliance on America consequently has taken a heavy toll on the military's most important, yet invisible asset, i.e., morale. While South Korea has among the world's finest military tactical capacities, it lacks the mental readiness to go about establishing its own independent strategic map. While South Korean soldiers are equipped with better arms, are better trained and better fed than their Northern counterparts, they are brainwashed into believing that they cannot defeat North Korea without U.S. help. The criticism that "the ROK-U.S. alliance spoiled the Korean military" came from this context.

Link Extensions

Reliance on the United States prevents ROK military modernization which is key to deterring Pyongyang

Mangum 4 (Ronald S., Professor who is a retired U.S. Army Brigadier General. He currently consults in the former Soviet Republic of Georgia as Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Defense, responsible for advising the Georgian government on the development of its National Security Strategy., “Joint Force Training: Key to ROK Military Transformation”, The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, 16(1), Spring, http://www.kida.re.kr/data/2006/04/13/06_ronald_s_mangum.pdf)

Even though adopting joint training and doctrine will enhance ROK military capabilities, there are two limiting factors which may have to be overcome before military transformation can proceed. The first limiting factor is the cost of transformation. The ROK currently has a well-equipped medium-heavy infantry-centric force, but the ROK alliance with the United States has permitted the ROK government to rely on U.S. military capability instead of acquiring its own comparable weapons systems.⁴ The failure to acquire new weapons has restricted the capability of ROK forces of all services to a level at which many believe that the ROK will have difficulty repelling a concerted attack by North Korea without U.S. support.⁵ If you take away the U.S. military capabilities that are committed to the defense of South Korea, it becomes difficult to assess the relative strength of the South Korean army against its North Korean neighbors. While the ROK Army is large—over 650,000 soldiers—its large size may belie its capability. Some writers have suggested, for example, that the U.S. 2nd Infantry Division alone, currently stationed around the Uijeonbu area north of the South Korean capital of Seoul, surpasses the firepower of 3-4 ROK divisions, exceeding a ROK corps in strength.⁶ In addition, U.S. capabilities of high performance fighter aircraft, precision-guided munitions and sophisticated communications simply don't exist in the ROK inventory. This lack of firepower is what leads analysts to determine that without U.S. military assistance, the ROK military would not be able to stop a North Korean military attack. Furthermore, this cost estimate does not address the cost required to repair existing military infrastructure—barracks, for example—to bring quality of life for ROK soldiers in line with modern standards. A recent article decried the Spartan condition of ROK army barracks that are more than 40 years old and in which battalion-sized units of 400 often use a bathroom suited for 40 soldiers. Reliance on U.S. military support for its defense needs has also permitted the ROK government to ignore upgrades in basic weaponry. Most ROK tanks were built in the 1950s and 1960s, and spare parts are no longer being produced. Many ROK helicopters have been in service for more than 40 years—long beyond their expected useful life. So even if the ROK were to continue to rely on the U.S. military presence, it must bear the cost to upgrade quality of life for its soldiers and its weapons systems.

*****Answers to Negative Arguments**

US-South Korea Relations Answers

-- Turn – burden-sharing – plan boosts ROK defense spending, key to balanced cooperation – that's Bandow. Vital to overall relations.

Bandow 3 (Doug, Senior Fellow – Cato Institute and Robert A. Taft Fellow – American Conservative Defense Alliance, “Bring the Troops Home: Ending the Obsolete Korean Commitment”, Cato Policy Analysis, 5-7, <http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa474.pdf>)

Cutting the U.S. security commitment to South Korea does not mean ending close cooperation and friendship between the two countries. Intelligence sharing and port access rights would be beneficial for both nations. Depending on the direction inter-Korean relations take, the ROK might become interested in cooperating with Washington in developing a missile defense and possibly nuclear weapons. Cultural ties between the two states would remain strong. Family and friends span the Pacific, as a result of the millions of Americans who have served in South Korea and the hundreds of thousands of Koreans who have immigrated to America. More than 1.2 million Americans identified themselves as Korean in the 2000 census.¹¹⁷ Indeed, Americans are likely to receive a warmer welcome if our fractious military relationship is replaced by one based on commerce. An equal, cooperative relationship between the governments is more likely once the ROK is no longer dependent on America for its defense. Finally, economic ties will remain strong after an American troop withdrawal. Korea is America's seventh largest trading partner, with two-way trade totaling \$57.4 billion in 2001.¹¹⁸ An obvious step forward would be a free trade agreement. In May 2001, even before congressional approval of President Bush's Trade Promotion Authority, Sen. Max Baucus (D-Mont.), then chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, introduced legislation authorizing the U.S. Trade Representative to negotiate such an agreement.¹¹⁹ The ROK has already inked a trade accord with Chile and is discussing the possibility of doing so with Japan.¹²⁰ Investment flows both ways. The United States is a leading source of foreign direct investment in South Korea. At the same time, total Korean investment in America rose above \$3.1 billion, 40 percent of the ROK's total. The United States competes with China as the leading destination for Korean overseas investment and is ahead of all other nations.¹²¹ That trend is likely to continue as South Korean businesses grow in size, expertise, and resources. In sum, South Koreans have built a vital, powerful, and growing nation. The best way for America and the ROK to achieve the sort of “equal” relationship desired by so many Koreans is to eliminate the ROK's status as an American defense protectorate.

-- Plan solves anti-Americanism that will collapse relations –key to sustainable cooperation

Kang 3 (C.S. Eliot, Associate Professor of Political Science – Northern Illinois University, “Restructuring the US-South Korean Alliance to Deal with the Second Korean Nuclear Crisis”, *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 57(2), July, p. 322)

*Note – USFK = United States Forces, Korea

Such a major overhaul of the alliance would be a positive development in bridging the current divide in the US-South Korea alliance. For both Seoul and Washington, the dramatic scaling down of the USFK and the termination of the CFC would help to defuse a dangerous and growing anti-American nationalism in South Korea and would deny North Korea important points of contention that it has manipulated to win sympathy in South Korea. If the result of the earlier ‘separation’ of the United States and the Philippines is a useful indicator, the ‘strategic distancing’ being contemplated could have a salutary effect on the long-term bilateral relationship as less familiarity and intimacy seem to foster more respect and better cooperation on common security concerns.

US-South Korea Relations Answers

-- Alliance collapse inevitable – multiple reasons

Bandow 3 (Doug, Senior Fellow – Cato Institute and Robert A. Taft Fellow – American Conservative Defense Alliance, “Ending the Anachronistic Korean Commitment”, *Parameters*, 33, Summer, <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/PARAMETERS/03summer/bandow%20.pdf>)

The United States established a permanent troop presence in the Korean peninsula with the onset of the Korean War. But changing perceptions of the threat posed by the North, combined with increasing national self-confidence in South Korea, are challenging bilateral relations. South Korean frustrations are not new, but they have gained greater force than ever before. Explains Kim Sung-han of the Institute for Foreign Affairs and National Security, “Anti-Americanism is getting intense. It used to be widespread and not so deep. Now it’s getting widespread and deep.”⁹ Although polls show that a majority of South Koreans still supports the US troop presence, a majority also pronounces its dislike of America. Some Americans hope that the sentiments will recede and everything will go back to normal. However, the generation grateful for American aid in the Korean War is passing from the scene. Younger people associate the United States more with US support for various military regimes and the indignities (and tragedies) of a foreign troop presence. Policy differences between Seoul and Washington also will likely worsen as the nuclear crisis proceeds. In late January, President Kim Dae-jung offered veiled criticism of the United States: “Sometimes we need to talk to the other party, even if we dislike the other party.”¹⁰ At the same time, Washington was pushing the issue toward the UN Security Council, which, in Seoul’s view, would short-circuit the diplomatic process. Shortly thereafter the Bush Administration pointedly observed that military action remained an option, generating a near hysterical response from Seoul. Indeed, Roh Moo-hyun, who once called for the withdrawal of US forces, ran on an explicit peace platform that sharply diverged from US policy: “We have to choose between war and peace,” he told one rally.¹¹ He owes his narrow election victory to rising popular antagonism against the United States and particularly the presence of American troops. Of course, he later tried to moderate his position and called for strengthening the alliance. Yet he complained that “so far, all changes in the size of US troop strength here have been determined by the United States based on its strategic consideration, without South Korea’s consent.”¹² Moreover, proposed “reforms” of the relationship—adjusting the Status of Forces Agreement, moving America’s Yongsan base out of Seoul, withdrawing a small unit or two, changing the joint command (which envisions an American general commanding Korean troops in war)—are mere Band-Aids. President Roh has called for a more “equal” relationship and promised not to “kowtow” to Washington. ¹³ But the relationship between the two countries will never be equal so long as South Korea is dependent on Washington for its defense. The United States cannot be expected to risk war on another nation’s terms.