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# Democracy promotion

## Broad- includes econ., edu., liberalism, etc.:

*(Sandra Lavenex [Institute of Political Science at the University of Lucerne] and Frank Schimmelfennig [Centre for Comparative and International Studies at Eidgenossische Technische Hochschule], Democracy Promotion in the EU’s Neighbourhood: From Leverage to Governance?, Google Books, published by Routledge, Sept 13 2013)*

**We propose three** ideal-typical **models of democracy promotion**: **linkge, leverage, and governance**. These models can be distinguished on four main dimensions: the target system of democracy promotion, the envisaged outcome, the main channels, and the typical instruments. • Target systems of democracy promotion. **Democracy promotion can be targeted at the polity as such, including the electoral regime, the division of powers between state organs, and respect for individual rights and civil liberties**. On the other hand, **it may** operate at the level of society and **target the socio-economic preconditions for democratization, including economic growth, education, the spread of liberal values, and the organization of civil society and the public sphere.** Finally, **democracy promotion may also target sectors: the policy-specific governance regimes** — **such as environmental policy, market regulation, welfare regimes, or internal security.** • Envisaged outcome of democracy promotion Depending on the target, the outcome of successful democracy promotion differs. If it is targeted at the polity level, the typical outcome should be democratic institutions guaran- teeing vertical (electoral) and horizontal accountability as well as the rule of law. When the target is society, the envisaged result is a democratic, 'civic' culture and meso-level institutions such as civic associations, parties, and a democratic public sphere. In the case of sectoral democracy promotion, the goal should be 'democratic governance', i.e. procedural prin- ciples of democratically legitimate political-administrative behaviour, including sectoral transparency, accountability, and societal participation. Channels of democracy promotion. The actors primarily addressed by inter-administrations/agencies. Correspondingly, we speak of an intergovernmental, transnational, and transgovernmental channel of democracy promotion and of a top-down, a bottom-up, and a horizontal direction of external democracy promotion. Instruments of democracy promotion **The** most **basic distinction regarding the instruments** or mechanisms **of** international **democracy promotion is** , 12 **'conditionality vs. socialization. Conditionality implies** a **bargaining** process **in which** an international actor uses selective **incentives** in order to **change** the **behaviour of actors in the target country.** These target actors are assumed to weigh the benefits they derive from democratic change against the costs and to comply with international conditions if the benefits exceed the costs. By contrast, **socialization is a learning process in which an** international **actor teaches** domestic actors **democratic norms and practices in order to persuade** them of their superiority. Democratic change then results from a change in normative and causal beliefs.

## Broad- includes contextual conditions:

*(A. Wetzel [postdoctoral fellow at the Mannheim Centre for European Social Research at the University of Mannheim] and J. Orbie [assoc. prof at the dept of poli sci and director of the centre for EU studies at Ghent Univ], The Substance of EU Democracy Promotion: Concepts and Cases, Google Books, Published by Springer, Feb 17 2015)*

We have modified Merkel's original model in that we have explicitly added the element of stateness and have included state bureaucracy from Linz and Stepan's conceptualization. **In the following** paragraphs, **we** briefly **summarize the five partial regimes and four context conditions along which we** will **structure** our **analysis** **of** the substance of EU **democracy promotion** (for the next paragraphs, see Merkel 2004: 38-9). **The electoral regime has the central position of the five partial regimes** since it is necessary, but not sufficient, for democratic governing. Following Dahl, Merkel outlines **four supporting elements of this regime: universal, active suffrage; universal, passive right to vote; free and fair elections; and elected representatives. The** most **closely connected partial regime is** constituted by **the political liberties that go beyond the right to vote.** Most basically, **they include the right to political communication and organization**, that is, **press freedom and the right to association**. These define how meaningful the process of preference formation is in the public arena. **The third partial regime consists of civil rights that are central to the rule of law, that is, the 'containment and limitation of the exercise of state power'** (Merkel 2004: 39). Most fundamentally, **this includes that individual liberties are not violated by the state, and equality before the law. Related to this is the existence of independent courts. The fourth** connected **partial regime consists of divisions of power and horizontal accountability. This implies that 'elected authorities are surveyed by** a network of **relatively autonomous institutions and may be pinned down to constitutionally defined lawful action'** (Merkel 2004: 40; see also Morlino 2004: 18). The horizontal separation of powers thus amends the vertical control mechanisms of elections and the public sphere. Particular emphasis is put on the limitations to executive power. Central to this partial regime is the existence of an independent and functional judiciary to review executive and legislative acts. **The last partial regime is the effective power to govern. This means that it is the elected representatives that actually govern and that actors not subject to democratic accountability should not hold decision-making power**. In particular, there should be no tutelary powers or reserved policy domains (Merkel 2004: 41—2; see also Valenzuela 1992: 62—6). **While these five partial regimes are understood to be the defining components of a democracy, there are some more conditions that,** while not part of the definition itself, shape the 'environment that encompasses, **enable**s, **and stabilize**s **the democratic regime'** (Merkel 2004: 44). **Damage to these conditions might lead to** defects in, or the **destabilization of, democracy**. However, it is important to add that the promotion of the external conditions alone does not necessarily further democratization. On the contrary, a sole focus on the context conditions can even be to the detriment of democratization (for example, Fukuyama 2005: 87—8). **The first of the external supporting conditions is stateness, understood as the ability of the state to pursue the monopoly of legitimate physical force.** Where the monopoly of authority and physical force is not institutionalized, it cannot be democratized (Merkel et al. 2003: 58). Following Linz and Stepan, a state is indispensable for democracy: 'No state, no democracy' (1996b: 14). Although this strict connection between state and democracy can be disputed (Beetham 1999: 4—5), it is consistent with the traditional liberal democratic definitions of democracy that focus on 'governmental activity and institutions' at the state level (Held 2006 77). Stateness is seen to be problematic when the territorial boundaries and the eligibility for citizenship are disputed (Linz and Stepan 1996: ch. 2). **It also 'implies that** the organs of the state uphold monopolistic control in a basic military, legal, and fiscal sense' and that **there are no competing power centres exercising control** in these areas (Bäck and Hadenius 2008: 3). **The second external context condition**, which, in contrast to Merkel's original framework and our own earlier work, we have separated from stateness, **is state administrative capacity. It refers to a capable administration.** As Linz and Stepan put it, democracy relies on 'the effective capacity to command, regulate, and extract'. **The bureaucracy must be usable** by the democratic government (Linz and Stepan 1996: 11). In a broader sense, **this condition refers to good governance**, in particular to the output-related understanding. It includes in particular the effective government component of good governance promotion, which deals with the 'administrative core of good governance' and implies 'improving governance through strengthening the government and its administration' (Börzel et al. 2008: 10). **The third external context condition is** the presence of **civil society. This is the 'arena of the polity where self-organizing groups, movements, and individuals, relatively autonomously from the state,** attempt to **articulate values, create associations** and solidarities, **and advance their interests'** (Linz and Stepan 1996: 7). The importance of this context condition stems from the assumption that a well-developed **civil society strengthens democracy by generating** and enabling **'checks of power**, responsibility, **societal inclusion**, tolerance, fairness, trust, cooperation, **and** often also the **efficient implementation of** accepted political **programs'** (Merkel 2004: 47). The promotion of civil society is often seen as a part of good governance promotion and can be both input and output-oriented. While the former orientation stresses the empowerment of non-state actors in policy-making 'in order to improve the democratic quality of decision-making processes' the latter refers to the strengthening and/or inclusion of non-state actors in the policy implementation process with the aim of either producing better policies or better implementing policies. The case studies will, as far as possible, indicate which orientation EU civil society promotion follows in each specific instance (Börzel et al. 2008: 10). **The fourth external condition** that has an influence on the state of democracy **is the socio-economic context**. On the one hand, **this condition accounts for the link between economic development and** the capability to sustain **democracy**, which has proven to be very stable (Ingelhart and Welzel 2009). On the other hand, it reminds us that a certain level of socio-economic equality is necessary for meaningful political equality: 'Only when citizens are secured and educated by means of a sufficiently developed social and economic status will they be able to form independent opinions as citizens and participate in the political process (Merkel 2004: 45; see also O'Donnell 2001: 27-9). **On this basis**, and with regard to the above-mentioned puzzle, **we distinguish five possible types of democracy promotion** that differ with regard to the substance that is being promoted **1-** **Externally embedded liberal democracy promotion**: **besides the five partial regimes**, the EU also significantly **supports the advancement of the external conditions. 2- Liberal democracy promotion**: the EU mainly **promotes the five partial regimes of liberal democracy**. **3- Partial liberal democracy promotion**: the EU mainly **promotes some partial regimes while it neglects others, for example 'electoralism'** 4**- External conditions democracy promotion**: the EU mainly **supports the advancement of the external conditions**. **5- No liberal democracy promotion:** there are **no activities related to the support of any partial regime or context condition (even though** the EU **may refer to some actions as democracy promotion**).

## Broad- experts disagree on def.:

*(Susan B. Epstein, Nina M. Serafino, and Francis T. Miko, Specialists in Foreign Policy Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, Congressional Research Service, “Democracy Promotion: Cornerstone of U.S. Foreign Policy?,” https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34296.pdf, Dec 26 2007)*

**The U**nited **S**tates **provides democracy assistance to many countries in a variety of circumstances** and with mixed degrees of success. Analysts categorize country circumstances and affects of assistance in different ways. **Generally**, **analysts have viewed U.S. democracy aid as facilitating transitions either from authoritarian or communist rule,** as in Latin America and Central Europe, **or from conflict**, as in Bosnia and African nations such as Sierra Leone and Liberia.38 **The range of U.S. democracy promotion activities and programs also varies greatly, from assistance for elections to aid in developing institutions and to funding of civil society groups.** (These types of assistance are discussed below.) Thus far, **there is little agreement among experts and practitioners on** the circumstances in which democracy promotion success may be achieved; the appropriate **emphasis, sequencing, and mix of programs** to achieve it; and the time frame necessary for an enduring democracy to take hold.

## Broad- 3 elements:

*(Danile Smadja, “The European Union: Key actor in worldwide democracy promotion,” Proceedings of a conference organised by the European Office of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftunghttp://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas\_11856-1522-2-30.pdf?110504154444, June 5-6 2007)*

**Three elements can be considered** **as characterising** the EU approach to **democracy promotion** or democracy building: **1).** **The** EU **approach** relates to a wide variety of possible situations. It **may** be **target**ed towards **regimes with very limited freedoms and** little **political pluralism**; **it may be combined with peace-building in post-conflict situations; it may support new institutions and democratic practice in emerging democracies; it may be** well **integrated in development cooperation, strengthening participation and accountability** within sector programmes for achieving Millennium Development Goals; i**t may also be offered to more established democracies to assist in dealing with new threats, such as terrorism. 2). The** EU **approach uses many different instruments or tools. The focus may be on financial and technical assistance and grant aid**, but several other tools may be of particular relevance such as **political dialogues and other diplomatic instruments, financial incentives, conditionalities and sanctions, trade and investment instruments - for example** EU support for **WTO membership - mobilisation of civilian and military capabilities, humanitarian assistance, multilateral initiatives, public information and advocacy and monitoring. The wide range of possible instruments, that may be used individually or in combination, means that there is a** major **challenge** for the EU to achieve a joinedup approach between instruments, **to ensure coherence and** a **common narrative between different democracy actors and donors**. This is not always easy. The value that democracy can add, for example in helping achieving the MDGs, attracting investment, avoiding social unrest and political instability, linked with ‘local ownership’ of the democratisation and development process, is a standard justification for democracy assistance, whereas universal values and commitments under international conventions are often used as a frame of reference for political conditionalities and invoked in cases of specific abuse. **3). The** EU **approach** involves many different types of assistance. It **may be long term and highly structured, as in an accession partnership agreement – combining a road map, financial and technical assistance, benchmarks, monitoring – or very short term and highly specific, such as election observation. It may involve very indirect action to assist in creating a conducive environment for democracy** to flourish **for example through peace building initiatives, educational reform, action to combat drug trafficking, or direct technical support for a specific political process for example security sector reform. Any action to facilitate, advocate, inform, educate, or bring pressure to secure particular policy changes, for example quotas for women in parliament or abolition of torture, may be considered** a form of **democracy promotion.**

## Broad- includes tech & financial assistance:

*(Julia Leininger, “Democracy promotion in fragile states: challenges and opportunities for the EU,” Worldwide promotion of democracy: challenges, role and strategy of the European Union, Proceedings of a conference organised by the European Office of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftunghttp://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas\_11856-1522-2-30.pdf?110504154444, June 5-6 2007)*

The industry of **democracy promotion** has flourished in recent years. It **is exercised by a multitude of actors in very heterogeneous contexts** – some of them extremely difficult. This presentation focuses on fragile states, a specific type of difficult environment, and on **the** specific actor that is the European Union. Against the background of the current debate on international democracy promotion with specific regard to the EU, I argue that, firstly, the EU should play a major role as a promoter of democracy. Secondly, the paradigm of sequencing in democracy promotion is not valid under certain circumstances and, thirdly, the EU could strengthen its role as a democracy promoter within its existing framework by pursuing a complementary approach of state-building and democracy promotion. My presentation is structured in three parts. First, I introduce my **concept of democracy promotion** and state-building in the context of fragile states. Second, short empirical findings from the EU´s cooperation with Haiti and Mali will be discussed. Third, I will conclude my presentation with general remarks on how the EU´s role as a promoter of democracy can be strengthened. I use the term democracy promotion in a rather narrow sense; that **is** I am talking of **assistance to democracy in terms of direct technical, and maybe also financial support**. I further assume **that democracy cannot be enforced or exported.**

## Broad- “hearts & minds”:

*(Dr. Karsten Grabow, “Internal actors, external actors: country categories, country approaches – conclusions,” Proceedings of a conference organised by the European Office of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftunghttp://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas\_11856-1522-2-30.pdf?110504154444, June 5-6 2007)*

**In** summarising the main issues relating to **defining democracy promotion**, and developing appropriate policy approaches, **three main points can be identified**: The concept of democracy promotion **First, there is consensus that a detailed definition of democracy promotion** or democracy assistance **is necessary**, not only from European countries or organisations, but also from the EU itself. **This definition should emphasise that democracy means much more than regime change and free elections.** Democracy is a demanding political concept that is important for people’s lives. Therefore, democratic values should be placed at the centre of all activities – political education and **democracy promotion** – since democracy **begins** not at the institutional level, but **in hearts, minds and behaviour**. Once a detailed definition of democracy promotion exists, democracy promotion must become an integral part of the foreign policy of both EU member states and the EU itself. The role of foundations and other democracy promoters **Second, it is crucial to focus on institutions (such as parliaments) and individual and collective actors. Focusing on political parties is especially important, because parties are key actors of political integration and decision-making, which serve a special purpose in democracy promotion. Without political parties, democracy cannot be organised**. There are reliable and experienced organisations at European level, such as political foundations and party institutions, that can work with political parties in order to promote democratic party systems. These organisations combine experience of global democracy promotion and promotion of democratic parties, with country expertise and access to democratic and political decision-makers. Crucially, they are also based on general democratic values. These values, combined with experience of global democracy promotion and long established contacts with democratic partners in the host countries, make these organisations an efficient instrument of democracy promotion abroad. A multilevel approach **Third, the range and diversity of organisations, such as foundations and** European **political party organisations, are decisive assets for** European **democracy promotion. It seems logical that the work of promoting multiparty systems should be done through a decentralised framework, based on** and committed to **universal values of democracy.** For this purpose, political foundations, party organisations and similar institutions can serve as a model.

## Precise:

*(Philippe C. Schmitter and Imco Brouwer, EUI Dept of political and social sciences, “Conceptualizing, Researching and Evaluating Democracy Promotion and Protection,” European University Institute, EUI Working Paper No 99/9, http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/id/995/, 1999)*

1. Defining Democracy Promotion & Protection   
 Democracy promotion & protection is a subset of activities in what has been labeled as the international context or international dimensions of democratization, i.e. all external actors and factors that affect the political regime situation in a specific country. **Democracy promotion** & protection **can be defined as follows: Democracy promotion** & protection **consists of all overt and voluntary activities adopted, supported, and (directly or indirectly) implemented by (public or private) foreign actors explicitly designed to contribute to the political liberalization of autocratic regimes, democratization of autocratic regimes, or consolidation of democracy in specific recipient countries.** **This definition excludes**, among other things, **covert activities by external actors (e.g. "quiet" diplomatic efforts or activities of secret services) as well as indirect activities (e.g. literacy campaigns, improving a population's health, generic forms of propaganda, or promoting economic development).** Their exclusion from the definition of DPP should not be interpreted as implying that they have no impact on political liberalization, democratization, or consolidation of democracy, but just that **they are qualitatively different in intent and origin**. Moreover**, the effects of these activities upon regime change are** generally very hard or i**mpossible to observe and analyze. The definition also** excludes activities adopted, supported and implemented exclusively by domestic actors. In addition, it **excludes** a number of **factors** of the international context "**without agency**" **that could positively influence democratization, i.e. all forms of imitation, contagion, learning that emerge from the "normal" transactions between persons and countries. Our definition** of DPP **does include** a large variety of activities, such as **sanctions, diplomatic protests, threats of military intervention when they are used conditionally upon the democratic behavior of recipients, activities to promote the observance of human rights, to educate to civic norms, and the transfer of institutional models - such as supreme courts, legislatures, and electoral and party systems.**

## Middle East specific:

*(Thomas Carothers [Carnegie Endowment], “Choosing a Strategy,” printed in “Uncharted Journey: Promoting Democracy in the Middle East,” edited by Thomas Carothers [vice president for international politics and governance at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and founder and director of the Endowment's Democracy and Rule of Law Project] and Marina Ottaway [director of the Carnegie Middle East program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace], Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Print, March 1 2010)*

To date, the soft line lacks definition. As U.S. State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) **officials have searched for ways to step up U.S. efforts to promote democracy in the Middle East, they have** tended to **put forward many ideas**. All of these various ideas are appealing to one group or another in the U.S. policy community but do not necessarily add up to a coherent strategy— **promoting women's rights, bolstering civil society, revitalizing education, fostering good governance, strengthening the rule of law, supporting decentralization**, and so forth.

## U.S. Senate definitions:

*(Susan B. Epstein, Nina M. Serafino, and Francis T. Miko, Specialists in Foreign Policy Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, Congressional Research Service, “Democracy Promotion: Cornerstone of U.S. Foreign Policy?,” https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34296.pdf, Dec 26 2007)*

The following year, **the Senate Appropriations Committee** Report for FY2007 (S.Rept. 109-277/H.R. 5522) **asserted**, “to ensure a common understanding of democracy programs among United States Government agencies, **the Committee defines** in the act ‘**the promotion of democracy’ to include programs that support good governance, human rights, independent media, and the rule of law, and otherwise strengthen the capacity of democratic political parties, NGOs, and citizens to support the development of democratic states, institutions and practices that are responsible and accountable to citizens**.”15

*(Susan B. Epstein, Nina M. Serafino, and Francis T. Miko, Specialists in Foreign Policy Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, Congressional Research Service, “Democracy Promotion: Cornerstone of U.S. Foreign Policy?,” https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34296.pdf, Dec 26 2007)*

**Congress has demonstrated its concern for the** lack of **a consistent definition for democracy. The Senate Foreign Operations Appropriation Committee** Report for FY2006 (S.Rept. 109-96/H.R. 3057) stated, “The Committee remains concerned that the State Department and USAID do not share a common definition of a democracy program. For the purposes of this Act, ‘**a democracy program’ means technical assistance and other support to strengthen the capacity of democratic political parties, governments, non-governmental institutions, and/or citizens, in order to support the development of democratic states, institutions and practices that are responsive and accountable to citizens.”**14

## Types of USFG demo promo:

*(Susan B. Epstein, Nina M. Serafino, and Francis T. Miko, Specialists in Foreign Policy Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, Congressional Research Service, “Democracy Promotion: Cornerstone of U.S. Foreign Policy?,” https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34296.pdf, Dec 26 2007)*

For years, **the U.S. government has supported numerous** bilateral and multilateral **activities that promote democracy around the world. Both the executive and congressional branches** of government **are involved.** Executive Branch Activities The Bush Administration has been heavily invested in promoting democracy to other countries. A theme in Secretary Rice’s Transformational Diplomacy, announced in January 2006, is her plan to reform U.S. diplomacy and foreign assistance activities with a key objective of promoting democracy in other countries.67 Bilateral Programs. Specific executive branch **bilateral government activities that support democracy** reform **include providing aid to support election procedures and good governance practices, assisting in building the legal system, assisting in military and police training, and teaching the importance of a free press. Public diplomacy programs such as U.S. international broadcasting, exchanges, and international information programs promote democracies overseas by showcasing American democracy and culture. Some exchanges provide foreign participants with training and experience in broadcast or print media techniques**. **The Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), a foreign assistance program** proposed by President Bush in 2002 and authorized by Congress in 2004, **was designed to provide foreign aid to countries that make progress toward democratic** and economic **reform**. **The Department of State is** considered to be **the lead agency for democracy promotion** activities; **others involved** with democracy promotion **include** the U.S. Agency for International Development (**USAID**), the **D**epartments **o**f **Defense** **and** **Justice**, **and the Broadcasting Board of Governors**. **In addition, numerous NGOs, including the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and The Asia Foundation, are** fully **involved** in democracy promotion abroad. **They receive congressionally appropriated funds** that are passed to them through the Department of State’s budget. U.S. government funding for democracy programs is primarily within the State Department/Foreign Operations budget. Referred to as the Governing Justly and Democratically strategic objective, **this funding is allocated by** account and by region. (See Table 1 below.) Governing Justly and Democratically includes **four elements: 1- Rule of Law and Human Rights. Funding** under this heading **supports constitutions, laws and legal systems, justice systems, judicial independence, and human rights. 2- Good Governance.** Funding under **this supports legislative** functions and **processes, public sector executive functions, security sector governance, anti-corruption reforms, local governance, and decentralization. 3- Political Competition and Consensus-Building.** This category **supports elections and political processes, political parties, and consensus-building processes. 4- Civil Society. Funding focuses on media freedom, freedom of information, and civic participation.** In addition to funds for Governing Justly and Democratically, the Department of State budget contains funds that are transferred to the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and The Asia Foundation. NED’s FY2008 total request is $80 million, of which about $70 million will go for democracy program support. The Asia Foundation’s FY2008 total budget request is $10 million, of which about $8.8 million will support democracy promotion. Therefore, the total estimated funding request for democracy promotion activities in FY2008 is over $1.5 billion. Multilateral Programs. **The U.S. government also contributes to a number of multilateral efforts to promote** or monitor **democratic reform around the world. Included are the United Nations Development Program, the U.N. Democracy Fund, the Community of Democracies, and Freedom House, as well as the World Bank and the Organization of American States** (OAS). An indication of the level of importance Secretary Rice places on democracy promotion is her announcement to establish the Advisory Commission on Democracy Promotion to “help us think about the issues of democracy promotion, to from time to time give us constructive criticism on what it is that we’re doing, as well as constructive suggestions about what more we might do.” What the Commission will not do, however, which many foreign policy observers say is needed, is coordinate all the many facets of democracy promotion activities in which the U.S. government is involved. A coordination mechanism, experts say, would contribute to improving the effectiveness and efficiency of ongoing programs and would help to minimize the possibility of democracy promotion programs and U.S. tax dollars working at cross purposes. Furthermore, some observers note, there is a lack of global coordination among developed countries supporting democracy promotion throughout the world. From their perspective, improved communication among developed democracies and letting each specialize in its area of comparative advantage, whether economic, cultural, or geographical, could further democracy promotion effectiveness worldwide while keeping costs down. Congressional Involvement **Congress also plays a role in democracy promotion**. **Setting funding levels and providing oversight** of Administration democracy promotion programs are typically how Congress influences U.S. democracy promotion programs. **The House** of Representatives **also created the House Democracy Assistance Commission** (**HDAC**) **to help other governments’ legislative branches evolve**. (See below and Appendix B for a history of congressional democracy promotion activities.) From the 101st Congress through the first session of the 110th Congress, numerous pieces of legislation were introduced and passed to authorize and appropriate funds for democracy promotion in specific countries and regions, and to press governments of non-democratic countries to begin a process of democratization. Significant sums were appropriated for democracy programs through the annual State Department and Foreign Operations Appropriations. In FY2006, Congress created the Democracy Fund in the Foreign Operations Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2006 (P.L. 109-102, Title III), which provided $94.1 million for various democracy promotion activities in FY2006 and the same amount for FY2007.68 In addition, Congress passed the Implementation of the 9/11 Commission Act (P.L. 110-53/H.R. 1), which includes Title XXI, Advancing Democratic Values, Subtitle A — Activities to Enhance the Promotion of Democracy. n the first session of the 110th Congress, several bills involving democracy promotion were introduced. The ADVANCE Democracy Act of 2007 (H.R. 982), introduced on February 12, 2007, by Representative Tom Lantos (D-CA) and others, contains provisions to promote democracy in foreign countries, calls for specific State Department actions and reports with regard to non-democracies, aims to strengthen the “Community of Democracies,” and authorizes funding for democracy assistance for FY2008 and FY2009. Other bills introduced in the 110th Congress address democracy in individual countries, including the Ukraine, Venezuela, Afghanistan, Vietnam, and Serbia. Building on a long tradition of supporting the development of democracies and democratic institutions around the world in many ways,69 Congress currently carries out its own program to support legislatures in new democracies. The House Democracy Assistance Commission (**HDAC**) was created in March 2005, in effect the successor effort to previous congressional legislative assistance programs in the 1990s. HDAC was established to enable Members, officers, and staff of the House of Representatives and congressional support agencies to **provide** expert **advice to fledgling legislatures on subjects such as committee operations, oversight, constituent relations, parliamentary procedures, and the establishment of support services**. To date, the HDAC has assisted legislatures of 12 countries throughout the world.70

## Requires 3 prongs:

*(Michael Singh, Visiting fellow at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, "The U.S. Approach to Promoting Democracy in the Middle East", Paper presented at a conference organized by the Euro-Mediterranean Foundation of Support to Human Rights Defenders (EMHRF): Democratic Change in the Arab Region: State Policy and the Dynamics of the Civil Society, Brussels, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/html/pdf/Singh20110403Brussels.pdf, April 2011)*

A Three-Pronged Approach to Democracy Promotion **Debates over democracy promotion are often muddled by the fact that promoting democracy can mean different things to different people. In fact**, a comprehensive approach to **democracy promotion requires three prongs**: **top-down work with governments, bottom-up work with civil society, and institutionbuilding efforts to** provide a **connect**ion between **the two**.17 **It is tempting**, and sometimes politically expedient, **to focus on just one or two of these prongs** and dispense with the others. **However, doing so seems likely to** fail and perhaps to **backfire**. **For example**, exclusively top-down or bottom-up efforts risk appearing hypocritical or unreasonably raising expectations for change; **focusing exclusively on institutionbuilding may** simply **increase the competence of an autocratic system**. Top-down democracy promotion involves working with or pressuring governments to open space for popular participation in politics. While this likely includes pressing for free, fair, and competitive elections and a pluralistic party system, it is not limited to calling for elections. Indeed, while the United States has been criticized in the past for a supposed overemphasis on elections in democracy promotion, Tom Carothers of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace asserts that “U.S. democracy promotion, programs, and policies for the most part do not reflect an exclusive or even an overweening emphasis on elections.”18 Other aspects of opening political space—the object of top-down efforts—include, but are not limited to, increasing participation (for example, by women and minorities) in politics; ensuring civil liberties such as freedom of expression, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, and—an apt addition made by Secretary Clinton—“freedom to connect”; and ensuring the independence of the judiciaries and legislatures. Top-down efforts should also focus on economic reform and corruption, which often are intimately connected to the structural underpinnings of autocratic regimes. While top-down pressure on governments for political and economic reform can strain relations, so can many other diplomatic issues of interest to the United States—pressure for reform is hardly unique in this regard. The impression, however, that democracy promotion is not a core interest of the United States, but rather a luxury vaguely connected to our values, can lead senior and working-level officials alike to shy away from top-down pressure and instead focus on saving our diplomatic capital for more “strategic” issues. But this is a mistake—it is in the day-to-day work of diplomats and in the content of meetings and press conferences, not in one-off speeches, that democracy promotion policy truly resides. Bottom-up democracy promotion, to put it simply, involves the provision of assistance to individuals and civil society organizations aimed at enhancing their political or, in some cases, economic participation. Bottom-up efforts raise issues which are perhaps more complicated than those implicated by top-down efforts—for example, whether to deal with certain parties (such as Islamists), the possibility that direct association with the United States or other Western governments may undermine civil society actors, and difficult decisions about whether to work with or around governments. For these and other reasons, the U.S. government frequently conducts its bottom-up democracy promotion efforts at arm’s length, through NGOs or multilateral bodies. Institution-building efforts are the intermediary between top-down and bottom-up democracy promotion; if top-down efforts open political space and bottom-up efforts train individuals and organizations to fill that space, then institution-building efforts seek to provide that political space with structure. In a sense, institution-building is the most important of the three prongs, in that decisions by leaders can be reversed, and individual members of civil society come and go, but effective and deeply rooted institutions—such as functioning courts and prisons, accountable legislatures, professional media, political parties, internet connectivity, and professional security services—can provide stability and sustainability to a process of democratization. But institution-building is also the most difficult and most slowly unfolding of the three prongs. Diplomacy and development must come together for successful institution-building, as maintaining its momentum and progress over time often requires working with a succession of governmental and civil society leaders. Across these three prongs of democracy promotion, many tools are available to the United States. These include bilateral diplomacy, such as meetings between high-ranking officials which provide a venue to stress the importance of political reform to the United States; multilateral diplomacy, such as that conducted through the Broader Middle East and North Africa (BMENA) initiative through the G-8; cultural and public diplomacy, such as people-to-people and legislative exchanges; technological tools; public statements, such as the speeches noted earlier; public-private partnerships, such as the “Partners for a New Beginning” initiative launched in April 2010; financial and other forms of assistance; and tools such as sanctions, incentives, and occasionally coercion.

## Includes political & developmental:

*(A. Wetzel [postdoctoral fellow at the Mannheim Centre for European Social Research at the University of Mannheim] and J. Orbie [assoc. prof at the dept of poli sci and director of the centre for EU studies at Ghent Univ], The Substance of EU Democracy Promotion: Concepts and Cases, Google Books, Published by Springer, Feb 17 2015)*

In order **to map** the substance of EU **democracy promotion, we take into account not only activities that are explicitly labelled as such, but all activities that are** potentially **conducive to the development of** any of the partial regimes or context conditions. Thus, for instance, while cooperation on social matters is sometimes separated from **democracy**, **for example** in the Commission's progress reports in the enlargement framework (see the respective chapters), **we treat** it **as** a **democracy promotion** **activity** because it contributes to **advancing** **the socio-economic** context **condition**. Yet we are aware that a sole focus on social issues may not lead to democratization. We have elaborated on this tension elsewhere (Wetzel and Orbie 2011b, Wetzel and Orbie 2012). Conversely, **activities labelled as democracy promotion are** only **counted as such when they are designed to develop any of the partial regimes or context conditions (regardless of their actual effectiveness**). For instance, the 'Democracy, Good Governance and Stability' Platform established under the EU's Eastern Partnership actually comprises a range of activities that would not be considered as democracy promotion, such as police cooperation on drug trafficking, migration, fight against cybercrime, and coping with natural and man-made disasters (Eastern Partnership 2012). The terms 'narrow' and 'shallow' are not meant to refer to a 'worse' form of EU democracy promotion. The EU might have good reasons not to pursue a broad democracy promotion strategy in a certain country. In some instances, such as in Brazil or Israel, the state of democracy is already rather advanced. In other cases, such as Eritrea, the third country government's willingness to cooperate on democracy promotion is low.

*(A. Wetzel [postdoctoral fellow at the Mannheim Centre for European Social Research at the University of Mannheim] and J. Orbie [assoc. prof at the dept of poli sci and director of the centre for EU studies at Ghent Univ], The Substance of EU Democracy Promotion: Concepts and Cases, Google Books, Published by Springer, Feb 17 2015)*

Against the background of the above-mentioned dual finding regarding the content of EU **democracy promotion activities**, we take the democracy models developed by Linz and Stepan (1996a) and Merkel (2004) as a point of departure for the mapping exercise.2 These works are particularly suitable because they offer a broad conceptualization of liberal democracy.3 They **encompass** interlocking **core institutions of democracy and supporting external conditions,** both of which have been found to be important elements of EU democracy promotion. At the same time, these models allow us to keep core conditions and enhancing external conditions conceptually separate.

## Includes institutions & civil society:

*(Susan B. Epstein, Nina M. Serafino, and Francis T. Miko, Specialists in Foreign Policy Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, Congressional Research Service, “Democracy Promotion: Cornerstone of U.S. Foreign Policy?,” https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34296.pdf, Dec 26 2007)*

The view that democracy would be achieved if political leaders could be persuaded to govern democratically, or when reasonably free and fair elections are held, has given way to a range of other conditions that must be met for a country to be considered a sustainable democracy. **The idea that elections are a sufficient measure of success was discarded as analysts realized that this measure “ignores the degree to which** multiparty **elections** (even if they are competitive and uncertain in outcome) **may exclude significant portions of the population** from contesting for power or advancing and defending their interests, **or** may **leave** significant **arenas of decision making beyond the control of elected officials**.”40 **Subsequently, two other means to establish a democracy have become recognized** as essential, although opinion is divided as to which is the more important. **One is the promotion of strong democratic institutions.** Diamond argues that the political institutionalization — **the establishment of “capable, complex, coherent and responsive” formal institutions of democracy** is the “single most important and urgent factor in the consolidation of democracy....”41 “If it is a liberal democracy that we have in mind, then **the political system must** also **provide for a rule of law**, and rigorously **protect the right of individuals and groups to speak, publish, assemble, demonstrate, lobby, and organize**.” He lists **a full range of institutions** (**i.e, “political parties, legislatures, judicial systems, local government, and** the **bureaucratic structures** of the state more generally”).42 Carothers **point**s **to** “troubled political parties” as an “ubiquitous institutional deficiency” in “the global landscape of attempted **democratization**,” examines their problems, and suggests new approaches to political party **assistance**.43 Democracy assistance efforts may well face a wide range of impediments to the establishment of viable institutions, however. According to Carothers, those promoting transitions may often encounter “entrenched concentrations of political power ... deeply rooted habits of patronage and corruption ... mutually hostile socioeconomic or ethnic groups ...” (i.e., the underlying interests and power relationships that are most often resistant to change).44 He suggests that democracy assistance programs will be more effective by “building the underlying interests and power relationships into [them],” but warns that effective programs “require much deeper knowledge about the recipient society than most aid providers have or want to take the trouble to acquire.”45 **The other means to promoting democracy is the creation of** a vibrant **civil society,** which many argue is the sine qua non for a functioning democracy. Karatnycky views “an active and dynamic civil society” as “the crucial agent in ensuring a durable, democratic outcome.... [T]he evidence from dozens of postconflict and post-authoritarian transitions shows that the best way for advanced democracies to increase the chances for successful support of democratic openings is by maximizing the resources devoted to the development of civic nonviolent forces.”46 In a study published in 2002, he cited East Timor as a “case of international intervention where it appears that things are going right” with major credit because of the international community’s “major investment ... for independent civil life, which bodes well for the future.” Reinforcing his judgment on the importance of civil society is his view that “civic empowerment appears to be more significant in determining democratic outcomes than whether or not a society suffered wrenching violence.” Although some experts, such as Carothers and Diamond, believe that political institutionalization is more critical, Diamond points to civil society as promoting not only a transition to democracy, but also its “deepening” and consolidation once democracy is established.47 While in Diamond’s view, civil society does not play the central role initially, “the more active, pluralistic, resourceful, institutionalized, and internally democratic civil society is ... the more likely democracy will be to emerge and endure.”48 **A lack of funding is often** viewed as **the most significant obstacle for the creation of civil society non-governmental organizations** in developing and even middle-income countries. Many of these countries, including the upper-middleincome countries such as Chile and Argentina where international donors are likely to withdraw support, are “weak in the social capital and public-spiritedness which enable civil society organizations to raise substantial funds from the private sectors of their own countries,” according to Diamond.49 **Without help from abroad, the only recourse for such organizations is to turn to the state for funding, which creates** its own **problems**. **The importance of any one of these three means to democracy is a subjective judgment,** as analysts’ opinions can differ and may well vary by type and even over time. In a comparative study, Karatnycky views two countries torn by conflict in the 1980s (i.e., Nicaragua and El Salvador) as two success stories, which are “now relatively stable democracies with competitive multiparty systems.”50 Although he attributes success to strengthening of democratic civil society in Nicaragua and to centrist and reform movements in El Salvador that helped build “vibrant civic sectors,” Karatnycky also judges another factor as important (i.e., that both countries had multiparty electoral structures during the periods of conflict that were c

## Includes institutions & civil society:

*(Frank Spengler, “Internal actors, external actors: country categories, country approaches (I),” Worldwide promotion of democracy: challenges, role and strategy of the European Union, Proceedings of a conference organised by the European Office of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftunghttp://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas\_11856-1522-2-30.pdf?110504154444, June 5-6 2007)*

**In designing** tailor-made country strategies for **democracy promotion, three categories** of countries **can be considered:** **In the first** category, political and government forces openly promote the establishment or strengthening of democracy. These are countries where **democracy promotion can include government-organised projects as well as projects organised by civil society. External actors take the role of dialogue partners, providing technical expertise, best practice examples, and assistance in implementing jointly-drafted solutions**, which can be done both by internal and external actors. **The second category includes** countries with formal democratic structures where the government and political forces maintain authoritarian attitudes, and are reluctant to translate the constitutional democratic order into real democratic life. In such countries, government forces do not support the strengthening of the democratic culture. **Strengthening and capacity-building involving civil society organisations and other non-state actors** is primarily the task of so-called non-governmental actors**. In the third category**, government and ruling political forces openly oppose multiparty democracy and functioning democratic processes. In most of these cases, there is still nevertheless room for **projects by foreign, non-state actors, especially by political foundations and NGOs**. The objective is to **build up civil society’s democratic awareness and capacity.**

## Excludes economic development:

*(Susan Stewart, Lecturer at the Chair for Political Science and Contemporary History at Mannheim University & Senior Associate for Researcg at German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Democracy Promotion and the 'Colour Revolutions', German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Google Books, published by Routledge, Sept 13 2013)*

**Democracy promotion is distinguished** in this article **as one form of international** donor **assistance, different from all other forms of aid, be they macro-economic, developmental, military, or technical in nature.** With the end of the Cold War, the overseas development assistance community witnessed a relative decline of aid for security (anti-communist) purposes, and an increase in attempts to export democratic practices and values for their own sake.2 **This is not to minimize the importance of stabilizing currencies, reducing poverty, building infrastructure, encouraging business development, or transferring technology as efforts to secure justice and political and social stability as preconditions for a more democratic** and peaceful **order**. **However**, despite the far greater monetary flows captured in **these** forms of international aid, this article does **[are] not** treat such macro-economic, developmental, military, or technical aid as **democracy promotion** assistance efforts **per se**. In this article, **democracy promotion assistance refers only to assistance that is primarily and directly designed to inculcate or enhance liberal democratic values, institutions, and practices. This generally takes the form of assistance squarely targeted by donors to build or strengthen civil society organizations, mass media, election systems, political parties, minority and women's rights, the rule of law, or state institutional capacity for the purpose of producing institutions and processes that are more transparent and responsive to** the needs of ordinary **citizens**. There are of course real world **exceptions** that blur this distinction, **such as the transfer of heating oil** and other infrastructure projects by international donors **to Serbian municipalities** intended **to bolster parties in opposition to the** Milosevié **regime**, where they had taken power after hard-fought elections and demon- strations in 1996—1997. But such exceptions act**ually underline the rule: rather than to fight poverty or improve development outcomes per se, such aid was given explicitly and primarily** as a lifeline **to preserve** independent **political opposition** to MiloSevié. It provided the means for local government leaders, and there- fore the parties holding local power, to demonstrate tangible results for the votes of their constituents, despite the attempt of the central government in Belgrade to deny local government funds to the opposition and thereby weaken the latter's social support.

*(Dr. Hauke Hartmann, “Democracy promotion: definition, priorities, preconditions,” Worldwide promotion of democracy: challenges, role and strategy of the European Union, Proceedings of a conference organised by the European Office of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftunghttp://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas\_11856-1522-2-30.pdf?110504154444, June 5-6 2007)*

**This distinction has a very real and practical significance when the goals of democracy promotion are defined. Questions must be addressed**, such as whether poverty, hunger and sickness make it harder to introduce democratic governance (in the sense that there seems to be a correlation **between** the standard of living and the quality of democracy), and if the protection of at least the most basic social and **economic rights** are not part **and**-parcel of **democratic development.** According to KAS “the opportunity for the citizens to participate actively in solving problems and in decision-making – the most basic element of democracy – is even indispensable for people’s survival and for socioeconomic development in the medium term. The Millennium Development Goals cannot be reached and sustained without existence of democratic life.” I readily subscribe to this. **This is not to say that democracy promotion is** really **about economic development**. But it means that an increase in **social justice** is likely to improve the quality of democracy. The Bertelsmann Transformation Index takes into account both the political and the economic aspects of transformation. This **does not mean adding to the** already long **catalogue of measures for democracy promotion** by simply adding redistributive or welfare elements. **However, a pro-poor policy**, as pursued, for example, by the British government, **can** and should **be linked to a policy of democracy promotion.**

## Excludes economic development:

*(Eva Bellin [Hunter College], “The Political-Economic Conundrum,” printed in “Uncharted Journey: Promoting Democracy in the Middle East,” edited by Thomas Carothers [vice president for international politics and governance at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and founder and director of the Endowment's Democracy and Rule of Law Project] and Marina Ottaway [director of the Carnegie Middle East program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace], Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Print, March 1 2010)*

Conventional wisdom in the development community has long held that economic and political reforms are directly linked. With regard to sequencing, **the debate has been dominated by two schools: one prioritizing economic reform, the other political reform. Yet neither approach is useful as policy guidance. Although** linkage between economic and political reform indeed exists (and **in the Middle East resistance to both kinds of reform is** intrinsically **interwoven in** the logic of **many regimes**), **the relationship between the two is not deterministic, nor is any fixed sequencing warranted.** The permissive linkage between economic and political reform suggests **that neither is a precondition of the other.** Further, **if either democratization or economic reform is the** stated policy **goal, each must be pursued not as a means to the other but rather for its own sake and on its own terms.**

## Not just elections:

*(Dr. Cor Van Beuningen, “Democracy: features and fundamentals,” Worldwide promotion of democracy: challenges, role and strategy of the European Union, Proceedings of a conference organised by the European Office of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftunghttp://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas\_11856-1522-2-30.pdf?110504154444, June 5-6 2007)*

**Free elections are essential but not sufficient for the make up** and well-functioning **of democracy**. **In order to avoid** malfunctioning and even **perversion, respect for human rights** – especially for the minority, and for minorities - **and for the rule of law is indispensable, as are effective institutions and checks and balances**. In **democratic politics**, different proposals for the directionality to be given to the development of society compete for electoral support. This **presupposes both voice and choice**, **which** in turn **implies** the following: **an electorate composed of citizens**; a number of different proposals for public or collective action, embodied by **competing political parties** (multiparty democracy); **and free elections**. Ideally, **then**, democratic politics involves a number of political parties with different proposals for development, competing for the electoral support of engaged citizens. However, **it will be clear** to anyone slightly familiar with reality in developing countries, **that** the factual functioning of politics here does not comply with this ideal description. This is also true for most democracies (and even, for that matter, for most democracies in the first world). What can be observed in reality, is – **for example** - that **political bosses** compete for electoral support, however not in order to get access to state power and to serve development and the common good, but **aiming** **to** get **access** to the loot constituted by **public resources**, in order **to administer them as** their own **patrimony** and distribute them **amongst** themselves and **their clienteles** (state capture, patronage and clientelism, corruption). 30 **And** conversely, the **electorate** is **constituted** not by engaged citizens that choose the best proposal for the development of society, but **by persons that act as clients** looking for compensation by their patrons through the redistribution of the public loot. In fact, what is involved here **is** **a** more or less institutionalised **perversion of** the logic of **democratic politics**; a perversion which to some extent is observable in many if not most of the developing countries (and elsewhere). **Forms and procedures may be perfectly ‘democratic’, while they are being** used and **made to function for purposes that are against everything that democracy was meant for.**

## Excludes physical force/military:

*(Sandra Lavenex [Institute of Political Science at the University of Lucerne] and Frank Schimmelfennig [Centre for Comparative and International Studies at Eidgenossische Technische Hochschule], Democracy Promotion in the EU’s Neighbourhood: From Leverage to Governance?, Google Books, published by Routledge, Sept 13 2013)*

**Democracy promotion comprises all direct, non-violent activities by a state or international organization that are intended to bring about, strengthen, and support democracy in a third country. This definition excludes the use of physical coercion as well as indirect and unintended effects such as the international demonstration effects of successful democratic transitions or the** potentially **positive effects of** general **international interconnections** on democracy. **'Democracy' is** understood in a very general and simple way as the **accountability of public authorities to the people.** **Accountability mechanisms comprise**, inter alia, the accountability of officials to the electorate through **free and fair elections,** the accountability of governments to parliaments, **or** the accountability of agencies **to public scrutiny. Any activities designed to strengthen accountability, and hence also responsiveness** **to** the **citizens**, **qualify as democracy promotion.** **The concrete contents of democracy promotion activities vary across targets, envisaged outcomes, channels and instruments**. For the purpose of this special issue, they are a matter of empirical analysis, not definition. We focus on democracy-promoting activities of the EU as an international organization rather than on the activities of its member states. Moreover, we further focus on strategies and behaviours rather than on the motivations of the EU. In other words, we are not interested in explaining why the EU promotes democracy and whether it is normatively desirable.

## Distinct from “democracy protection”:

*(Nelli Babayan [Post-doctoral Researcher within Transworld project at the Freie Universität Berlin] and Daniela Huber [Researcher at the Istituto Affari Internazionali], “Motioned, Debated, Agreed? Human Rights and Democracy Promotion in International Affairs,” Transworld, Working Paper 6, http://www.transworld-fp7.eu/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/TW\_WP\_06.pdf, December 2012)*

But also the **concepts of** major **democracy** and human rights **promoters** such as the US and the EU **are** **slightly** **diverse**. While there seems to be a broad global ‘script’ on the substantive content of **democracy** and human rights **promotion** (Magen, Risse, and McFaul 2009) which leans towards the liberal definitions of both concepts, the European script also includes a social-democratic dimension. Carothers who **differentiates between the “political type”** of democracy promotion **and the developmental one**, argues that the US tends more to the former and Europe to the latter (Carothers 2009a). **Political type of democracy promotion focuses on elections, parties, the judiciary, media, civil society, and political rights, while the developmental one involves socio-economic measures.** The challenge of democracy being a contested concept also translates into the literature on democracy promotion, which is – it should be noted and similar to the practice it analyses – Western dominated. Firstly, there is no agreement on what democracy is and diverse models exist (Held 2006). Secondly, even if spanning over two decades, **the literature has produced only vague definitions of democracy promotion itself, concentrating more on its sectors and strategies**. Arguably one of **the clearest understanding**s **of democracy promotion defines it as “overt and voluntary activities adopted, supported, and (directly or indirectly) implemented by (public or private) foreign actors explicitly designed to contribute to the political liberalization of autocratic regimes and the subsequent democratization of autocratic regimes in specific recipient countries”** (Schmitter and Brouwer 1999: 14). Partly to distance itself from the Bush agenda of democracy promotion, **an academic discourse has** recently **emerged to rename the promotion of democracy to democracy assistance** (Burnell 2010, 17). **However, the two concepts remain very similar without** wielding **substantial differences** to the strategies or targets. Schmitter and Brouwer also **differentiate between democracy promotion and democracy protection, with the latter defined as “overt and voluntary activities adopted, supported, and (directly or indirectly) implemented by (public or private) foreign actors explicitly designed to contribute to the consolidation of democracy in specific recipient countries”** (Schmitter and Brouwer 1999, 14). **Democracy protection does not intend to change the current political regime,** especially if it is democratic, but acts to make it more effective and efficient. **Likewise, organisation of police training for enforcement of human rights** and support for trade unions are **activities directed at consolidation of democracy**. While democracy promotion activities are likely to be more effective on the state and political establishment, democracy protection activities can be more influential when targeting civil society and individuals. However it may be, the boundary between democracy promotion and protection is often blurred in the actual activities of promoters who do not strictly differentiate between the two. A more helpful way to conceptualize the phenomenon might be to distinguish between the targets of democracy promotion, visualized in table 1. This template indicates that **democracy can be promoted through bottom-up and topdown approaches**. **Though** **these approaches should be used simultaneously** in order to achieve better results (Babayan 2012), **strategies** usually **differ from promoter to promoter**. **The US** and the EU **use[s] both** approaches, even though the EU focuses on a top-down approach, while the US has **a** rather **balanced approach** (Huber 2008). **Encouragement of multiparty systems and increasing both the supply (state institutions) and demand (civil society) sides are equally important for** successful **democracy promotion** (Carothers 1999) in order to avoid resistance to democratization from the authorities and reluctance to advocate democratization from the civil society.

## Distinct from “democracy protection”:

*(Philippe C. Schmitter and Imco Brouwer, EUI Dept of political and social sciences, “Conceptualizing, Researching and Evaluating Democracy Promotion and Protection,” European University Institute, EUI Working Paper No 99/9, http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/id/995/, 1999)*

2. Distinguishing Democracy Promotion from Democracy Protection

In the studies of political regime changes from autocratic to democratic regimes, three qualitatively different processes have been distinguished: (l) political liberalization; (2) democratization; and (3) the consolidation of democracy The process of political liberalization is made up of two core elements: (l) increasing quantity and quality of political liberties; and (2) encouraging the de- stabilization or eventual collapse of autocratic regimes. The process of democratization is a process in which a minimally democratic regime is established. The process of consolidation of democracy is qualitatively different from the former two processes because It ums at sheer survival of a (newly) established democracy by introducing elements of predictability in an effort to avoid, first of all, a relapse into autocracy. Measures that are considered to be useful to consolidate newly democratized regimes can have a negative impact on the collapse of autocratic regimes and the establishment of democratic regimes. For example, reinforcement of the rule of law might stabilize not only a neo-democracy, it might also stabilize an autocracy. **It is** therefore **of** strategic **importance to distinguish between the promotion of**, on the one hand, political liberalization and democratization **and**, on the other hand, **the protection** (consolidation) **of democracy**. Thus, the overarching concept of DPP is made up of two qualitatively different elements, **which can be defined as follows. Democracy Promotion consists of** all overt and voluntary **activities adopted, supported, and (directly or indirectly) implemented by (public or private) foreign actors explicitly designed to contribute to the political liberalization** of autocratic regimes **and** the subsequent **democratization of autocratic regimes** in specific recipient countries. **Democracy Protection consists of** all overt and voluntary **activities** adopted, supported, and (directly or indirectly) implemented by (public or private) foreign actors explicitly **designed to contribute to consolidation of democracy** in specific recipient countries.

## Distinct from “liberalization”:

*(Thomas Carothers [Carnegie Endowment], “Choosing a Strategy,” printed in “Uncharted Journey: Promoting Democracy in the Middle East,” edited by Thomas Carothers [vice president for international politics and governance at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and founder and director of the Endowment's Democracy and Rule of Law Project] and Marina Ottaway [director of the Carnegie Middle East program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace], Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Print, March 1 2010)*

As Daniel Brumberg argues in chapter two of this volume, the **political liberalization** that these regimes have pursued **is** quite **different from democratization, and it would be a mistake to assume any** easy or **natural path from liberalization to democratization.** The **regimes have engaged in limited**, often sporadic political **liberalization to relieve accumulated domestic political pressure and gain some reformist legitimacy. The reforms are a means of preserving their hold on power, not of creating democracy**. The reforms are not aimed at creating a process that would lead to the leaders eventually having to risk giving up power to some elected alternative. As Brumberg notes, liberalization in the Arab world tends to go a certain distance and then get stuck, resulting in the widespread regional syndrome of political blockage, or what he calls the trap of liberalized autocracy.

## Defined by goals, not mechanism/implementation:

*(Nelli Babayan [Post-doctoral Researcher within Transworld project at the Freie Universität Berlin] and Daniela Huber [Researcher at the Istituto Affari Internazionali], “Motioned, Debated, Agreed? Human Rights and Democracy Promotion in International Affairs,” Transworld, Working Paper 6, http://www.transworld-fp7.eu/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/TW\_WP\_06.pdf, December 2012)*

**Democracy promotion has been on the** American and European foreign policy **agenda**s **for** two **decades**, **but a “onesize fits all” approach** (Börzel and Risse 2009) **and set “toolboxes”** (Carothers 2004) **have not resulted in a “success recipe.”** So, in this section we come back again to the two central players in the field, since it is them who have invested extensively in this area and it is their policies which are analysed in the literature. The issue of the impact of democracy promotion on democratizations has by now become a central field in Comparative Political Science. **For several decades**, scholars of comparative politics assumed that international factors and processes are of marginal, if any, importance to democratization. **Advocates of** the **endogenous** genesis and development **democratization** processes **claimed that regime change was** encouraged, **initiated** and carried out **exclusively by domestic actors**. In this context, **endogenous** **factors** such as the strength of the national economy, the institutional design (Linz 1990), the openness of political culture (Diamond, Linz, and Lipset 1989), and elite behaviour (Higley and Burton 1989) **were identified as the** main **catalysts of democratic change** without initially acknowledging that even endogenous factors can be influence from the outside. **These studies** have either **overlooked** **the significance of international factors** or have simply denied any possibility of their influence on domestic change (Schraeder 2002). **This narrow** and exclusive **approach** of comparative politics **resulted in disagreement from** various **scholars who considered international factors** to play a **significant** role **in** the process of regime change and subsequent **democratization** (Pridham, Herring and Sandford 1994). At the beginning of the 1990s **scholars of democratization supposed** that **external governments** and institutions may **have a determinative impact on democratization** of a given country (Huntington 1991) **Others** argued that in the coming decades the significance of international institutions might prove pivotal for domestic political change (Vachudova 2005). In a revisit of his well-known “requisites of democracy” article, Lipset **concluded** that **domestic conditions “do shape the probabilities for democracy, but they do not determine their outcomes**” (1994: 17, 16). **Democracy is an “international cause” and democracy promotion has become the link between the international and domestic dimensions of democratization** (Babayan 2012). Some scholars argue that **there are four international dimensions of democratization, in which** targeted **democracy promotion is intertwined** with general spread of democracy: **1) coercion**, seen as **military intervention**; **2) contagion**, seen as intended or unintended **emulation of** the **democratic** regime of a **neighbouring country**; **3) conditionality**, seen as imposition of **sanctions or rewards**; **and** **4) consent**, seen as **activities by an external actor** in a target country **requiring** the **consent** **of** **the** **domestic** **government** (Whitehead 2001).4 Within these international dimensions of democratization, **there are three methods of democracy promotion** (Whitehead 2001: 88) –**incorporation, invasion, and intimidation**. While contagion does not involve specific actions of external actors, coercion does not require the consent of the domestic actors. **Conditionality is** not a separate dimension but **a strategy** used **in the framework of a consent-dominated democratization process**. While international factors have received thorough examination in the literature on democracy promotion (Whitehead 2001; Schraeder 2002; Carothers 1999 and 2004), domestic factors and their connection to the international ones have usually been neglected (Schmitz 2004), even though they are now receiving comparatively more attention in some recent works (Schimmelfennig, Engert and Knobel 2006; Babayan 2012). The analyses of democracy promotion strategies of the most influential international actors, the EU and the US (Carothers 1999 and 2004; Gillespie and Youngs 2002; Youngs 2002; Burnell and Youngs 2010) and the effort at comparing the two (Magen and McFaul 2009: 11) have shed light on the genesis, rationale and nature of the democracy promotion phenomenon. However, there are still open questions among democracy promotion scholars on the specific types of transformations that democracy promotion can lead to. Some acknowledge the value of studies on demonstration effects, contagion, emulation, and diffusion, but point to their failure in identifying causal mechanisms that lead to specific outcomes (Magen and Morlino 2009). Others mention that they do “not venture to evaluate their [strategies’] impact” (Magen and McFaul 2009: 20) and that “this task has to wait for another book” (Risse 2009: 268). The theoretical framework guiding their analysis is derived, as the authors also acknowledge, from the theoretical traditions in international relations, international law, and Europeanization studies. Indeed, the “logics of influence” (Magen and McFaul 2009: 11) adopted as an umbrella concept for the strategies of control, material incentives, normative suasion, and capacity-building are largely based on the logics of action – appropriateness and consequentialism – and works of other scholars of democratization and norms diffusion. As a result of analysing EU and **US democracy promotion strategies** **in the Middle East**, the Mediterranean, the Newly Independent States, the South Caucasus, Latin America and Indonesia, Risse (2009: 250) argues that strategies of both promoters are “remarkably comparable”, as they both **use the whole set of strategies** diverging only in the case of Latin America. In addition, Magen and Morlino provide “cycles and layers of democratic anchoring” as a framework of studying EU democracy promotion (Magen and Morlino 2008). Cycles identify periods when EU incentives can be most effective, while levels entail rule adoption, implementation, and internalization. Another view on strategies of democracy promotion has been suggested through the international socialization framework applied to norm promotion by European community organizations (Schimmelfennig, Engert, and Knobel 2006), and later directly applied to EU democracy promotion (Babayan 2009). The framework developed by Schimmelfennig and his collaborators is based on an amalgamation of rationalist and constructivist perspectives and demonstrates that norm promotion happens through two types of reinforcements: social and material. Based on the observation of six domestic and international variables and abovementioned strategies within nine country-cases, they argue that the EU membership incentive is necessary for norm promotion to be effective. Notwithstanding its empirical validity, this argument has left out a variety of cases where an EU membership perspective is not possible per se. The introduced **frameworks allow grasping the concept of democracy promotion and differentiating between its types, sectors, and strategies. However, they do not elaborate on the mechanisms of development and implementation of democracy promotion policies** (Babayan 2012), which would assist in understanding how central players like the EU and the US adjust their policies to economic and political developments or their own interactions. Furthermore, they do not specify the conditions under which specific democracy promotion policy may have a certain outcome. Given these gaps, the structural and geographical scopes of the international socialization framework have been expanded, providing a more nuanced vision of democracy promotion strategies and their outcomes (Babayan 2012). However, also the newly developed framework requires further application to other cases.

## Defined by goals, not mechanism/implementation:

*(Kristina Kausch, “Worldwide promotion of democracy: challenges, role, and strategy of the European Union,” Worldwide promotion of democracy: challenges, role and strategy of the European Union, Proceedings of a conference organised by the European Office of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftunghttp://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas\_11856-1522-2-30.pdf?110504154444, June 5-6 2007)*

While there has been endless debate on the definition of democracy, **it is doubtful that** extensive theoretical **debate on a definition of democracy promotion will add** significant practical **value to this** **field** of work in policy terms. There is no universally accepted definition of democracy, despite the considerable attention that democracy support has received in recent years. Instead, many democracy promoters indirectly define democracy by listing the policy areas, measures and instruments that contribute to democratisation. Among EU member states **there is a wide range of headings under which measures that contribute directly or indirectly to promoting democracy are listed (for example, good governance, public administration reform, human rights, civil society support, rule of law, and decentralisation**). **Because of this** European democracy policies, **rather than operating with an overarching definition of democracy promotion**, rather **pragmatically aim to** influence the direction of the overall reform process by **work**ing **on the different components of democracy.** Obviously, focusing on the components of democracy narrows the perspective on the relationships these different elements have to one other, and how they are ultimately supposed to lead to the ‘big undefined whole’. Nevertheless, **the lack of a strict definition is not** necessarily **a weakness. It** also **has** certain **advantages**. **In democracy promotion, where interpretive concepts** often **prevail over firmly delimited policy categories, it might be preferable to work without an overly mechanistic framework.**

## Defined by goals, not effectiveness:

*(Daniela Huber, senior fellow at the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) in the Mediterranean and Middle East programme, Gerda Henkel Guest Researcher at LUISS University & PhD in international relations from Hebrew Univ in Jerusalem, Promotion and Foreign Policy: Identity and Interests in US, EU and Non-Western Democracies, Google Books, Published by Springer, April 26 2015)*


**Democracy promotion is** then **defined as all** those **foreign policy activities which aim at fostering the transition to, consolidation of, or improvement of democracy in other states and their societies.** Since this study examines the motivations of democracy promoters, **this definition focuses on the goals of the democracy promoter and not the effectiveness of this policy. It excludes cases where a foreign policy is not explicitly aimed at promoting democracy, even though it might** effectively **do so as a**n unintended **side effect**, I or where a foreign policy is propagated as democracy promotion, even though this just serves as window dressing.2

*(A. Wetzel [postdoctoral fellow at the Mannheim Centre for European Social Research at the University of Mannheim] and J. Orbie [assoc. prof at the dept of poli sci and director of the centre for EU studies at Ghent Univ], The Substance of EU Democracy Promotion: Concepts and Cases, Google Books, Published by Springer, Feb 17 2015)*


In order **to map** the substance of EU **democracy promotion, we take into account not only activities that are explicitly labelled as such, but all activities that are** potentially **conducive to the development of** any of the partial regimes or context conditions. Thus, for instance, while cooperation on social matters is sometimes separated from **democracy**, **for example** in the Commission's progress reports in the enlargement framework (see the respective chapters), **we treat** it **as** a **democracy promotion** **activity** because it contributes to **advancing** **the socio-economic** context **condition**. Yet we are aware that a sole focus on social issues may not lead to democratization. We have elaborated on this tension elsewhere (Wetzel and Orbie 2011b, Wetzel and Orbie 2012). Conversely, **activities labelled as democracy promotion are** only **counted as such when they are designed to develop any of the partial regimes or context conditions (regardless of their actual effectiveness**). For instance, the 'Democracy, Good Governance and Stability' Platform established under the EU's Eastern Partnership actually comprises a range of activities that would not be considered as democracy promotion, such as police cooperation on drug trafficking, migration, fight against cybercrime, and coping with natural and man-made disasters (Eastern Partnership 2012). The terms 'narrow' and 'shallow' are not meant to refer to a 'worse' form of EU democracy promotion. The EU might have good reasons not to pursue a broad democracy promotion strategy in a certain country. In some instances, such as in Brazil or Israel, the state of democracy is already rather advanced. In other cases, such as Eritrea, the third country government's willingness to cooperate on democracy promotion is low.

## Charts:

*(Nelli Babayan [Post-doctoral Researcher within Transworld project at the Freie Universität Berlin] and Daniela Huber [Researcher at the Istituto Affari Internazionali], “Motioned, Debated, Agreed? Human Rights and Democracy Promotion in International Affairs,” Transworld, Working Paper 6, http://www.transworld-fp7.eu/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/TW\_WP\_06.pdf, December 2012)*



*(Sandra Lavenex [Institute of Political Science at the University of Lucerne] and Frank Schimmelfennig [Centre for Comparative and International Studies at Eidgenossische Technische Hochschule], Democracy Promotion in the EU’s Neighbourhood: From Leverage to Governance?, Google Books, published by Routledge, Sept 13 2013)*




*(Daniela Huber, senior fellow at the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) in the Mediterranean and Middle East programme, Gerda Henkel Guest Researcher at LUISS University & PhD in international relations from Hebrew Univ in Jerusalem, Promotion and Foreign Policy: Identity and Interests in US, EU and Non-Western Democracies, Google Books, Published by Springer, April 26 2015)*

Table 2.2 Three types of action to promote democracy







## Precise definitions are key:

*(Rouba Al-Fattal Eeckelaert, Prof at Centre for European Studies at Carleton Univ focusing on EU foreign policy in the Middle East and democratization & co-founder of the Central European Journal for International and Security Studies, Transatlantic Trends in Democracy Promotion: Electoral Assistance in the Palestinian Territories, Google Books, Published by Routledge, Feb 24 2016)*

**The** main **problem** of the EU's strategy **concerning democracy promotion** in the PT **is that it lacked a clear definition** of what democracy is and, more importantly, what type of democracy it envisages for the PT. Except for the idea of fostering participatory democracy anchored in political representation through regular and fair elections, the EU did not elaborate much on whether it wanted to foster **electoral democracy, liberal democracy or democratic governance**.293 **Each of these types would** have  **require**d **a different approach**. While **the first would** have **focus**ed **on elections; the second would focus on elections as well as** on **basic freedoms, rule of law, and human rights; and the last would focus on all of the above in addition to transparency, accountability and legitimacy**. It is hard to tell if the EU was aware of these differences when it embarked on democracy promotion in the PT. From looking at the policy development and the strategy mentioned earlier, it seems that the EU was 294 promoting a general, and to some extent vague, version of democracy. Indeed, until today a clear definition of what democracy means is still 295 missing in EU treaties and policy documents. However, **a clear definition and strategy of democracy is of utmost importance. Without that we** observe the EU wandering by first pushing for Palestinian elections, but when the results did not suite its interests or liberal stance we **see** it dismissing the results of the elections — which sent **a** really **confusing message** to everyone involved in the electoral assistance process. Another related issue is that the EU did not allow Palestinians to define their own democracy model. For instance, the EU first supported the presidential model of democracy in the P T, but when it was not satisfied with President Arafat's performance it pushed in 2003 for reforms to introduce a parliamentary model of democracy. This was merely done to give more power to Abbas who was then appointed the first Prime Minister (Chapter 2). It is obvious that Palestinians have not yet identified what model of democracy they want to adopt, which is normal as it took Western states centuries before defining their own unique models. So, the fact that the EU is **lacking clarity in** its **definition and vision of democracy is quite substantial to** the **success** of its policy in the PT.

*(Daniela Huber, senior fellow at the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) in the Mediterranean and Middle East programme, Gerda Henkel Guest Researcher at LUISS University & PhD in international relations from Hebrew Univ in Jerusalem, Promotion and Foreign Policy: Identity and Interests in US, EU and Non-Western Democracies, Google Books, Published by Springer, April 26 2015)*

**This goal-oriented definition**, however, also implies that democracy is a subjective, rather than objective, category: democracy is in the eye of the beholder; it is what the democracy promoter believes it to be. Such a definition **is a double-edged sword**: on the one hand it acknowledges that democracy is an essentially contested concept (Gallie 1955) and that there are diverse models of democracy (Held 2006). On the other hand, **the promotion of almost any form of governance — such as, for example, 'sovereign democracy' through Russia — can then be classified as democracy promotion, making the concept an empty category.** This is related to the parallel discussion in the democratization literature triggered by David Collier and Steven Levitsky (1997) who pointed out that **in the wake of the third wave of democratization democracy has lost its conceptual validity through adding adjectives to democracy such as 'authoritarian democracy' or 'military-dominated democracy'. Hence, to uphold conceptual validity** and to limit complexity, **it makes sense to define** democracy and therewith **the substance of democracy promotion**.

## Precise definitions are key:

## Precise definitions are key:

*(Susan B. Epstein, Nina M. Serafino, and Francis T. Miko, Specialists in Foreign Policy Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, Congressional Research Service, “Democracy Promotion: Cornerstone of U.S. Foreign Policy?,” https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34296.pdf, Dec 26 2007)*

**The lack of a clear definition of democracy** and a comprehensive understanding of its basic elements may have **created multiple problems for U.S. policy making,** according to some. Arguably, **the lack of a** clear **definition** of democracy and a comprehensive understanding of its basic elements may have **hampered the formulation of democracy promotion policy and effective prioritizing of democracy promotion activities over the years. Also, the lack of definition** may have **complicated coordination** of democracy programs **and** the **assessment** of U.S. government activities and funding. Further, **without a consensus on democracy definition and goals, what criteria will determine when, if ever, a country has attained an acceptable level of democratic reform and no longer needs American assistance?**

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Further, **without a consensus on democracy definition and goals, what criteria will determine when, if ever, a country has attained an acceptable level of democratic reform and no longer needs American assistance?** According to Richard Haass, former State Department official and current President of the Council on Foreign Relations, **democracy is more than elections**; **it** is a diffusion of power where no group within a society is excluded from full participation in political life. Democracy **requires checks and balances** within the government, among various levels of government (national, state and local), and between government and society. **Elements such as independent media, unions, political parties**, schools, **and** democratic rights for women provide checks on government power over society. **Individual rights such as freedom of speech and worship** need to be protected. **Furthermore, a democratic government must face the check of electable opposition and leaders must hand over power peacefully**.6 One scholar, Laurence Whitehead, discusses the various academic attempts to define democracy, pointing out that **the definition has varied over time, and among cultures (with even subtle differences in British and American understandings** of key elements of democracy), and arguing that **the “outer boundaries” of the concept of democracy are “to a significant ... extent malleable and negotiable**....”7 “**Democracy has some indispensable components**, without which the concept would be vacuous, **but these** indispensable elements **are skeletal and can** in any case **be arranged in various possible configurations**,” Whitehead posits.8 He argues that **democracy requires the minimal procedural conditions (safeguarding free and fair elections, freedom of speech and association, and the integrity of elective office**) as described by other scholars.9 **Yet**, he cautions, **these minimal procedures only establish “contingently and for the present period** ... a rather coherent and broad-based **exposition of the predominant view.”** He notes that **the meaning of democracy “is likely to remain contested, and** even to some extent **unstable, as** current **processes of democratization unfold**.”10 “**Democratization**,” he thus writes, “**is best understood as a complex, long-term, dynamic, and open-ended process**. It consists of progress towards a more rule-based, more consensual and more participatory type of politics. Like ‘democracy’ it necessarily involves a combination of fact and value**, and so contains internal tensions.”**11 Lack of a generally accepted view of democracy is evident in multilateral organizations, such as Freedom House and the Community of Democracies, dedicated to the cause of good governance. Freedom House, an independent nongovernmental organization (NGO) founded in the 1940s, supports freedom worldwide, rating countries’ level of freedom rather than defining or measuring democracy. Freedom House rates countries as free, partly free, or not free via numerical assessments of a country’s political rights and civil liberties. Political rights enable people to participate freely in the political process, including the right to vote freely for distinct alternatives in legitimate elections, compete for public office, join political parties and organizations, and elect representatives who have a decisive impact on public policies and are accountable to the electorate. Civil liberties allow for the freedoms of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy without interference from the state.12 Freedom House states that it is not enough that a country has elections to be considered free; it must have a competitive multi-party political system, universal adult suffrage for all citizens, regularly contested elections with secret ballots, and public access to major political parties. According to the Freedom House mission statement, “Freedom is possible only in democratic political systems in which the governments are accountable to their own people, the rule of law prevails; and freedoms of expression, association, belief and respect for the rights of minorities and women are guaranteed.”13 The Community of Democracies consists of over 100 nations that first met in 2000 to form a coalition of countries that are committed to promoting and strengthening democracies worldwide. This organization does not define democracy, but does provide criteria for participation in the Community. (See Appendix A for its stated criteria.) **Congress has demonstrated its concern for the lack of a consistent definition for democracy. The Senate Foreign Operations Appropriation Committee** Report for FY2006 (S.Rept. 109-96/H.R. 3057) **stated**, “**The Committee remains concerned that the State Department and USAID do not share a common definition of a democracy program.** For the purposes of this Act, ‘a democracy program’ means technical assistance and other support to strengthen the capacity of democratic political parties, governments, non-governmental institutions, and/or citizens, in order to support the development of democratic states, institutions and practices that are responsive and accountable to citizens.”14

## Definition varies according to situation:

*(Dr. Eduard Westreicher, “Democracy promotion: the German approach,” Worldwide promotion of democracy: challenges, role and strategy of the European Union, Proceedings of a conference organised by the European Office of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftunghttp://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas\_11856-1522-2-30.pdf?110504154444, June 5-6 2007)*

Approaches to democracy support and the German criteria catalogue **The specific situation in a given** partner **country** or region **can require very different approaches** and priorities **to assistance**. The German Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development (Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung – BMZ) published in 2005 a position paper (BMZ 2005 ‘Promoting Democracy in German Development Policy: Supporting Political Reform Processes and Popular Participation’) that explains the German position on **democracy promotion** within the scope of development cooperation. Political foundations such as KAS participated extensively in preparing the paper. In this position paper, policy **options are formulated for** supporting processes of democratisation **in different political situations in partner countries, for example, in hybrid systems, in authoritarian states or in post-war societies.** As far as approaches and priorities are concerned, particular attention in our view has to be given to conditions of fragile statehood. BMZ recently published (May 2007) the strategy paper ‘Development-Oriented Transformation in Conditions of Fragile Statehood and Poor Government Performance’. The strategy stipulates that **there are different possible approaches**, and that it is important to strengthen a democratic culture through the political participation of the poor and disadvantaged, especially women, young people, and minorities. Germany has also updated its catalogue of criteria, first established in 1990. **Besides concrete analysis to examine the feasibility of projects** and programmes, **assessment of the** development **orientation** **of** Germany’s **partner countries** within the framework of this annually updated catalogue **is of great relevance**. Democracy is one of the five main criteria in the catalogue, as follows: • Pro-poor and sustainable policies; • Respect for, protection and fulfilment of all human rights; • Democracy and the rule of law; • Efficiency and transparency of the state; • Cooperative stance within the international community. Range of players The German approach to democracy support takes account of actors at different levels with specific performance profiles. **Democracy promotion through state players mainly depends on the partner governments’ willingness to reform. Political foundations and churches can be active in areas where official bilateral development cooperation cannot play a part.** A certain degree of **institutional variety is necessary for the promotion of democracy. NGOs** must **act** on their **own responsibility, and** must be able to work **without political constraints. Pluralism is one of the constituent features of democratic societies.**

## No stable definition exists:

*(Karin Kortmann, “Keynote presentation: democracy promotion –key to peace, stability and development in a globalised world,” Worldwide promotion of democracy: challenges, role and strategy of the European Union, Proceedings of a conference organised by the European Office of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftunghttp://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas\_11856-1522-2-30.pdf?110504154444, June 5-6 2007)*

**The rationale for democracy promotion would** seem to **be** self-evident: **supporting democracy and setting up funding programmes. However, it is not always clear what ‘democracy promotion’ actually means. It is important to** exchange examples of good practice and to **discuss** the contribution public policy instruments can make alongside the efforts of civil society, political parties and foundations. Discourses on **supporting** democracy usually refers to the term ‘**good governance’**, which can be summed up as support for **human rights**, reinforcing **the rule of law, and the fight against corruption. All this is a part of democracy, but an exact meaning remains to be defined.**

## Includes demo “support”/“building”/“assistance”:

*(Danile Smadja, “The European Union: Key actor in worldwide democracy promotion,” Proceedings of a conference organised by the European Office of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftunghttp://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas\_11856-1522-2-30.pdf?110504154444, June 5-6 2007)*

The first issue that becomes apparent **when looking at democracy promotion** is that **there is a confusing lexicon of terms ranging from democracy promotion, democracy support, democracy building, democracy assistance or support, to democratic governance.** **The** European **Commission favours taking ‘democracy promotion’ as a concept encompassing the full range of external relations and development cooperation activities, which contribute to the development and consolidation of democracy** in third countries. However, **the final objectives of democracy promotion are clear, even if different terminologies are used.** More relevant perhaps are the means, approaches, methods, instruments and tools of democracy promotion. But first, I would like to touch upon some common understandings and assumptions underlying the EU’s activities in this field. First, understandings of democracy may vary. Yet, **the concept of democracy, including the rule of law and the protection of human rights, constitutes a universal value, the principles of which are enshrined in numerous international texts and conventions.** Democracy and human rights are inseparable and interdependent. Democracy is thus a right for all and a goal in itself. Democracy has an intrinsic value. Second, democracy is a process. In this context, I would like to refer to Recital 9 of the new European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights Regulation: “**democracy has** also **to be seen as a process**, developing from within, **involving all sections of society and a range of institutions** (…) that should ensure participation, representation, responsiveness and accountability. The task of building and sustaining a culture of human rights and making democracy work for its citizens, though especially urgent and difficult in emerging democracies, is essentially a continuous challenge, belonging first and foremost to the people of the country concerned but without diminishing the commitment of the international community.” In other words, **democracy “promotion” must not impose ideas, but support the relevant local actors in their efforts to steer change and the democratic reform process.** Third, the democratic process has an important value in creating the conditions for effective poverty alleviation and economic development. It is a prerequisite for government accountability, including civilian control of security. It is required to sustain an independent judiciary, a free media and a framework for protecting human rights. It is a tool to fight corruption and impunity. It is the most basic form of crisis management and conflict prevention. Fourth, to accomplish its aspirations as a responsible global player, pursuing peace, stability, and prosperity through effective multilateralism, the EU also needs likeminded democratic third countries as partners. The European Security Strategy (‘A secure Europe in a better world’) of December 2003 underlines that “the quality of international society depends on the quality of the governments that are its foundation. The best protection for [the EU’s] … security is a world of well-governed democratic states. Spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights are the best means of strengthening the international order.”

# Middle East

## Broad- Includes N. Africa, Afgan., Pak.:

*(Encyclopaedia Britannica, “Middle East,” http://www.britannica.com/place/Middle-East, August 20 2014)*

The change in usage began to evolve prior to World War II and tended to be confirmed during that war, when the term Middle East was given to the British military command in Egypt. By the mid-20th century **a common definition of the Middle East encompassed** the states or territories of **Turkey, Cyprus, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Iran, Israel, the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, Jordan, Egypt, Sudan, Libya,** and the various states and territories of Arabia proper (**Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Yemen, Oman, Bahrain, Qatar, and the** Trucial States, or Trucial Oman [now **U**nited **A**rab **E**mirates]). Subsequent events have tended, in loose usage, to enlarge the number of lands included in the definition. **The** three **North African countries of Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco are closely connected in sentiment and foreign policy** with the Arab states. **In addition, geographic factors often require** statesmen and others to **tak[ing]**e **account of Afghanistan and Pakistan in connection with the** affairs of the **Middle East.**

*(Geoffrey Kemp and Robert Harkavy, Strategic Geography and the Changing Middle East: Concepts, Definitions, and Parameters, Brookings Press, http://acc.teachmideast.org/texts.php?module\_id=4&reading\_id=120&sequence=6, 1997)*

Which then should be included in our grouping? First **the** traditional **U.S. State Department list for the Near East must be included (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Israel, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Iran, Iraq, the GCC states, and Yemen).** We believe **Sudan, Ethiopia, and Somalia have to be discussed**, albeit briefly, **because of their strategic and political importance**, though we refer to them mainly in the context of military geography. Given the strategic developments in the eastern Mediterranean, the Caucasus and Central Asia, Greece, Russia, and China are all important players but to include them within a definition of the Middle East is inappropriate. However, **Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, Sudan, and Turkey must be included as should** the energy-producing countries of the Caspian Basin (**Azerbaijan, Kazakstan, and Turkmenistan**). **Given their location Georgia and Armenia must also be included** but we have not gone into any detailed discussion of the other Central Asian states (Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan) even though they are shown **on our map of the** new **Middle East** and we occasionally refer to them. Our inclusion of India and Pakistan raises a question about the definition of South Asia. **We have not included Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka** in the analysis and some South Asians would argue that Burma (Myanmar) and even Tibet should be included in a comprehensive definition of South Asia.

We believe **the most accurate way to describe the region** covered by this study **would be the Middle East** (including **North Africa**, Turkey, Sudan, and the Horn of Africa), **the Transcaucasus, west Central Asia, and South Asia. Yet this is too clumsy. We have therefore decided to include all the above countries** and groupings **under the phrase** greater **Middle East region**. We realize this will not sit well with some analysts but **short of convening a quorum of geographers to iron out an agreed definition this is our best** alternative, and we hope our **usage** is acceptable **for the purposes of** this **study** (see map 1).

*(Middle East Institute, “Countries and Organizations,” http://www.unc.edu/mideast/where/mei-2005.shtml, 2005)*

**"Middle East"**

**Afghanistan Algeria Armenia Azerbaijan Bahrain Djibouti Egypt Georgia Iran Iraq Israel Jordan Kazakhstan Kuwait Kyrgyzstan Lebanon Libya Mauritania Morocco Oman Pakistan Palestine Qatar Saudi Arabia Sudan Syria Tajikistan Tunisia Turkey Turkmenistan U**nited **A**rab **E**mirates **Uzbekistan Yemen**

## Broad- Includes N. Africa, Afgan., Pak.:

*(Steven A. Camarota, Director of Research at the Center for Immigration Studies, “Immigrants from the Middle East,” http://cis.org/MiddleEasternImmigrantsProfile, August 2002)*

Based on an analysis by the Center for Immigration Studies of just-released data from the Census Bureau, this Backgrounder is one of the first to examine the socio-demographic characteristics of Middle Eastern immigrants in a systematic way. For the purposes of this study, **the Middle East is defined as** Pakistan, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Turkey, the Levant, the Arabian peninsula, and Arab North Africa.

We include Bangladesh in our estimates because in 1970 it was part of Pakistan, and thus it is unavoidably included in our Mideast estimates for that year. The entire list of Middle Eastern countries included in the study are: **Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Syria, Turkey, Oman, Qatar, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Yemen, Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia, West Sahara, and Mauritania.**

*(Duhaime’s Law Dictionary, “Middle East Definition,” http://www.duhaime.org/LegalDictionary/M/MiddleEast.aspx, 6/11/14)*

The Middle East Journal proposed, in the foreward of their inaugural issue (January 1947), that the area known as **the Middle East includes:**

**"Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Transjordan, the Arabian Peninsula, and Egypt**; but **not without** due **reference to closely related** peripheral **areas, such as the Mediterranean** approaches, **North and Northeast Africa, Transcaucasia, Afghanistan, India and Turkestan.** With a few notable exceptions, these are Moslem lands."

*(International Monetary Fund, “Regional economic outlook : Middle East and Central Asia,” https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/reo/2010/mcd/eng/10/mreo1024.pdf, 2010)*

The October 2010 Regional Economic Outlook: Middle East and Central Asia (REO), covering countries in the Middle East and Central Asia Department (MCD) of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), provides a broad overview of recent economic developments in 2009 and prospects and policy issues for the remainder of 2010 and 2011. To facilitate the analysis, the 30 MCD **countries** covered in this report **are divided into two groups**: (1) countries of **the Middle East**, North Africa, Afghanistan, and Pakistan (**MENAP**)—which are further subdivided into oil exporters and oil importers; **and** (2) countries of **the Caucasus and Central Asia** (**CCA**). The country acronyms used in some figures are included in parentheses. **MENAP** oil exporters **comprise Algeria** (ALG), **Bahrain** (BHR), **Iran** (IRN), **Iraq** (IRQ), **Kuwait** (KWT), **Libya** (LBY), **Oman** (OMN), **Qatar** (QAT), **Saudi** **Arabia** (SAU), **Sudan** (SDN), **the** United Arab Emirates (**UAE**), and **Yemen** (YMN). MENAP oil importers comprise **Afghanistan** (AFG), **Djibouti** (DJI), **Egypt** (EGY), **Jordan** (JOR), **Lebanon** (LBN), **Mauritania** (MRT), **Morocco** (MAR), **Pakistan** (PAK), **Syria** (SYR), **and Tunisia** (TUN). **CCA countries comprise Armenia** (ARM), **Azerbaijan** (AZE), **Georgia** (GEO), **Kazakhstan** (KAZ), **the Kyrgyz Republic** (KGZ), **Tajikistan** (TJK), **Turkmenistan** (TKM), **and Uzbekistan** (UZB). In addition, the following geographical groupings are used: The CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) comprises Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Mongolia, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. Georgia and Mongolia, which are not members of the CIS, are included in this group for reasons of geography and similarities in economic structure. The GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) comprises Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. The Maghreb comprises Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia. The Mashreq comprises Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria.

## Includes Egypt

*(Carbon Disclosure Project, “Technical Note: Country Regions,” https://www.cdp.net/Documents/Guidance/Country-Regions.pdf, 2013)*

**Middle East: Bahrain Cyprus Egypt Iran Iraq Israel Jordan Kuwait Lebanon Oman Palestinian territories Qatar Saudi Arabia Syria**n Arab Republic **Turkey U**nited **A**rab **E**mirates **Yemen**

*(GlobalSecurity.org, “Near East/Middle East,” http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/middle-east.htm, Sept 23 2012)*

Core **Mid-East:**

**Egypt Israel Lebanon Syria Jordan Iraq Iran Kuwait Saudi Arabia Bahrain Qatar UAE Oman Yemen**

## Generic

*(Middle East Studies Association, “About MESA,” http://mesana.org/about/index.html, 2011)*

**The Middle East Studies Association (MESA) is** a private, non-profit, non-political learned society that brings together scholars, educators and those **interested in** the study of the region from all over the world. MESA is primarily concerned with **the area encompassing Iran, Turkey, Afghanistan, Israel, Pakistan, and the countries of the Arab World** from the seventh century to modern times. **Other regions**, including Spain, Southeastern Europe, China and the former Soviet Union, **also are included for the periods in which their territories were parts of the Middle Eastern empires or were under the influence of Middle Eastern civilization**. From its inception in 1966 with 50 founding members, MESA has increased its membership to more than 2,700 and now serves as an umbrella organization for more than sixty institutional members and thirty-nine affiliated organizations. The association is a constituent society of the American Council of Learned Societies, the National Council of Area Studies Associations, and a member of the National Humanities Alliance.

As part of its goal to advance learning, facilitate communication and promote cooperation, **MESA** sponsors an annual meeting that is a leading international forum for scholarship, intellectual exchange and pedagogical innovation. It **is responsible for the International Journal of Middle East Studies, the premiere journal on the region**, the MESA Review of Middle East Studies and a biannual newsletter. An awards program recognizes scholarly achievement, service to the profession and exemplary student mentoring. MESA is governed by an eight-member Board of Directors elected by the membership.

*(World Atlas, “What Is The Middle East And What Countries Are Part Of It?,” http://www.worldatlas.com/webimage/countrys/me.htm, March 10 2016)*

**The Middle East is a geographical and cultural region located primarily in western Asia, but also in parts of northern Africa and southeastern Europe.** The western border of the Middle East is defined by the Mediterranean Sea, where Israel, Lebanon, and Syria rest opposite from Greece and Italy in Europe. **Egypt in Africa** also borders the Mediterranean and **is sometimes considered as part of the Middle East**, while **Turkey and Cyprus** literally **connect Europe to Asia and oscillate between being called European and Middle Eastern**. **Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia**, all located just northeast of Turkey, **are at times associated with the Middle East, Europe, Asia, or as their own separate region**. South of the Mediterranean Sea, the Red and Arabian Seas surround the southern part of the Middle East. **Saudi Arabia, Yemen**, and **Oman** border these waters, with **Iraq and Jordan connect**ing them **to the western part of the region**. **At the center of the Middle East rests** the Persian Gulf, cutting into the region and giving it its hook-like shape. Countries along the Persian Gulf include **the U**nited **A**rab **E**mirates, **Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Iran**. **The eastern and northern borders of the Middle East are somewhat difficult to define. Both Afghanistan and Pakistan border Iran to the east, but Pakistan’s shared history with India causes it to sometimes be seen as part of South Asia instead of the Middle East. Some of the countries bordering Iran and Afghanistan’s north, such as Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, are sometimes included within the** northern borders of the **Middle East, but are other times seen as their own Central Asian region alongside Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan**. **There are also several unrecognized or partially recognized states within the Middle East. Palestine**, which is made up of the Gaza Strip and West Bank regions in and around Israel, declared its independence in 1988 and is currently recognized as independent by 134 countries, though it is not an official member of the United Nations and is not considered to be its own countries by every G-8 nation except Russia. **Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and South Ossetia** are all located within the Caucasus region around Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, **and** Russia and all declared their independence during the 1990s, with limited recognition internationally. **Northern Cyprus** declared its independence in 1983 but is only recognized as a sovereign state within the UN by Turkey, with every other member considering it as simply part of Cyprus. **Some borders within the Middle East are similarly difficult to define as a result of territorial disputes** between countries within the region. Some examples include the island of Abu Musa in the Persian Gulf, which is administered by Iran by claimed by the United Arab Emirates, the Golan Heights plateau, which was part of Syria until it was occupied and annexed by Israel during the Six-Day War, and the region of Kurdistan, which is officially a part of northern Iraq but also has an autonomous status.

## U.S. State Dept. definition:

*(US Dept of State, FY 2007-2012 Department of State and USAID Strategic Plan: Near East, http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/dosstrat/2007/html/82969.htm, May 2007)*

**The following countries are in the Near East region**:

Western Sahara **Morocco Algeria Tunisia Libya Egypt Israel Lebanon Syria Jordan Iraq Iran Kuwait Saudi Arabia Bahrain Qatar U**nited **A**rab **E**mirates **Oman Yemen**

## Excludes Egypt:

*(World Atlas, “What Is The Middle East And What Countries Are Part Of It?,” http://www.worldatlas.com/webimage/countrys/me.htm, March 10 2016)*

**Countries Of The Middle East**

**Afghanistan, Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Oman, Pakistan, Palestinian Territories, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, U**nited **A**rab **E**mirates, **Uzbekistan, Yemen, West Bank**

## Excludes Egypt, Afghanistan, Pakistan:

*(U.S. Department of Energy Office of Science, “Countries Comprising the Middle East,” http://cdiac.ornl.gov/trends/emis/mdelist.html, Sept 26 2012)*

**Countries Comprising the Middle East Bahrain Cyprus** Former Democratic **Yemen** Former Yemen Islamic Republic of **Iran Iraq Israel Jordan Kuwait** and Part of the Neutral Zone Kuwait Oil Fires **Lebanon Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia** and Part of the Neutral Zone **Syria**n Arab Republic **Turkey** **U**nited **A**rab **E**mirates Yemen ﻿

*(Joshua Landis, head of the Center for Middle East Studies at the University of Oklahoma, Middle East and Islam, “Middle East,” http://www.ou.edu/mideast/region/middle-east.htm, 2002)*

**Bahrain Iran Iraq Israel Israeli Controlled Territory Jordan Kuwait Lebanon Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia Syria Turkey U**nited **A**rab **E**mirates **Yemen**

## Excludes Afghanistan, Pakistan:

*(American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, “Facts about Arabs and the Arab World,” http://www.adc.org/2009/11/facts-about-arabs-and-the-arab-world/, Nov 29 2009)*

What is the Middle East?

**The Middle East** is a loose term, not always used to describe the same territory. It usually **includes the Arab countries from Egypt east to the Persian Gulf, plus Israel and Iran. Turkey is sometimes considered part of the Middle East,** sometimes part of Europe. **Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh are** usually described as **South Asia.**

## Distinct from “Near East” & “Levant”:

*(Guido Sabatinelli, World Health Organization MD stationed in the Middle East, “Near East and Levant- Definitions,” http://www.glaphyridae.com/Biogeografia/NEL.html, 2008)*

**Different terms are used to encompass the territory** comprises **between Mesopotamia and Mediterranean Sea**, all these terms include geographical or political areas nested one in the other or adjoining.

**Particularly important** for the entomologists **is** the geographical **interpretation of** the Syria labels in old pinned specimens since, as explained in the following paragraphs, the geographical extension of Syria greatly changed between the end of XIX century and the Syria and Lebanon independence, in 1943.

In the present website I will use **the** following **Geographical terms: Middle East, Near East and Levant. It is useful to provide an explanations of their geographical meaning:**

**The Middle East** is the geographic region bordering Europe, former USSR, Tropical Asia and Africa and **comprises the following countries: Afghanistan, Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, U**nited **A**rab **E**mirates **and Yemen**.

**The Near East refers to the region encompassing** Anatolia (**the Asian portion of** modern **Turkey**), the Levant (**Syria, Jordan, Israel, Lebanon, and Palestine), Georgia, Armenia, and** Mesopotamia (**Iraq**).

The Levant is an imprecise term referring to an area of cultural habitation rather than to a specific geographic region. It denotes a large area in the Middle East, roughly bounded on the north by the Taurus Mountains, on the south by the Arabian Desert, and on the west by the Mediterranean Sea, while on the east it extends into Upper Mesopotamia; however, some definitions include nearly all of Mesopotamia. The Levant does not include the Caucasus Mountains, or any part of the Arabian Peninsula. The term Levant is somewhat synonymous with the term Mashriq, relating to "the east" or "the sunrise". **The Levant** in its geographical sense **comprises** the following political entities: West part of **Syria, Lebanon, West part of Jordan, Palestine (West Bank and Gaza Strip), Israel,** Sinai (**Egypt**). From 1920 to 1946 the French Mandates of Syria and Lebanon were called the Levant states. A specific chapter on Levant will describe its peculiarity and zoogeographical meaning.

## Distinct from “Arab world” & “Islamic world”:

*(Portland State University, Middle East Teaching Tools, “Geography of the Modern Middle East and North Africa,” http://www.middleeastpdx.org/resources/original/geography-of-the-modern-middle-east-and-north-africa/, 2012)*

**Many different terms have been used to describe this area of the world**, and **although various geographic and cultural descriptions have** major **overlaps, each may** **significantly** **exclude different regions**. The region can be referred to most neutrally by continental terms, such as “West Asia” or “Southwest Asia and North Africa.”

Linguistically, **the “Arab world” includes the Arabic-speaking countries from North Africa, Southwest Asia, and the Arabian Peninsula, but excludes Iran, Turkey, and Israel.**

**The “Islamic world” includes all of the Arabic countries, as well as** neighboring **Turkey and Iran**. Other nations that are predominantly Muslim, like **Indonesia, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and many sub-Saharan African countries, should be considered** as integral parts of the **Islamic** world, **but terminology for the region** often **omits them.** In addition, there are significant populations of Christians, Jews, Zoroastrians, and other religious groups that live in these same nations that make up the so-called Islamic world.

## Distinguishing between “Middle East,” “North Africa,” and “Gulf Region”:

*(Portland State University, Middle East Teaching Tools, “Geography of the Modern Middle East and North Africa,” http://www.middleeastpdx.org/resources/original/geography-of-the-modern-middle-east-and-north-africa/, 2012)*

Countries of the Middle East and North Africa

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| English Name | Arabic Name | Capital | Location |
| Algeria | al Jaza’ir | Algiers | North Africa |
| Bahrain | Bahrayn | Manama | Gulf |
| Egypt | Misr | Cairo | North Africa |
| Iran | Iran | Tehran | Gulf |
| Iraq | Al’Iraq | Baghdad | Middle East |
| Israel | Isra’il | Jerusalem | Middle East |
| Jordan | Al’Ordun | Amman | Middle East |
| Kuwait | Kuwait | Kuwait City | Gulf |
| Lebanon | Lubnan | Beirut | Middle East |
| Libya | Leebya | Tripoli | North Africa |
| Morocco | Al Maghrib | Rabat | North Africa |
| Occupied Palestinian Territories | Filasteen |  | Middle East |
| Oman | ‘Oman | Muscat | Gulf |
| Qatar | Qatar | Doha | Gulf |
| Saudi Arabia | Al mamlaka al Arabia al Sa’udeeya | Riyad | Gulf |
| Syria | Sūriyya | Damascus | Middle East |
| Tunisia | Toonis | Tunis | North Africa |
| Turkey | Toorkia | Ankara | Middle East/Asia |
| United Arab Emirates | Al Imārāt al ‘Arabīyah al Muttaḥidah | Abu Dhabi | Gulf |
| Yemen | Al Yaman | Sana’a | Gulf |

## Same as “Near East”:

*(U.S. Department of State, “Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs,” http://www.state.gov/p/nea/index.htm, ND, accessed 3/16/2016)*

**The Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs** (**NEA**), headed by Assistant Secretary Anne Patterson, **deals with U.S. foreign policy and** U.S. diplomatic **relations** **with Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Palestinian Territories, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, U**nited **A**rab **E**mirates, **and Yemen.** Regional policy issues that **NEA handles** include Iraq, **Middle East peace**, terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, **and political and economic reform.**

## Definitions are arbitrary:

*(Carolina Center for the Study of the Middle East and Muslim Civilizations, “Where Is the Middle East?,” http://mideast.unc.edu/where/, 2016)*

**The concept of** a region called **the** “**Middle East” is a** relatively **recent and unstable construction**. Since **the term** was first coined at the beginning of the 20th century, it **has been applied to different sets of countries and territories**. **To complicate matters further, territories which have at times been categorized as “Middle East” have also attracted other designations: Near East, western Asia, eastern Mediterranean, the Arab world, and so on.** These designations all represent different ways of conceptualizing what these territories have in common and how they relate to other parts of **the** world.

For practical purposes, CCSMEMC uses an admittedly **arbitrary designation** **of** contemporary nations into “**core areas” and “extended regions” of the Middle East as follows:**

**Core Areas:** **Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Cyprus (northern), Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, West Bank and Gaza (Palestine) and Yemen**

**Extended Regions** of Muslim Civilizations: **Afghanistan, Albania, Bangladesh, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Brunei, Burkina Faso, Chad, Djibouti, Eritrea, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, India, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia, Mali, Mauretania, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sahara, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan**

The following presentation uses maps to illustrate the **[there is a] lack of consensus among governments, international organizations, and scholars regarding how to define the Middle East or even whether to use that term. The instability of the concept “Middle East” points to the need to break down traditional area studies barriers.**

## No stable definition exists:

*(Geoffrey Kemp and Robert Harkavy, Strategic Geography and the Changing Middle East: Concepts, Definitions, and Parameters, Brookings Press, http://acc.teachmideast.org/texts.php?module\_id=4&reading\_id=120&sequence=6, 1997)*

**There is no single, agreed definition of the political and geographic boundaries of the Middle East. Geographers, historians, journalists, and bureaucrats all use the term, yet frequently have different definitions** of what they mean. In parts of Asia it is fashionable to refer to the region as West Asia but this then excludes **Egypt, Sudan, and the Magreb,** which **are in Africa yet are generally thought of as Middle East countries**. In the nineteenth century the major European powers regarded the East or Orient as the region of Eurasia (excluding Russia) that began where Western civilization ended, which is to say with the African continent and the Ottoman Empire. The great strategic competition among Britain, France, Russia, and Germany for access to and control of this area came to be known as the Eastern Question. With the expansion of Western influence further into Asia, however, it became necessary to distinguish between the Near East and Far East. According to Bernard Lewis, **the term Middle East was first used** by Mahan **to refer to the area between Arabia and India** that had particular relevance for naval strategy - **that is, the Persian Gulf.** During World War I the command for the British forces in the region was designated the Middle East Command. Since that time **the term has been used,** sometimes **synonymously with the term Near East, to mean the area from North Africa up to but not including the Indian subcontinent.** 24 **The U.S. Department of State refers to the region as the Near East and includes within that designation North Africa, the Levant, and the Gulf countries but not Turkey** since the latter is a member of NATO. 25 In contrast, **the U.S. Department of Defense divides the region in** **yet another way**. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) has responsibility for military operations in a region **that includes** **Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya, Somalia, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran, the states of the Gulf Cooperation Council** (GCC), **Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Excluded are Turkey, Israel, Syria, and India** - the first three remaining the responsibility of the European Command (EUCOM) and India falling under the Pacific Command (PACOM).

**The breakup of the Soviet Union and the establishment of the** newly independent **republics of the Caucasus** (Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia) and Central Asia (Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Kazakstan) has **once more raised questions about exactly where the Middle East begins and** where it **ends** **and whether it can be** comprehensively, **consistently defined**. Given the strategic thrust of this study **we believe the definition of the region must include those countries** directly involved **in** **four main conflicts in the area -- Arab-Israeli, Persian Gulf, Caspian Basin, and South Asia.** 26

**How** then **do we define the Middle East**? One option would be to use the phrase "Greater Middle East," which has gained some currency, to cover the areas we think are most significant to our basic thesis. 27 Yet such **a formal designation implies a degree of precision that we do not believe is** presently **justified** and embraces more countries than we are examining in this study. **It assumes there is a consensus concerning which countries to include and** which to **exclude** (as in the case of defining continents, for example, Asia or Africa).**Yet selection is** bound to be **arbitrary** because the rationale for including one country **and** excluding another is **based on judgments** about which are the determinant variables. **Since we are** primarily **interested in** strategic **geography** **rather than religion or political alliances our selection of countries is necessarily different from those who would** wish to **analyze, say, the Muslim world or the** East-West **cold war** confrontation states. As will become clear our focus is on the strategic importance of energy resources, water scarcity, and weapons proliferation, all of which have critical geographical components.