



PF Topic Analysis

March 2016

Public Forum debaters will be discussing “**Resolved: The United States should withdraw its military presence from Okinawa.**”

We’ll begin by taking a closer look at the meaning of the key phrases in the resolution.

Resolutional Analysis

The United States is the actor for this resolution. Hopefully, you know what the United States is! This part seems pretty self-explanatory, so we’ll move on.

Should is a word that is typically understood to demand a particular policy action—in this case, withdrawal from Okinawa. Although I do not anticipate many debates on this particular resolution will hinge on arguments about the word “should,” you may nevertheless wish to review our more thorough discussion of its nuances from [last month’s topic analysis](#).



Withdraw is defined by [Merriam-Webster](#) as “to take back or away” or “to remove from use or cultivation.” In other words, “to withdraw” can be thought of as basically meaning “to exit” or “to pull back from.”

However, this topic takes place in a military context, so we’ll want to also check the military definition of the term.

According to [Rick Baillergeon](#) (*retired U.S. Army Infantry Officer Associate Professor of Tactics at U.S. Army Command and General Staff College*) and [John Sutherland](#) (*retired U.S. Army Infantry Officer, former Professor of Tactics at the U.S. Army Infantry Center at Fort Benning and at the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, current employee at the Joint Center for Operational Analysis*) “withdrawal” is [defined](#) thusly in military parlance:

Is a form of retrograde in which a unit is in contact, but not necessarily under pressure. In this operation, the unit disengages from the enemy and moves to an assembly area or a new defensive position. A unit may conduct a withdrawal unassisted or with assistance from other friendly forces. Within the withdrawal, there are two basic types – under enemy pressure and not under enemy pressure. We will discuss each in detail momentarily. First, we will highlight some basic principles that are critical to achieving success in either type.

That seems to largely fit with the civilian understanding of the word. There is significant discussion within military literature of various types of withdrawal during the course of combat, but we need not become concerned with those here. A withdrawal from Okinawa would involve the termination of an occupation, not a tactical maneuver during an active battle with an enemy. Therefore, the various sub-varieties of military withdrawal tactics aren’t relevant to debates on this topic.



Here is the important thing about “withdraw”—it is absolute. In other words, “withdraw” is *not* synonymous with terms like “reduce,” “decrease,” “curtail,” etc. Pro teams on this topic *cannot* meet their burden by arguing that the U.S. should close one (or several) bases. They will need to defend total removal of America’s military forces from the island.

However, it would be legitimate for pros to advocate that bases be moved from Okinawa to the Japanese mainland, or elsewhere in the region (more on that later). As long as all U.S. forces leave Okinawa, it’s fair game.

Nevertheless, I have a feeling that plenty of pros on this topic will try to get away with strategies endorsing less-than-full removal of U.S. forces. To check back against those tactics, we’ll also be releasing a supplemental topicality file covering the “withdraw” debate at-length. It will be published within a day or two of this guide, so don’t forget to check back. For now, though, let’s keep going.

Its is possessive. Since we know the U.S. is the actor, “its” means America needs to remove troops and other military operatives that belong to the United States.

The definition of **military presence** might seem intuitively obvious to you, but there is actually some nuance involved. Obviously, soldiers are included, but what about infrastructure, vehicles, weapons and gear, support staff, intelligence capabilities, non-combat peacekeepers, unmanned drone operations, etc. etc. etc.?



Like “withdraw,” the phrase “military presence” must be defined contextually, within the discipline of national security. However, experts don’t necessarily speak with a unified voice when it comes to whether these borderline considerations should technically be considered “presence.” For that reason, you’ll want to make sure you have an interp to support your pro case, and potentially a few additional interps to check back against opponents’ pro cases you might consider unfair.

Most generally, “military presence” can be understood to mean *everything* the U.S. military owns that is stationed abroad. However, most definitions suggest that “presence” is specific to people/things stationed as a part of planned, routine, non-combat functions, like deterring potential adversaries. It does not typically include people/things deployed as a part of an active combat response to an unplanned crisis. Here is **evidence**:

*(James Thomason, Project Leader, Institute for Defense Analysis, “Transforming US Overseas Military Presence: Evidence and Options for DoD,”
<http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.122.1144&rep=rep1&type=pdf>, July 2002)*

US ^{overseas} **military presence consists of all the US military assets in overseas areas that are engaged in** relatively **routine non-combat activities or functions**. Collectively, these assets constitute one of a set of very important military instruments of national power and influence. It is regularly asserted within the Department of Defense that these overseas **military presence** activities **promote** key **security objectives, such as deterrence, assurance of** ^{friends and} **allies, the provision of** ^{timely} **crisis response capabilities, regional stability and**, generally, **security conditions** that in turn promote freedom and prosperity.

In other words, according to the definition above, a military ship that patrols a particular region for the purposes of monitoring things and/or “flexing” to discourage aggressive actions from foreign nations would be considered a component of “presence.” A military ship deployed to attack an enemy vessel in response to an act of war would not be “presence.”



Expanding on that interpretation a bit, here is further **evidence** clarifying that “presence” *does* include units engaged in training foreign militaries, gathering intelligence, and/or conducting peacekeeping:

*(James Thomason, Project Leader, Institute for Defense Analysis, “Transforming US Overseas Military Presence: Evidence and Options for DoD,”
<http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.122.1144&rep=rep1&type=pdf>, July 2002)*

Our working definition of US overseas military presence is that it consists of all the US military assets in overseas areas that are engaged in relatively routine, regular, non-combat activities or functions.

By this definition, **forces** that are located overseas may or may not be engaging in presence activities. If they are **engaging in combat** (such as Operation Enduring Freedom), **or are involved in a one-time non-combat action (such as an unscheduled carrier battle group deployment from the United States aimed at calming or stabilizing an emerging crisis situation)**, then **they are not engaging in presence** activities. Thus, an asset that is located (or present) overseas may or may not be “engaged in presence activities,” may or may not be “doing presence.” We have thus far defined presence activities chiefly in “negative” terms—what they are not. **In more positive terms, what exactly are presence activities, i.e., what do presence activities actually entail doing?** Overseas **military presence** activities are generally viewed as a subset of the overall class of **activities that the US government uses** in its efforts **to promote** important **military/security objectives** [Dismukes, 1994]. **A variety of recurrent, overseas military activities are normally placed under the “umbrella” concept of military presence. These include** but are not limited to **US military efforts overseas to train foreign militaries**; to improve interoperability of US and friendly forces; **to** peacefully and visibly **demonstrate US commitment and/or ability to defend US interests; to gain intelligence** and familiarity with a locale; **to conduct peacekeeping** activities; **and to position** relevant, capable **US military assets such that they are** likely to be **available** sooner rather than later **in case an** evolving **security** operation or **contingency should call for them.**

However, per this **evidence**, “presence” *excludes* diplomatic efforts, economic negotiations, etc.:

(Charles Greer, Lieutenant Colonel, US Army, “The Future of Forward Presence,” <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA234227&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf>, 1991)

To establish a conceptual framework for this paper, **I developed the following definition of forward presence within the context of national defense: the visible employment of US military personnel and/or military material as a deterrent outside of the continental United States** (OCONUS) at any point along the operational continuum **short of** involving **major US conventional forces in combat.**



My simplistic definition could be subject to endless scholarly debate. **It includes small unit combat operations of limited scope and duration and peacetime contingency operations** such as Desert Shield in Saudi Arabia, but it excludes the subsequent combat operation designated Desert Storm. It includes our military activities in Alaska and Hawaii. **It excludes any diplomatic, economic, social or psychological activities that do not have a military component.**

On the other hand, this **evidence** says diplomacy is included:

(Patrick Brady, Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy, "IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U.S. NAVY OF A 50 PERCENT DECREASE IN DEFENSE SPENDING," <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA261766&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf>, 1992)

In this new era of regional threats the need for forward presence has become more important.^{2 1} Yet defense budget cuts and **the closing of many overseas bases have prompted the DOD to reevaluate its traditional definitions of forward presence** in order for the nation to continue to fulfill its many obligations.^{2 2} **The new definition of forward presence emphasizes the need to "show our commitment, lend credibility to our alliances, enhance regional stability, and provide crisis response capability while promoting U.S. influence and access."**^{2 3} The planned reduction of forward land-based U.S. forces worldwide could mean naval forces will be increasingly responsible for fulfilling the objectives of forward presence. **There are six roles for the Navy under forward presence. The first role is peacetime engagement.** This is similar to the traditional presence role the Navy has historically fulfilled. It is needed **to counter the image of an American global withdrawal as force reductions occur** and fewer forces are forward based. The forward deployment of naval forces in this role "provides an underpinning for diplomatic activities which, when combined with other U.S. foreign policy initiatives, are influential in shaping events. **These forward operations are oriented toward diplomacy, coalition building and the promotion of stability** which fosters peace and cooperation."^{2 4} Additionally, **this role will also guarantee the freedom of the sea which will facilitate trade** and improve the economic conditions of the United States and our allies. Typical **missions include: Stationed forces; rotational overseas deployments; access and storage agreements; port visits; military-to-military relations; and joint and combined training exercises.**^{2 5} This role does not necessarily have to be fulfilled by aircraft carrier battle groups to be credible.^{2 6} **The second role is to enhance crisis response capability.** Naval forces provide the National Command Authority with the ability to react to ambiguous warning in the early stages of a crisis. This timely show of force can stabilize the situation and permit diplomacy to prevail. By complicating the risk versus gain calculus of potential adversaries, we cause them to consider carefully the initiation of activity which might be counter to U.S. interests. Depending upon the crisis, forward deployed naval expeditionary forces can respond autonomously or become an enabling force about which a decisive joint/coalition based response can be shaped.^{2 7} **The third role is protecting U.S. citizens.** This includes not only responsive and capable evacuation lift, but the ability to be able to do it in the midst of conflict. **This could also include protection against terrorists by stopping vessels, suspected of containing terrorists or illegal arms shipments,** on the high seas. **The fourth role is combating drugs. This involves ocean surveillance of potential drug traffickers, interdiction of drug shipments, and intelligence collection** for counter narcotics agencies. **The fifth role is humanitarian assistance.** This requires the ability **to respond** rapidly and effectively **to disasters.** As stated in the National Military Strategy, "Not only must our forces provide humanitarian aid, but as seen recently in Northern Iraq, in some cases they must also be prepared to engage in conflict in order to assist and project those in need."^{2 8} **The final role is intelligence collection.** This requires the ability to overtly and covertly collect information, and then transmit real-time information to the National Command Authorities in time to avert or mitigate crises. This role is



necessary under all four elements of the new defense agenda. Typical missions include maritime intelligence collection in support of national requirements; surveillance of air or naval forces that could act hostile against vital interests of the United States; and detection, tracking, and reporting vessels involved in terrorist-related activities.

This **evidence** says covert operations can be included, as long as an adversary is aware that some activity is taking place:

(Charles Greer, Lieutenant Colonel, US Army, "The Future of Forward Presence," <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA234227&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf>, 1991)

The more controversial aspect of my definition lies in the terms "deterrent" and "visible." **Deterrence is "the prevention from action by fear of the consequences.** Deterrence is a state of mind brought about by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction." Once major conventional forces are engaged in protracted combat operations, it is clear that deterrence, by definition, has failed.

Visibility is inextricably linked to deterrence. Visible to whom? To those we wish to deter. This is reminiscent of the old philosophical question, "**If a tree falls deep in the forest and there is no one there to hear it, does it make a sound?**" **In the case of forward presence, the answer is "no."**

Target audience is the key to the concept of visibility. A target audience may be the world at large, the senior leadership of a specific country or movement, the control cell of a terrorist organization or countless other possibilities. Therefore, forward **presence, by definition, also includes covert activities using military personnel and/or material, as long as the activity is visible to the targeted audience and deters that group or individual from taking an undesired action. An invisible presence is both contradictory and serves no useful deterrent purpose, which goes to the heart of the issue. Deterrence is the ultimate purpose of forward presence.**

This **evidence** indicates that "presence" includes only assets that are *physically* present:

(Gregory Coe, Professor of Criminal Law at The Judge Advocate General's School of the United States Army, "Restating Some Old Rules and Limiting Some Landmarks: Recent Developments in Pre-Trial and Trial Procedure," Army Law, no. 25, April 1997)

Reviewing the Manual for Courts-Martial, the Army court held that the speakerphone procedure violated the law because of the logical definition of presence, the policy reasons why physical presence is required to conduct a court-martial, and the military judge's justification for conducting the arraignment by speakerphone.ⁿ¹⁷³ The court determined that the Manual for Courts-Martial nowhere defines "presence" in the applicable provisions.ⁿ¹⁷² Looking to the plain meaning of the word in Webster's Dictionary, **the Army court held that presence meant "the fact or condition of being present."**ⁿ¹⁷³ According to Webster's, **"present" means "being in**



one place and not elsewhere, being within reach, sight, or call or within contemplated limits, being in view or at hand, being before, beside, with, or in the same place as someone or something."ⁿ¹⁷⁴

This **evidence**, though, contradicts the above by claiming that support staff based in the United States are also included, if they are working on efforts taking place abroad:

(Barry Blechman, President of DFI International, formerly with Department of Defense, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, & the Office of Management and Budget, "Military Presence Abroad in a New Era: The Role of Airpower," Strategic Review, pp. 14, Spring 1997)

The highly complex nature of military presence operations, with manifestations both psychological and physical, makes their effects difficult to identify and assess. Nonetheless, presence missions (whether employing forces stationed abroad or afloat, temporarily deployed or permanently based overseas, or based in the United States) are integral parts of U.S. defense strategy. **Through** routine **presence** operations, **the U**nited **S**tates **seeks to reinforce alliances** and friendships, **make credible security commitments** to crucial regions, **and** nurture cooperative political relations. More episodically, forces engaged in presence operations can **dissuade aggressors** from hostile demands, help prevent or contain regional crises, and, when conflict erupts nonetheless, provide an infrastructure for the transition to war. Given its multifaceted nature, neither practitioners nor scholars have yet settled on a single definition of **presence**. Technically, the term **refers to** both a military posture and a military objective. This study uses the term "presence" to refer to **a continuum of military activities, from a variety of interactions during peacetime to crisis response involving both forces on the scene and those based in the U**nited **S**tates. **Our definition follows that articulated by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff: "Presence is the totality of U.S. instruments of power deployed overseas** (both permanently and temporarily) **along with the requisite infrastructure and sustainment capabilities."**²

This **evidence** says "presence" refers to people only (e.g. not "stuff"):

(The Oxford Essential Dictionary of the U.S. Military, by Oxford University Press, Inc. republished and cited as "US Military Dictionary," <http://www.answers.com/topic/presence>, 2002)

presence

n.a **group of people, especially soldiers** or police, **stationed in a particular place**: *maintain a presence in the region.*



More **evidence** on “people only”:

(Bradford Booth, Principal with ICF International & Prof of Sociology at the University of Maryland, “2000 Sociologists for Women in Society,” Gender & Society, Vol. 14 no. 2 pp. 318-332, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/190277.pdf>, April 2000)

This article uses Public Use Micro sample (PUMS) data drawn from the 1990 census to explore the relationship between **military presence, defined as the percentage of the local labor force in the active-duty armed forces**, and women's employment and earnings across local labor market areas (LMAs) in the United States. Comparisons of local rates of unemployment and mean women's earnings are made between those LMAs in which the military plays a disproportionate role in the local labor market and those in which military presence is low

Even more “people only” **evidence**:

(United States Army Combined Arms Center, “military presence”, <http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/cac2/call/thesaurus/toc.asp?id=20296>, September 17 2008)

Military presence. Definition/Scope: Maintaining forces in an area to demonstrate interest and resolve, and enhance the ability to respond quickly in a crisis.

This **evidence** specifies that “military presence” also includes civilian support staff, based in a particular location to support military goals:

*(Yang Qingchuan, news writer, “Colombia deal suggests unchanged U.S. policy to keep mammoth global military presence”, [Although Washington has been readjusting its global military presence since the Cold War, the global reach of **U.S. military presence is** still unparalleled. Excluding huge presence of U.S. troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, there are about 900 U.S. military facilities in 46 countries and territories, accommodating 190,000 U.S. **troops and** 115,000 **civilian employees**, according to official figures. However, some analysts say the real figures may be far greater. All together, the Pentagon owns or rents 322,000 hectares of](http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:TXfW4ttwj44J:www.globalresearch.ca/index.php%3Fcon text%3Dva%26aid%3D14770+%22military+presence%22+definition&cd=4&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us&client=safari, August 14 2009)</i></p></div><div data-bbox=)*



land overseas, with an inventory of weapons worth trillions of U.S. dollars according to some estimate. U.S. policymakers gave two sets of reasons for keeping such a vast network of global presence. One is to enhance security of the world by deterring attacks from "rogue countries" and preventing unrest, and the other is to provide humanitarian assistance.

This **evidence** echoes the above, and also includes office buildings and other assets located off of military bases:

(Robert E. Harkavy, Professor of Political Science at Pennsylvania State University, "Bases Abroad: The Global Foreign Military Presence, Oxford University Press, p. 8, 1989)

One might prefer the use of a still broader term, "foreign military presence." Everything that falls under the headings of bases and facilities would thereby be included. So too would large military formations (combat units, etc.) and military advisory groups, and headquarters operations which may be spread around office buildings in the centre of a host city.

All U.S. military-owned infrastructure is included, according to this **evidence**:

(GAO [General Accounting Office], "EUROPEAN SECURITY U.S. and European Contributions to Foster Stability and Security in Europe," <http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/testimony/214.pdf>, November 2001)

DOD defines overseas presence as the mix of permanently stationed forces, rotationally deployed forces, temporarily deployed forces, and infrastructure required to conduct the full range of military operations.



This **evidence** says access agreements are “presence”:

(William Harmon, US Army Major, “The Korean Question: Is There a Future for Forward-Based American Forces in a Unified Korea?,” <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA415880&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf>, 2003)

American military doctrine addresses forward presence in Joint Publication 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War. In this doctrine forward **presence is defined as, “ activities [that] demonstrate our commitment, lend credibility to our alliances, enhance regional stability, and provide a crisis response capability while promoting US influence and access. In addition to forces stationed overseas and afloat, forward presence activities include periodic and rotational deployments, access and storage agreements, multinational exercises, port visits, foreign military training, foreign community support, and military-to-military contacts.”**

And, according to this **evidence**, providing support, weapons sales, etc. to a host nation’s armed forces is also “military presence”:

(James Thomason, Project Leader, Institute for Defense Analysis, “Transforming US Overseas Military Presence: Evidence and Options for DoD,” <http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.122.1144&rep=rep1&type=pdf>, July 2002)

This is generally consistent, for example, with B. Dismukes’ formulation: “Overseas **presence encompasses a variety of activities.... In addition to permanent and rotational forces forward on the ground, forces deployed at sea, and prepositioned equipment, overseas presence includes: exercises and training of US forces with those of friends and allies; unilateral training by US forces on foreign soil; US C3I systems, especially in their bilateral and multilateral roles; arrangements for access by US forces to facilities overseas; stationing and visits abroad by senior US military and defense officials; visits to port and airfields by US naval and air forces; public shows by demonstration teams such as Thunderbirds and a host of public affairs activities, including military musical groups; staff-to-staff talks and studies with foreign military organizations** and analytical groups; exchanges of military people between the US and friends and allies; military training of foreign personnel in the US and in their home countries; training of military officers of former totalitarian and some developing states in the roles of the military in a civil society; foreign military **sales and funding** and co-production **of military equipment with other nations.**” [pp. 13–14]



This **evidence** further supports the claim that “presence” excludes crisis-response operations:

(Bradford Dismukes, analyst with the Center for Naval Analyses, “The U.S. Military Presence Abroad”, Strategic Review, pp. 55, Spring 1995)

Logically, forward presence has become the most important strategic task of U.S. conventional forces. With respect to adversaries, if forces abroad are successful in deterrence, then the requirement to respond to crises (not to mention war) can be avoided. **Presence is the primary mission; crisis response is the** necessary, but less desirable, **back up.** These conclusions have far-reaching consequences both for the use of existing U.S. forces and for the acquisition of forces for the future. **Because of their scope and complexity, these necessarily must be addressed separately. More important yet are their implications for the way Americans think about** why they should bear the risks and costs of **keeping forces abroad.** For America’s partners, particularly other G7 members, there are equally important implications for why and how they share the political and financial costs of U.S. presence.

However, this **evidence** says crisis-response *is* included:

(Barry Blechman, President of DFI International, formerly with U.S. Department of Defense, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and U.S. Office of Management and Budget, “Military Presence Abroad in a New Era: The Role of Airpower,” Strategic Review, pp. 13, Spring 1997)

Occupying a continuum of operations short of actual combat, **presence** missions have **included** the **permanent basing of troops overseas, routine military-to-military contacts, military exercises and training with other nations, participation in multinational peace and humanitarian operations, the provision** of timely **intelligence** information **and** other **data** **to** leaders of **other nations, military deployments in response to crises, and** when necessary, the **deployment of forces in anticipation of combat.**

More **evidence** that “military presence” includes responses to crises:

(Ryan Henry, former Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, “Reposturing the Force: U.S. Overseas Presence in the Twenty-first Century,” <http://www.usnwc.edu/Publications/Naval-War-College-Press/Newport-Papers/Documents/26-pdf.aspx>, 2006)



Finally, operational access comprises the presence, global management, and surging of our forces overseas, all enabled by the political and geographic access we enjoy with hostnation partners. **Presence is defined by the permanent and rotational forces that conduct military activities (training, exercises, and operations) worldwide, from security cooperation to crisis response. That presence consists of both small units** working together in a wide range of capacities **and major formations** conducting elaborate exercises to achieve proficiency in multinational operations. Second, our posture supports our new approach to force management, which seeks both to relieve stresses on our military forces and their families and to manage our forces on a global, rather than regional, basis. Combatant commanders no longer “own” forces in their theaters; rather, forces are managed according to global priorities. Third, managing our military forces globally also allows us to surge a greater percentage of the force wherever and whenever necessary.

Finally, here is **evidence** supporting the broadest possible interpretation of “military presence”—it says “presence” is everything the military does:

(Richard Meyer, Lieutenant Commander, US Navy, “Naval Presence with a Purpose: Considerations for the Operational Commander,” <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA470845&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf>, 2007)

In 2007, naval **presence is no longer enumerated as a stand-alone mission** of U.S. naval forces. However, the concept of **presence is inherent in all that we do**. In the Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) there is only one specified task with presence in the title and it is the strategic-national task 3.1, “Coordinate Forward Presence of Forces in Theaters.”⁷ In the definition of this task, the UJTL strikes at the heart of the matter by stating that **presence “...is** a crucial element of deterrence and can be a **demonstration of resolve to allies and potential adversaries**.”⁸ In addition to this one task, however, the term presence or forward presence is used in the definition of several other tasks such as operational task 1.2.4.1, “Conduct a Show of Force”.⁹ **This gives credence to the belief that presence is an underlying theme in every mission we undertake** as a Navy.

More broad definition **evidence**:

(William Johnsen and Thomas-Durrell Young, Strategic Research Analyst at the Strategic Studies Institute and former National Security Affairs Analyst at the Strategic Studies Institute, “DEFINING U.S. FORWARD PRESENCE IN EUROPE: GETTING PAST THE NUMBERS” <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA255193&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf>, 1992)

The National Military Strategy of the United States defines forward presence as “...forces stationed overseas and afloat... periodic and rotational deployments, access and storage agreements, combined exercises, security and humanitarian assistance, port visits, and military-to-military contacts.”⁴ Because of this rather all-encompassing description, forward **presence** currently **has the** unavoidable **characteristic of being all things to all people.**



Moving on, from “military presence,” the word **in** is obvious, but just in case you need interpretation **evidence**, here is some:

(Words and Phrases, resource series providing judicial definitions from both state and federal courts, published by Thompson-Reuters Legal Solutions USA, Volume 20A, p. 16, 1959)

In the act of 1861 providing that justices of the peace shall have jurisdiction “in” their respective counties to hear and determine all complaints, etc., **the word “in” should be construed to mean “throughout”** such counties

Okinawa is a [Japanese island](#), located about 400 miles South of the rest of the nation. It is the largest island in the Ryukyu archipelago. The island covers [454 square miles](#)—about 0.6% of Japan’s total landmass—and is home to about 1.3 million residents. About [44,000](#) of these inhabitants are American troops and their families. Despite its small size, Okinawa currently hosts roughly half of all U.S. soldiers stationed in Japan under the security alliance, and 1/3 of all American forces in the Asia-Pacific region.

Okinawa is of strategic interest to military forces due to its geographical positioning—it sits roughly equally between Japan and China (~400 miles), and about 300 miles North of Taiwan.

Due in part to its location, Okinawa’s history, culture, and tradition are distinct from that of broader Japan. It was an independent kingdom functioning as a tributary of China until 1609, when it was conquered and occupied by Japanese forces. It was fully integrated into the Japanese state in 1879. Today, most of its inhabitants speak Japanese, but Okinawa does have its own language, indigenous religion, culinary tradition, etc. A certain attitude of “outsiderness” from mainstream Japan remains prevalent.



We'll cover the origin and history of United States military presence in Okinawa during the following section on Background.

In the status quo, [32](#) United States military bases are located on the island of Okinawa. These bases occupy about 20% of the total area of the island, and account for 4-5% of its total economic activity. For a number of reasons (which we will cover in detail later on), this American military presence tends to be unpopular with local residents. That is the source of the controversy that gives us something to debate!

So, taken together, we can see that the March PF topic asks debates to discuss whether America should remove its military presence from the Japanese island of Okinawa. Although there are a few possible sticking points, this resolution is, for the most part, pretty clear.

Now that we've gone over the meaning of the key terminology, we need to take a look at the historical as well as recent events that have led us to this debate.

Background

Like most topics, especially those dealing with the concerns of multiple nations, this one comes with a lengthy and complex history. This section will provide an overview of the crucial background information, so you can discuss the issues with confidence.



The United States has had a military presence on Okinawa since World War II. In March 1945, the U.S. began [the war's largest amphibious attack](#) on Japan, beginning with an invasion of Okinawa. Japanese forces mounted an intense resistance, and both sides suffered tremendous casualties. On the Japanese side, it is reported that 100,000 civilians were killed, including many forced by their own nation's military leadership to commit suicide rather than surrender. This struggle nearly destroyed the island.

Once American forces took possession of Okinawa, they used it to stage their attacks on the Japanese mainland. On August 15, 1945, Japan surrendered.

Following the surrender, the U.S. assumed administrative control over the whole of Japan, including the island of Okinawa. As a part of this, American forces demilitarized Japan, and in 1947 set up a new government which adopted a constitution featuring a clause forbidding Japan from re-developing an offensive military. Later, the country was enabled to develop a "Japan Self-Defense Force" to protect themselves in case of an invasion. This Force, however, is not empowered to conduct other kinds of self-defense operations.

In 1951, the WWII allied nations and Japan signed the Treaty of San Francisco, which returned sovereignty to Japan and formally established the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance. The Alliance vests the United States with the responsibility to serve as Japan's primary military protector. As a part of this, Japan requested that the U.S. continue to operate its military bases in Japan, including those located on Okinawa.

This presence is governed by a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), a term you may see referenced in the topic literature. Essentially, the SOFA lays out the basic rules and expectations the two nations agreed upon for structuring American presence on Okinawa.



Until 1972, the United States maintained administrative control over Okinawa. In that year, administrative control was returned to Japan, although obviously the U.S. continues to operate bases on the island.

As you'll soon see, the citizens of Okinawa have not always appreciated the presence of the American armed forces. Residents complain of noise from aircraft, pollution, and crime. In 1995, opposition to U.S. presence coalesced around a tragic event in which a 12-year-old Japanese schoolgirl was raped by 3 U.S. servicemen stationed on Okinawa.

In 1996, an agreement was reached to close one of the most controversial bases, the U.S. Marine Corps Air Station Futenma. Roughly 9,000 Marines were to be relocated (mostly to bases on Hawaii or Guam), while 10,000 would remain on Okinawa at a different, to-be-constructed base located in another area of Okinawa, called Henoko. However, the plan has stalled due to continued disagreements over construction. Many Okinawans, including the prefecture's current governor Takeshi Onaga, want the base off the island entirely. As a result, Futenma remains open today. The relocation plan is expected to be delayed until at least 2023, and American forces predict 2025 is a more accurate estimate.

As of the publication of this paper, the Japanese central government had recently accepted a court-mediated settlement to pause construction on the relocated base facilities. Protests and negotiations are ongoing.



Now is also a particularly apropos time to discuss this topic due to rising tensions in the region. The U.S. and China have been exchanging increasingly heated rhetoric in recent months over China's claims to several disputed territories within the Asia-Pacific region.

First, China has been constructing [artificial islands](#) in the South China Sea, a location of extreme global geostrategic importance. Not only are these waters home to some significant fisheries and oil reserves, more importantly, the islands will serve as mini-bases from which to deploy sea and air patrols of the surrounding area. Because a huge amount of global trade routes traverse the South China Sea, it affects the interests of the United States, as well as other nations. Since their completion, it has been confirmed that China has also placed radar technology and weapons on several of these artificial islands.

Second, closer to Okinawa, China has also made territorial claims against Japan in the East China Sea. An island chain, known to the Chinese as Diaoyu and the Japanese as Senkaku, is the primary subject of the dispute.

The U.S. and its allies fear that Chinese actions in the region may disrupt freedom of navigation and risk escalating into armed conflict.

Because developments on the base relocation issue have occurred as recently as March 5, 2016, not to mention the ever-present possibility of a major geopolitical event arising with China or another adversary, PFers would be smart to keep their eyes on the news while debating this topic.



Strategies

We are now ready to begin substantive discussion of strategic options for debaters on both sides of the March resolution.

Okinawan Citizens' Opinions

A common theme in many discussions about the Okinawan military presence issue is, as you might imagine, the wishes of the local residents. After all, they are citizens of a sovereign, democratic, foreign nation. It is logical that their views ought to count for something.

Most of the evidence indicates that Okinawans tend to be strongly against the continued presence of American military bases.

According to this **evidence**, the depth of this feeling is so strong that it brought the current Okinawan governor to a landslide victory on an anti-military base platform. Although the central government attempts to pacify residents with subsidies, it says, popular sentiment is so strong that it cannot continue to be ignored:

(Doug Bandow, Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute specializing in foreign policy and civil liberties & JD from Stanford, "U.S. Filled Okinawa With Bases And Japan Kept Them There: Okinawans Again Say No," Forbes, <http://www.forbes.com/sites/dougbandow/2014/11/26/u-s-filled-okinawa-with-bases-and-japan-kept-them-there-okinawans-again-say-no/#5031a89c4022>, Nov 26 2014)

Opposition to the overpowering American presence crystalized nearly two decades ago after the rape of a teenage girl by U.S. military personnel. Gov. Masahide Ota led the campaign to downsize America's presence and large numbers of Okinawans turned out in protest. However, political activism eventually ebbed. **The national government in Tokyo** continued to **pacify and pay off as many Okinawans as possible**, while promoting various schemes to rearrange the local burden. **The bases**



remain because no one else in Japan wants to host American military forces. Thus, **Tokyo politicians have every incentive to keep the U.S. presence concentrated** (about three-quarters of base area and more than half of 47,000 military personnel) **in the most distant, least influential, and poorest prefecture.** After a decade of negotiation Tokyo and Washington agreed in 2006 to move some Marines to Guam and shift Futenma airbase to the less populated Henoko district of Nago city. Few Okinawans were satisfied. Three years later the Democratic Party of Japan took power and promised to address Okinawans' concerns. The party also advocated a more equal bilateral security partnership. But the Obama administration proved to be as intransigent as its predecessor, thwarting the efforts of Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama, whose party was divided. He eventually resigned. Since then Tokyo has attempted to implement the relocation agreement, despite strong local opposition, with about 80 percent of Okinawans against the Henoko scheme. Last year Tokyo gained the support of Gov. Hirokazu Nakaima. However, a week ago Naha Mayor Takeshi **Onaga defeated Nakaima on an anti-base platform**, declaring: "The new military base will not be built." In fact, Onaga may only be able to slow the planned move. But he is looking for legal ways to revoke the landfill permit granted by his predecessor. **Onaga announced that** "I will do everything possible to prevent **the** construction of a new **base** in Henoko. Futenma **needs to be moved out of the** nation and out of the **prefecture.**" Onaga's victory was welcomed by Nago Mayor Susumu Inamine, who won reelection last January and visited Washington a couple of years ago to lobby American policymakers against the plan. "It's going to be huge for us," he said, with city and prefectural governments working together in opposition. **Before the election** Yoshihide Suga, **chief cabinet secretary, claimed that the controversy was "an issue of the past."** But **Onaga's victory demonstrates the depth of popular feeling.** Nakaima had flip-flopped in favor of the relocation plan in return for \$2.6 billion in economic aid from Tokyo and enjoyed strong support from Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. Onaga shifted the other way, campaigning against Tokyo's attempt to buy off islanders and attacking America's presence for impeding Okinawa's development. **Onaga won with a 100,000 vote margin in a four-way race with about 700,000 votes cast. The Abe government** promised to move forward with its relocation plan, but faces early elections on December 14. Although the Liberal Democrats are expected to win given the opposition's weakness, they likely will possess a smaller majority and **will have a correspondingly harder time overriding local opinion against the bases.**

This **evidence** indicates that there is a broad coalition of political activists fighting against U.S. presence:

(Emma Chanlett-Avery [Specialist in Asian Affairs] & Ian E. Rinehart [Analyst in Asian Affairs], "The U.S. Military Presence in Okinawa and the Futenma Base Controversy," Congressional Research Service, <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42645.pdf>, Jan 20 2016)

In the November 2014 **Okinawa** gubernatorial election, the incumbent governor Hirokazu Nakaima lost to his former political ally, who ran on a platform opposing construction of the Futenma replacement facility (FRF).¹ The new **governor**, Takeshi **Onaga**, a former member of the conservative LDP, **built a broad political coalition** of liberals and conservatives **by emphasizing his opposition to the base** relocation. Since taking office, Governor **Onaga** has pursued a multipronged approach to halt construction of the FRF and dissuade Tokyo and Washington from proceeding with their plan (see section "Governor Onaga's Multi-Pronged Struggle against Futenma Relocation"). His political stance **has reenergized the anti-base movement** on Okinawa **and renewed the political contestation over the U.S. military presence** on Okinawa and the fate of the Futenma base. **Onaga has declared his intent to use all** the legal and administrative **authorities at his disposal to prevent** the **construction** of the FRF. The Okinawa prefectural government and the central government have initiated legal proceedings against each other, and observers expect that the byzantine process of rulings, suspensions, lawsuits, and counter-suits could continue for a year or more. Observers believe that it is highly likely that the central government eventually will be able to override Governor Onaga's objections, but **the administrative and legal processes** could create significant delays for the project and **dredge up doubts about the viability of the FRF plan.**



Although current protest movements tend to be centered around the relocation controversy, this **evidence** clarifies that Okinawans' concerns are not limited to one or two bases. Rather, they are demanding a complete removal of American military presence:

(Russia Times, "Okinawa sues Japanese govt over plans for construction of new US military base," <https://www.rt.com/news/327143-okinawa-lawsuit-tokyo-futenma/>, December 26 2015)

The governor of Okinawa has filed a lawsuit against the government of Japan **to stop the relocation of US Marine Corps base Futenma to another part of** the region. A relatively small island, **Okinawa** hosts more than half the US troops in Japan. **"We will resort to every possible measure and will not allow the new base to be built** in Henoko," Governor of Okinawa Takeshi **Onaga told a press conference** on Friday, as quoted by Japan Today. Onaga's lawsuit adds to an ongoing legal war with Tokyo to revoke the government's decision to construct a new military base for US troops in northern Okinawa. The current USMC Air Station Futenma is planned to relocate there under US-Japanese arrangements citing "less military impact" on the island's population. Governor Onaga took office in 2014 with his electoral campaign based mainly on his anti-relocation promise. Earlier in October, he canceled a 2013 decision by former governor Hirokazu Nakaima allowing construction works at Henoko Bay, also known as Nago, a town planned to host the new USMC airbase. In response, Japan's Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism suspended Onaga's cancellation decree, while in November the central government sued him to retake control of the construction project. More than a simple bureaucratic battle, **the relocation issue reflects the** decade-long **demand by Okinawans to eject US military presence from the island entirely. The residents cite a long record of pollution, noise, public disorder and crime, including sexual abuse** that comes from US base Futenma, located slap in the middle of residential blocks in the town of Ginowan.

What is the cause of the residents' antipathy? There are a number of frequently-cited complaints, most of which we'll discuss in-depth in the sections below. For now, though, here is a piece of **evidence** providing a laundry list of citizen grievances, including air pollution, economic disruption, crime, and insecurity:

(Céline Pajon, research specialist at Ifri Japan, associate researcher at the Canon Institute for Global Studies (CIGS) in Tokyo, & MA in International Relations from the Graduate Institute of International Studies, [Translated by Nicholas Sowells], "Understanding the Issue of U.S. Military Bases in Okinawa," The Institut français des relations internationales Center for Asian Studies, Japan Program, https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/understanding_the_issue_of_u.s._military_bases_in_okinawa.pdf, June 2010)

The bases are concentrated in the south and center of the main island of Okinawa and **occupy a large share of arable land. The issue of acquisition of** these **land**s for military exercises **remains sensitive** in Okinawa. **In 1953, the U.S.** occupation authority **confiscated the land (half of which was agricultural) from more than 50,000 owners** in order **to expand military bases.** Despite the widespread protests that took place in 1956 (shimagurumi-toso – or the fight of the entire island), the system continued and the Americans paid regular rent to the wronged owners.²⁴ In



1972, the Japanese government took over these lease payments, since the bases are part of the security treaty, and opposition to the system has weakened under pressure from national and local authorities. Since then, as the land rents have increased significantly, the opposition to the loan system has remained very small. However, this symbolic issue resurfaced in 1995.

Moreover, as the bases occupy about 20% of the main island of Okinawa, they strongly constrain traffic, which is constantly congested. With the urbanization of the last forty years, the bases have increasingly impinged on local communities (in terms of noise and pollution). They represent a real obstacle to the implementation of an economic development policy or urban planning by some municipalities. The Futenma base covers 500 hectares and occupies one quarter of the city of Ginowan. It is located in the heart of a densely populated urban area with 88,000 inhabitants. The heliport consists of a 2,800 meter-long runway, hangars and communication and repair installations and is one of the largest Marine air bases in Japan, home to the airborne division of the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force (3rd MEF).²⁵ The city of Ginowan has gradually been built-up around the base, and with increasing urbanization the risks associated with military activities of the base have increased. In August 2004, a helicopter crashed on the campus of Okinawa International University, miraculously causing no casualties. The air base is also a source of significant noise pollution for residents. On June 27, 2008, the Naha court also ordered the government to pay ¥140 million in compensation to 400 neighboring residents of the base, while refusing to grant their request to ban flights at night and early mornings.²⁶ The closure of Futenma would remedy these disturbances and the threat of accidents, as well as allowing for more coherent urban planning and the boosting the municipality's economy.

Finally, this **evidence** brings all of the points above together:

(Maki Kimura, Teaching Fellow at the Department of Political Science, University College London, "The anti-US military base struggle in Okinawa, Japan," Open Democracy [nonprofit org covering debates over forms of democratic change], <https://www.opendemocracy.net/maki-kimura/anti-us-military-base-struggle-in-okinawa-japan>, Feb 13 2016)

Two peace activists from Okinawa, Aihara Sarasa and Kamoshita Yuichi, set out on a two-week European lecture tour in February 2016 to spread the word about the ongoing struggle by the Okinawan people against the construction of a new US military base adjacent to Camp Schwab in Henoko. Invaded and colonised in the early seventeenth century during the Tokugawa Era, and annexed by the Meiji government in 1879, Okinawa and its people have suffered from serious discrimination and exploitation for centuries. In particular, towards the end of the Asia-Pacific War, Okinawa became a battlefield, the only one, in Japan. There, Okinawans found themselves not only under attack by the US military; the Japanese military, which was supposed to protect the Okinawan people, in fact used them as a human shield and forced them to commit 'honourable' suicide before 'they are captured by the US soldiers'. Within three to four months of the Battle of Okinawa, it is said that over 200,000 people were killed, of which over 120,000 were from Okinawa, including 94,000 civilians. One in five Okinawan people were killed. After the war, Okinawa was occupied by the United States until 1972, and suffered various forms of violence, including land confiscation and recurring sexual violence. It still hosts 74% of US military bases and facilities (thirty-two) in Japan today, while Okinawa constitutes only 0.6% of Japan's total area. The strategic importance of Okinawa for military operations has meant that people in Okinawa have lived with the consequences of the presence of the military and the Japan-US Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). These include the everyday violence of environmental damage, aeronautical noise, accidents caused by aircraft and military vehicles, together with sexual violence. As a result, anti-US military base movements and protests in Okinawa have been active for years. Feminist anti-military campaigns, such as those by Okinawa Women Act Against Military Violence, led by Takazato Suzuyo, have highlighted the violation of human rights of people in Okinawa, particularly the suffering of women who fell victim to sexual violence. Residents in Higashison Takae Village in the northern part of the main island have organised a sit-in protest since 2007 to oppose the building of new helipads that prepare for the deployment of military aircraft Osprey. However, these examples are only the beginning of the chronicle of Okinawan resistance. Currently, the focal point of the struggle in Okinawa may be found in Henoko, which has taken the form of a big sit-in protest in front of Camp Schwab. This started in July 2014 in objection to the relocation of Futenma Air Station to Henoko. Futenma Air Station, situated in the southern part of the main island, is called 'the world's most dangerous military base'. It is constructed with out an acceptable level of 'Clear Zones' (a primary school next to the base), and has constantly ignored legal standards set out in Japan's



Civil Aeronautics Act. **Given this safety issue, and** pressurised by a citizens' mass rally denouncing the chilling rape **incident** in September 1995 **in which a 12-year-old schoolgirl was gang raped by three US servicemen**, Japan and the US agreed Futenma should be returned to Okinawa in 1996, and Henoko was announced as the (originally planned to be much smaller) relocation site in November 1999. **Residents** of Henoko, who had already been protesting against this relocation plan, **started their sit-in protest** in April 2004. Furthermore, paddling canoes and divers also attempted to block seabed drilling investigations being carried out by the Naha Regional Defence Facilities Administration Bureau. With growing signs of more substantial construction work beginning in summer 2014, protesters began to gather in front of Camp Schwab to obstruct construction vehicles entering the Camp. **Anti-military base protests in Okinawa are no ordinary political struggle**, and this is what Aihara and Kamoshita hope to convey through their talks in cities in the UK, Germany and Poland. **Various groups and individuals** in Okinawa **have formed associations**, such as Shimagurumi Kaigi (All Okinawa Council) and the Okinawa Peace Citizen's Network **for collaboration**. While Yamashiro Hiroji, the Chairman of the Okinawa Peace Movement Center, is often considered as the leading figure of the struggle, there is no fixed hierarchical structure in the movement, and decisions are made democratically amongst participating (core) groups as they take it in turn to lead the protest each day. Protest activities are organised and led by people in Okinawa, as their lives are/have been most under threat. However, local activists urge people outside Okinawa to join them, and ask for their support. There is, indeed, a constant flow of visitors. Kamoshita maintains that about 30% of those who sit in front of the gates of Camp Schwab are those from other parts of Japan, and more people from outside participate in other protest activities. I, too, visited Henoko in June 2015, although very briefly, and met many people like myself. What we all shared was the understanding that **the struggle** in Henoko **is not simply an Okinawan question, but a vital issue for the whole of Japanese society**. Many visitors stay for a prolonged period, become regular visitors or even completely relocate to Okinawa, as Aihara and Kamoshita did a few years ago. Although diverse individuals are involved in the protest, at the centre of the struggle are people of older generations, who retain horrifying memories of the Battle of Okinawa (and their children and families who were brought up listening to them.) They participate in sit-ins and other activities with a strong conviction that the tragedy of war should not be repeated and that no construction of military bases, the instrument of war and killing, should be allowed. This message permeates the Henoko anti-base movement. **Their goal is to** stop the construction (and eventually **secure the withdrawal of all military bases from Okinawa**) to make the world a more peaceful place to live in. Okinawan activists, it follows, do not see the police, private security guards and the US military personnel as their enemies, but rather treat them as individual human beings by greeting and speaking to them. This is manifested in their fundamental principle of non-violence, though the protest can still be direct and physical. Participants of sit-ins link arms with each other so that they are not easily removed by the police. However, they are also instructed not to put up a fight when they are being taken away. Therefore, while determined and serious, they rarely show physical aggression or hatred towards the police who are removing them.

However, describing local opinion, by itself, doesn't accomplish much for the pro in terms of strategic value. You should not just read these kinds of arguments and then move on. Instead, use them as internal links to arguments about things like the importance of democracy, or the threat of revolt. We'll get to those points below.

As for the con, for the most part, they will want to hedge against popular sentiment with arguments about deterrence and global security, which we'll cover later on. However, they may also choose to play defense on this issue.



Here is a piece of **evidence** that disputes the idea that opposition to American presence is universal. It indicates that some Okinawans actually like having the bases around, because it generates economic benefits. Moreover, it says negative sentiments are mostly expressed by elders, while younger citizens are much less bothered:

(Emma Chanlett-Avery [Specialist in Asian Affairs] & Ian E. Rinehart [Analyst in Asian Affairs], "The U.S. Military Presence in Okinawa and the Futenma Base Controversy," Congressional Research Service, <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42645.pdf>, Jan 20 2016)

The views of Okinawans are far from monolithic. Many residents of base-hosting communities **appreciate the economic benefits, whether as employees on the bases, as local business owners who serve American customers, or as landowners of base property.** Some locals resent the actions of outsiders who focus on environmental issues at the expense of economic development.

Prorelocation authorities point to the village of **Henoko** (in Nago City municipality) as an example of local **citizens** who **are more in favor of additional U.S. facilities** than the broader population, though this may have to do with the monetary compensation that Tokyo provides to specific host communities. **There is also a "generation gap" between older Okinawans with personal memories of past incidents and younger residents** who may not be as involved in the anti-base activist movement. **There appear to be no reliable opinion polls that** might **illuminate** the extent of the **opposition to U.S. presence across demographic categories.** The anti-base movement remains strong and vocal in Okinawa. Opposition to U.S. military bases derives from two main areas: (1) concerns that the American presence degrades the local quality-of-life with regard to personal safety, noise, crime, and the natural environment; and (2) pacifism and anti-militarism. These two strands are often interwoven in the rhetoric of the anti-base movement, but not all residents oppose the U.S. military presence on principle. There are those who support the U.S.-Japan security alliance while objecting to the significant and disproportionate "burden" imposed on Okinawa.

More **evidence**:

(Emma Chanlett-Avery [Specialist in Asian Affairs] & Ian E. Rinehart [Analyst in Asian Affairs], "The U.S. Military Presence in Okinawa and the Futenma Base Controversy," Congressional Research Service, <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42645.pdf>, Jan 20 2016)

On the other hand, the **residents who would be most directly affected have** mixed, and even **positive, feelings about the proposed base, possibly due to the economic benefits** for the hosting community. A small mountain range about seven miles wide separates the designated base site in Henoko village from the densely populated area of Nago City (see Figure 3). It is unlikely that most people living in Nago City would experience the noise of overflights near the base. In May 2010 the administrative council of Henoko village, where the base would be built, passed a resolution accepting the relocation of Futenma on the conditions that the runway site be moved further into the sea and that the government provide additional compensation.²⁵ Henoko village **residents are** reportedly more **focused on the economic benefits** of the new base **and irked by the intrusion of environmentalists.**²⁶



The con might also make arguments about recent reforms conducted by the United States on Okinawan military bases. This **evidence** suggests that the reform effort has resolved the main factors upsetting the citizens, dulling opposition:

(Emma Chanlett-Avery [Specialist in Asian Affairs] & Ian E. Rinehart [Analyst in Asian Affairs], "The U.S. Military Presence in Okinawa and the Futenma Base Controversy," Congressional Research Service, <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42645.pdf>, Jan 20 2016)

The U.S. and Japanese governments have implemented measures to mitigate some impacts of the U.S. military presence for Okinawan residents. The DPRI initiated several of these actions, whereas more recent steps were developed on an ad hoc basis. **The Aviation Training Relocation program reduces noise pollution for local residents by having U.S. aircraft conduct training in Guam,** away from crowded base areas. **The United States has increased access for local fisherman to the ocean** training area known as "Hotel/Hotel" **off the eastern coast** of Okinawa. Based on the DPRI and SACO agreements, **the U.S. military has turned** several plots of **land over** to the Okinawan local authorities, including Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield, Sobe Communications Site, **and** Gimbaru Training Area. A 125-acre plot, formerly the West Futenma Housing area, **reverted to local control** in April 2015. **Several more areas** of present-day U.S. military facilities **are approved for expedited return in the near future.** A 2015 report by former U.S. military officers recommends accelerating the schedule of land returns, especially from Camp Kinser, in order to reduce resentment toward the U.S. military presence. ¹⁷ In response to Governor Nakaima's request **in late 2013** for advance environmental screening of land schedule for reversion, **the United States and Japan reached an environmental stewardship agreement to allow Japanese inspectors early access to those facilities.** A rash of off-base criminal incidents involving U.S. servicemembers **in 2012** spurred **U.S. military leaders** in Japan to **institute[d] new conduct policies for all U.S. troops in Okinawa. These restrictive policies likely played a role in the significant drop since 2013 in reported crimes linked to U.S. military personnel (including dependents and DOD civilian employees)** on Okinawa.¹⁸

The pro, in turn, might answer with this **evidence**, arguing that reforms have not eroded popular demands for base removal:

(Emma Chanlett-Avery [Specialist in Asian Affairs] & Ian E. Rinehart [Analyst in Asian Affairs], "The U.S. Military Presence in Okinawa and the Futenma Base Controversy," Congressional Research Service, <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42645.pdf>, Jan 20 2016)

These long-held grievances burst into the forefront of Okinawan political life after a 12-year-old girl was raped by three U.S. servicemembers **in 1995**, inciting a massive anti-base protest. In response, **the bilateral Security Consultative Committee** (composed of the U.S. Secretaries of State and Defense and their Japanese counterparts,



also known as the “2+2”) **established the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) to alleviate** the burdens of the **base-hosting communities. SACO led to** concrete **changes** that improved conditions on Okinawa, **10** **but these** propitiatory **moves were offset by a number of distressing incidents; for example, a U.S. military helicopter crashed on the campus of Okinawa International University** near MCAS Futenma in August 2004. Ultimately, the unwillingness of Tokyo and Washington to close Futenma without a replacement facility has fostered the perception that the two governments are discriminating against Okinawans. **Media outlets in Okinawa** contribute to this narrative by viewing many developments in the base negotiations as further evidence of mainland discrimination. **The two main** daily **newspaper**s, **the Ryukyu Shimpo** and the Okinawa Times, **are** generally seen as left-leaning and **deeply unsympathetic to** Tokyo’s **security concerns**. For example, the U.S. military’s humanitarian response to the devastating March 11, 2011, tsunami and earthquake in northern Japan received scant coverage in local Okinawan newspapers compared to the mainland press. In its reporting on the 2014 summit between Prime Minister Abe and President Obama, **rather than applaud** their **intention to reduce the “burden” of U.S. bases** on Okinawans, **the Ryukyu Shimpo drew attention to the phrase “long-term sustainable presence for U.S. forces” and criticized its implication of a permanent military presence** on Okinawa.¹¹

Now, let’s dive deeper into some of the main reasons Okinawans might dislike American military presence on the island.

Okinawa’s Economy

One factor driving public opposition to U.S. military bases in Okinawa is their economic impact. According to protestors, American presence has a disruptive effect on the local economy.



The **evidence** below lays out the primary warrants supporting this argument. It says the dramatic land usage of American military bases—20% of the island’s total area—makes major infrastructural development impossible and drives away potential investors. According to the author, the result has been the worst economic performance of any area of Japan. To justify the connection, it provides an empirical example—when U.S. troops left one city, its economic vitality improved by a factor of 10x:

(Jon Mitchell, award-winning journalist focusing on Okinawa & winner of the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Japan Freedom of the Press Award for Lifetime Achievement, “What awaits Okinawa 40 years after reversion?,” The Japan Times, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/life/2012/05/13/life/what-awaits-okinawa-40-years-after-reversion/#.VtYUO_krlgs, may 13 2012)

But today **Okinawa is hurting**. The rate of **unemployment is the highest in the nation, and** when people can find a job, their **salaries are the lowest**. Meanwhile, **fewer students** in Okinawa **finish high school** than in any other prefecture in the country, **and fewer go to university**. That’s before even starting to consider the **32 American military bases** that together **monopolize almost 20 percent of Okinawa’s** main island, **forcing people into cramped residential strips, hobbling infrastructural improvements and making outside businesses reluctant to invest** in the islands’ economy owing to uncertainty over the bases’ future. Without a doubt, the 40 years since reversion have not been kind to Okinawa — but how about the next four decades? Will the islands’ fortunes improve by 2052? Before looking forward, first it’s necessary to learn from the past — starting 500 years back in more settled times — to see how Okinawa has ended up in its current mess. During the 16th century, Okinawa was the independent Ryukyu Kingdom, whose leaders parlayed its strategic location in the South China Sea by funneling Chinese investments into trading textiles, sulfur and spices throughout the region. This commerce brought Okinawa a measure of wealth — but it also caught the avaricious eye of a Kyushu-based samurai clan by the name of Satsuma. In 1609, this clan dispatched a party of warriors to Okinawa to muscle a cut of the kingdom’s profits. At the time, the feudal Tokugawa Shogunate was too occupied consolidating its newly won power to intervene and follow the Satsuma lead, while in the 1630s a series of laws were passed to ban both outward and inbound international trade or travel. That left the Satsuma with a convenient well-established backdoor in Okinawa through which they could profit from trade with the Asian mainland. For centuries after that, Japan maintained the islands in a geopolitical gray zone — neither as a formal part of Japan nor an entirely independent nation. In the late 19th century, though, the United States and European nations began stripping swaths of Asia of natural resources and subduing any resistance they encountered with guns and opium. So to prevent Okinawa falling under foreign control, in 1879 — 11 years after the overthrow of the Tokugawa Shogunate and the restoration of the Emperor Meiji — Japan declared Okinawa a fully fledged prefecture. Thereafter, Tokyo set about bringing the islands into the homogeneous embrace of the homeland. To do so, over the next decades it suppressed Okinawa’s culture, degraded its native languages as mere dialects of Japanese and disproportionately taxed the population — contributing to a famine in the 1920s that killed thousands and forced still more to seek survival as far afield as Hawaii, Peru and Brazil. Japanese disdain for Okinawa reached a climax in the final months of World War II, when the Imperial Army sacrificed it as a *suteishi* — a throwaway pawn — to bog down the Allies and make them think twice about invading the main islands. During the Battle of Okinawa in the spring of 1945, more than a quarter of the civilian population died — including many in military-enforced mass suicides, and those shot by Japanese soldiers as suspected spies for speaking Okinawan languages. Then **in July 1945, the U.S. military declared Okinawa under its control — and since then it has never left**. The Allied occupation of mainland Japan ended with the Treaty of San Francisco in 1952. But thanks to a secret 1947 memo sent to Washington by Emperor Hirohito inviting the U.S. to keep control of Okinawa as a bulwark against international communism, America retained the islands. Keen to have secure bases within bombing range of communist countries in Asia — primarily, of course, China — **the U.S. rapidly set about seizing civilian land and transforming Okinawa into one of the most militarized places on the planet** — what it termed the “Keystone of the Pacific.” While the 1952 deal allowed Tokyo to focus its economic exertions on rebuilding its industrial strength on the mainland, for the next 20 years **Okinawa languished under U.S. administration as a Third World economy**. “The 1972 reversion was supposed to bring economic parity to Okinawa,” says Masahide Ota, the grand old man of Okinawan politics and the islands’ governor between 1990 and 1998. “In the 1960s, we campaigned to return to Japan because at the time neither the Japanese nor the American constitutions were applicable to Okinawa. But even after 1972, the Constitution was thwarted and the mainland continues to discriminate against us.” If anybody is qualified to discuss Japan’s unfair treatment of Okinawa, it is 86-year-old Ota. In 1945 at the age of 19, he was conscripted into the Imperial Army’s Blood and Iron Student Corps and witnessed firsthand the barbarism of the Battle of Okinawa. Then during his governorship, his anti-bases stance raised hackles on the mainland, culminating, as many people believe, in a Tokyo-orchestrated carrot-and-stick campaign that railroaded him out of office by tempting the electorate with multi-billion-yen sweeteners and a court case in which Ota was sued by then Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama. for dereliction of his professional duty. Like many Okinawan people, Ota regards the 1972 reversion as another betrayal to add to the sellouts of 1609, 1879, 1945 and 1952. But despite this long and bitter list, he is remarkably optimistic



about Okinawa's future — particularly in regards to the military bases. Not only is he confident that the islands can survive without them, but he believes Okinawa will prosper after they have gone. "Back in the 1960s, **the income from U.S. bases** amounted to 52 percent of the whole income that Okinawa gained. By reversion, that had decreased to 15 percent. **Today it amounts to less than 5 percent [of the economy], but** our research has found that **if the military bases were returned to civilian use, we could guarantee 10 times the current employment**. For instance, **when Omoromachi (in Naha) was under military control, civilian employment was less than 300. In 2002, that area was handed back to Okinawa, and today there are more than 30,000 people employed there."**

This **evidence** also points out that average income in Okinawa is the lowest in all of Japan, and blames U.S. military bases as the primary cause:

(Shannon Tiezzi, Managing Editor at The Diplomat, former research associate at the U.S.-China Policy Foundation & Masters from Harvard, "Beyond Futenma: Okinawa and the US Base Conundrum," The Diplomat, <http://thediplomat.com/2015/11/beyond-futenma-okinawa-and-the-us-base-conundrum/>, Nov 4 2015)

Okinawans object to the number of **bases** on their island **for many reasons**, some obvious and some less so. The obvious reasons are the **disruptions U.S. military installations** (and particularly airfields) **cause to daily life: noise pollution, accidents and environmental damage, and violent incidents including rapes and brawls involving U.S. military personnel**. Kiku Nakayama, a survivor of the Battle of Okinawa who devotes much of her time to anti-base activism, comes prepared for our meeting: she's carrying a stack of newspapers around an inch thick. Each one contains a story tied to some negative incident involving U.S. military installations: Ospreys flying overhead in the middle of the night and keeping residents awake; universities and schools protesting U.S. military flights during school hours; a brawl involving U.S. soldiers. These reports, she says, are just from the last three weeks. It's "really outrageous" how many bases are in Okinawa, Nakayama says. Another Okinawan, local radio company chairman Takemasa Ishikawa, says that **human rights are being infringed upon thanks to the bases**. There are so many accidents, incidents and crimes, he says, that **the bases truly bring suffering to the Okinawan people. Okinawans also complain that** the vast number of **bases** has **crippled** the island's **economic growth. Nearly 20 percent of the total land area of Okinawa Island is taken up by U.S. bases – land that could otherwise be occupied by houses, hotels, restaurants, and businesses**. Ishikawa says that **the U.S. base factor is one of the main reasons Okinawa has the lowest income level of any prefecture in Japan**. Of course, **bases** provide employment opportunities as well, but critics say they **are a net negative for Okinawa's economy**.

One way for the con to answer this line of argument is by suggesting that, even if U.S. military bases were perhaps not the *ideal* trajectory for Okinawa's economic development, "that ship has already sailed," so to speak. In other words, the entire structure of the island's economy is now dependent on American presence, and withdrawal now would cause dramatically worse consequences.



This piece of **evidence** sets up three warrants supporting that argument. First, U.S. personnel spend their salaries in Okinawa, driving the local economy. Second, a variety of subsidies paid to Okinawa by the Japanese central government make up a huge chunk of the island's total revenue. Third, and finally, just as the pro points out, the bases have dominated the area so much that few business enterprises exist independent of them. If America pulled out, then, there would be little commercial activity to replace it:

(Yoshida Kensei, professor at Obirin University in Japan, [Translated by Rumi Sakamoto-lecturer in Asian Studies at Auckland University and Matt Allen- Japan Focus associate & prof of Asian history at the University of Auckland], "US Bases, Japan and the Reality of Okinawa as a Military Colony," <http://apjif.org/-Yoshida-Kensei/2857/article.html#sthash.bQSwDbtx.dpuf>," The Asia-Pacific Journal, vol. 6 iss. 8 no. 0, August 1 2008)

Other factors that influence the prolonged stationing of the USF **is** Japan's 'sympathy budget' that far exceeds any other country's US base budget, as well as **the Okinawan economy's dependence on the bases. Japan's contribution towards the cost of the** stationing of US **bases**, which the US calls 'host nation support', consists of direct support (Japanese employees' salaries, land rents, housing, utilities, relocation costs of training facilities – all added to the annual budget) and indirect support (tax waivers, road tolls and port use fees etc.). Every year, Japan's financial support far exceeds the total of such support by NATO member nations, including Germany, Italy, and the UK. (The total amount of support by the 18 NATO member nations other than the US in 2002 was \$2.5 billion or ¥300 billion; Japan's support was \$4.4 billion or ¥530 billion). Japan is one of the military superpowers of the world along with the UK, France, and China, with a defense budget of \$44.3 billion. Japan's 'sympathy budget' provides 75% of the total costs of the USF stationed in Japan (The NATO total is 27%, of which 97% is indirect contributions). Part of the contribution **comes back to the Okinawan economy in the form of land rents, salaries, material purchases, construction work etc. In addition, cities, towns, and villages that host US bases can claim from the Japanese state base-related expenses such as noise prevention measures, fishing industry compensation, and other subsidies and grants.** The cities, towns and villages that receive the relocated bases will receive new reorganisation subsidies from the government. **Okinawa has a very low** proportion – about 30% - of **independent revenue such as prefectural taxes. For the rest, it relies on** reallocating local taxes and **national Treasury disbursement;** in addition, in such places as Kin, Ginowan, Onna, and Kadena, **base-related revenue accounts for more than 20% of total revenues. The long-term presence of the bases has hindered Okinawa's autonomous economy (the bases did contribute to the civil engineering and construction business, food and drink industries and supply industries).** And Okinawa's reversion to Japan led to the maintenance of infrastructure such as roads and public facilities. However, neither laid a foundation for long-term autonomy such as manufacturing industry, and Okinawa has fallen into the pathology of the 'carrot and stick' ideology the Japanese government set up.



The pro can dispute dependency claims by arguing that U.S. military bases actually generate little economic activity for Okinawan citizens, because—as this **evidence** suggests—American personnel spend very little of their money in local businesses, choosing instead to conduct most of their business on-base:

(Céline Pajon, research specialist at Ifri Japan, associate researcher at the Canon Institute for Global Studies (CIGS) in Tokyo, & MA in International Relations from the Graduate Institute of International Studies, [Translated by Nicholas Sowell], "Understanding the Issue of U.S. Military Bases in Okinawa," The Institut français des relations internationales Center for Asian Studies, Japan Program, https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/understanding_the_issue_of_u.s._military_bases_in_okinawa.pdf, June 2010)

The presence of **the bases** and the particular history of Okinawa **have hindered** the **economic development** of this Autonomous Prefecture, **and** have **contributed to** the emergence of a **"distorted" economy**. It is commonly said that the Okinawan economy depends on the 3Ks: "Kichi, Kankou, Kokyokoji", i.e. the bases, tourism and public money (subsidies and public works). **According to** figures from **the Bank of Japan**, in 1972, 23.4% **of the income of** the Prefecture of **Okinawa** came from public works and subsidies. A further 15.6% and 8% came respectively from the bases and tourism. In 2004, the share of public subsidies amounted to 38.2%, with tourism accounting for 9.6%, while **the bases' share had** declined to **5.3% only**. Several observations can be made: 1. The share of income related to the bases has declined. These revenues are tied to the revenues of companies and commercial suppliers of various goods and services situated around the bases, the salaries of Japanese employees on the bases (about 8,800 in Okinawa) and the rents paid to landowners. **The decline in the share of income from the bases is linked to** the gradual reduction of troops, but especially **the relative decline of their purchasing power. Soldiers thus consume more on the bases.**

Moreover, this piece of pro **evidence** argues that U.S. withdrawal will allow community revitalization and investment, which will eventually increase economic vibrancy:

(Yoshida Kensei, professor at Obirin University in Japan, [Translated by Rumi Sakamoto-lecturer in Asian Studies at Auckland University and Matt Allen- Japan Focus associate & prof of Asian history at the University of Auckland], "US Bases, Japan and the Reality of Okinawa as a Military Colony," <http://apjif.org/-Yoshida-Kensei/2857/article.html#sthash.bQSwDbtx.dpuf>," The Asia-Pacific Journal, vol. 6 iss. 8 no. 0, August 1 2008)

In order for Okinawa to escape from its 'military colony' status, it is necessary to break free from this structure; it will not be easy. **We need to reduce the importance of the bases by** nurturing talented people and building up facilities in areas such as IT, medicine and care, by exchanges with neighboring countries, attracting investments, and further **promoting tourism, agriculture, fisheries, and trade, taking advantage of Okinawa's geographical uniqueness and nature.** We should not simply see ourselves as victims of



the Battle of Okinawa and the US bases, but think about the reality that the bases are supporting wars; then we will not be so eager to accept land rents or subsidies. **If the bases are returned, there will be less danger of crash accidents, less noise pollution, fewer sex crimes and other incidents involving US soldiers.** Not only will we reduce our association with wars (war cooperation), but **base sites can be turned into housing areas, commercial or industrial areas, parks, or education/research areas. Revitalisation of the community will bring about far more income and revenue than the current base-related revenue, which has benefitted a limited number of landowners,** businesses, cities, towns, and villages. Since the realignment of US bases throughout the world has been decided by the US, we cannot deny the possibility that one day the US will suddenly decide to reduce or withdraw its bases from Okinawa. To avoid being caught by surprise when that happens, Okinawa (Japan) needs to practice its sovereignty and prepare for that occasion.

Finally, pros might read the following **evidence**, which claims that the removal of noisy, polluting, unattractive military bases would allow a substantial tourism industry to develop in Okinawa:

(New Diplomacy Initiative Symposium on U.S. Military Bases and Okinawa, "The Problem of U.S. Military Bases in Okinawa: How Does This Issue Affect Japan and Okinawa?," The New Diplomacy Initiative (ND) [think tank that collects and distributes information and advocates policy options in the United States and Japan as well as throughout East Asia], http://www.nd-initiative.org/en_topics/1585/, March 5 2013)

Kariyushi Group is a sightseeing business, and our business can't exist without peace. **Since the 1990s, the number of tourists visiting Okinawa has been increasing and we have seen the growth of the New Metropolitan Center in Naha and of Chatan-cho, which were previously occupied by the U.S. military but have now been returned to Okinawa. Our economic system has changed. We** can say that we **don't need military bases to support the economy.** We can be confident in our economy.

On the other hand, the **evidence** below provides a con answer to tourism warrants. It claims that Okinawan tourism statistics are misleading, and tourism to the island is actually driven mostly by the bases:

(Robert D. Eldridge, retired tenured associate professor at Osaka University and deputy chief of staff for Marine Corps Installations Pacific, "The Okinawa "Base Problem" Today" <http://www.nippon.com/en/in-depth/a00501/>, Dec 2 2003)

As the above incidents suggest, **the highly politically charged rhetoric of elected officials and the self-admittedly biased local media have led to the geostrategically important Okinawa having a disproportionately large amount of influence**



within Japan, and particularly vis-à-vis **the central government** (with its lack of Okinawan and alliance experts), a fact that is increasingly resented in other equally less-well-off parts of naichi, or mainland Japan. **Instead of bringing about** a resolution or a sense of **contentment, however, it has caused the Okinawans to possess** an air of **pessimism about their future and** a combination of **complicated emotions toward the central government and the U^{nited} S^{tates}.** **These feelings are often,** sadly, **exploited by Okinawan leaders and the media to shame the two governments rather than truly seeking a workable and reasonable solution.** In the meantime, **many Okinawans feel** frustrated over their lack of sustainable economic prospects and **embarrassed** over the inconvenient fact **that while some protest the presence of the bases, their economy is heavily dependent on them, directly through land rents or indirectly through numerous compensation and stimulus packages. Even the tourist industry, viewed through rosy glasses as an alternative future for Okinawa, is heavily dependent on the presence of the bases—many school trips, media tours, academic visits, government and political fact-finding missions, counted as “tourism” in the statistics, are actually related to the bases.**

The subject of tourism provides a nice transition into our next section, where we'll discuss possible harms U.S. military presence might have on the surrounding natural environment.

Okinawa's Environment

Besides the air and noise pollution referenced in several of the cards we've already discussed, pro teams can also develop environmental arguments surrounding a number of other incidents of toxic materials contaminating the local ecosystem.



This piece of **evidence** discusses the accidental release of poisonous chemicals into Okinawan drinking water sources, made worse by America's failure to disclose the incident to the broader population:

(Jon Mitchell, award-winning journalist focusing on Okinawa & winner of the Foreign Correspondents' Club of Japan Freedom of the Press Award for Lifetime Achievement, "Documents indicate chemical leaks at U.S. base have polluted Okinawa water supply," Japan Times, <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/02/09/national/documents-indicate-chemical-leaks-u-s-base-polluted-okinawa-water-supply/#.VtcFUfkrIgu>, Feb 9 2016)

U.S. **documents** released under the Freedom of Information Act **reveal that lax safety standards** at Kadena Air Base **in Okinawa may be to blame for** the recent **contamination of** local **drinking water** sources. **The internal reports expose a spate of accidents at the base during the past 15 years that have involved at least 21,000 liters of** fire extinguishing agents — some of them **toxic**. In one incident last May, described by base officials as "vandalism," a drunk U.S. Marine activated a firefighting system. It filled a hangar with more than 1,500 liters of JET-X 2.75 percent — a foam classified by the U.S. government as hazardous. It contains **chemicals known to cause cancer, and neurological and reproductive disorders. Although the agent flowed** off the base **into nearby waterways and the ocean, military officials decided not to report the accident to Japanese authorities or local residents.** Other incidents at Kadena, the largest U.S. air base in the Pacific, included the escape of approximately 17,000 liters of fire extinguishing agents during a three-day period in 2001, attributed by base officials to mechanical and electronic malfunctions. Further leaks between 2012 and 2014 totaled more than 3,400 liters. One was blamed on malfunctioning equipment and another on mechanical failure. A third incident that spilled 1,135 liters was recorded as "operator error." The revelations appear to confirm suspicions in Okinawa that the base has been polluting the local water system. Last month, **Okinawa authorities announced that high levels of** Perfluorooctanesulfonate (**PFOS**) — an ingredient found in many fire extinguishing agents — **had been discovered in waterways near the** Kadena **base. The area supplies drinking water to seven municipalities, including the** prefectural **capital, Naha.** According to an announcement Jan. 18 by the Okinawa Prefectural Enterprise Bureau, tests conducted between February 2014 and last November recorded maximum PFOS levels of 80 nanograms per liter (ng/L) at its Chatan Purification Plant, rising to 1,320 ng/L in the Dakujaku River, which is fed by water from the base. The bureau also noted that readings from a well within the base in 2008 measured 1,870 ng/L. **The** U.S. Environmental Protection Agency **(EPA) categorizes PFOS as** an "emerging contaminant" that is **readily absorbed by oral ingestion, accumulating in the blood, kidneys and liver. It does not break down easily in the environment or the human body, where it has a half-life of** up to **nine years.** Due to concerns that **PFOS can lead to reproductive and developmental problems**, the EPA in 2009 set a provisional health advisory limit for drinking water at 200 ng/L for short-term exposure. Although **the Japanese government has** not yet set any specific limits, it has fundamentally **prohibited production and use of PFOS-containing products since 2010.** The bureau noted that PFOS levels discovered near Kadena Air Base are far higher than other places in Japan: During the past 10 years, the highest reading in any other part of the country never exceeded 22 ng/L.



Further, this **evidence** warns of the threat of contamination by dangerous military weapons-related materials:

(Jon Mitchell, award-winning journalist focusing on Okinawa & winner of the Foreign Correspondents' Club of Japan Freedom of the Press Award for Lifetime Achievement, "What awaits Okinawa 40 years after reversion?," The Japan Times, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/life/2012/05/13/life/what-awaits-okinawa-40-years-after-reversion/#.VtYUO_krlgs, may 13 2012)

"Even if MCAS Futenma is returned tomorrow, **it may be decades before it can be put to civilian use due to contamination** of the land. Take **for example Onna** Communication Site; **the U.S. military gave it back almost 20 years ago but we still can't use it because that ground is contaminated with** seven different toxic chemicals." As for removal of the other U.S. military facilities on Okinawa, there is little impetus to encourage the U.S. to vacate them. Japanese taxpayers contribute ¥190 billion a year for the upkeep of their runways, mess halls and golf courses, making it cheaper for the Pentagon to keep its troops on the islands than bring them home. But even a U.S. exit tomorrow couldn't turn back the clock on the almost 70 years during which **the U.S. military has used the bases to store (and sometimes dump)** a witches' brew of **poisonous materials – from Nike nuclear missiles and mustard gas** in the 1960s, **to depleted-uranium** munitions in the '90s **and, currently, irradiated equipment from** its relief operations near Tokyo Electric Power Co.'s **Fukushima** No. 1 nuclear power plant. **Recent revelations** from the pages of The Japan Times have **added Agent Orange** – the Vietnam War defoliant containing large volumes of extremely toxic dioxin – **to this list** of pollutants on the U.S. bases. The accounts published here of more than 30 seriously-ill American veterans of shipping, storing and spraying the herbicide on the island have embarrassed U.S. officials who continue to consistently deny Agent Orange was ever present on Okinawa. At the same time, the campaign to win justice for sick former service members and Okinawan civilians has created a never-seen-before solidarity of environmental activists, veterans-rights campaigners, politicians – both in the U.S. and Japan – and lawyers. In the past, no matter what form of contamination, and despite protests from the prefecture and local residents, **the U.S. government has repeatedly refused to foot the bill for the massive clean-up costs** of former bases. Quite how it will approach the issue of Agent Orange contamination remains to be seen. For Ota, **this environmental threat far outweighs the danger** most usually **cited to justify the** continued **American military presence** – China.

Remember, when defending the pro side of the resolution, you need to build on the reasoning established above with some environmental impacts. Alone, just establishing a risk of pollution is not a very strong argument. It lacks uniqueness, not to mention any way to convincingly weigh it against the con's big security impacts. Make sure you are explaining why the environmental damage you're describing would be significant enough to actually matter.



In response to ecological arguments, the con might point to a report conducted by the Japanese government, which concluded U.S. military presence posed no environmental threat to the island. Here's **evidence**:

(Emma Chanlett-Avery [Specialist in Asian Affairs] & Ian E. Rinehart [Analyst in Asian Affairs], "The U.S. Military Presence in Okinawa and the Futenma Base Controversy," Congressional Research Service, <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42645.pdf>, Jan 20 2016)

The concerns of environmental groups stem mainly from the possible degradation of natural habitats caused by construction of the proposed FRF at Henoko. The offshore landfill design for the runways could involve the destruction of coral reefs and could have a negative impact on the health and biodiversity of Oura Bay ecosystems. Activists are particularly concerned with the plight of the dugong, a manatee-like endangered species. **The environmental impact study conducted by the Japanese government concluded that the proposed base construction would not do significant damage to the dugong's natural environment**, but academics at Okinawan universities and elsewhere have disputed the report's findings. In February 2015, a U.S. federal judge dismissed a lawsuit against the DOD that sought to prevent construction of the FRF on the grounds that it would harm the dugong. Another environmental concern is the impact of toxic substances stored on U.S. bases, largely a legacy of chemical storage during the Vietnam War era.¹²

Another option for the con would be to answer commercial investment, tourism, and environmental claims all at once by arguing that the real pollution threat to Okinawa comes from the construction of resorts and artificial beaches by outside tourism companies. This next piece of **evidence** covers that idea:

(Jon Mitchell, award-winning journalist focusing on Okinawa & winner of the Foreign Correspondents' Club of Japan Freedom of the Press Award for Lifetime Achievement, "What awaits Okinawa 40 years after reversion?," The Japan Times, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/life/2012/05/13/life/what-awaits-okinawa-40-years-after-reversion/#.VtYUO_krlgs, may 13 2012)

Even with no new influx of holidaymakers, **Okinawa Island's environment has already been pushed to a tipping point due to the overdevelopment of tourism over the past four decades**. Among those concerned by this is Hideki Yoshikawa, a cofounder of the nongovernmental organization Citizens' Network for Biodiversity in Okinawa. "Since reversion, **the biggest change has been** from land reclamation — including **artificial beaches**," Yoshikawa points out. **Okinawa's natural shoreline is coral, so we used to think the fake beaches were good places for children to swim — but now we know** otherwise. **The sand is from the deep sea** and when it is dumped on the coast it **introduces unfamiliar species**. Dugong (an endangered cousin of the manatee) used to live along our shores — but reclamation projects destroyed the sea grass on which they grazed, driving them away." As well as the artificial beaches, Yoshikawa cites **the harmful effects of palm tree-packed resorts** that conform to tourists' expectations of what a subtropical paradise should look like but **have very little relation to Okinawa's true flora or fauna**. Additionally, he points an accusing finger at the dozens of **golf courses** built to cater to visitors, but which **take inordinate amounts of water — and**



harmful grounds-keeping chemicals — to maintain. Yoshikawa does not share Ota’s optimism about his islands’ future. “To be honest, I can’t see beyond the next 10 years — let alone 40 years ahead,” he says. **“Can Okinawa ever recover from this overdevelopment?”** I’m a strong believer in the resilience of nature. But **in only 40 years, it won’t be able to** rebound. **It has already been destroyed too much.”** **The tourist enclaves** that currently blight Okinawa’s coasts and look certain to expand in the future **are** predominantly **managed by mainland Japanese companies** which siphon profits off the islands, **bringing little benefit to local people.** But to blame the islands’ environmental problems solely on outside forces would be disingenuous. Okinawan construction companies — many with close ties to local politicians — have been more-than-willing participants in the destruction of their islands’ environment. A combination of **forest clear-cutting and irresponsible public-works projects** has **rendered Okinawa’s rivers** among **the most polluted in the nation.** Meanwhile, **an** ongoing prefecture-backed **landfill scheme** at Awase **threatens countless endangered species and will cause irreparable damage to the islands’ largest tidal flats.**

Okinawans also have some more individual-level complaints about U.S. military presence. We’ll discuss those next.

Democracy & Human Rights

As referenced in the Citizen Opinions section, one rationale for opposing U.S. military presence in Okinawa could be that, because the local population tends to disapprove of it, its continuation is anti-democratic. Along a similar line of reasoning, some argue American bases have resulted in the degradation of Okinawan human rights.



Here is **evidence** arguing that American presence in Okinawa is undemocratic and constitutes discrimination against the island's citizens:

(Shannon Tiezzi, Managing Editor at The Diplomat, former research associate at the U.S.-China Policy Foundation & Masters from Harvard, "Beyond Futenma: Okinawa and the US Base Conundrum," The Diplomat, <http://thediplomat.com/2015/11/beyond-futenma-okinawa-and-the-us-base-conundrum/>, Nov 4 2015)

But the base issue goes beyond the tangible impact of the bases. More than anything else, it's the attitude of the Japanese central government toward the issue that irks Okinawans.

There are profound **feelings** of alienation on the island; over and over again I hear **that Okinawa is being discriminated against by mainland Japan. The historical roots of that sentiment run deep.** Okinawa was home to the independent Ryukyu kingdom until it was subsumed by Japan in 1879. Then, in 1945, the island was the site of the only land battle in Japan during World War II. The local perception is that **Okinawan people and homes were sacrificed in the Battle of Okinawa to buy time for mainland Japan to shore up its defense. Over 94,000 Okinawans civilians** died in the taking of Okinawa; the Okinawan Prefectural Peace Museum heavily implies they **were needlessly sacrificed** as part of Tokyo's "war of attrition" strategy. **Today, Okinawans believe their** island and their **lives are still being sacrificed** to serve mainland Japan (and, of course, the United States). Many of them readily admit to the security value of the U.S.-Japan alliance and even the installation of U.S. bases in Japan. They just don't understand why their island bears so much of the burden. Ota points to these historical issues as a major cause of the tensions today. Without the experience of the Battle of Okinawa perhaps the Okinawan people would be more receptive to hosting military facilities. "Okinawa shouldn't be a battlefield again, so that's why Okinawan people reject military bases," he explains. Plus, **if the bases are so important to Japan's national security, why is it that no other prefecture will accept them – and that Okinawa is stuck with them instead?** The answer is that the "Japanese government does not pay any attention to the sufferings of Okinawan people," Ota argues. Nakayama, along with many of my other interviewees, agrees that **Okinawans are being discriminated against.** It doesn't matter if the bases are located in Okinawa or elsewhere, she says, and it's "not right" that the central government is ignoring the wishes of the Okinawan people when it comes to the Futenma relocation. **Japan and the United States are both democracies**, she says, **but their approach to Okinawa "is not democratic at all."** Kurayoshi Takara, who served as vice governor of Okinawa under Hirokazu Nakaima, Onaga's predecessor, says that the Okinawa people "are always victims." Japan "sacrificed Okinawa to the U.S." when Tokyo lost the war, he says, and since then nothing has substantially changed: Okinawa is still largely alone in bearing the burden of the U.S.-Japan security alliance.



Thanks to the island's tragic history and current geopolitical factors, the notion that American presence in Okinawa forces residents to risk being "sacrificed" for outside interests runs deep. That is the subject of this **evidence**:

(New Diplomacy Initiative [think tank that collects and distributes information and advocates policy options in the United States and Japan as well as throughout East Asia], "Why the Right to Collective Self-defense Now? – Considering the Issue from the Front Line of Security," http://www.nd-initiative.org/en_topics/1469/, April 22 2014)

Japan, which **has been taking part in** the **US-led wars by allowing them use** of our **bases** in Japan and by providing financial assistance, is now compounding the level of cooperation by the acceptance of the exercise of Right to Collective Self-defense. **I visited an ICBM base in Siberia at the end of the Cold War. The stored missiles were aimed at Okinawa as the second target after the U.S. Possessing the most advanced US base in East Asia entails that Japan will be the first and foremost target of any attack against the US.** Unlike the conventional LDP regime, it is really concerning that the Abe administration directly has been working on and exerting their influence on the "education" and "media" that have their place to generate the "Sentiments of the Public".

This next piece of **evidence** takes that claim further, suggesting that the situation is undermining the broader legitimacy of Japanese democracy in general:

(Nadia Prupis, staff writer, "'Whatever It Takes': Okinawa Sues Tokyo in Effort to Block US Base," Common Dreams (news source), <http://www.commondreams.org/news/2015/12/26/whatever-it-takes-okinawa-sues-tokyo-effort-block-us-base>, Dec 26 2015)

Residents and officials charge that the Japanese government's Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport, and Tourism illegally intervened in Onaga's order earlier this year that halted preliminary work on the base. The prefecture said that the ministry acted unlawfully when it suspended Onaga's permit cancellation for work needed to move the U.S. Marine Corps Air Station Futenma to its slated spot in Henoko. The legal challenge is the latest effort to block the continued militarization of **the** southern Japanese **island**, which **has long served as** home **base for more than half of the 50,000 American military service members in Japan**, as well as over two-thirds of U.S. bases in the country. In late October, hundreds of Okinawa residents, largely elders, linked arms and physically blocked vehicles transporting building materials to the base. **"Don't the people of Okinawa have sovereignty?"** one protester, 70-year-old Katsuhiro Yoshida, told Japanese paper The Asahi Shimbun at the time. **"This reminds me of the scenes of rioting against the U.S. military before Okinawa was returned to Japan (in 1972). Now we are facing off against our own government. It is so contemptible."** Residents have long expressed anger and frustration over the crime and pollution they say comes along with the presence of foreign troops. **"Democracy and local self-determination in Japan are in severe condition," Onaga, who was elected on an anti-base platform, said** Friday. **"We want the rest of the world to know how the Japan-U.S. security treaty is affecting us."**



From here, pros could choose to develop impacts to Japanese democracy, and/or provide more philosophically-grounded arguments highlighting the importance of democracy as a principle.

Related to this issue are claims of subjugation of Okinawans at the hands of U.S. military personnel. If American service members are violating the human rights of Okinawan citizens, that provides some potentially-fruitful ground for justifying the necessity of withdrawal.

First, there have been some heinous incidents associated with U.S. military presence in Okinawa, including sexual assault. Here is **evidence** summarizing some of the issue:

(Céline Pajon, research specialist at Ifri Japan, associate researcher at the Canon Institute for Global Studies (CIGS) in Tokyo, & MA in International Relations from the Graduate Institute of International Studies, [Translated by Nicholas Sowell], "Understanding the Issue of U.S. Military Bases in Okinawa," The Institut français des relations internationales Center for Asian Studies, Japan Program, https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/understanding_the_issue_of_u.s._military_bases_in_okinawa.pdf, June 2010)

However, **the presence of U.S. troops is first associated with prostitution**, which has accompanied the development of the bases. At the height of the Vietnam War when the bases were used intensively, the local police estimated there to be more than 7,300 prostitutes. Subsequently, some red districts lapsed into disuse.³⁰ **U.S. soldiers are also a source of crime** (including violence against women). This is all the more sensitive in Okinawa as the majority of military personnel are from the Marine Corps: young men (18-25 years old), with a high rate of turnover on the island. They have not yet founded families, as is the case of the older and more stable staff in other units. The Prefecture of **Okinawa has identified more than 5,400 crimes attributed to American troops since 1972**.³¹ **On September 4, 1995, the rape of a 12-year old Okinawan girl by three G.I.s angered the population and major demonstrations were held, bringing together nearly 85,000 people.**³² **Okinawans protested** against **insecurity due to the U.S. presence, against the legal privileges accorded to arrested American military prisoners, and demanded** a reduction or even **complete departure of the bases.**



More evidence:

(Sherwood Ross, award-winning reporter, "US Military Bases: Time to Set Okinawa Free," Centre for Research on Globalization, <http://www.globalresearch.ca/us-military-bases-time-to-set-okinawa-free/12104>, Jan 31 2009)

It's way past time for the U.S. to get out of Okinawa—and, for that matter, to take its Tokyo good buddies with it. Before Japanese warlords annexed the Ryuku islands in 1879, Okinawans enjoyed more freedom than they do today. Every liberty-loving American ought to be shouting: "Okinawa for the Okinawans!" Right now, this Los Angeles-sized Pacific gem of 454-sq.-miles is Pentagon Tropical Paradise No. 1. It's a land of martinis-and-honey where our 25,000 military personnel and their 23,000 dependents can live in high-rise splendor with housing allowances approaching \$1,000 or more a month (plus cost-of-living perks), enjoy PX shopping as good as it gets, and tan on the exotic beaches as Kin Red and Kin Blue. This comes at a price, though—paid for by U.S. taxpayers and 1.3 million long-suffering Okinawans. The Pentagon has studded their island paradise with airfields, barracks, artillery and bombing ranges, ammunition depots, toxic chemical, depleted uranium (and nuclear bomb) storage dumps—everything a demented mind could wish for to threaten modern civilization. These lethal chazzerei take up 20 percent of Okinawa's acreage, swindled from its hapless owners by Uncle Sam without benefit of cash payment the same way Joe Stalin collectivized Soviet Russia's farms. What particularly galls the locals (85% of Okinawans polled want the Yanks o-u-t) is not just the presence of U.S. troops, mostly Marines, occupying their homeland, but the hundreds of ensuing rapes and sexual violations of their daughters, some as young as twelve. These have spurred vast anti-American demonstrations. **The incidence of rape on Okinawa is twice that of the States and the military has freed hundreds of U.S. sex offenders despite their court-martial convictions.** Last March, **Okinawans rallied** in a baseball stadium to protest the latest child rape and, according to the Associated Press, "banners **demanding the complete withdrawal of U.S. troops** ringed the makeshift stage." The AP noted that "problems with base-related accidents, crowding and crime are endemic." **Okinawans can do little to stop this lawlessness: "When U.S. servicemen and their families commit crimes, they shall be detained by U.S. authorities** until Japanese law enforcement agencies file complaints with the prosecutors' office," the Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement(SOFA) states—and by then the perps could be back in Hahira, Georgia. Although the New York Times editorial page claimed "American military behavior in Japan has generally been good since the occupation in 1945," **between 1972 and 1995 U.S. service personnel were implicated in 4,716 crimes.** At one point up to a third of the Third Marine Division was infected with venereal disease, prompting author Chalmers Johnson in "Blowback"(Henry Holt) to crack "one has to ask what the New York Times might consider bad behavior." What's more, Newsweek noted that **when Okinawa poet Ben Takara surveyed girls at Futenma senior high, one-third to one-half of them said they had "scary experiences with U.S. soldiers** on their way to school or back home." Approximately 75 percent of all U.S. forces in Japan (why, fellow taxpayers, do we keep any forces in Japan, why?) are concentrated on Okinawa, having less than one percent of Japan's total land area, which "amounts to a permanent collusion of the United States and Japan against Okinawa," Chalmers observes. The answer is found in Tim Weiner's "Legacy of Ashes"(Anchor Books), who recalls Okinawa was "a crucial staging ground for the bombing of Vietnam and a storehouse of American nuclear weapons." Weiner notes that when opposition politicians in 1968 "threatened to force the United States off the island" the CIA funneled big bucks into Japan to defeat them at the polls. In short, Japan can conveniently dump the military burden of its U.S. defense pact on the backs of their captive Okinawans, with 14 military bases jammed onto its 70-mile-long expanse. (Japan itself has just eight U.S. bases.) This saddles Okinawa with the constant hullabaloo of jet warplane noise. (The Futenma base alone has 52,000 takeoffs and landings a year.) Yoshida Kensei, former professor at Obirin University in Japan, and Asian Studies Lecturer Rumi Sakamoto of Auckland University, New Zealand, write that Okinawa is nothing more than a U.S. "military colony." They want to rid the island of all "war cooperation" and reallocate its land to "agriculture, fisheries, and trade," high tech, medicine and tourism. And they wouldn't mind seeing Okinawans make some real cash by converting the U.S. bases into remunerative housing areas, commercial and industrial properties, and educational or research parks. Author Johnson quotes editor Koji Taira of the Ryukyuanist as writing, "the incomes generated directly or indirectly by the bases are only 5 percent of the gross domestic product of Okinawa. This is far too small a contribution for an establishment sitting on 20 percent of Okinawa's land...In effect, the U.S. and Japan are forcing on Okinawa's economy a deadweight loss of 15 percent of its GDP every year." As Johnson concludes, "Okinawa is still essentially a military colony of the Pentagon's, a huge safe house where Green Berets and the Defense Intelligence Agency, not to mention the air force and Marine Corps, can do things they would not dare do in the United States." World War Two has been over for 60 years: Okinawans need to be free of the Pentagon and free of Japan.



Furthermore, according to this **evidence**, foreign soldiers operate largely outside of the reach of local law enforcement, resulting in rampant unaccountability:

(Yoshida Kensei, professor at Obirin University in Japan, [Translated by Rumi Sakamoto-lecturer in Asian Studies at Auckland University and Matt Allen- Japan Focus associate & prof of Asian history at the University of Auckland], "US Bases, Japan and the Reality of Okinawa as a Military Colony," <http://apjif.org/-Yoshida-Kensei/2857/article.html#sthash.bQSwDbtx.dpuf>," The Asia-Pacific Journal, vol. 6 iss. 8 no. 0, August 1 2008)

These two examples reveal that **in Okinawa**, which is supposedly a part of Japan, **US military intentions prevail over the wishes of Japanese residents, and that the Japanese constitution and laws do not apply in Okinawa.** Not only in Okinawa but also in Japan, **US military bases**, US military planes and warships that arrive and leave from these bases, US military **personnel and civilian employees** who belong to the bases, and even civilian ports if the US needs them, **all fall under the principle of extraterritoriality; that is, they are beyond Japanese law.** Okinawa, which hosts US military forces (USF) and US bases, can, therefore, be called a 'military colony' of the US. I would like to begin this article using this perspective to examine the reality of the USF in Okinawa, the history of military bases in Okinawa, the role of these bases within US international policy, and the nature and future of US bases in Okinawa. US bases are an extension of the US. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the USF and bases in Japan are governed by the SOFA, which 'regulates the USF's use of facilities and areas, as well as the status of the USF. This is to ensure effective operations of the USF maintained in our country in order to achieve the goal of the Japan US Security Treaty'. However, although Japan accepts the stationing of the USF in Japan and provides the bases, the USF Japan, military personnel and civilian employees are basically an extension of US sovereignty and the US military. **Therefore, the USF, military personnel and civilian employees are subject to a military chain of command with the US President at the apex** and below him the Secretary of Defense, Commander of the Unified Commands (I will discuss this in more detail later), the commander of the USF in Japan, the commander of Marine Corps Forces in Japan (and concurrently the commander of III Marine Expeditionary Forces) in Okinawa, and commanders and senior officers at each base. They are also bound by the US Constitution, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), regulations within each unit, commanders' orders, or precedents within the USF (although there are some cases where the US Constitution and laws have not been observed in Okinawa). Okinawa thus coexists with the US with only a wire fence separating them. Many base-related problems arise from military planes, transport planes, helicopters that take off from these bases for training and combat, toxic substances the USF uses, and (some) service members and civilian employees who hit the town nightly. The USF differ greatly from ordinary Japanese society. There are some cases, such as leaking official secrets or rape, where a court martial is stricter than Japanese courts; but **if a US service member commits other sex crimes** or manslaughter due to drunk driving, depending on the status, distinguished service, and wishes of the complainant, **in order to protect the honour of the military** and the person concerned, **or in order to avoid complex legal procedures, it is possible to allow them to voluntarily retire instead of being dishonourably discharged or imprisoned.** It is also possible for a criminal or a gang member to join the military forces through the 'waiver' system. Because of the difficulty in recruitment, some foreigners are inducted in the armed forces in exchange for the promise of US citizenship. The military regime is arduous, and many soldiers depend on alcohol to deal with stress from base discipline and combat training. Perhaps such a 'military culture' forms the background for the crimes around the bases. **The US Department of Defense stated that there were 2,688 incidents of sexual violence by US soldiers (of which 60% were rape cases) in the year starting September 2006. However, given the nature of sexual violence, in which victims often remain silent, this could be just the tip of the iceberg.** Despite Ministry of Foreign Affairs' insistence that USF and US **service members 'must respect Japanese laws and pay appropriate attention to public safety**, as required by SOFA', Japanese police power and jurisdiction **do not apply to the bases. Even if there is concern regarding environmental pollution, Japanese Ministry of Environment or local municipalities cannot enter a base to investigate. There is no obligation for the US to return the land in its original condition** when the bases are closed and returned to Japan (it has such an obligation within the US). **Even with incidents outside the bases, if the service member involved was 'on duty', the case falls under US jurisdiction. With 'off duty' incidents, too, if the US arrests the suspect, they will keep the detainee until the Japanese side presses charges, thus slowing down important early stage investigation. Military personnel and US civilian base employees** in Okinawa are treated differently from ordinary foreigners. They do



not have to show their passports for entry into and exit from the country, nor do they have to register as residents in Japan. **Even if they live outside the bases, right next to ordinary citizens, they are not required to register with local Japanese authorities** the name of their unit, their rank, gender, age etc. If Japan has no information on those to whom SOFA applies, how is it to ensure that they adhere to SOFA? With USF exempted from conforming to the Japanese Constitution and laws, it is unsurprising that service members respect neither Japanese custom and law, nor the SOFA.

More **evidence** detailing lenient penalties for American offenders:

(Associated Press- Tokyo, "Sexual assaults by US military in Japan unlikely to end in prison," <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/09/sexual-assaults-us-military-japan-prison-unlikely>, Feb 9 2014)

At US military bases in Japan, most service members found culpable in sex crimes in recent years **did not go to prison, according to internal** Department of Defence **documents. Instead**, in a review of hundreds of cases filed in America's largest overseas military installation, **offenders were fined, demoted**, restricted to their bases **or removed from the military. In** about **30 cases, a letter of reprimand was the only punishment.** More than 1,000 records, obtained by the Associated Press through the Freedom of Information Act, describe hundreds of cases in graphic detail, painting a disturbing picture of how senior American officers prosecute and punish troops accused of sex crimes. The handling of allegations verged on the chaotic, with seemingly strong cases often reduced to lesser charges. **In two rape cases, commanders overruled recommendations to court-martial and dropped the charges instead. Even when military authorities agreed a crime had been committed, the suspect was unlikely to serve time.** Of 244 service members whose punishments were detailed in the records, **only a third were incarcerated. The analysis of the reported sex crimes**, which were filed between 2005 and early 2013, **shows a pattern of random and inconsistent judgments.** The marines, for example, were far more likely than other branches to send offenders to prison, with 53 prison sentences out of 270 cases. By contrast, of the navy's 203 cases, more than 70 were court-martialled or punished in some way. Only 15 were sentenced to time behind bars.

At the risk of beating a dead horse, if you want to use these points to support your pro case, don't forget to provide some analysis as to why these sorts of issues might outweigh the more global scope of con global security arguments.



One option would be to gain inroads into con offense by arguing that outrage over criminal incidents risks the strength of the US-Japan security alliance (something we'll be impacting out shortly). Here's **evidence**:

(Associated Press, "Okinawa Military Rape Arrests: Japan Decries U.S. Troops In Sexual Assault Allegations," http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/17/okinawa-military-rape_n_1974475.html, October 17 2012)

Japan's defense minister said he was deeply concerned by allegations that two American military servicemen had raped a woman **on** the island of **Okinawa** and suggested that the U.S. take more measures to prevent such attacks. "This is a very serious crime," Defense Minister Satoshi Morimoto told reporters Wednesday. Morimoto said the case follows another sexual assault in August, and he indicated he was considering discussing the matter with U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta. The sailors were identified as Seaman Christopher Browning and Petty Officer 3rd Class Skyler Dozierwalker of the Fort Worth Naval Air Base in Texas. According to Japanese media, they had been drinking before they attacked the woman, in her 20s, who was on her way home before dawn Tuesday. The two were in Japanese police custody, according to Okinawa Prefectural Police spokesman Takashi Shirado. Later Tuesday, police handed over investigation to prosecutors to decide whether to press formal charges. Browning and Dozierwalker are both 23 and enlisted in 2008. They were assigned to the Fort Worth base the same year. Base spokesman Don Ray declined to comment on the men's arrests. The arrests sparked immediate anger on Okinawa, which hosts more than half of the 47,000 U.S. troops in Japan and has recently seen massive protests against plans to deploy the Marine Corps' MV-22 Osprey to a base there because of safety concerns. **Okinawa Gov. Kazuhiro Nakaima**, who has been in Tokyo since earlier this week, **said the U**nited **S**tates **should worry about the consequences of repeated crime by U.S. servicemen on the island, where people already resent their presence. "It could damage Japan-U.S. security alliance unless there is dramatic improvement," Nakaima said. "We want the U.S. government and its military to take measures that are far severer** than a disciplinary measure or something lenient like that." **Tensions between the U.S. military and their Okinawans hosts are endemic, and base-related crimes are a particularly sensitive issue.** Local opposition to the U.S. bases over noise, safety concerns and crime flared into mass protests after the 1995 rape of a schoolgirl by three American servicemen. That outcry eventually led to an agreement to close a major Marine airfield, but that plan has stalled for more than a decade over where a replacement facility should be located. **Concerned that anti-base sentiment on Okinawa could swell, Vice Foreign Minister Shuji Kira lodged a protest with U.S. Ambassador John Roos**, who promised full cooperation with the investigation.

As defense against this line of argumentation, the con could argue that many more crimes are actually committed by Japanese citizens, on a per-capita basis than by U.S. service personnel. This would indicate that the bases are not causing dangerous crime and violence against civilians. Here is **evidence**:

(The Japan Times, "U.S. military crime: SOFA so good?," <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/community/2008/02/26/community/u-s-military-crime-sofa-so-good/#.Vt8YDvkrIgt>, Feb 26 2008)

In 2006, the Okinawan islands had a population of 1,368,000 people, 6,808 of which were registered foreign residents not covered by the SOFA. In 2006, there were 4,188 arrests for penal code offenses and 605 arrests for special law violations. Foreigners not covered by the SOFA were responsible for 44 of these penal code offenses, and we can use partially reported figures to estimate that this group committed around 22 special law violations. Doing the math gives us an **arrest rate of 0.342 percent for Japanese in Okinawa, a bit lower than the rate for the entire country. Now let's turn to the U.S.**



military in Okinawa. There are about 42,570 SOFA-covered Americans living in the prefecture. **In 2006, 63 SOFA-covered individuals were arrested for penal code offenses**. Eleven arrests for special law violations can be estimated. A little math **using these numbers gives us an arrest rate of 0.174 percent, about half that of Japanese in Okinawa** (0.342) **and the entire country** (0.351). Shocked? I am! It's particularly surprising when you consider that almost half the U.S. military population is 25 years old or younger. In fact, 80 percent of U.S. service members are younger than 35. And men comprise nearly 85 percent of the U.S. military force. If we were to attribute 80 percent of arrests of Japanese in Okinawa to men and women aged 15 to 64, a group that makes up 65.1 percent of the prefecture, the arrest rate among Japanese in this age bracket in Okinawa would rise to 0.420 percent. In fact, we would have to attribute 67 percent of arrests in Okinawa to those under the age of 15 and over the age of 64 before the arrest rate of Japanese in the 15-to-64 age bracket would fall below that of SOFA-covered individuals in the area. Shocking indeed! Let's not pretend, though, that living among foreigners trained to kill is Disney in fatigues. On-base arrest data is not released. Environmental issues and land-use concerns abound. And noise has always been a problem. However, **there were no arrests in Japan of SOFA-covered individuals for rape or sexual assault in 2006, even though the NPA did arrest 1,094 Japanese for rape and another 4,733 for sexual offenses — that's nearly 16 a day.** Many feel that society would be great if we had no need for military forces, but as long as governments don't feel the same way the fact remains that we have to put them somewhere. All of which raises the question: **Is it hypocritical to give such disproportionate media exposure to crimes committed by U.S. service members when the data shows that their adherence to our laws apparently exceeds our own?**

Further, the next piece of **evidence** indicates that the rate at which U.S. military members commit crimes on Okinawa has been steadily dropping for decades, reaching its lowest point ever in 2015:

(Matthew M. Burke and Chiyomi Sumida, journalists, "Number of SOFA personnel accused of crimes on Okinawa drops," Stars and Stripes (daily newspaper for American military community overseas), <http://www.stripes.com/news/pacific/number-of-sofa-personnel-accused-of-crimes-on-okinawa-drops-1.332412>, March 3 2015)

New **statistics show the number of U.S. servicemembers, family members and civilian workers accused of committing crimes on Okinawa dropped last year to the lowest level since** the reversion of the tiny island prefecture back to Japan in **1972. Out of 3,410 total arrests prefecture-wide in 2014, only 27 involved** Status of Forces Agreement **personnel**, down from 38 in 2013, according to statistics released Feb. 12 by Okinawa Prefectural Police. Of those, **only 10 were servicemembers on active duty**, the same as the previous year. The overall number of crimes allegedly perpetrated by SOFA personnel dropped from 32 to 29. The number of what are referred to in Japan as "heinous" crimes, including rape, murder, robbery and arson, went up in 2014 — to a single arrest for rape. That charge, however, was later dropped by Japanese prosecutors, U.S. officials said. Also, the number of arrests for violent crimes such as assault and extortion dropped from seven to four. Okinawan police officials declined to comment on the statistics by phone. U.S. Forces Japan said good conduct by servicemembers is "key" to fostering a relationship with the communities that host them. The fall in the numbers was likely impacted by a curfew and restrictions on alcohol consumption that began in 2012 following the rape of an Okinawan woman by two visiting U.S. Navy sailors. The restrictions lasted in some form until Dec. 9. A similar curfew, enacted in 1995 following the brutal gang rape of a 12-year-old girl by two Marines and a Navy corpsman, contributed to the second-lowest total since 1972 — 33 arrests on 39 crimes in 1996. That particular crime led to a surge in anti-U.S. military sentiment on the island and widespread protests that have left a lingering impact to this day. Any crimes perpetrated by SOFA personnel are highly publicized in local media and threaten to harm the U.S. military alliance with Japan. "We have made progress since implementing the USFJ Liberty Policy to address issues of concern, and have realized a substantial drop in the number of incidents of misconduct across the command as members are taking care of and educating each other to make responsible choices," Marine Gunnery Sgt. Tiffany Carter, media relations chief for USFJ, said in a statement. In November, Okinawa overwhelmingly elected Takeshi Onaga, who ran on an anti-U.S. military platform, as governor. **The current batch of crime figures is remarkably low considering there are** approximately **30,000 U.S. troops stationed on Okinawa, along with 20,000 family members and civilian government employees. According to Federal Bureau of Investigation crime statistics, the** estimated **arrest rate in the U** **nited S** **tates in 2012 was**



1,944.1 — including 83.15 for violent crimes — **per 50,000** inhabitants. **The number of arrests** of SOFA personnel **on Okinawa has steadily declined since peaking in 1977** with 396 arrests on 342 crimes, according to the data. There were 280 arrests in 1980, 74 in 1990, and 67 in 2000.

And, according to the **evidence** below, U.S. troops are actually subject to greater penalties for criminal actions than Japanese citizens would be:

(Robert D. Eldridge, retired tenured associate professor at Osaka University and deputy chief of staff for Marine Corps Installations Pacific, "The Okinawa "Base Problem" Today" <http://www.nippon.com/en/in-depth/a00501/>, Dec 2 2003)

One sees the same thing when one looks at crime statistics. **There is a perception that US forces in Okinawa are a lawless** bunch, and that Japan has no control over them. **This perception is incorrect** in at least two respects. **US personnel and their dependents comprise only a tiny fraction of all arrestees in Okinawa, even though they make up 3% of the local population.** In contrast, on average, **the local Okinawan crime rate is six times more than those committed by US forces.** Secondly, the Status of Forces Agreement **and** other arrangements allow Japanese authorities to arrest and detain suspects for off-base crimes and have access to suspects on base for suspects that are under US jurisdiction until they are ready to charge them. Of course, Okinawan political leaders will tend to point to the accumulative number of crimes and incidents over the years, noting that the numbers continue to grow. Indeed, in a clear misrepresentation of statistics, a report released in the summer of 2000 by a national lawyers' group announced that US crime statistics in Okinawa were 10 times that of local citizens. The story was widely carried in the local press. The data of the report, written by a member of the Okinawa Lawyers' Association, however, was later found to be highly inaccurate. However, the damage was done. Even after small corrections were made, without notice, in the press, a speaker at a rally on July 15 that year in Ginowan cited the same figure, and the impression continues that crimes by US forces are high.(*7) If anything, **crime rates for US personnel have been decreasing over the years.** It also needs to be pointed out that **punishment is much more severe on the US side as well. Not only are military members punished in civilian courts if found guilty, but they would likely be punished in military courts as well** for chargeable offenses. **Moreover, alleged crimes dismissed by Japanese prosecutors may still be punished within the military** if regulations and codes of conduct were found to have been broken.

More **evidence**:

(Los Angeles Times, "Okinawa Rape Suspect's Lawyer Gives Dark Account : Japan: Attorney of accused Marine says co-defendant admitted assaulting 12-year-old girl 'just for fun.'," http://articles.latimes.com/1995-10-28/news/mn-62075_1_japanese-girl, October 28 1995)

Despite the national **clamor** here for better procedures **to try suspects under Japanese law**--the United States agreed Wednesday to give Japan early custody in rape and murder cases--**Matsunaga and others say the U.S. military system typically imposes harsher penalties. Rape convictions under Japanese law normally result in sentences of three to four years, but U.S. courts-**



martial for rape in Okinawa have typically carried a minimum sentence of 10 years, said Matsunaga, a Japanese attorney who has represented more than 300 U.S. servicemen on the southern island over the past 29 years. "We want to try our [own] people so we can hold our people up as a model," said Col. A.J. Cunningham, top legal counsel for the U.S. forces in Japan.

This **evidence** summarizes many of the con claims introduced above:

(Tom Conway [journalist/interviewer] & Kevin Maher [former Director of the Office of Japan Affairs at the State Department, Consul General in Okinawa, & Director of Political-Military Affairs at the American Embassy in Tokyo], "The other side of Okinawa," Collier's, <http://colliersmagazine.com/article/other-side-okinawa>, April 2012)

What about the interactions between those on the base and Okinawan civilians? Is crime a problem?

Kevin Maher: Obviously any crime committed by a US military member or their family is one too many, and should be treated very strictly. But the reality is, **on a per capita basis, the crime rate of the military people on Okinawa is much less than that of the local population. This doesn't excuse anything but this notion that the US military is there committing all these crimes running amok all over the people of Okinawa just isn't reality.** Any group of 25,000 people will have some crime but the standards of the US military are very high. You can look at the Japanese police statistics. **The crime rate in Japan is very low**, it is a very safe country, **and the US military crime rate in Okinawa is even lower than that.** I understand the local reaction because, like the police, **the military is here to protect and it is held to a higher standard, as it should be. It also is important to note that the idea the Status of Forces Agreement protecting military personnel from being subject to Japanese law isn't true. Criminal acts committed by a military member off base or on base, if committed against a Japanese national, are subject to the primary jurisdiction of the Japanese**, not the United States. **Only if the Japanese waive or don't exercise primary jurisdiction does the US then have secondary jurisdiction to prosecute**, which has happened, but **it is up to the Japanese** authorities to **first** decide. There is one exception for acts during official duty but those are very rare cases.

The con could also use this next piece of **evidence** to argue that local outrage over Americans and crime is driven by the media, not by reality:

(The Wall Street Journal, "Marines Struggle as Tensions Rise in Okinawa," <http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323689604578217873597101726>, Jan 3 2013)

Americans say that **the number of reported crimes remains small and hasn't been rising. Yet each case** in recent weeks has **attracted heavy coverage in the Okinawa media**, which hosts 70% of all the U.S. troops stationed in Japan. **That** has **prompted**



U.S. officials to respond with more stringent measures, to show to their Japanese hosts they take these incidents seriously. They have banned the consumption of alcohol off base, and prohibited the nighttime sale of alcohol, even inside the bases. Officials also required soldiers to "buddy-up" with colleagues when they leave their bases while off-duty. To Americans, a sort of vicious cycle has emerged. As rules grow stricter, adherence to them has become tougher. That has led to more rule-breaking and more headlines in the local media. "Every measure we implement ends up being another stick that we get beaten with in the local press," said William Truax, a colonel who handles government and external affairs at the Marine Corps in Okinawa.

Next, we'll look at another reason why local opposition to military presence could be concerning.

Okinawan Independence?

Military presence as an affront to democracy and human rights, as we just covered, is one way pro teams might develop substantial impacts. Some debaters, though, might find that line of argumentation a little too philosophical. If you prefer more concrete impact claims, another option could be to suggest that continued indifference to citizens' demands will stoke popular anger enough to fuel a movement to separate from Japan, resulting in potential negative consequences.

The **evidence** below makes exactly that argument, contending that resentment over U.S. military presence is growing support for Okinawan independence:

(Justin McCurry, Tokyo correspondent, "Okinawa independence movement seeks inspiration from Scotland," The Guardian, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/15/okinawa-independence-scotland-japan-us-military-base>, Sept 14 2014)

Campaigners from Okinawa will arrive in Scotland on Monday to **seek** inspiration from the yes campaign as they look to boost **support for** making the southern Japanese island **an independent nation**. While Okinawa's movement is tiny compared with its counterpart in Scotland, **activists** say they stand to **benefit from** mounting public **anger over** Tokyo's plans to push through **the** construction of a controversial **US military base** in defiance of local opposition. "We're really interested in seeing how the rest of the UK and the international community react if Scotland does vote for independence," said Masaki Tomochi, a professor of economics at Okinawa International University and a leading figure in the independence movement. "Scotland has every right to be independent and to take decisions about its own future. That's what people all over the world want, including the people of Okinawa." Tomochi and his colleagues, along with a reporter from the Ryukyu Shimpo newspaper, will tour Scotland meeting voters, academics and Scottish National party officials. Their group has posted a condensed Japanese version of the SNP's Scotland's Future manifesto on its website. **The history of**



Okinawa, Tomochi argues, is one of bloody sacrifice at mainland Japan's behest, and collusion between Tokyo and Washington, beginning with a secret postwar agreement to allow the US to bring nuclear weapons to the island and maintain military bases there indefinitely. The 2012 deployment of MV-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft on the island, and the relocation of a military base have added to popular resentment towards Tokyo. "The only way we can fix this is to declare our independence from Japan and go back to the way we were before Japan used force to take the islands," he said. Okinawa covers about 0.6% of Japan's land area, but is home to more than half the 47,000 US troops in the country and three-quarters of US bases. Some residents depend on the US military for employment, but campaigners say the bases emasculate the local economy, the poorest of Japan's 47 prefectures. Opposition to the US military presence now centres on the relocation of Futenma, a sprawling US marine base located in the centre of a densely populated area, to an offshore site on the island's north-east coast. Opinion polls show that 74% of Okinawans oppose the move, and there are fears the new offshore runway would endanger residents' safety and damage the marine environment. Tokyo and Washington, however, are determined to push ahead with the plan, which would cement Okinawa's critical role in the event of a conflict with China over the sovereignty of the nearby Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. As a sweetener, the US has agreed to move 8,000 marines and their families off the island to Guam and Hawaii. "The politicians in Tokyo have been ignoring our wishes for decades," said Kenzo Nagamine, a restaurateur. "As far as they are concerned, Okinawa counts for nothing." The Okinawa island chain once formed an independent kingdom, known as the Ryukyus, until it was forcibly annexed by Japan in 1879. The island was the scene one of the bloodiest battles of the Pacific war, claiming the lives of 240,000 people, including US troops and about a quarter of the civilian population. US occupation authorities did not return the territory to Japanese control until 1972. The Okinawan activists hope to discover how the yes campaign in Scotland increased support to levels that make Thursday's vote too close to call. A 2011 poll found only 4.7% of Okinawans were pro-independence, although more than 15% wanted more devolution. Just over 60% preferred the political status quo. Tomochi says support for independence has risen over the past two years. Like their allies in Scotland, activists here have been accused of endangering security and the economy. In an independent Okinawa, there would be no US bases and an end to subsidies from Tokyo. Fears the island would fall into Chinese hands were unfounded, said Tomochi, who regards Okinawans as ethnically different from mainland Japanese, with their own language and culture. "We would be far more likely to be invaded by Japan. China never invaded us for centuries when this was an independent kingdom," he said. The pro-independence movement envisages an Okinawa relieved of its heavy military burden, with a thriving economy based on trade with China and south-east Asia.

More evidence:

(Julian Ryall, Japan correspondent for the Daily Telegraph, "Governor puts Okinawa on collision course with Tokyo," DW, <http://www.dw.com/en/governor-puts-okinawa-on-collision-course-with-tokyo/a-18715361>, September 15 2015)

The governor of Okinawa Prefecture, Takeshi Onaga, has announced that he will rescind permission that was granted by his predecessor to carry out reclamation and construction work off the north-east coast of the island for the expansion of a US Marine Corps base, further delaying a project that should have been completed a decade ago. The uncompromising stance of Onaga - elected in a landslide victory in November after campaigning almost exclusively on a manifesto of opposition to the large US military presence in the prefecture - is frustrating the national governments in both Tokyo and Washington and has interfered with the Pentagon's realignment of its troops throughout the Asia-Pacific region. Ultimately, however, analysts say that the national government in Tokyo will turn to the courts to win the argument and push ahead with the development work at the US Marine Corps' Camp Schwab, close to the town of Henoko. The danger is that by doing so, and even potentially suspending the governor's powers, the government of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is seen as being overly high-handed, which could alienate even more local residents than are already opposed to the US military presence in the islands. And that, some say, could fuel further demands for independence from Tokyo in a nascent Okinawan nationalist movement. Message to the government "We believe the governor's actions have sent a strong message to the central government, that he will do everything in his power to prevent the construction of a larger base at Camp Schwab," Yasukatsu Matsushima, a professor at Ryukoku University in Kyoto, told DW. "He has made clear his intention to cancel the previous plan and the people of Okinawa are very pleased about that," said Matsushima, who is the co-founder of an association dedicated to winning independence for an archipelago that - until annexation by Japan in March 1879 - had been an independent kingdom known as the Ryukyus. "Our organization only has around 400 members at the moment, but the recent actions of the government in Tokyo have significantly increased interest in what we do and our calls for independence," Prof Matsushima said. Hampering the 'pivot' As well as being divisive, the debate over the relocation of the US military personnel in



Okinawa has been prolonged by the governor's move. The plan was to shift several thousand of the troops from the US Marine Corps' Futenma Air Station out of the congested town of Ginowan, in central Okinawa, to other bases in the region, including around 8,000 personnel to the Pacific island of Guam. Others were to be redeployed to northern Australia and South Korea, although the remainder would move to an enlarged Camp Schwab. Built on the coast, the base at present has insufficient air capability and the plan calls for reclamation work off the coast and the construction of two runways in a V-shaped configuration. But the repeated delays in implementing the relocation plan also mean that Washington has been hampered in its "Pacific pivot," the policy of refocusing attention in everything from trade, diplomacy and closer cultural ties away from the Atlantic and towards the Pacific. The most critical part of the policy, however, is the bolstering of Washington's military commitment to the region. At present, the US Navy operates a 50-50 split between its capabilities in the Atlantic and the Pacific; by 2020, fully 60 percent of the Pentagon's assets are projected to be in the Pacific. Controversial base The plan has been controversial from the outset, with local residents strongly opposed to a massive influx of US troops with little in the town of Henoko to entertain them. Other concerns include the inevitable increase in noise pollution from flight operations, particularly at night. Environmental groups have attempted to intervene in the dispute by pointing out that the reclamation work would destroy a protected coral reef and the feeding grounds of endangered dugongs. Governor Onaga and the residents who voted for him say Okinawa shoulders too much of the burden of US troops stationed in Japan and that the functions of Futenma should be moved to mainland Japan. The collapse of the most recent attempt to thrash out a compromise agreement between Tokyo and Okinawa has prompted the governor's decision to withdraw permission for more work at the Camp Schwab site; although the national government has made it clear it intends to forge ahead with the development. "The government has already indicated that it will contest the governor's decision to rescind permission and the next stage will be the courts," said Jun Okumura, a visiting scholar at the Meiji Institute for Global Affairs.

Anticipated backlash **Legally, the national government is ultimately able to step in to effectively take over** the powers of the elected governor, Okumura pointed out. Tokyo has so far resisted the temptation to do **that** as it **will inevitably trigger a backlash** and accusations of undermining an elected local authority, **but it may be the government's only option**, the expert noted. "I see no possibility of compromise that would be acceptable to either side," said Okumura. "The administration of PM Abe has too much riding on this - not least the defense arrangement with the US - while the governor is showing no signs of backing down," he added. And **while Tokyo will come out of the skirmish on top, it will inevitably leave a bad taste in the mouths of Okinawans**, say experts. They stress that the islanders already believe they are the most neglected part of the nation; and **the issue of bases might just be enough to encourage them to reconsider their allegiance to the rest of Japan.**

And, although the con is likely to argue that an independence movement would be blocked by mainland Japan or other political impediments, the following **evidence** suggests that independence is actually quite feasible:

(The Japan Times, "Ryukyu pro-independence group quietly gathering momentum," http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/01/26/national/ryukyu-pro-independence-group-quietly-gathering-momentum/#.Vt7mj_krlgs, Jan 26 2015)

The Association of Comprehensive Studies for Independence of the Lew Chewans, which represents native residents of the islands, said in its charter that **"By gaining independence from Japan and removing all military bases from our islands, we** Lew Chewans wish to **achieve our** long sought-after **goal of becoming a sovereign island of peace."** The chain, which belongs mostly to Okinawa Prefecture, was ruled by the Ryukyu Kingdom from the 15th century to the 19th century. The Japanese first invaded the islands in the early 17th century, eventually annexing them in the late 19th century. **The calls** issued by Lew Chewans, or Ryukyuan people, **to remove U.S. military bases from Okinawa** Prefecture **have long been ignored by the central government** **laments** Yasukatsu **Matsushima, a professor at Ryukoku University** in Kyoto and co-founder of the group. **"If we become independent, we can eliminate the military bases as our own choice,"** he said. Matsushima, 51, founded the group jointly with four other people including Shinako Oyakawa, a 34-year-old lecturer at Meio University in Nago, Okinawa, last May. The group has more than 250 members so far. Independence for the Ryukyu Islands has largely been downplayed in Japan as "a topic of pub conversations," Matsushima said. "We accept that fact, but even pub talk helps the issue move forward," he added. The question of Scottish independence from the United Kingdom, for instance, had been a popular topic in pubs among Scots, said Matsushima, who witnessed the referendum on the issue in Scotland last September. People for and against Scottish independence discussed the issue "on the street in a level-headed manner," Matsushima recalled. Many of those in favor of independence called for the removal of the Clyde naval base, home port for the Royal Navy's nuclear submarines. Matsushima, who wore a "Yes" sign on his chest while in Scotland, said many in the pro-independence camp were aware of the huge U.S. military presence in Okinawa and welcomed his visit. "I was impressed and encouraged by the mature debate," he said, even though the Scottish people voted to remain within the United Kingdom. Matsushima, whose main area of study is economics, said Okinawa is no longer dependent on U.S. military bases to support itself. American military bases occupy 10 percent of Okinawa's prefectural land and 18 percent of the island itself. But the bases contribute only an estimated 5 percent of its gross domestic product, while job opportunities and tax revenues in areas since returned by the U.S. military have risen sharply, Matsushima said. Critics question his group's movement, saying the central government would never approve independence for the Ryukyu Islands. "Japan's approval is unnecessary in the first place," Matsushima argued. The U.N. Charter and the International Covenants on Human Rights recognize that all peoples have the right to self-determination. **Okinawa can "declare its**



independence and apply for U.N. membership if the prefectural assembly decides on the motion and **wins** majority **support** for it **in a referendum**,” Matsushima said. “We will then increase the number of countries that recognize us as a nation. **That’s all we will have to do**, though the process will be slow.”

This next piece of **evidence** suggests that an independent Okinawan nation may choose to align itself with China, rather than Japan and the United States. This gives the pro room to capture some of the “China deterrence” arguments that typically belong to the con (as we’ll cover in the next section):

(Robin Harding, Associate Professor of government in the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Oxford, “US military bases fuel Okinawa independence debate,” Financial Times, <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/7d8d444a-7ef1-11e5-a1fe-567b37f80b64.html#axzz41IYvNHt>, November 3 2015)

In a decrepit office below a billiard hall in the city of Naha, capital of **Okinawa** in southern Japan, **a small group is dreaming of a new country.** Surrounded by flags showing three stars on two bands of blue, symbolising the Okinawan sea and sky, **they represent a revived movement for the Ryukyu Islands, which include Okinawa, to declare independence from Japan. “Support** for Ryukyu independence **is growing,” says** Chousuke Yara, a perennial electoral candidate for **the movement.** “People are coming to understand that Okinawa was originally part of the Ryukyu kingdom, then invaded by Japan and made Japanese by education.” The movement has a long way to go — a recent poll of islanders put support for independence at just 8 per cent. But another 21 per cent back full devolution and 88 per cent want greater self-determination — **a sign of a growing alienation from** the rest of **Japan that could have profound consequences for regional security. The Ryukyu chain,** which stretches in a 1,000km arc from Taiwan to the Japanese mainland, **are a natural barrier between China and the Pacific.** The island of **Okinawa is a cornerstone of** the **US military presence in Asia,** with US bases covering about 20 per cent of its land area. There is a range of opinions on security in **the independence movement,** Mr Yara says. But his **vision of a nonaligned and pacifist republic would send shivers down the spine of any US military planner. “The Ryukyus and China have always had a friendly relationship, so there’s no reason to think the current Chinese regime would trouble us,”** he says. “For example, **if Japan were picking on us, we could have a military alliance with** Taiwan or **China,** or the opposite, we could ally with the US and Japan.” **Resentment over the US bases has been a running sore in relations between Okinawa and the mainland** following incidents such as the rape of a local schoolgirl by US servicemen in 1995 and the crash of a US helicopter in 2004. Shinzo Abe, Japan’s prime minister, wants to relocate the controversial helicopter base at Futenma to Henoko Bay in the north of the island, but **locals want the base shut or moved off the island altogether.** Takeshi Onaga, Okinawa’s popular governor, recently revoked a permit for building a new base at Henoko. Last week Mr Abe took out a court injunction against Mr Onaga and resumed construction. Elderly protesters outside the site at Henoko were dragged away by police after Mr Abe’s decision. “I can’t restrain my furious resentment,” says Mr Onaga, elected last year on a mandate to oppose relocation of the Futenma base to Henoko. “The coercion continues.” Masaaki **Gabe, a professor at the University of the Ryukyus, agrees that Okinawans feel distant from** the government in **Tokyo. “People** feel Japanese but they also **have feelings of discrimination by the Tokyo government,”** he says. Another incident like the rape or the helicopter crash could change feelings towards independence, he adds. “If there was a big event, and it wasn’t handled to the satisfaction of the Okinawan people, then it could have serious effects.” **The dispute over the US bases is the most significant issue between Okinawa and the mainland** but the island is diverging from Japan in other ways. With Japan’s highest birth rate, its population is ageing more slowly. **And** unlike on the industrial mainland, **the island economy is growing fast.** Asian **tourists are drawn by**



Okinawa's blend of **subtropical beauty** and urban culture: **visitor numbers rose 10 per cent last year** to more than 7m, **with** the number of **Chinese tourists more than doubling**. Okinawa is also trying to promote its strategic location to business as a potential logistics hub. **The economy's dependence on the military bases is down to** about **5 per cent**. **"We've gone from being an economy that relies on bases to the bases holding us back,"** said Masaki Tomochi, **an economics professor at Okinawa International University** and a leading light in the independence movement. Mr Tomochi, who can see the Futenma base from his office, went to Scotland last year to support its campaign for independence from the UK and came back inspired. Okinawa was invaded by the Satsuma samurai in 1609, six years after King James I united the thrones of England and Scotland. "Discrimination is not just in the past, it's today — we're still being discriminated against," he says. "First we need everyone to know the history of the Ryukyus. Then we can think about the future."

More China **evidence**:

(Martin Fackler, Tokyo bureau chief of The New York Times, Society of Publishers in Asia award for excellence recipient & Pulitzer Prize for International Reporting finalist, "In Okinawa, Talk of Break From Japan Turns Serious," http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/06/world/asia/in-okinawa-talk-of-break-from-japan-turns-serious.html?_r=0, July 5 2013)

The **talk of independence has grown enough that it is being heard in Tokyo**, where some conservative newspapers have begun calling the Okinawan independence activists "pawns" of China. Whether or not the activists are pawns, **there is** certainly some **discussion in China about using the independence movement**. Recently, an editorial in The Global Times, a state-run Chinese newspaper, said **China could pressure Japan by "fostering forces in Okinawa that seek** the restoration of the **independence** of the Ryukyu chain." Few believe China is about to pursue ownership of Okinawa. But **Japanese analysts see the** informal **campaign as the latest gambit in China's attempts to take over the** smaller group of islands, known as the **Senkaku** in Japan and Diaoyu in China, **by** essentially **warning that China could expand its claims beyond those islands if Japan ignores its arguments**.



Continuing with that scenario, this **evidence** suggests that a move towards Okinawan independence could create a lose/lose situation in which the U.S. and its allies must either allow China to significantly grow its geostrategic power in the region, or stage an armed intervention to stop the movement. This card also has the useful feature of providing a few possible locations outside Okinawa where bases could be relocated:

(Mio Yamada, Masters in International Affairs from Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University focusing on International Information and Communication & Strategic Management and International Consultancy, "The Battle for Okinawa," Foreign Affairs, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/japan/2016-01-20/battle-okinawa>, January 20 2016)

The United States, however, finds itself an unwelcome guest. The governor of Okinawa has gone so far as to argue[d], in September 2015, that Washington and Tokyo have ignored Okinawans' human rights and right to self-determination. If Washington and Tokyo wish to maintain the bases, they must be prepared to address the historical and political issues that have led Okinawans to reject them. A viable agreement means that it cannot just be on

Tokyo and Washington's terms; **grievances must be met** with empathy rather than apathy. BETWEEN A ROCK AND A HARD PLACE Uchina, as Okinawa is called in its native tongue, was the largest island of the archipelagic Kingdom of Ryukyu in the East China Sea. An independent country from the fifteenth to the seventeenth century, it played an important role in the maritime trade of East and Southeast Asia. Although it became a tributary state, first to China and then to Japan, it remained largely autonomous and prospered, providing a crucial channel between two kingdoms that otherwise had no formal relationship. Ryukyuan were not considered Japanese; in fact, Japan forbade them from adopting Japanese customs, clothing, or names. This changed in 1879, when Japan's Meiji government abolished the Ryukyu Kingdom and incorporated it as Okinawa Prefecture. Thus followed a period of subjugation and forced assimilation under imperial Japan, particularly during World War II. About a quarter of Okinawa's civilian population lost their lives during the Battle of Okinawa, a series of skirmishes from April to June 1945 that resulted in Allied victory. Not all the deaths were a result of Allied action. The Japanese military ordered many Okinawans to kill family members and commit suicide rather than risk the shame of capture; Okinawans, indoctrinated to be loyal to the Japanese emperor and to "be more Japanese," complied. After the war, Okinawa effectively became a U.S. military colony, and the United States updated and expanded military installations around the island. Although the United States purchased much of the land from locals, it also reportedly resorted to coercion and deception in order to buy it, evicting unwilling residents by bulldozer and bayonet. The Okinawans under U.S. occupation had neither political authority nor legal redress for the seizure of property or for crimes committed by service members. If Okinawans hoped that the reversion to Japanese governance in 1972 would decrease the U.S. presence on their lands, hopes were dashed by geopolitical considerations. With fleet anchorage, troop staging, and airfields at a close distance to Seoul, Shanghai, and Taipei, the island is key to the United States' security strategy in the Asia-Pacific. Although Okinawa constitutes less than one percent of Japan's total land area, it bears the burden of 74 percent of the U.S. military's overall footprint in the country, including facilities, equipment, and roughly half of the 53,000 U.S. troops stationed in Japan. Yet Okinawans have not benefited. Despite substantial subsidies from Tokyo to compensate for the loss of land and other impositions, anti-base sentiment runs strong, as people complain that the bases cause noise pollution and an influx in crime. According to the Okinawan government, from 1972 to 2011 there were 5,747 criminal cases involving U.S. military personnel. In 1995, the rape of a 12-year old girl by three U.S. servicemen incited outrage and dredged up years of resentment, sparking a nationwide debate about the terms of the U.S. occupation. Since the 1980s, the percentage of base-related revenue has hovered around the 5 percent mark for gross prefectural income; revenue from tourism is twice that amount. According to an expert panel assembled by then Governor Hirokazu Nakaima in 2010, the productivity of an average land lot in Okinawa was 1.6 billion yen per square kilometer, compared to only 900 million yen per square kilometer on a military base. Recognizing the rising tensions in Okinawa, Washington and Tokyo convened the Special Action Committee on Okinawa in 1995 to reduce the impact of the U.S. military on the island. The committee's final report, in which the United States agreed to return 21 percent of the land from 11 U.S. military installations on the island, was meant to pave a new path for Okinawa and the U.S.-Japanese alliance. Yet Okinawan opposition has persisted. The newest issue is Washington's relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps Futenma Air Station from urban Ginowan to the less populous but environmentally sensitive Henoko Bay, home to the critically endangered Okinawa dugongs, distant relatives of the manatee. Tokyo and Washington agreed to the relocation in 2006; Okinawans still feel strongly against it a decade later. Okinawans were particularly incensed in 2012, when Washington deployed the MV-22 Osprey aircraft to Futenma, despite the aircraft's numerous safety issues. (In May 2015, the Osprey was involved in a deadly landing accident in Hawaii.) In March 2015, Okinawan Governor Takeshi Onaga ordered a halt to new construction at Henoko, a move supported by 83 percent of Okinawans and 51.3 percent of Japanese nationwide. In a speech at the United Nations last September, he framed the issue as a matter of human rights. "Our right to self-determination and human rights have been neglected," he said. "Can a country serve values such as freedom, equality, human rights, and democracy with other nations when that country cannot guarantee those values for its own people?" "A WILD ROSE AMONG THE THORNS" The first line of the 1934 version of the Asadoya love song—"Are you a wild rose among the thorns?"—could also describe Okinawa's position in the region, surrounded by several areas of potential conflict, including the Senkaku Islands (known in China as the Diaoyu Islands), the

Taiwan Strait, the Korean Peninsula, and the East and South China Seas. **Tensions have only increased since Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo**

Abe passed his new security legislation last September. Ostensibly, the new laws seek **to amend Japan's pacifist constitution**

(imposed by American victors 70 years ago) **so that Japan's defense and security policy can meet the challenges of this century.** Most significantly, the law allows Japan to **engage militarily "when an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs** and as a result threatens Japan's survival and poses a clear danger to fundamentally overturn people's right to life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness." Reaction has



been mixed, both domestically and internationally. **The U_{nited} S_{tates} welcomed the move**, since it has long sought Japan to “play a more active role in regional and international security activities,” in the words of the U.S. State Department. **Japan’s** closest **neighbors**, victims with long memories of Japan’s past militarism, **were much less enthusiastic**. Although South Korea is a fellow U.S. ally, it felt it necessary to stress that Japanese armed forces would not be allowed into the country without explicit consent from Seoul, and emphasized that Japanese military action should be “based on the absolute respect for the third country’s sovereignty.” **China condemned the bills** in a statement from its foreign ministry, **urging Japan “to** draw hard lessons from history... and **refrain from jeopardizing China’s sovereignty and security interests** or crippling regional peace and stability.” Xinhua, the official Chinese press agency, published an op-ed titled “Japan’s New Security Bills Betrayal to Its Own People.” If Washington and Tokyo wish to maintain the bases, they must be prepared to address the historical and political issues that have led Okinawans to reject them. Surprisingly, **many Japanese agree**. Although in other countries it is understood that one must fight alongside one’s allies in times of war, all but the oldest generation of Japanese have grown up with Article 9 of the Japanese constitution: “the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.” The debate surrounding the bills in Japan has been furious, sparking some of the biggest demonstrations in recent memory. **Critics fear that Japan will be dragged into** far-away **U.S.-led conflicts or** that Japan will **incur the wrath of the U_{nited} S_{tates’} enemies**. Some 90 percent of Japanese constitutional scholars say the new bills are unconstitutional. Abe’s previously high approval ratings have taken a hit; **the bills themselves are supported by only roughly 30 percent of the** Japanese **public**. **Okinawans**, for their part, **fear that if the U_{nited} S_{tates} engages in any potential Asia-Pacific conflict, they will once again find themselves on the frontlines; Abe’s policies make Okinawa even more of a strategic target. The rifts between the Japanese public and the government, between Tokyo and Okinawa, and between Japan and other U.S. allies could upset the delicate power balance in the region. China**, the United States’ (and Japan’s) chief rival in the arena, **is poised to take advantage of any weakness—and Okinawa is the weak link in the “first island chain” that cuts China off from the Pacific. Various Chinese semi-official forums have expressed support for Okinawa’s right to self-determination, and the Communist Party newspaper**, the People’s Daily, **has published articles questioning Japan’s sovereignty over Okinawa. The** tiny but **burgeoning Okinawan independence movement could be the** sole **secessionist group** in the world **toward which China is sympathetic**. It is not impossible that **should the status quo persist in Okinawa, discontent could lead to serious confrontation between pro-independence factions and an unyielding central government. This would leave Washington and Tokyo with an uncomfortable choice: let Okinawa go (with China’s blessing, if not backing), or forcefully quash self-determination in the name of** peace, **stability, and freedom in the region**. REDUCING OKINAWA’S BURDEN If **the U_{nited} S_{tates} and Japan wish to maintain the moral high ground in Okinawa, they will have to make some sacrifices. Tokyo should acknowledge Okinawa’s suffering to ease local discontent. Washington should similarly recognize that, in the case of Okinawa, Americans were aggressors as well as oppressive occupiers. U.S. Ambassador Caroline Kennedy’s recent decision to return some land to Okinawa by March 2018 is a gesture of goodwill, but it does not go far enough. She has continued to support Futenma’s relocation to Henoko, defending the move as “the best of any other plan that was considered.” Such rhetoric will not result in reconciliation, and although the statement may have been true at the time the agreement was originally signed, there have been some notable developments since. In fact, although the Japanese government may not have had Okinawa in mind, the new security bills, coupled with the growing Chinese presence in the East and South China Seas, has opened up other avenues for both Tokyo and Washington to explore. They can protect places including the Philippines, South Korea, and Taiwan by redistributing U.S. military assets throughout the region, away from Okinawa. Japan’s new defense policy and the revised U.S.-Japanese defense cooperation guidelines seek to make the alliance better at responding to potential crises in the region. Although it remains to be seen how Japan will implement this more robust, outward-looking strategy, it may consider building more joint-use bases on the main islands. In the south, Kyushu Island is closer than Okinawa to the Korean peninsula (and the Chinese mainland). In the north, Japan and the United States could explore placing bases in the Tohoku region, where pro-U.S. sentiment is high after Washington’s post-tsunami assistance. To reduce the burden on Okinawa, the U_{nited} S_{tates} should also look beyond Japan. The Philippines, for example, has recently welcomed the return of U.S. forces to Subic Bay amid fears over Chinese land reclamation in the South China Sea. Subic Bay is also close to Taiwan, making it a more strategic location than Okinawa. Although it may not be a simple case of reshuffling troops from one base to another, U.S. policymakers would be remiss not to reexamine all alternatives to Okinawa.**



One last final piece of pro **evidence**, which provides a hypothetical scenario of Japanese collapse resulting from a successful Okinawan independence movement, and ties the points covered above together:

(Trefor Moss, journalist covering Asian politics, defence and security & former Asia-Pacific Editor at Defence Weekly, "Okinawa: the Scotland of Asia?," The Diplomat, <http://thediplomat.com/2013/07/okinawa-the-scotland-of-asia/?allpages=yes>, July 24 2013)

A new flag flies in East Asia, as the Republic of Ryukyu becomes the world's youngest sovereign state. Riding a wave of democratic independence movements that has already seen Catalonia, Quebec and Scotland calve from their respective countries, **the people of Okinawa** and its neighboring islands have just **voted** decisively in a referendum **to break away from Japan. The split has profound implications. In Tokyo, an embarrassed central government collapses, having failed to maintain the integrity of the Japanese state, and a period of political and economic turmoil ensues.** The U.S. military, given three months to leave by the new national government in Naha, starts pulling back to its bases in Guam and the Japanese mainland, while Washington sets about rethinking its entire Asia-Pacific strategy. And **the Okinawan administration, having inherited** the Japanese claim to **the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu, cedes the sea-rocks to China in return for a huge investment package** from Beijing, **which** it says **will kick-start its economy** and guarantee its viability as a sovereign nation.... Rewind to July 2013, and the reality is an Okinawan independence movement that is a long way from achieving its goal. Though hardly new, it forever seems a nascent force only just setting out on a political journey that might yet lead nowhere. **The tension over the large U.S. military presence on Okinawa seems never to subside** the U.S. Marines' deployment of noisy, and possibly quite dangerous, MV-22 Osprey aircraft having been one recent trigger. And yet, if asked to vote today, Okinawans would overwhelmingly stick with the status quo: a recent poll by Ryukyu Shimpo found that only 5 percent of citizens favor independence, with 62 percent opposed. Then again, these things start from humble beginnings, and independence is at the very least being discussed seriously. Okinawa has a complex relationship both with Tokyo and with the U.S. military, **and it is too casual to dismiss** the notion of **independence as the pipedream of just a handful** of local activists.

The con, of course, would want to dispute such predictions.



Here's **evidence** for the con, disputing that Okinawan independence is a serious possibility for a laundry list of reasons:

(Trefor Moss, journalist covering Asian politics, defence and security & former Asia-Pacific Editor at Defence Weekly, "Okinawa: the Scotland of Asia?," The Diplomat, <http://thediplomat.com/2013/07/okinawa-the-scotland-of-asia/?allpages=yes>, July 24 2013)

The weak support for independence can be explained by "the long history of colonial rule over Okinawa

by Japan, believes Tomochi Masaki, a founder of the independence movement's latest incarnation, the Association of Comprehensive Studies for Independence of the Lew Chewans (ACSIL) – the Lew Chewans being Okinawa's indigenous people – and an associate professor at Okinawa International University. The long process of assimilation has amounted to "brainwashing," he says, the steady dismantling of the Okinawan people's distinct sense of identity, but ACSIL's founders hope to start reversing that process by opening up a forum "where we can discuss the independence of Ryukyu intensively." Tomochi believes that Okinawa could be a viable state, and others have argued that Singapore is potentially a useful model for the Okinawan economy. The pros and cons of Okinawa's economic position within the Japanese state remain the subject of intense debate, however. Tomochi believes that Tokyo's economic control over Okinawa is an extension of colonial rule, and that while the central government has by some counts pumped \$100bn into the local economy, "a lot of the money used in Ryukyu is sucked up by Japanese enterprises." But viewed from the other side of the argument, **Okinawa has benefited greatly from Tokyo's largesse.**

"Okinawans are very proud of their local customs and traditions," says Matsumura Masuhiro, a professor at Momoyama Gakuin University in Osaka. "So when Okinawans talk about their heart, they are telling the truth. But that's not all they think." **The financial advantages of remaining within the Japanese state also influence Okinawans very strongly,** Matsumura believes, and **raising the independence issue is not so much a plea for political freedom so much as a "negotiating tactic," to which Tokyo responds by "continuously appeasing the local government with more and more subsidies, because there's no alternative."** Tensions are only running high now, Matsumura says, as a result of former Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama's disastrous mishandling of Okinawan affairs – promising, and then failing to deliver, the removal of U.S. bases. If Okinawa's economic viability remains debatable, **the political barriers to secession appear,** if anything, **even more**

daunting – although events elsewhere suggest a possible pathway for the independence movement. Scotland in particular shows how frustration with a central government can build over time into a credible drive for self-determination. Until the 1980s, only around 15 percent of Scots backed independence from the United Kingdom; today it's nearer 50 percent, and Scotland is one year away from holding an independence referendum that could end a formal political union twice as old as Japan and Okinawa's. The reason for this turnaround is that the politics fundamentally changed: the London government appeared increasingly remote and out of tune with Scottish interests; and this opened up political space for the nationalist idea to grow in the public consciousness until, eventually, independence became a realistic option. "Scotland can be our potential model and we are paying attention to it," explains Tomochi, adding that ACSIL is studying a range of other potential future states from Guam to Corsica. On the one hand, it would seem that if the Scots can do it, the Okinawans can do it too – notwithstanding Scotland's ancient dislike of the English, the Okinawans, burdened for nearly 70 years by a massive U.S. military presence, have the more obvious incentive to go their own way. However,

Matsumura thinks that **comparisons with Scotland are misleading. "There's no cultural parallel,"** he argues, adding that "Puerto Rico might be a better analogy than Scotland" in that Puerto Rico is a dependency rather than a country-within-a-country. The biggest flaw in the Scottish paradigm is surely the qualitative difference between Scotland's relationship with London and Okinawa's relationship with Tokyo. **Scotland has its independence referendum**

because the UK government granted one. But the Japanese government is not about to hand the same privilege to Okinawa. "The local elite have spoken about this cause for the last six decades," says Matsumura,

but they blatantly have no chance [of securing independence]. **China's rise,** and renewed speculation about Okinawa's status in the Chinese media, **has made Okinawa's breakaway even less likely than before,** Matsumura feels. "Okinawa is now indispensable for defense vis-à-vis China,"

he says. **All Japanese are sorry that they have to co-exist with American bases, but we can't do anything about it because the need for those bases will only increase more and more because of China.** It may also be

that the **Okinawans themselves feel that they need the solid presence of** the JSDF and **the U.S. military."** However,

Tomochi rejects the idea that China has any designs on claiming Okinawa. "Right-wing **people** in Japan who hate China **are trying to spread a rumor that China will invade Ryukyu,**" he says. "But to us, **this** hypothetical story that China's taking a risk to invade Okinawa **is too unrealistic.**" In fact, Tomochi believes, the removal of U.S. and Japanese forces from Okinawa would make the islands safer by establishing them as a "center of peace for East Asia and the world." Scotland may not in the end be especially useful to the Okinawan cause – especially if, as the polls currently suggest, the Scots reject independence in next year's vote. Tomochi accepts that ACSIL faces an uphill struggle, but pledges to "do whatever we can for taking back our dignity and achieving our independence." The vast majority of his fellow Okinawans still need convincing that their islands could stand apart. And even if they start to believe, Okinawa's situation at the central crossroads of East Asian geopolitics suggests that Tokyo is not about to let them go.



As another pro option, here is **evidence** arguing that an independent Okinawa would be desirable from a security perspective, because it could diffuse tensions over disputed territory in the East China Sea:

*(The China Post, "East China Sea peace may lie in independent Ryukyus,"
<http://www.chinapost.com.tw/editorial/taiwan-issues/2013/05/29/379705/East-China.htm>, May 29 2013)*

On March 16 this year, **a Chinese scholar published a paper** in a state-run newspaper **challenging Japanese ownership of Okinawa**. The Ryukyu National Independence Research Society was launched in **Okinawa** last Wednesday **and its representatives** presented a petition to the prefectural government of Okinawa, demanding removal of all American troops and self-determination of the Ryukyu people to establish a free state. They **have every reason to demand a free state. The U.N. Charter**, in Article 76 of Chapter XII, **specifies that the basic objectives of the trusteeship system shall be**, among other things, **"to promote the political, economic, social, and educational advancement of the inhabitants of the trust territories, and their progressive development towards self-government or independence** as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned, and as may be provided by the terms of each trusteeship agreement." However, **the United States hasn't made any such promotion**. The Kingdom of the Ryukyus, a vassal state to both Japan and China for close to three centuries, was incorporated on Oct. 16, 1872. Qing China protested and negotiations were started at once. A treaty on the partition of the Ryukyus was concluded. Under the treaty, which was not ratified, all the islands north of Okinawa would belong to Japan, and those to the south of that largest island in the Ryukyus would remain under control of Qing China. The Republic of **China**, which succeeded the Great Qing Empire, **has never acknowledged Japanese sovereignty over the Ryukyus**. That's why Roosevelt asked for Chiang's recommendation at Cairo. The Republic of China on Taiwan and the People's Republic of **China** on the Chinese mainland **claim[s] the Diaoyutai or Diaoyu Islands as their inherent territory, though the Japanese also claim sovereignty over them as the Senkaku Islands and have administrative control after the United States returned them, along with the rest of the Ryukyu Islands, to Japan 41 years ago. The ongoing sovereignty row** between Japan and China **is fraught with chances of an accidental war**. Isn't it possible that a plebiscite be held to resurrect the old Kingdom of the Ryukyus as **a new Ryukyu republic to [could] end all the trouble in the East China Sea?**

For the most part, though, the con's strategy for winning the geopolitics section of the debate will focus on the strategic value of Okinawan military presence itself. Let's discuss that now.



Security & Deterrence

The primary rationale for continuing U.S. presence in Okinawa is, like all military bases, its strategic value in terms of global security. This ground presents the con's best area for developing strong impacts.

The **evidence** below refers to Okinawa as "critical" to America's ability to prevent threats in all of the world's most dangerous areas:

(Yoshida Kensei, professor at Obirin University in Japan, [Translated by Rumi Sakamoto-lecturer in Asian Studies at Auckland University and Matt Allen- Japan Focus associate & prof of Asian history at the University of Auckland], "US Bases, Japan and the Reality of Okinawa as a Military Colony," <http://apjif.org/-Yoshida-Kensei/2857/article.html#sthash.bQSwDbtx.dpuf>," The Asia-Pacific Journal, vol. 6 iss. 8 no. 0, August 1 2008)

Since World War II, the US has rationalised and modernised the armed forces. Central to this process has been Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) both in and outside the US, and the functional reorganisation of the armed forces. In particular, aiming at constructing a post-Cold War new world order, the US advanced the Unified Combatant Command (area army) system.

The USF in Japan including Okinawa belongs to the Pacific Unified Command based in Honolulu. Its area of responsibility covers the west coasts of South and North Americas (including armed forces stationed in Alaska and Hawaii, but excluding the area within 500 nautical miles of the US mainland and the West coast of South America, which comes under the responsibility of the US Southern Command), **most of the Indian Ocean** except the Middle East, **and more than half the Arctic Ocean and the Antarctic Ocean. Located in this area, which covers more than half the surface of the world, are the world's military superpowers: the US, China, Russia,** as well as **India, Japan, Korea, North Korea and** Australia, as well as **major US trading partners. This area is critical for the US strategically and economically.** The Command system that covers the whole earth and stretches even to outer space, shows that the US regards itself 'the world's sheriff'. The US national defense expenditure for carrying out its international strategies, partly because of the rising cost of the Iraq War, reached \$700 billion (48% of the world's total national defense expenditure) in 2008. This is six times higher than China's national defense expenditure in the same year, which was \$120 billion (8%) (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute). US national defense expenditure exceeds, for example, the GDP of Turkey or Taiwan (2007 estimate), and is more than 350 times the United Nations' normal budget. **The new role the US has allocated to the USF in Okinawa international strategies was to deal with the area** that the US Department of Defense has **called 'the arc of instability'** in the 2001 'Review of the National Defense Strategy', **namely from North Korea via South East Asia to the Middle East and the African coasts. Okinawa has turned into a military base for the 'state of perpetual preparedness for war'** watching over the 'arc of instability.'



This **evidence** says that's key to deter aggressive action from a number of adversaries, including China and North Korea. It also denies that any replacement location could be sufficiently effective:

(Grant Newsham, senior research fellow at the Japan Forum for Strategic Studies in Tokyo, retired US Marine Officer, & former US Diplomat, "US military bases on Okinawa — still an essential deterrent," Asia Times, <http://atimes.com/2015/10/us-military-bases-on-okinawa-still-an-essential-deterrent/>, October 30 2015)

US military bases on Okinawa remain a contentious issue, and probably always will be. Opposition to the military bases is owing to a combination of things; to include local politics, historic resentments of mainland Japan, anti-military feeling, and even a need by base opponents to pressure the central government to continue handsome subsidies to Okinawa. Millions of words (probably more) are written each year about the Okinawa base issue. I will add some more, but this commentary will focus on the role of US military bases on Okinawa as **a 'deterrent.'**^[1] Deterring what? One should first ask what is being 'deterred'? Put simply, US forces forward deployed on Okinawa as elsewhere in Japan are **intended to deter countries that would attack** other nations or seek to **seize land** territory **or dominate seas and airspace that are either** international **global 'commons' or owned by somebody else.** For many years, the Okinawa bases were seen as playing a role in deterring a North Korean attack on South Korea. However, in recent years the People's Republic of **China** (PRC) **has strengthened the case** for the US bases' deterrent value. **The PRC's rapid military build-up**, increasing Chinese military activities throughout the region, **and claims to** nearly all of **the South China Sea have unsettled** China's **neighbors** — nearly all of **whom look** (even if furtively) **to the United States to restrain China.** Why do Okinawa bases deter? **The Okinawa bases** alone do not deter China or anyone else. But they **are an important part of a larger network of American resources, power, and influence that give the PRC pause.** One first notes **Okinawa's location.** **It is near Taiwan, close to contested areas in the** East China Sea and the South China **Seas, and not far from** the **Korean Peninsula.** **Okinawa is a perfect place from which to** deploy and **conduct** a range of **military operations to counter an aggressor** or someone seeking to upset long established rules regarding freedom of navigation and flight, and even international boundaries. **Time and distance** still **matter in warfare.** **Being close** to where one will operate **allows a more rapid and comprehensive response.** **Okinawa-based forces are able to move** just about **anywhere in Asia in** a matter of days or even **hours.** **This** response time **is much shorter than if based elsewhere in Japan — and weeks or months faster than US-based forces, even** if based **in Hawaii.** **Also, being nearby allows you to stay 'on-scene' longer. Try patrolling the South China Sea from** bases in Hokkaido or **Hawaii.** **By the time forces arrive it is almost time to go home.** An illustration that helps one understand the importance of time and distance (and location) is to consider the effect of moving Tokyo Metropolitan Police Headquarters to Gotemba — 60 miles west of Tokyo. Theoretically, TMPD might send patrols into Tokyo for a few hours a day or as needed to respond to emergencies — before driving back to Gotemba to refuel. This is obviously less effective for maintaining law and order than actually being based in Tokyo. Similarly, US bases on Okinawa are located near where trouble might occur — and therefore better able to respond and to deter adversaries. China understands the importance of location Chinese behavior in the South China Sea shows it understands the role of 'location' as a part of deterrence. PLA forces operating out of Hainan Island can operate throughout the South China Sea. However, **China's recent island-building** efforts much further south **in the South China Sea demonstrate** a clear **understanding of the importance of basing** forces 'forward' **in the area one wants to control** or influence. **This** forward location facilitates military operations — allowing a more rapid and constant presence — and it **also 'deters.'** Some critics have pointed out that China's new man-made islands are indefensible in the event of war with a competent enemy. This is true enough, but it misses a larger point. **Once** the island **bases** — even with small military detachments in place — **are established, they** effectively **deter' other countries** from striking back — or even applying pressure — **out of fear of** provoking or **starting a war** with China. **Thus,** these **small islands with military forces** placed on them **can restrain** a potential **adversary's behavior.** **This** restraining effect **is** otherwise known as **deterrence.** US bases on Okinawa from which US Air Force, US Navy, US Marine, and US Army forces operate serve a similar function in bolstering American defense power and the possibility of using it in the region — as Beijing would probably admit. Aren't US forces assigned to US bases on Okinawa too small to deter? Some commentators argue that there are not enough US forces on Okinawa to deter an aggressor, much less make a difference in the event of a major conflict in Asia. Besides the fact that even a small number of troops, ships, or aircraft rapidly deployed can make a difference,



this argument overlooks the fact that in the event of a more serious contingency, Okinawa-based forces will be reinforced. They are intended to be employed as part of a larger effort involving US forces from overseas. Only a rash opponent would care to take on the full might of the United States. A similar dynamic applies on the Korean Peninsula. The relatively small number of US Army troops in South Korea stationed near the DMZ have a limited warfighting capability, but force the North to run the risk of bringing the full weight of the United States in the event of an attack. This deterrent effect has worked for many decades. Also, one should remember that deploying US troops from a distance (i.e. the US mainland or even Hawaii) is almost always a difficult domestic political decision. With forward deployed troops, the decision has mostly already been made — and if US troops are targeted or harmed, the certainty of a response is near 100 percent. This gives adversaries pause. It is, of course, possible to reduce US forces (and bases) on Okinawa to a point where they are operationally irrelevant or ineffective — and therefore of little deterrent value from a purely military standpoint. Similarly, such a reduction in forces and bases might easily be viewed by an adversary such as the PRC as a weakened US commitment to defending Japan writ large. The ‘political’ deterrent effect of US bases on Okinawa. Ultimately, US bases on Okinawa — with all the challenges and costs they involve — demonstrate a political commitment on the part of both governments — to include America’s promise to defend Japan. This sort of commitment is closely watched as an adversary decides how much to push. One recalls the classic example of Saddam Hussein miscalculating the United States’ willingness to defend Kuwait in 1990 that led to the First Gulf War. One often detects a degree of puzzlement on the PRC’s part over the US’s willingness to defend Japan — and particularly certain territory in the Ryukyus, such as the Senkaku Islands. Solidly linked US and Japanese forces that are able to operate effectively together — to include forces based on Okinawa — are ultimately evidence of a strong political link between the two countries. This directly affects deterrence.

More evidence:

(Tom Conway [journalist/interviewer] & Kevin Maher [former Director of the Office of Japan Affairs at the State Department, Consul General in Okinawa, & Director of Political-Military Affairs at the American Embassy in Tokyo], “The other side of Okinawa,” Collier’s, <http://colliersmagazine.com/article/other-side-okinawa>, April 2012)

Kevin Maher: I think absolutely, Our fundamental strategy for years has been to maintain a forward deployed presence. I think one of the lessons of the 20th century unfortunately has been if the US withdraws the world becomes very dangerous and we end up having to get involved anyway. Particularly in the Pacific it is important to maintain forward presence because it is a long way away and we need to maintain that presence to deter certain contingency situations from occurring. Japan is fundamental to that. It is a good deal for the US too in terms of the sharing of responsibility and cost of maintaining that forward presence because of the host nation support agreements we have with the Japanese government. The Japanese provide a substantial amount of financial support as its contribution to the alliance, things like the wages of Japanese employees on the bases, utilities, and a majority of construction on base as well. It is a very good relationship because the responsibility is shared. Japan provides more host-nation support than any other ally. I think if we were to pull these forces out of Japan, East Asia would become a very dangerous place. A power vacuum would occur and probably an arms race as well. It is much safer to maintain the presence here, maintain the stability of the region, and deter potential aggressors from starting trouble. One of the lessons of history is that at some point someone is going to do something stupid and its better to be in place and try to deter that, and to maintain the capability to respond to it if needed.



Okinawa also allows the U.S. to maintain strong responsive capabilities and treat deterrence in the Middle East and towards the IndoPak region, according to this **evidence**:

(Céline Pajon, research specialist at Ifri Japan, associate researcher at the Canon Institute for Global Studies (CIGS) in Tokyo, & MA in International Relations from the Graduate Institute of International Studies, [Translated by Nicholas Sowells], "Understanding the Issue of U.S. Military Bases in Okinawa," The Institut français des relations internationales Center for Asian Studies, Japan Program, https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/understanding_the_issue_of_u.s._military_bases_in_okinawa.pdf, June 2010)

After 9/11, the United States embarked on a strategic shift towards the transformation of its overall military positioning. In response to new post Cold War threats and hyperterrorism, the redeployment of **U.S. forces** has **aimed to develop the capability, deployability and mobility of troops to respond rapidly in crisis theaters**, according to the QDR 2001.¹⁹ **The realignment calls for the strengthening** and capacity enhancement **in Northeast Asia**, not only **to ensure stability in the region** (North Korea, Taiwan Strait) **and protect U.S. allies, but also to** serve as advanced bases or stepping-stones that **allow U.S. forces to be projected globally**.²⁰ **The Global Posture Review of 2004** therefore announced that the troops levels would not be cut in Japan, while South Korea would benefit from a substantial reduction of forces (a redeployment of 12,500 troops out of 37,500). The redeployment of troops **was an opportunity for Washington to reduce sources of friction** stemming **from** the local impact of **bases**, to ensure their sustainability **and to improve** the **strategic flexibility** of U.S. forces and their capacity for rapid deployment to distant theaters. It may also permit the alliance to be strengthened militarily, **with a better balancing of responsibilities and improved interoperability between armed forces**.²¹ For its part, **Tokyo wanted to preserve the deterrent capability of U.S. forces while reducing pressure on populations living next to bases** that lead to recurrent tensions.²² **The bases** in Japan **are still relevant for the U.S strategy: the aircraft carrier USS Kitty Hawk** based at Yokosuka **took part in** the conflicts in **Afghanistan and Iraq**. Combat aircraft stationed at Misawa and Kadena were also deployed in Iraq as of 2003. **The bases in Okinawa in particular are crucial to force projection in the Indian Ocean and the Middle East.**



Additionally, says this **evidence**, the deterrent effect spills over to nations throughout the region, decreasing overall instability:

(Grant Newsham, senior research fellow at the Japan Forum for Strategic Studies in Tokyo, retired US Marine Officer, & former US Diplomat, "US military bases on Okinawa — still an essential deterrent," Asia Times, <http://atimes.com/2015/10/us-military-bases-on-okinawa-still-an-essential-deterrent/>, October 30 2015)

Political **deterrence also extends to third countries. The presence of US forces in Japan — and on Okinawa — is**, as noted earlier, **something** many **other regional nations** desire and **find reassuring. This** tends to **bolster[s]** their **willingness** — both individual and collective — **to stand up to Chinese threats** and/or blandishments — **thus, deterring** Chinese **behavior that would otherwise be even more aggressive** and assertive.

More **evidence**:

(Mio Yamada, Masters in International Affairs from Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University focusing on International Information and Communication & Strategic Management and International Consultancy, "The Battle for Okinawa," Foreign Affairs, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/japan/2016-01-20/battle-okinawa>, January 20 2016)

Growing discontent in **Okinawa has the potential to reverberate beyond Japan's borders. With** a wary eye to the **increasing Chinese military activity in the South and East China Seas, the U_{nited} S_{tates} and its allies are not keen to reduce the** forward operating **capabilities of U.S. forces in the region. Due to Okinawa's proximity to potential flashpoints, U.S. forces** stationed **there** form the cornerstone of the U.S.-Japanese alliance and **are** considered **essential to U.S. policy in the Western Pacific. A strong U.S. presence acts as both sword and shield, not just for Japan but also for the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, and all the other countries that rely on it for security.**



Even more **evidence** on the regional stability created by American military presence in Okinawa, which also covers its value in terms of responding to humanitarian crises such as natural disasters:

(Emma Chanlett-Avery [Specialist in Asian Affairs] & Ian E. Rinehart [Analyst in Asian Affairs], "The U.S. Military Presence in Okinawa and the Futenma Base Controversy," Congressional Research Service, <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42645.pdf>, Jan 20 2016)

Okinawa's location has become more strategically important over the past few decades. (See Figure 2.) In the post-World War II environment, Japan's northern islands were seen as a bulwark to contain the Soviet Union's Pacific fleet. Post-Cold War **security threats include the potential flashpoints of the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait,** but more **recent assertiveness by the Chinese People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) in the South China Sea and East China Sea has drawn growing attention from Department of Defense (DOD) planners.** **The U.S. military presence in** Japan, and particularly **Okinawa, allows it to** fulfill its obligations under the 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security to not only defend Japan but to maintain **security in the Asia-Pacific region. The** forward-deployed **presence** of the U.S. Air Force and **Navy also allows** for **response to humanitarian disasters in the region, as demonstrated by the rapid U.S. assistance after the March 2011 earthquake and tsunami in northeastern Japan and after the November 2013 super-typhoon in the Philippines.** The deployment of MV-22 "Osprey" tilt-rotor aircraft to Okinawa reportedly has enhanced the operational capability of the Marines based there, because MV-22s have a greater range and faster cruising speed than the helicopters they replaced. **The intensification of the territorial dispute between Japan and China over small islands** in the East China Sea **has provided another rationale** for the approximately 19,000 marines stationed on Okinawa. The main island of **Okinawa is only 270 nautical miles from the disputed islets,** called Senkaku in Japan, Diaoyu in China, and Diaoyutai in Taiwan. The potential role of U.S. Marines in defending and/or retaking uninhabited islands from a hypothetical invasion force is unclear, but the operational capabilities of the Okinawa-based Marines are aligned with the needs of such a mission.



According to the next piece of **evidence**, an American withdrawal from Okinawa would result in a landgrab by China, resulting in the seizure of the rest of the area's disputed island chains, in addition to Okinawa itself. From there, it says, China will have the strategic positioning they need to be able to stage a serious attack on the United States mainland:

(Gordon G. Chang, lawyer, author, television commentator, speaker specializing in East Asia, "Now China Wants Okinawa, Site of U.S. Bases in Japan," The Daily Beast, <http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/12/31/now-china-wants-okinawa-site-of-u-s-bases-in-japan.html>, December 30 2015)

Beijing is pushing out in all directions, from the South China Sea to several Japanese islands, with an eye on the eastern Pacific that laps American shores. On **the day after Christmas, three Chinese boats**, one modified to carry four cannons, **entered Japan's territorial waters** surrounding the Senkaku Islands in the southern portion of the East China Sea. **The move, a dangerous escalation, is the first time** the People's Republic of **China sent an armed vessel into an area** that **Tokyo claims** as its own. The sending of the three Chinese vessels on **Dec. 26 appears to signal a new phase of incursions to grab** not just the Senkaku **Islands** but the nearby—and far more important—Ryukyu Islands. **Those include Okinawa**, which hosts more than half of the 54,000 American military personnel in Japan, including those at Kadena Air Force Base, the Army's Fort Buckner and Torii Station, eight Marine Corps camps, as well as Air Station Futenma and Yontan Airfield, and the Navy's Fleet Activities Okinawa. Geopolitically, **Okinawa is key to the American-Japanese alliance and the heart of America's military presence in Japan**. But **if Beijing gets its way, U.S. military bases will be off Okinawa soon. And Japan will be** out of Okinawa, **too**. Chinese authorities in the spring of 2013 brazenly challenged Japan's sovereignty of the islands with a concerted campaign that included an article in a magazine associated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; a widely publicized commentary in People's Daily, the Communist Party's flagship newspaper and therefore China's most authoritative publication; two pieces in the Global Times, the tabloid controlled by People's Daily; an interview of Maj. Gen. Luo Yuan in the state-run China News Service; and a seminar held at prestigious Renmin University in Beijing. At the same time, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs refused to affirm that China recognized Okinawa and the Ryukyus as Japanese. The close timing of events indicated these efforts had been directed from the top of the Chinese political system. **Over the last decade, Beijing has been moving in on Okinawa step by step**, almost island by island. **It has regularly dispatched its ships and planes to the Senkaku Islands**, often entering sovereign water and airspace, **in a campaign to wrest from** the **Japanese those small and uninhabited specks** in the ocean. The provocations around the islets, which China first claimed in 1971 and now calls the Diaoyus, spiked upward in 2012 and then noticeably declined the following year. Whatever Beijing's genuine intentions, Tokyo is not taking any chances. Japanese authorities are now fortifying 200 islands strung across the 870-mile gap between Kyushu, the most southern of Japan's main islands, and the island of Taiwan. When completed, the line of anti-ship and anti-aircraft missile batteries will dot the Ryukyu chain, blocking a critical passage linking the Chinese coast to the Western Pacific. Reuters notes that for the first time Japanese officials are publicly admitting that these fortifications are intended to keep China, in the words of the wire service, "at bay." As a result of the new barrier, the naval and air elements of China's People's Liberation Army will pay a dear price to get from the west side of the Ryukyus to the east in wartime. **Today**, however, **Chinese ships and planes can transit this line of islands unimpeded**. Eleven Chinese military aircraft—eight H-6K bombers and three surveillance and electronic intelligence planes—did just that on Nov. 27. The group split into two before reaching the Ryukyus, with at least four bombers flying through a critical chokepoint, the Miyako Strait, which cuts that island group in two. The Japanese were obviously concerned. After clearing the Miyako Strait, the H-6Ks flew 620 miles into the Pacific. **From their turnaround point**, the **Chinese aircraft could have fired** CJ-10K **cruise missiles**, which from there had the range to land conventional munitions—or nuclear warheads—**on Guam, the American fortress** in the Mariana Islands. The H-6Ks, **China's most modern bomber, could** also **have launched** their devastating payloads **toward Hawaiian targets** if they had proceeded deeper into the Pacific. **And** as Rick Fisher of the International Assessment and Strategy Center told The Daily Beast, **China's next-generation bombers**, the H-10s, **will be able to hit West Coast cities from** locations over **that body of water**. The most immediate U.S. concern, however, is **that** during their late-November **jaunt** the H-6Ks **brushed by Okinawa, which** sits on the north side of the Miyako Strait and **is the biggest island in the Ryukyus**. Beijing's argument, like all its territorial claims, is rooted in long-ago history—1372 to be exact. By that year, as Gen. Luo pointed out to the China News Service, the Ryukyu kingdom was paying tribute to the Chinese court, and Japan



did not complete its annexation of the island chain until 1872. In their landmark May 2013 People's Daily commentary, Li Guoqiang and Zhang Haipeng of **the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences maintain**ed the annexation of **the Ryukyus** constituted an invasion. Moreover, they wrote that Japan's defeat in World War II nullified the Treaty of Shimonoseki of 1895, by which the Qing court formally renounced its claims to the islands. "For now, let's not discuss whether they belong to China—they **were** certainly **China's** tributary state," **said Luo to the China News Service**. "I am not saying all former tributary states belong to China, but we can say with certainty that **the Ryukyus do not belong to Japan.**" The issues are not as clear cut as Luo, Li, and Zhang indicate, however. A Japanese feudal lord conquered the islands in 1609 but permitted the Ryukyans to also pay tribute to the court in China. Another complication undermining China's position involves the identity of the Qing dynasty. Although Beijing now considers that set of rulers to be Chinese, the Qing did not think of themselves that way, especially during the early part of their rule, and the Chinese at the time certainly viewed them as foreign invaders. Why, then, did Beijing question Japan's sovereignty over the Ryukyu chain? It looks like it wanted to gain an advantage in the Senkaku dispute, as a May 2013 Global Times editorial, titled "Ryukyu Issue Offers Leverage to China," makes explicit. Yet Beijing's position is ultimately puzzling because, by raising the stakes with intimidation tactics, the Chinese have made themselves look incurably aggressive, thereby reducing Japan's incentive to agree to any territorial concessions. Once Beijing disputed more than just the Senkakus—in other words, once Chinese leaders showed their real intention was to dismember Japan—China essentially foreclosed further discussion. "Using the Ryukyu sovereignty issue to resolve the Diaoyu dispute would destroy the basis of China-Japan relations," Zhou Yongsheng of China Foreign Affairs University told the Financial Times. "If this was considered, it would basically be the prelude to military action." A fight of that sort is something China cannot win. **As Dennis Blair, former commander in chief of the U.S. Pacific Command, said** to The Daily Beast, "**An attempt to take the Ryukyus by China would mean war with the United States, as we are pledged to defend Japan**, and the Chinese would not succeed in capturing them." To win without fighting, the Chinese are doing their best to undermine Japanese rule. As June Teufel Dreyer, a political science professor at the University of Miami, told The Daily Beast, **Beijing has been quietly** stoking the issue from time to time, "**funneling cash to** Chinese student associations in Okinawa. "Some funds may also find their way into support of **Okinawans who are anti-U.S. bases**," noted Dreyer, who teaches courses on China and international relations. These tactics, although irritating, are counterproductive, just enough to get Japanese policymakers angry but not enough to change the political calculus in the Ryukyus. Although the Ryukyans may be irritated at Tokyo from time to time, they have no intention of becoming Chinese pawns, especially in light of Beijing's military moves off their shores. The issue going forward is whether Beijing will renew its Ryukyu campaign now that it is increasing the pressure on the Senkakus. One option for China is to go beyond the open-ended position it took in 2013 and lay a formal claim to the Ryukyus. That would constitute another strategic mistake. "If the debate now includes Chinese extension of sovereignty over the Ryukyus, then this is precisely the kind of overreach that will ultimately harm China," argues Toshi Yoshihara of the Naval War College, in an e-mail message to The Daily Beast. "This line of reasoning parallels China's claims to 'historic rights' over the South China Sea." As Yoshihara notes, "Such a worldview suggests that everything is potentially up for grabs." Chinese officials stopped talking about the strategically important Ryukyus around the same time they began to decrease their intrusions around the nearby Senkakus. After 2013, Beijing shifted its attention southward, to the South China Sea. Now, Beijing's ambitions are expanding in all directions. While making advances in the South China Sea, it is renewing efforts to take the Senkakus. Its next target looks like the Ryukyus, putting the American bases on Okinawa in play. And China is unlikely to stop there. "**Our navy wants to push through the island chains and reach the eastern Pacific,**" **said** Zhang Haipeng, **one of co-author's of the People's Daily commentary on the Ryukyus,** at the 2013 Renmin University seminar. **The eastern Pacific, let's remember, washes onto American shores.**

The following **evidence** further emphasizes that threat, declaring that, when it comes to deterring Chinese expansionism, "there is no plan B" to Okinawa:

(Shannon Tiezzi, Managing Editor at The Diplomat, former research associate at the U.S.-China Policy Foundation & Masters from Harvard, "Beyond Futenma: Okinawa and the US Base Conundrum," The Diplomat, <http://thediplomat.com/2015/11/beyond-futenma-okinawa-and-the-us-base-conundrum/>, Nov 4 2015)

It is 1,100 kilometers from Kyushu (the southernmost of Japan's four main islands) to the southern islands, Morimoto explains. **This is China's only good route to the open ocean** beyond the first island chain. Japan is intensifying its own SDF presence around these islands, he says, **and it's** also **"very crucial" to keep U.S. forces stationed on Okinawa.** As for the relocation of Futenma to Henoko, the central government has a "very strong determination to implement this construction project at any cost," Morimoto says. His message to America on this question: "Don't worry." Tomohiko Taniguchi, a professor at Keio University Graduate School and a special adviser to Shinzo Abe's Cabinet, describes Okinawa along similar lines. **Given the expansionist policy Beijing is after** over the maritime domain, Okinawa



and **the strategic value the island chain holds have never been as high as they are now,** Taniguchi says. Japan's location – and particularly **Okinawa's geographic position – is precisely why the United States considers Japan such an important ally.** There's a reason the United States has long referred to Okinawa as the "Keystone of the Pacific." **Given Okinawa's strategic location and growing security concerns vis-à-vis China, officials in Tokyo are not willing to simply shutter Futenma, thereby reducing the U.S. military presence on the island.** Koji Kano, the director of defense policy in Japan's Ministry of Defense, says that Japan "cannot afford to decrease the deterrent or response capability of the [U.S.-Japan] alliance." **The security environment is "dire" – particularly when it comes to Japan's southwestern islands.** "Just throwing away that air station is not a good idea, and [is] something we cannot afford," he argues. The relocation of the base is vital, Kano explains, as keeping the base where it is now is too dangerous. The relocation to Henoko is important for the U.S.-Japan alliance, Japan's security policy, and for reducing the risks associated with the Futenma base. Completing the relocation is the "only viable way," **Kano says. "There is no Plan B."**

Finally, this last piece of **evidence** links the deterrence effect into the next subject we'll cover, the strength of America's defense alliance with Japan:

(Grant Newsham, senior research fellow at the Japan Forum for Strategic Studies in Tokyo, retired US Marine Officer, & former US Diplomat, "US military bases on Okinawa — still an essential deterrent," Asia Times, <http://atimes.com/2015/10/us-military-bases-on-okinawa-still-an-essential-deterrent/>, October 30 2015)

Calculating the deterrent effect of bases and/or forces is always an imprecise business. Perhaps the most important determinant is the degree of commitment and willingness of one country to sacrifice for another. **To date, the US-Japan defense relationship and the maintaining of US bases on Okinawa for over 40 years after Okinawa's reversion to Japan has maintained peace and stability in Northeast Asia. This has also had a calming effect in other parts of the region. The Government of Japan obviously values the US bases on Okinawa or it otherwise would have closed them down — as is quite doable under the US-Japan Defense Treaty.** However, the Japanese government must explain clearly and forcefully to the Japanese public why these bases are necessary for Japan's national defense if it hopes to keep them. To date, no Japanese administration has done what is necessary in this regard. Maybe someday one will — as **the more secure the US Okinawa presence, the greater the deterrent value.** Importantly, **deterrence has never been tested quite like it is today. The US military presence on Okinawa is,** as noted, operationally important and also **a measure of the US-Japan political relationship. Our adversaries know this,** although in both the US and Japan many observers and commentators downplay the deterrent effect of US bases on Okinawa. Perhaps the ultimate test of the US Okinawa bases' deterrent value is to **remove the US military presence** or drastically reduce it. Do so, **and we will soon discover that they were a deterrent** — and a good one indeed.

The pro should be prepared to contest the deterrent value of U.S. presence on Okinawa in a number of ways. Of course, one line of attack will be that pro impacts outweigh. It's always strategic to build a case strong enough



that you can win a debate even if your opponent also wins a strong risk of their impacts. Regardless, pro teams should also engage the con directly on questions of global security.

One option for the pro would be to read this **evidence**, which argues that Japanese forces can handle any realistic threats on their own, that U.S. resources on Okinawa aren't appropriate for responding to the kinds of threats con debaters present, and that China won't attempt to seize the islands regardless:

(New Diplomacy Initiative [think tank that collects and distributes information and advocates policy options in the United States and Japan as well as throughout East Asia], Symposium celebrating the first anniversary of the New Diplomacy Initiative, "What to do with the Military Bases and the Right of Collective Self-Defense – the choice of Okinawa," http://www.nd-initiative.org/en_topics/1585/, August 25 2014)

Kyoji Yanagisawa, a board member of ND, stated that "**The Japanese government has claimed that the U.S. Marine Corps needs to stay in Okinawa to make deterrence work. However, this logic** about deterrence **fails** when they say the U.S. Marines can leave for five years by temporary relocating osprey aircraft currently deployed at Futenma Air Station to Saga Air port." **When it comes to** emergency situation in **the Senkaku Islands**, Mr. Yanagisawa believes that **the "Japanese Coast Guard and Self-Defense Force are sufficient** enough **to prevent landings** on the islands. **If necessary, they may request the cooperation of the U.S. Air Force and Navy. The U.S. Marines, however, are not critical for the defense of the** remote islands as they cannot be realistically **reached with Marine resources."** As for the Japanese government's forcible relocation and construction of new military bases at Henoko Bay, Mr. Yanagisawa emphatically calls Japan to "Say No from Okinawa and tell it to the U.S. government." He further claimed that, with the premature approval to exercise the right of collective self-defense, **the Japanese government failed to** adequately **discuss** negative aspects, such as **the possibility that Okinawa could be targeted by retaliatory missile attacks.** He closed with the statement that, "While Prime Minister Abe wants to make the US-Japan relations an 'alliance of blood,' I will prevent it by any means." Mike Mochizuki, a board member of ND began by stating "**There is no chance for the U.S. Marine Corps if an emergency situation happens in North Korea or Taiwan Strait.**" He further states that "**Neither the U.S. nor China find any merit in fighting over the Senkaku Islands, so there is no reason to** claim that **stationing** the U.S. **Marine Corps** in Japan is **for the** defense of Senkaku **Islands.**" Shigeru Handa, an editor of the Tokyo Shimibun, also took issue with the suggestion that deterrence is the primary motive for maintaining a continued presence of U.S. Marines in Okinawa. To support the fallacy of this argument, he highlighted the fact that, "**in 2012, the U.S. decided to move** operating **units** of the US Marine Corps **from Okinawa to Guam,"** effectively **removing their claimed deterrent effect.** Mr. Handa suggested that the "National security policy of the Japanese government lacks consistency. The U.S. Marine Corps – they are out of Okinawa most of the time – does not play any substantial role in 'deterrence.' It is clear that **'deterrence' is just fiction."**



Here's more pro **evidence** disputing the validity of defensive justifications for presence on Okinawa:

(New Diplomacy Initiative [think tank that collects and distributes information and advocates policy options in the United States and Japan as well as throughout East Asia], "Why the Right to Collective Self-defense Now? – Considering the Issue from the Front Line of Security," http://www.nd-initiative.org/en_topics/1469/, April 22 2014)

There are four typical **cases where the use of collective self-defense is said to be required, but none of them are realistic. The first is** the case **where U.S. vessels are under attack.** It is said that the right of collective self-defense needs to be exercised to defend such vessels. **However, an attack on a U.S. Vessel is unlikely to happen. Only those who are determined to open a new war with the U.S. would dare to do so. The second case, to shoot down missiles aimed at the U.S. territory, is technically unfeasible. An ICBM launched by North Korea and aimed at the U.S. mainland will fly over the arctic.** It will fly **too far and will be too fast to be shot down. Other cases are on-board inspections of ships and blockades by laying mines** that are said to be necessary in certain situations. **These are, however, considered to be very ineffective as security measures.**

This **evidence** further supports that line of reasoning, using an empirical example from the Middle East to demonstrate the strategic unimportance of stationing U.S. troops on Okinawa:

(New Diplomacy Initiative Symposium on U.S. Military Bases and Okinawa, "The Problem of U.S. Military Bases in Okinawa: How Does This Issue Affect Japan and Okinawa?," The New Diplomacy Initiative (ND) [think tank that collects and distributes information and advocates policy options in the United States and Japan as well as throughout East Asia], http://www.nd-initiative.org/en_topics/1585/, March 5 2013)

We have only limited channels of information to know how the discussions on U.S.-Japan relations and U.S. military base issues are being carried out in the US. Considering U.S. it is doubtful whether it is necessary for them to station Marine Corps in Okinawa. Some **American policymakers and military personnel** also **say** that **stationing U.S. marines in Futenma or Nago is not necessary. They have also considered the option of relocating the marines to Hawaii or Guam.** However, the Japanese media does not report such views from the U.S. **As the past U.S. operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have shown, it is the U.S. Air Force that is first,ly deployed to attack major military bases from the air. Then, aircraft carriers and warships follow. Finally, the Marine Corps appears when the ground battles start. The Marine Corps does not get involved in battles from the start.** Furthermore, **the Marine Corps can reach everywhere in Asia from Guam and Hawaii. Therefore it is not necessary for them to be stationed in Okinawa.** Rather, it is the Japanese government that claims the Marine Corps is necessary to provide a "deterrence." The problem cannot be solved unless the Japanese government changes its submissive attitude .



On the other hand, this bit of **evidence** can help the con answer many of the pro claims outlined above:

(Tom Conway [journalist/interviewer] & Kevin Maher [former Director of the Office of Japan Affairs at the State Department, Consul General in Okinawa, & Director of Political-Military Affairs at the American Embassy in Tokyo], "The other side of Okinawa," Collier's, <http://colliersmagazine.com/article/other-side-okinawa>, April 2012)

Kevin Maher: I think MCAS Futenma is probably going to stay where it is. The reason I say that is because both governments and even the current, Democratic Party of Japan-led, government recognize as well that **you need to maintain the deterrent compatibility of the forces in Okinawa**. The **reason for that is they are very concerned about the rise of China, which has** been very provocative in the region in the last few years. They (**China**) have **expanded their blue water naval capability and increased their defense spending, rapidly. Their strategic plan is** what they call the First Island Chain Defense and if there was ever a conflict they would look **to control the first chain of islands off the coast of China and that includes** the Ryukyu Islands, the **Okinawa** islands. **Their** basic air/naval **strategy** is what they call Area Access /Area Denial and that **is the denial of access to the East China Sea and the South China Sea**. Back in 2010 in September there was a dispute over the Senkaku Islands, between Japan and China. The US was very clear the US-Japan Security Treaty covers those islands. After that you saw demonstrations in China of people saying they need to take **the Ryukyu (Okinawa) islands** back. These islands, the southwest islands, **are in a very strategic location. There are no other American territories in the area where we could move a base** like Futenma? Is it possible for the deterrent to come from elsewhere, outside of Okinawa? Kevin Maher: In that context, the specific answer as to why you can't locate Marine Corps Air Station Futenma outside of Okinawa is that **the marines are the only mobile ground forces we have in the western Pacific. The US Army elements in Korea are heavy units, not mobile units like the Marine Corps**. The Marines are a rapid response force and they have to train regularly because they never know when they are going to be deployed. Now that training is what generally causes the friction in these urbanized areas because the Marines have to fly their helicopters to go up to the training ranges in the northern part of the island and the helicopters often have to fly into Futenma at night because they have a lot of nighttime training. So those are the complaints you get of helicopters flying in after 10 at night. People new to the discussion on the Japanese and American side often say well why can't we just move the helicopters off the island and bring them back when we need to. That doesn't work because the **Marines** are an integrated force, meaning they have their own air support. They **have to have air, ground and support units all located close to the training range. If the helicopter units were to be relocated outside of Okinawa, they would lose their ability to do integrated training. The bottom line is if they don't train they die in battle. The Marines never know when they are going to be deployed, so they must be ready at all times, and must train regularly. We cannot sacrifice the lives** of young Marines **for** the sake of **local politics**. **If the bases cannot be moved off Okinawa**, why can't they be relocated on the island like the plan proposes? Kevin Maher: I just don't think the Japanese government has the political will to try to force the Okinawa governor to agree to it. Landfills, which are a key part of the plan, require the local governor's consent. Problem is, the governor used to support the plan and then he ran for reelection. Prior to that, Yukio Hatoyama, who became the Prime Minister of Japan starting in early September 2009, came out with a policy, without really understanding the issues, and promised to move Futenma out of Okinawa. Only 8 months later he realized that wasn't possible and changed his position. In the meantime the governor had changed his position as well in line with what the Prime Minister had originally said so when he ran for reelection part of his platform was that Futenma needed to be moved outside of Okinawa as opposed to relocated to Camp Schwab. So I am not optimistic that plan can be implemented. It is very disappointing from the perspective of the people living in Okinawa that the Japanese Government and politicians in Okinawa aren't able to show the leadership needed to push this forward. Frankly, does it matter to the United States where the bases are in Okinawa? Kevin Maher: If the realignment cannot be implemented it is not a crisis for the alliance because the current situation operationally works just fine. Operationally it does not really matter. I think our position should be as long as the operational capability is maintained it should be up to the Japanese side to decide if it stays at Futenma or moves up to Camp Schwab, either works. Personally, I think it would be much better to implement the plan because it really is a large-scale reduction of the irritants, the friction, and ultimately the burden of the bases. **The US** has long recognized that our **presence there is very heavy but people just have to understand that the capability needs to be maintained in order for the U.S. to meet its commitments for the defense of Japan and to maintain peace and stability within the region.**



Returning to the pro side of the debate, to throw in a bit of offense, debaters could use this **evidence** to suggest that Okinawa is actually uniquely unsuitable for military bases, due to the ease with which adversaries could strike it with missiles:

(Emma Chanlett-Avery [Specialist in Asian Affairs] & Ian E. Rinehart [Analyst in Asian Affairs], "The U.S. Military Presence in Okinawa and the Futenma Base Controversy," Congressional Research Service, <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42645.pdf>, Jan 20 2016)

One negative aspect of Okinawa's proximity to the Asian continent is its vulnerability to missile attack. Harvard University professor and former defense official Joseph Nye observed in an interview in December 2014, "Fixed bases are still of value. But **with the increase in Chinese ballistic missile capabilities,** it means **you have to be aware of their vulnerability, and if you put all your eggs in one basket, you are increasing your risks.**"⁶ **Reducing the vulnerability of U.S. military facilities to air and missile attack,** often referred to as "hardening," **has become a central** theme for Congress when considering priorities for overseas military construction.

Another option can be found in this **evidence**, which argues that withdrawing from Okinawa would make rival nations see America as less aggressive, in turn decreasing their aggressiveness towards us. It says this can be accomplished without reducing deterrence effectiveness:

(Usamah Andrabi, "US Bases in Japan and the Refashioning of US-Japan Relations," The Cornell Roosevelt Institute Policy Journal, Cornell Center for Foreign Policy and International Studies, iss. 4, http://www.cornellrooseveltinstitute.org/uploads/1/3/1/9/13199888/cri_foreign_policy_spring_2013.pdf, Spring 2013)

Second, **a withdrawal of U.S. presence in Japan makes America symbolically less of a threat to North Korea and China, reducing the likelihood of an East Asian power struggle. However, this will not reduce the U.S.' capabilities of deterrence significantly. The United States' deterrent for possible Korean conflicts are its bases in South Korea** and many additional bases remain in Japan, even in Okinawa. Consequently, **removal of two bases in Okinawa allows the U.S. to make a symbolic gesture while continuing to have the capabilities to address conflicts in East Asia. If the U.S. wants to improve its East Asian relations while not significantly reducing its stronghold there, it must remove** the Kadena Air Base and MCAS Futenma **from Okinawa.**



More **evidence** on why less American presence may actually bolster regional stability:

(Doug Bandow, Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute specializing in foreign policy and civil liberties & JD from Stanford, "U.S. Filled Okinawa With Bases And Japan Kept Them There: Okinawans Again Say No," Forbes, <http://www.forbes.com/sites/dougbandow/2014/11/26/u-s-filled-okinawa-with-bases-and-japan-kept-them-there-okinawans-again-say-no/#5031a89c4022>, Nov 26 2014)

The U.S. is over-burdened militarily and effectively bankrupt financially, but Washington is determined to preserve every base and deployment, no matter how archaic. Such as the many military facilities in Okinawa, which risks sinking under the plethora of American installations, runways, materiel, and personnel. No wonder the Okinawan people again voted against being conscripted as one of Washington's most important military hubs. The Ryukyu Islands once were independent, but in the late 19th century were seized by Imperial Japan. Okinawans suffered terribly in April 1945 from the so-called "Typhoon of Steel" during the American invasion. The U.S. held onto the territory afterwards, filling it with bases before finally returning Okinawa to Japan in 1972. Even now the Pentagon controls roughly one-fifth of the land, including several beautiful beaches. Opposition to the overpowering American presence crystallized nearly two decades ago after the rape of a teenage girl by U.S. military personnel. Gov. Masahide Ota led the campaign to downsize America's presence and large numbers of Okinawans turned out in protest. However, political activism eventually ebbed. The national government in Tokyo continued to pacify and pay off as many Okinawans as possible, while promoting various schemes to rearrange the local burden. The bases remain because no one else in Japan wants to host American military forces. Thus, Tokyo politicians have every incentive to keep the U.S. presence concentrated (about three-quarters of base area and more than half of 47,000 military personnel) in the most distant, least influential, and poorest prefecture. After a decade of negotiation Tokyo and Washington agreed in 2006 to move some Marines to Guam and shift Futenma airbase to the less populated Henoko district of Nago city. Few Okinawans were satisfied. Three years later the Democratic Party of Japan took power and promised to address Okinawans' concerns. The party also advocated a more equal bilateral security partnership. But the Obama administration proved to be as intransigent as its predecessor, thwarting the efforts of Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama, whose party was divided. He eventually resigned. Since then Tokyo has attempted to implement the relocation agreement, despite strong local opposition, with about 80 percent of Okinawans against the Henoko scheme. Last year Tokyo gained the support of Gov. Hirokazu Nakaima. However, a week ago Naha Mayor Takeshi Onaga defeated Nakaima on an anti-base platform, declaring: "The new military base will not be built." In fact, Onaga may only be able to slow the planned move. But he is looking for legal ways to revoke the landfill permit granted by his predecessor. Onaga announced that "I will do everything possible to prevent the construction of a new base in Henoko. Futenma needs to be moved out of the nation and out of the prefecture." Onaga's victory was welcomed by Nago Mayor Susumu Inamine, who won reelection last January and visited Washington a couple of years ago to lobby American policymakers against the plan. "It's going to be huge for us," he said, with city and prefectural governments working together in opposition. Before the election Yoshihide Suga, chief cabinet secretary, claimed that the controversy was "an issue of the past." But Onaga's victory demonstrates the depth of popular feeling. Nakaima had flip-flopped in favor of the relocation plan in return for \$2.6 billion in economic aid from Tokyo and enjoyed strong support from Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. Onaga shifted the other way, campaigning against Tokyo's attempt to buy off islanders and attacking America's presence for impeding Okinawa's development. Onaga won with a 100,000 vote margin in a four-way race with about 700,000 votes cast. The Abe government promised to move forward with its relocation plan, but faces early elections on December 14. Although the Liberal Democrats are expected to win given the opposition's weakness, they likely will possess a smaller majority and will have a correspondingly harder time overriding local opinion against the bases. "Okinawa has suffered a lot. Why do we have to suffer more," Onaga asked before his election? There's no good answer. Nakaima cited Tokyo's confrontation with China over the Senkaku Islands. Other advocates of America's base presence pointed to North Korea. The Marine Corps highlighted all of the nearby places where the Marine Expeditionary Force could be quickly deployed. But **Washington should not be plotting new wars. Instead, the U.S. should act** more as an "off-shore balancer," prepared to **intervene only if** a hegemonic power, namely **China, threatened to dominate the region, which is unlikely. Washington should leave day-to-day defense responsibilities to friendly Asian states, most notably Japan, and pull its forces back to America. The U.S. still should promote emergency base access, intelligence sharing, and joint training.** There undoubtedly would be other fruitful areas for military cooperation in East Asia and beyond. But 70 years after the end of World War II, 60 years after the end of the Korean War, 40 years after America's departure from Vietnam, and 25 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, **there's no longer any need for permanent U.S. garrisons in the region. Devoting only one percent of its GDP to defense has allowed Tokyo to create a potent "Self-Defense Force." Spending more would enable Japan to build a military well able to deter Chinese adventurism. South Korea has twice the population and 40 times the GDP of the so-called Democratic People's Republic of Korea, as well as about every technological, financial, and diplomatic advantage imaginable. Seoul does not need America's assistance. Australia, Vietnam, Singapore, and other countries have been boosting their military outlays** in response to increasing Chinese assertiveness. **India is** expanding its involvement in Southeast Asia, **acting as another counter to Beijing. While America should be watchful and wary, nothing on the**



horizon looks likely to overwhelm Washington’s friends and allies. Nor does America’s Okinawa bastion have much military utility. Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Ronald Fogelman admitted that the Marines “serve no military function. They don’t need to be in Okinawa to meet any time line in any war plan.” No one imagines the U.S. invading the Chinese mainland in the unlikely event of war. Indeed, a dumber idea is hard to imagine. Air and naval forces guarantee Japan’s security. South Korea is manpower-rich and does not require U.S. assistance from Okinawa-based forces. More mundane contingencies involving secondary powers—border clashes, civil disorder, sectarian violence, secessionist activity, humanitarian relief—are precisely the sort of conflicts in which America’s most proficient warriors should not be deployed. Burma, Cambodia, Fiji, Indonesia, the Solomon Islands, and Thailand to name a few, are unstable or otherwise insecure, but with little potential impact on America. Washington should not be the 911 number for everyone everywhere. Pulling U.S. forces back from Japan—there’s no reason to stop with the units deployed in Okinawa—would shift the basic responsibility for that country’s defense to Tokyo. Japanese citizens then could decide how to fill the gap. It’s not America’s place to tell its friends how much to spend on what, how many soldiers to recruit, and where to station military forces. The Japanese people should assess the importance of national security objectives, from enforcing contested territorial claims to preserving national survival, and decide what they need and how much they are willing to spend. Without Washington as a convenient scapegoat, Japan’s leaders would have to more seriously weigh fairness to Okinawans in deciding where to base whatever forces Tokyo chose to maintain. A genuine “rebalancing” by America, not the fake transformation heralded by the Obama administration, which merely intends a little more of the same, almost certainly would impel Tokyo to do more, though exactly what would be a matter of debate. In fact, attitudes in Tokyo are changing. Prime Minister Abe is more of a hawk than many of his predecessors, though he still values the U.S. defense umbrella. Even more independent was Prime Minister Hatoyama, who fell victim to pressure from Washington. He observed: “Someday, the time will come when Japan’s peace will have to be ensured by the Japanese people themselves.” Such a shift would place greater pressure on Japanese officials to forge better relations with their neighbors, starting with South Korea. Regional cooperation should become a primary tool of Tokyo’s defense policy. As long as Japan can hide behind the U.S. fleet, Japanese politicians can play the nationalist card at home. Left on its own, Tokyo would have to weigh the international cost of such behavior much more seriously. Of course, the Japanese people could decide to do nothing more, which would be their right. But the consequences of making that choice would be their own as well. Japanese pacifists also would have to demonstrate the courage of their convictions instead of being shielded from the consequences by the American military. Washington’s defense commitments and force deployments should be adapted to circumstances. The Cold War required an unnaturally aggressive U.S. military presence overseas. But America’s enemies have collapsed and allies have prospered. There’s no longer any need for Washington to defend Japan and its neighbors. Which eliminates the only excuse for burdening the Okinawan people with America’s extraordinary military presence. After nearly 70 years Okinawans deserve relief. So do Americans, who pay to defend most of the globe.



Finally, some pros might want to leverage their public opinion arguments here. This **evidence** could be useful for that; it says that Okinawans understand the security arguments used to justify the base, but they aren't persuaded:

(Shannon Tiezzi, Managing Editor at The Diplomat, former research associate at the U.S.-China Policy Foundation & Masters from Harvard, "Beyond Futenma: Okinawa and the US Base Conundrum," The Diplomat, <http://thediplomat.com/2015/11/beyond-futenma-okinawa-and-the-us-base-conundrum/>, Nov 4 2015)

Back **in Okinawa, explanations of deterrence** and geostrategic locations **fall flat**. Asked about Tokyo's explanation for why Okinawa hosts the vast majority of U.S. bases in Japan, Ota says flatly that "the Japanese government is making an excuse." He explains that during his administration, he had many meetings with U.S. officials about the possibility of relocating bases to Guam or elsewhere in Japan. People in Washington seemed sympathetic, but Tokyo was not, according to Ota. **For Okinawans, the everyday reality of living with U.S. bases resonates more** with the general public **than abstract security concerns**. Japanese analysts describe the security situation as getting worse nearly by the day, but Takara explains that **people in Okinawa** don't see that in their daily lives: "They **do not really feel that the dangers are increasing.**" **And while the majority of Okinawans would agree that the U.S.-Japan alliance is important**, he says, **that doesn't equate to a willingness to give up their land for U.S. bases.** That's why **many Okinawans don't like being asked such questions**, he explains – **it's hard to convey an understanding of the importance of the alliance while also being clear about not wanting U.S. bases on Okinawan soil.**

That last card brings us directly to the subject of the US-Japanese defense alliance, which is the focus of our next section on strategy.

US-Japan Alliance

As several cards above suggested, defenders of American presence in Okinawa argue that these bases are key to the sustained health of the alliance.



Here is further **evidence** on that point, stating that disagreement over Okinawa has been shown historically to create significant tension between the two governments:

(Céline Pajon, research specialist at Ifri Japan, associate researcher at the Canon Institute for Global Studies (CIGS) in Tokyo, & MA in International Relations from the Graduate Institute of International Studies, [Translated by Nicholas Sowells], "Understanding the Issue of U.S. Military Bases in Okinawa," The Institut français des relations internationales Center for Asian Studies, Japan Program, https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/understanding_the_issue_of_u.s._military_bases_in_okinawa.pdf, June 2010)

However, **the government** has certainly **made a strategic mistake by starting to tackle the** most complex and **most sensitive question within the alliance**, and doing so **with** neither prior consideration of how to approach the issue **nor** any **credible alternative to offer Washington**. With the announcement of a return to the 2006 plan, Hatoyama appears to have doubly betrayed Japanese voters, going back on his original promise to move Futenma "at least outside the prefecture of Okinawa" and giving in to U.S. demands that seek to stick closely to the 2006 agreement. In reality, **the issue of U.S. bases in Okinawa is so complex that alternative options are very limited**. Furthermore, **a reconsideration of the U.S. presence in** Japan and **Okinawa would imply a serious challenge to the security alliance** between the two countries, which Tokyo does not want. However, the government's inability to resolve the issue and the incessant procrastination have provoked strong **criticism** and pressure, both **in Okinawa** and Washington. On 25 April, 90,000 people gathered in Okinawa calling for the departure of American troops.³⁹ The government has revived the hopes and anger of the people by making hasty promises. It **has** also **created** unnecessary **tension with its U.S.** partner just as Democratic **administrations** came to power on both sides of the Pacific, which should have created an opportunity to conduct a thorough review to redefine the alliance.

More **evidence**:

(Michael Penn, Executive Director of the Shingetsu Institute for the Study of Japanese-Islamic Relations, reporter covering Japanese and East Asian affairs, & MA from the Center for Middle Eastern Studies of the University of Texas at Austin, "Voices of Okinawa: Standing against a US military base," Al Jazeera, <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2015/10/voices-okinawa-standing-military-base-151004072152389.html>, October 4 2015)

At issue is the construction of a new US Marines **airbase** at Henoko beach **in Okinawa that the two national governments have declared to be "the only option" for** the realignment of **US forces in the region**, but which public opinion polls and repeated elections have demonstrated to be unacceptable to local residents. **In 2009-2010, the Japanese national government briefly took** serious **cognisance of anti-base sentiment in Okinawa, but this led immediately to a political confrontation between**



Tokyo and Washington that brought down the administration of the Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama. Since May 2010, the Japanese government has given up any thought of resisting the US policy of constructing this base.

This **evidence** demonstrates that both nations see America's Okinawan presence as the "cornerstone" of the alliance, and strongly support continuation:

(Céline Pajon, research specialist at Ifri Japan, associate researcher at the Canon Institute for Global Studies (CIGS) in Tokyo, & MA in International Relations from the Graduate Institute of International Studies, [Translated by Nicholas Sowells], "Understanding the Issue of U.S. Military Bases in Okinawa," The Institut français des relations internationales Center for Asian Studies, Japan Program, https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/understanding_the_issue_of_u.s._military_bases_in_okinawa.pdf, June 2010)

The strategic location of Okinawa (Taipei, Shanghai, Hong Kong, Seoul, Manila and Tokyo are all within a radius of 1,500 km) **explains why the island remains a vital cornerstone of U.S. forces in Asia**. The return of Okinawa to Japan in 1972 followed bilateral negotiations, including secret agreements that have been officially recognized this year.⁸ But it also followed from a doctrine of disengagement defined by Nixon in 1969, according to which allies had to bear more of their defense burden. As a result, many bases around Tokyo were closed and forces partially redeployed to Okinawa, accentuating the geographical imbalance already observed.⁹ The U.S. Still Present in Asia After the Cold War The end of the Cold War and the breakup of the Soviet bloc directly led to the disappearance of the principal threat that had determined the strategic positioning of the United States across the globe. In the Asia-Pacific, 135,000 American soldiers were based in allied countries (including 50,000 in Japan, 45,000 in South Korea and 15,000 in the Philippines), countries which then questioned the legitimacy of such a large American presence whose economic and social costs were substantial.¹⁰ However, Americans did not disengage from the Asian theater. **The interests of the U.S. in the region were confirmed and new threats identified as early as 1995: North Korea's (nuclear and missile threat) and the rise of Chinese power justified maintaining a deterrent capability.**¹¹ Only 35,000 soldiers were withdrawn (which included all troops stationed in the Philippines in 1992),¹² reducing the average to 100,000 troops in Asia Pacific during the 1990s. **The alliance with Japan has been thus more than ever the cornerstone of U.S. security commitments in Asia, and the reasons for the American presence in Japan were clearly identified. They include "the strategic location of bases" and "comparative cost advantages" of facilities** that benefit from a high-level, technical infrastructure.¹³ In 1990, Japan contributed up to 45% of the costs of U.S. bases on its territory, a percentage which increased to 75% in 2007. ¹⁴ **For the Japanese**, despite concerns about the effectiveness of American protection against the ballistic threat from North Korea in particular (a North Korean Taepodong missile was fired over Japan in 1998), **the Security Treaty** between Japan and the United States **has not been questioned.**¹⁵ **Indeed, Japan has decided to strengthen its alliance with the United States for two reasons. Firstly, Tokyo believes it to be the most effective strategy for dealing with threats** in the post Cold War world.¹⁶ Secondly, **the alliance offers a valuable framework for developing Japan's own defense capabilities.**¹⁷



On the other hand, the pro also has some claim to sustaining the alliance. According to the next piece of **evidence**, residents' disapproval of American presence on Okinawa is actually a substantial threat to the alliance survival:

(Emma Chanlett-Avery [Specialist in Asian Affairs] & Ian E. Rinehart [Analyst in Asian Affairs], "The U.S. Military Presence in Okinawa and the Futenma Base Controversy," Congressional Research Service, <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42645.pdf>, Jan 20 2016)

Despite the prominence of the **U.S.-Japan alliance** in America's overall strategic posture in the Asia-Pacific region, local **concerns about the U.S. military presence on Okinawa have challenged** the management of **the alliance for decades**. In recent years, Okinawan resistance has crystallized around the relocation of a U.S. Marine Corps Air Station. The Japanese islands serve as the most significant forward-operating platform for the U.S. military in the region. With the United States pledging to rebalance its defense posture towards Asia, the uncertainty surrounding the medium and long-term presence of American forces on Okinawa remains a critical concern for national security decision-makers. **Many regional analysts have posed the question of whether this** issue is at its core simply a dispute over real estate, or if the **controversy threatens the fundamental sustainability of the alliance**. Some **Okinawans contend that the U.S. military presence** on the island **constitutes** a form of **discrimination** by Washington and Tokyo **and the suppression of local democratic expression**. The relocation of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma (MCAS Futenma) is the largest and most problematic part of a broad overhaul of the stationing of U.S. forces in Japan. A 2006 agreement between the U.S. and Japanese governments to relocate the Futenma base from its current location in the crowded city of Ginowan to Camp Schwab in Henoko, a less congested part of the island, was envisioned as the centerpiece of a planned realignment of U.S. forces. The anticipated air station is often referred to as the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF). The arrangement was designed to reduce the local community's burden of hosting a loud air base that has generated safety concerns and, eventually, to return control of the Futenma land to local authorities as a way to boost economic development in the area. In addition, the relocation would have triggered the transfer of roughly 8,000 marines and their dependents from Japan to new facilities in Guam. Japan agreed to pay around 60% of the costs, then estimated at \$10.3 billion. The agreement was struck at a moment when the bilateral relationship was strong, but implementation has been a struggle, due largely to political turmoil in Tokyo and resistance in Okinawa. In the watershed 2009 elections, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) defeated the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which had held power nearly continuously since the mid-1950s. Incoming DPJ Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama had pledged in his campaign to close MCAS Futenma and remove its functions from Okinawa. During Hatoyama's term, he examined a number of possible options for resolving the Futenma conundrum but ultimately discarded them and came to support the Henoko FRF site. Since then, successive prime ministers have endorsed the 2006 plan, but **many Okinawans now insist on closure** of Futenma **and relocation outside the prefecture**. In addition, the U.S. Congress raised major concerns about the ballooning costs of moving the Marines to Guam and for several years blocked funds dedicated to the Marine Corps realignment.

More **evidence**:

(Alexander Cooley, Professor of Political Science at Barnard College & Faculty Member of Columbia University's Saltzman Institute of War & Peace Studies, "Okinawa: A Crack in the Pacific Pivot to Asia," The National Interest, <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/okinawa-crack-the-pacific-pivot-asia-10760>, June 27 2014)

The Obama administration has affirmed its intent to "pivot" to Asia by concluding new security agreements with the Philippines and Australia. **In Japan, China's provocations over** the Senkaku Islands and more aggressive stance towards South China Sea **territorial issues have** seemingly **strengthened and refocused the pivot's linchpin: the U.S.-Japan security partnership**. **But in Okinawa**, the southern prefecture that hosts 74 percent of U.S. military facilities in Japan, **the complex local politics that**



surround the U.S. basing presence have entered an uncertain new phase, one that threatens to derail the new security consensus held by Tokyo and Washington. Okinawa has long been a source of both principled and patronage-driven opposition to the U.S. military.

Some Okinawans hold sincere antimilitary beliefs, due to the historical memories of the brutal battle fought there during World War II and the U.S. military's colonial-style administration from 1952 to 1972 during which it forcibly acquired local land for base construction. A related recurring complaint is that Tokyo privileges the political needs of the main islands above the wishes of the remote prefecture's residents. But for over forty years, Tokyo has alleviated Okinawa's "special base burden" by providing a wide range of payments, both to compensate individuals affected by base-related accidents and pollution, and to subsidize public-works projects for the regional government and base-hosting municipalities. In 1995, massive antibase demonstrations on the island followed the widely publicized rape of a twelve-year old schoolgirl by three U.S. service members. In response, Tokyo increased its compensation packages and, with the agreement of Washington, agreed to close and consolidate some basing facilities. Chief among them was a plan to relocate Marine Air Station Futenma, which is surrounded by crowded Ginowan City, to a new facility to be constructed off the coast of Cape Henoko in the north. Almost twenty years later, the relocation has not even broken ground and remains mired in thorny local politics. Okinawans favor closing Futenma, but most do not want scenic Henoko turned into a massive construction site, while the tsunami that led to the Fukushima disaster in 2011 has raised additional concerns about the offshore facility's vulnerability. Though in late December, Governor Hirokazu Nakaima formally approved the landfill for the new facility's perimeter, just a few weeks later Nago City, the municipality that governs Henoko, decisively elected challenger Susumu Inamine who triumphed over an incumbent Mayor on a strong anti-relocation platform against the central and regional government. The issue once again will be central in the new gubernatorial elections of November that will pick Nakaima's successor, while forcing the beginning of construction before the election may spark wide-ranging protests.

Meanwhile, **new regional and global developments are further complicating the status of U.S. bases on the islands.**

First, over the last twenty years, Okinawan activists have found transnational allies through the forces of globalization.

Okinawan NGOs and citizens' groups, once isolated, have networked with similar antibase movements and protest campaigns across the world, **exchanging tactics and raising the international media profile of their campaign.** For example, activists have recruited celebrities and have taken out ads in U.S.

newspapers depicting picturesque photos of Cape Henoko with an appeal to stop the construction. **Second, though policy makers** in Washington and Tokyo have **assumed that rising anti-Chinese attitudes** in Okinawa **would automatically generate stronger support for the basing presence** **countertrends are also observable.** A now widely cited opinion **poll** commissioned by the regional government from 2013 **found that** while Okinawan residents, indeed, have adopted unfavorable views of China at or even higher than the rest of Japan, Okinawans also believe that there will be an East Asian conflict at more than double the rate of the national average. But **only 10 percent of respondents believe that, in response, Japan's effective control over territories should be "reinforced," while two-thirds support that idea that Okinawa's role in Japanese-Chinese relations should be to "pursue friendship."**

Third, while Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has initiated a much-needed national debate on Japanese identity and security and proposed a constitutional amendment to expand the role of Japanese self-defense forces, the Okinawan prefecture is independently promoting itself as a future Asian regional hub in an attempt to lure investment and tourism under the new "Okinawa 21st Century Vision" campaign. A newly formed pro-independence party draws on antibase sentiment, while the island's media outlets now emphasize the theme of greater autonomy in the island's foreign relations. **The sum effect**

of these global and regional developments **is that the traditional levers of compensation and patronage used by Tokyo may no longer be sufficient to ensure Okinawan cooperation to implement necessary changes in the force posture, even in the face of a more aggressive Beijing.** The broader lesson is that the U.S. rebalance is taking place in an era where global information flows and new political networks are creating a far more unpredictable political and media environment than the traditional domestic populism and antibase opposition that

defense planners have had to cope with in the past. **Successfully managing and responding to these new forces may be just as critical to the pivot's success as** are the high politics of **reaffirming commitments to alliances.**



This piece of pro **evidence** relies on a claim we already discussed in favor of the con—the fact that Okinawa has been a historical source of US-Japan tensions—but uses it to reach the opposite conclusion. It suggests that the best way to preserve the relationship would be to eliminate the issue entirely by withdrawing American troops. It also introduces an additional pro benefit of reducing the U.S. budget deficit:

(Usamah Andrabi, “US Bases in Japan and the Refashioning of US-Japan Relations,” The Cornell Roosevelt Institute Policy Journal, Cornell Center for Foreign Policy and International Studies, iss. 4, http://www.cornellrooseveltinstitute.org/uploads/1/3/1/9/13199888/cri_foreign_policy_spring_2013.pdf, Spring 2013)

The United States maintains military bases throughout the globe. These marine, army, naval, and air force bases vary in size and utility, and many **are** little more than **Cold War relics**. Consequently, **many** of the U.S.’ bases **unduly contribute** to the U.S. defense budget’s **extensive drain on the federal budget, and** a few even **generate ill will towards Americans**. The American military bases in Okinawa exemplify these problems. **The U.S. military presence in Okinawa** is remnant of a post-World War II and Cold War era assertion of US global dominance and security institutions. The United States’ Marine Corps Air Station Futenma and the Kadena Air Base **remain** two of **the** largest and **costliest** Japanese military endeavors. Though supported by most current Japanese leaders, Okinawans and some political leaders fervently oppose this symbol of American imperialism. These **Okinawans resent the two bases for the pollution and danger they have brought to the island**. Various proposals of relocation have been made for some of these Okinawan bases, but no real plan has been implemented. In 2013, the American and Japanese governments came to terms on a removal and relocation plan for six of the military bases in Okinawa, including the MCAS Futenma. This plan would create replacement bases to northern Okinawa, near the Camp Schwab base.¹ However, **the problem lies in the U.S.’ excessive occupation of Okinawa and thus replacement will not solve local concerns or budget problems. The American occupation of Okinawa has always been oppressive for locals**. The United States has occupied Okinawa since their victory in the Battle of Okinawa in 1945.⁴ After the battle and the war, the U.S. seized ownership of Okinawa and the rest of the Ryukyu Islands and began building military bases on the island, often lawfully paying landowners, but occasionally forcefully expelling inhabitants.⁵ During this time, the **Okinawans were victims of** these and **thousands of other crimes by military personnel including hundreds of counts of “murder, burglary, and rape.”**⁶ Though the reinstatement of Japanese rule in Okinawa in 1972 mitigated these crimes now that Okinawans had their own judicial authority to prosecute American service members, crime is still rampant.⁷ The increase in U.S. military personnel in Okinawa due to the Korean War, Vietnam War, and increased security concerns in East Asia has led to further Okinawan concern for the bases’ potential physical and environmental danger. **There have been numerous instances of aircraft crashes** near both Kadena and Futenma **resulting in infrastructure damage and civilian casualties**, noise pollution, **and** fears of **degradation of natural habitats**.⁸ The United States’ continued occupation of Okinawa is justified primarily by the 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States, which obligates the US and Japan to jointly defend Japanese territories while allowing for US military presence in Japan to “provide security for Japan and the Far East.”⁹ The increased military might of countries like China and North Korea incentivize the U.S. to prolong its stay in Japan and further shore up military bases there. The United States’ long term goal in East Asia is to maximize positive relations with these East Asian powers while still deterring potential conflicts. However, **Japan must transition toward a less dependent military defense if it wants to serve its own self-interests rather than America’s interests**.¹⁰ **This will also transition the United States away from its interventionist mentality**, so it can stop defending countries that can now defend themselves. **Excessive intervention** in defense policy **risks unnecessary danger** for servicemen **and balloons the budget deficit. A reduction in military bases in Okinawa would start a “refashioning” of U.S.-Japan relations**.¹¹ Most recently in 2013 the two countries have come to another agreement relocating MCAS Futenma to other cities in Okinawa, but the problem still persists.¹² **The Okinawan base subject has caused historical strains on U.S.-Japanese relations, preventing the two nations from**



discussing other more important matters. The conflict can never fully be resolved as long as the U.S. continues to ^{try and re}locate the bases on Okinawa, rather than remove them because Okinawans will never be complacent with this ^{continued occupation.}

Pros could also argue that Okinawa presents a liability to U.S.-Japan relations because, should an American base on the island suffer a foreign attack, the U.S. might expect Japan to lend military assistance, which it would be reticent to do, due to a long-standing cultural attitude valuing nonviolence. Here's **evidence**:

(New Diplomacy Initiative [think tank that collects and distributes information and advocates policy options in the United States and Japan as well as throughout East Asia], "Why the Right to Collective Self-defense Now? – Considering the Issue from the Front Line of Security," http://www.nd-initiative.org/en_topics/1469/, April 22 2014)

Some argue that the right to collective self-defense needs to be exercised in the performance of international obligations. However, this means a departure from the principle not to intervene into another countries' armed conflicts—a principle that Japan has held for a long time. We must think very carefully over such an issue. On the other hand, others point out that there are strict conditions under which the right of collective self-defense could be used: in a time of a great threat to the security of Japan, by explicit request for assistance by a concerned country, and with the agreement of a third country when the Japanese forces pass through its territory. It is said that these conditions are restrictive enough to prevent the arbitrary use of collective self-defense by the government. However, these restrictions are nothing unique and could be ineffectual in a tense situation. **Although the administration has approved the use of collective self-defense in order to strengthen the Japan-U.S. alliance, it could have an adverse effect—the bilateral relations would be damaged if Japan refuses to exercise that right when requested by the U.S.**

Furthermore, says this **evidence**, the United States would be wise to avoid alienating its allies, especially Japan:

(Shujiro Yazawa, professor emeritus at Hitotsubashi University and Seijo University, former president of the Japan Sociological Society, "The crisis of democracy in Japan," Open Democracy, <https://www.opendemocracy.net/shujiro-yazawa/crisis-of-democracy-in-japan>, July 16 2015)

The USA's power and hegemony are in decline while China's are rising; therefore the USA needs all kinds of help from its allies. Especially in East Asia, it is essential for the USA to strengthen its ties with Japan and get assistance from **Japan**, not only politically and militarily but also economically and ideologically. The government is now hurrying to relocate the American military base in



Futenma to Henoko, in Nago City, against the will of the majority of the Okinawan people. **The will of the people of Okinawa is crystal clear:**

Okinawan people would like to relocate the Futenma base to somewhere else outside of Okinawa prefecture, hopefully outside Japan. But the Abe government has been accelerating preparations for building a new base in Henoko. Many Okinawans are protesting these relocation preparation activities by staging sit-ins at the construction site.

While that last card is specific to pro usage, either side will want to be sure to introduce an impact to alliance health if they plan to make these sorts of arguments. Here is **evidence** on that, which would work for either side:

(Cpl. April Price, 1 Marine Expeditionary Force, "EXERCISE IRON FIST 2016: TWO CULTURES, ONE WARRIOR SPIRIT," United States Marine Corps, <http://www.marines.mil/News/NewsDisplay/tabid/3258/Article/683902/exercise-iron-fist-2016-two-cultures-one-warrior-spirit.aspx>, March 2 2016)

Forged in the wake of World War II, **the U.S.-Japan security alliance has served as one of the Asia-Pacific Region's most important military relationships and as an anchor of U.S. engagement in the Pacific.** Revised in 1960, the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security grants the United States the rights to military bases in the Japanese archipelago in exchange for a U.S. pledge to defend Japan in the event of an attack.

"As security treaty allies, it is important for U.S. Marines and sailors to have working relationships with our Japanese military counterparts to continue honing our amphibious operations core competencies," said Col. Clay C. Tipton, commanding officer, 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit. "**Credible, ready maritime forces help to preserve peace and prevent conflict.**"

Further, this **evidence** says a strong US-Japan security alliance is necessary to prevent Japan from pursuing development of nuclear weapons, which would both destabilize the region and undermine the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, potentially causing other nations to follow suit and growing the worldwide nuclear threat:

(Tobias Harris and Jeffrey W. Hornung, research fellows at the Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA, "Trump Shouldn't Bash Japan," The National Interest, <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/trump-shouldnt-bash-japan-15328>, Feb 25 2016)

Donald Trump says that he wants to "make America great again." If that's the case, why has he continuously lambasted **Japan [is] the United States' most important military and economic partner in the world's most important region?** Trump regularly condemns Japan for both



its economic and military policies. He is wrong to do so. In Trump's worldview, Japan is one of a handful of countries—he also regularly mentions China and Mexico—that have taken advantage of the United States and have left middle-class Americans worse off. “I’ll bring back our jobs from China, from Mexico, from Japan, from so many places,” he said, announcing his candidacy in June 2015. While Trump has directed more attention towards China than towards Japan, this tendency to lump China and Japan together fundamentally misconstrues the U.S.-

Japan relationship. The reality is that **America’s and Japan’s economic interests may be more closely aligned than ever**

before. Since the end of their acrimonious trade disputes in the mid-1990s, Japan and the United States have increasingly found themselves on the same side of major economic issues. This was true during negotiations for the Trans-Pacific Partnership, when, with the exception of disputes over Japan’s agricultural tariffs and U.S. automotive tariffs, the two countries were united on most of the agreement’s chapters. Similarly, in their relationships with China both countries worry about Chinese trade practices, copyright piracy and the impact of China’s rise on domestic manufacturers and workers. Indeed, while Trump laments job losses overseas, Japanese leaders have spent two decades fretting about the “hollowing out” of Japan’s manufacturing sector following years of an overvalued currency and China’s entry into the global economy. Ironically, this benefited the United States: as of 2012, Japan’s stock of foreign direct investment in the United States was second only to the United Kingdom’s. Far from “stealing” jobs from Americans, Japanese automakers have built factories across the United States, directly employing thousands of American workers. Yes, Japan still runs large trade surpluses with the United States, but it is hard to argue that this is due to currency manipulation: Japan continued to run large

surpluses even in years when its currency was overvalued against the dollar. Trump similarly distorts the nature of **the U.S.-Japan security alliance.** “If Japan gets attacked, we have to go to their defense and start World War III,” he said in a stump speech on February 8. “If we get attacked, Japan doesn’t have to do anything.” While Mr. Trump **is** correct that Japan is not obligated to defend the United States according to the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty, he ignores the **strong** security relationship **built on decades of trust. Crucial**ly, he ignores more than two decades of change that have not only seen Japan take more responsibility for its own defense but also that of the United States, even if Japan **is** not attacked. He also ignores **Japan’s willingness to host** about fifty thousand **U.S. troops and military assets—including America’s only forward-deployed carrier strike group**—and the fact that Japan pays over \$2 billion annually towards their presence. Trump is right that these troops defend Japan, but **thanks to Japan’s willingness to host so many U.S. troops, the U.S is capable of projecting power in the region, enabling it to respond to regional contingencies, deter adversaries and reassure allies of American resolve.** Unfortunately, Trump does not seem to appreciate the extent to which the **U.S. military presence in Asia depends on Japan’s willingness to support it.** It is difficult to know how Trump would deal with Japan in

office. It is possible that he will see Japan’s value as a partner in pushing back against China. But if he were to pressure Japan too hard, it could have **disruptive effects on the U.S.-Japan relationship** and complicate U.S. policy in Asia. A return to the acrimonious trade and currency disputes of the past, for example, **would make it difficult** for the United States and **Japan to coordinate** their **response to China’s** efforts to change Asian economic governance. Meanwhile, depending on what Trump means by a more “fair and equitable” security relationship, and how he would go about attaining it, Japan could curtail its contributions to U.S. forces in Japan or call for **a revision of the Status of Forces Agreement.** If he tried using America’s nuclear umbrella as leverage, it **could lead Japan to**

question American commitment and therefore dramatically expand its own armed forces and perhaps **consider nuclear weapons, which would destabilize Northeast Asia and undermine the nuclear nonproliferation regime** the United States supports. Allies should criticize each other when appropriate, but it is difficult to see how the U.S.-Japan relationship will be improved—or Americans made safer or more prosperous—by critiques that fundamentally mischaracterize the relationship. The next president will have to deal with the regional and global consequences of China’s slowing economy. Likewise, he or she will have to respond to China’s growing military and increasing assertiveness in the maritime domain. The United States will need all the friends it can get, particularly trustworthy friends like Japan, with which the United States shares both interests and values. Maybe Mr. Trump’s Japan bashing makes for good sound bites, but it is unjustified by the facts, and if realized, it would do little more than disrupt a critical U.S. relationship in a critical region at a critical moment. U.S. leadership cannot be about getting the best possible deal for Americans at the expense of begging American allies and partners; it has to be about creating the conditions in which all can be secure and prosper. Only that will ensure that America is great.

On the other hand, here is **evidence** indicating that the US-Japan alliance is not such a good thing, because it creates Cold War-style factions that threaten regional stability:

(Ellis S. Krauss, professor emeritus of the School of Global Strategy and Policy at the University of California, San Diego, “JAPAN, THE UNITED STATES, AND A CHANGED PACIFIC,” The Wilson Quarterly, Winter 2016)

In 2012, the DPJ suffered a crushing defeat in the national assembly elections. The new LDP prime minister would be Shinzō Abe. By the time Obama began his second term in January 2013, Abe had been in office less than a month. **Tensions over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands** dispute were getting worse. In 2013, more than a thousand Chinese vessels



penetrated Japanese maritime space around the islands, and Japanese interceptors scrambled 415 times against Chinese incursions. The dispute **forced** President **Obama to commit the U_{nited} S_{tates} to come to Japan's aid in the event of an attack on the islands. Realistically, this had always been American policy — under the 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, the U_{nited} S_{tates} must come to Japan's defense over incursions on any territory** under Japanese administrative control — but previously, the United States had tried to tactfully ignore that stipulation, to keep itself out of scuffles over islands it cared little about. **Now, some analysts worried that Japan had “trapped” the U_{nited} S_{tates} into joining its territorial dispute again China, and made the prospect of a war with China a real possibility.** The tipping point for the United States came as President Obama ended his first term, as the administration touted its “pivot” toward Asia. It was an unfortunate word choice — “rebalance” was a more apt description — as the United States was not turning away from the rest of the world so much as acknowledging the rising importance of Asia. In many ways, a rebalance was long overdue. The Bush administration had made a tentative start, but the Obama administration made it a priority. **Trying to deter Chinese military aggression** in the region, **Obama reinforced old American alliances with** key democratic actors, including **Japan**, South Korea, and Australia. The capstone of the rebalance was Obama's Trans-Pacific Partnership, a massive trade agreement involving a dozen Pacific Rim countries, though not China. In Japan, the LDP was back in power, this time under its once-failed prime minister, Shinzō Abe, whose previous tenure as prime minister had lasted only a year, from 2006 to 2007. Abe was a nationalist and a strong admirer of his grandfather, Nobusuke Kishi, who had served as prime minister from 1957 to 1960. Kishi believed that just 12 years after Japan's surrender in World War II, the country should strive to become a “normal nation” again, maintaining its alliance with the United States while revising the constitution and building up Japan's military. Kishi's vision lost out to a more pacifist view of Japan's new role in Asia — one that has largely defined Japan's foreign policy ever since. About 50 years later, Abe revived his grandfather's agenda as a reaction to the threats posed by China and North Korea. Abe seems determined to depart from the postwar framework, defined by its limitations on Japanese claims of sovereignty and what Japan's political right perceived as excessive self-flagellation over the nation's wartime crimes. Abe wants to change Japanese attitudes toward the country's recent history, and though he is not anti-American, he wants his nation to deal with the United States on a more equal footing. On historical issues, Abe has made statements denying both the nature and extent of the Japanese military's sexual slavery of “comfort women” during World War II; has surrounded himself with cronies who also deny the extent or reality of the Nanjing Massacre; and has either visited or sent gifts to Yasukuni Shrine, where Japanese war criminals are honored, every year on the anniversary of the war's end. Chinese and Koreans, who certainly have not forgotten the horrors that Abe would rather not discuss, consider Abe's actions provocations, and every so often, the bad blood between Japan and its onetime enemies seeps into their respective foreign policies, undermining the regional partnership. But Abe did not come to power in 2012 by dint of his positions on foreign policy or Japanese history; he won because of the Japanese public's disappointment with the DPJ, and because he had promised to pull Japan out of its 20-year economic slump. His program, commonly called “Abenomics,” consists of fiscal stimulus, monetary easing, and structural reform. It seems that Abe had taken a lesson from his earlier, abortive term as prime minister in the mid-2000s, when he had given all his attention to foreign policy and not to things that concerned the average citizen. Abe's new strategy worked not once, but twice, as he won reelection in 2014 again by emphasizing Abenomics rather than national defense or foreign policy. After each election, though, Abe quickly turned his attention to defense, ordering an unprecedented string of policy shifts in Japan's security posture, including creating a National Security Council; passing Japan's first “state secrets” law, which critics see as dangerously vague; relaxing Japan's weapons export ban to the United States and U.S. allies; issuing an interim report that acknowledges space and cyberspace as “territory” under U.S.-Japan defense guidelines; threatening to shoot down any North Korean missile that might enter Japanese territory; and allowing the Japanese armed forces to provide fuel and medical aid to UN-sanctioned, multinational military operations, even in previously forbidden combat zones. Some, especially Japanese intellectuals and those working in foreign media, saw Abe's new military revamping as the end of Japan's pacifist foreign policy. This was and is a gross exaggeration: Japan's foreign policy has not been “pacifist” since the early part of the postwar American occupation, thereafter permitting the growth of an increasingly competent military. Rather than the end of pacifism, what Abe was really challenging was the Yoshida Doctrine, postwar Japan's foreign policy catechism of a minimal military and policy of defending Japan's home islands only. Others observers, including some in Washington, welcomed Abe's reforms. Japan, they argued, was now becoming a true ally, the “Britain of the Pacific” for which the United States had long hoped. This, too, was an exaggeration, since it was not clear what exactly Japan was becoming, or what the Japanese public would actually support, or what the SDF was capable of. In Japan, meanwhile, public opinion remains fairly unsupportive of the Abe government's changes, and seems to cling to the old Yoshida Doctrine that Abe is so determined to abandon. Yet these changes may presage a major change of direction under Abe, toward a closer and at least somewhat more “normal” military alliance with the United States. As 2016 dawned, instead of a new liberal party leading Japan's government, as many observers would have expected at the beginning of Obama's presidency, power rests with the familiar conservative party. And **instead of the much-touted “dual hedge” plan of balancing close economic and political ties to China with an American military alliance, Japan has enthusiastically endorsed the T_{rans}-P_{acific} P_{artnership}, worsening historically troubled relations and territorial conflicts with China** and South Korea. As far as both Obama and Abe's long-term legacies go, the jury is still out. A few questions have yet to be answered. East **Asia could well be on the cusp of a “soft Cold War,” with the fault line deepening between Japan and other American allies on the one side, and China and its own friends on the other. That the U_{nited} S_{tates} and Japan are now more militarily integrated than ever before only heightens the tension.**

No matter what impact claims you build your cases around, it is critical that you also remember to prepare to defend them against tricky opponents who might defend options besides “withdraw” and “stay the same.” We will turn to those types of strategies now.



Alternatives

As the last section in this guide, we'll consider some possible alternatives to the status quo. This topic is unique, however, in that both sides may find strategic value in proposing such an option. The pro might choose to argue that military presence in Okinawa could be effectively replaced by re-stationing U.S. forces elsewhere. The con, for its part, might suggest that changes short of complete withdrawal should be made in Okinawa.

Of course, there are countless various ways these sorts of strategies could be constructed. We don't have the time or space to cover them all in detail here. However, we'll go over some main ones.

The basic option for the con to present an alternate policy would be reduction instead of withdrawal. In this way, cons could diffuse a significant amount of the pro's offense while incurring geostrategic net benefits.

Here is a piece of **evidence** describing the viability capacity reduction on Okinawa:

(Emma Chanlett-Avery [Specialist in Asian Affairs] & Ian E. Rinehart [Analyst in Asian Affairs], "The U.S. Military Presence in Okinawa and the Futenma Base Controversy," Congressional Research Service, <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42645.pdf>, Jan 20 2016)

Although most **strategists agree on the importance of Okinawa's location for U.S. security interests** in East Asia, **there is less consensus on the particular number of marines necessary to maintain stability**. For example, two prominent **analysts suggested** a rethinking of U.S. military basing in light of cuts to the U.S. defense budget and Okinawan obstacles; they argue **that leaving a force of 5,000-10,000 marines on Okinawa while also pre-positioning supply vessels in Japanese waters and bringing most of the marines home to California would amply serve U.S. rapid response and deterrence needs**.⁵ **Defense officials continue to assert the need for substantial numbers of U.S. marines** to be positioned **in Asia, but have offered** a degree of **flexibility in their exact location**; current plans would deploy marines on a rotational basis through Guam and Australia. Congressional concerns, as discussed below, have focused on cost and implementation, but have not argued that the Marine presence itself is unnecessary.



However, a strategy that leaves some presence intact will not be able to fully access pro arguments that the Okinawan public wants the U.S. military gone completely. Cons presenting that kind of counterplan will also want to be sure to choose the evidence they use in the rest of their case very carefully, lest they wind up with the worst of both worlds: maintaining presence without being able to win strong solvency for international deterrence.

Any plans that do involve a total removal of American presence from Okinawa, of course, will be pro ground. As such, the pro actually has more flexibility than the con in terms of presenting alternatives on this topic.

One such option would be to suggest that the United States close its bases on Okinawa, but move its troops and other military assets to new locations on Japan's mainland.

The con can answer these sorts of proposals by arguing that relocating Okinawan bases to mainland Japan eliminates the deterrent effect that makes Okinawa so valuable. Here's **evidence**:

(Grant Newsham, senior research fellow at the Japan Forum for Strategic Studies in Tokyo, retired US Marine Officer, & former US Diplomat, "US military bases on Okinawa — still an essential deterrent," Asia Times, <http://atimes.com/2015/10/us-military-bases-on-okinawa-still-an-essential-deterrent/>, October 30 2015)

Can't US bases on Okinawa be moved to mainland Japan? Of course they can, and **the PRC would think this is a splendid idea.** **However,** the aforementioned **'time and distance' problems – and consequently weakened deterrence** – would **apply**. Moreover, **such a move would suggest a weakened US-Japan political relationship (and lessened deterrence) by virtue of Japan's central government being unwilling to make the political effort needed to maintain US bases on Okinawa. Additionally, moving US bases to mainland Japan would leave a vacuum.** Vacuums get filled, and it is possible the PRC will fill this vacuum. But it is almost unthinkable that a future Japanese administration



would allow this to happen as the result of a drastically reduced military presence on Okinawa's main island in light of the PRC threat. Thus, even if US forces leave their Okinawa bases, JSDF forces will certainly replace them. Importantly, **in the absence of a US military presence on Okinawa, Chinese forces would be facing off** more or less directly **with Japan Self Defense Force units. Removing the deterrent effect on the PRC of the fear of harming US troops would be dangerous given deep-seated Chinese resentment of Japan and** an increasing **belief the PLA is a match for the JSDF. In the absence of 'deterrent' US forces on Okinawa, expect the PRC to** ^{push and} **ratchet up the pressure on Japan** — and in the Ryukyus and the East China Sea, to which China has stated it is rightly entitled. **This is dangerous.**

The pro might also propose that Okinawa's bases could be shifted to Guam, a nearby island that already plays host to a substantial U.S. military presence.

However, as the **evidence** below indicates, this would be a very costly move. The con could use this to set up an external spending/economy disadvantage to operate alongside their "Okinawa key" claims:

(Emma Chanlett-Avery [Specialist in Asian Affairs] & Ian E. Rinehart [Analyst in Asian Affairs], "The U.S. Military Presence in Okinawa and the Futenma Base Controversy," Congressional Research Service, <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42645.pdf>, Jan 20 2016)

In May 2011, three Senators (Carl Levin, Chairman of the Armed Services Committee; John McCain, then-ranking minority Member of that committee; and James H. (Jim) Webb, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs) released a joint statement that called the U.S. military realignment plans in East Asia, and particularly those on Okinawa, "unworkable and unaffordable." They recommended alternatives, including transferring Marine Corps assets to the Kadena Air Base on Okinawa and moving some Air Force assets to Andersen Air Force Base on Guam. Senator Webb further proposed in subsequent letters to the Secretary of Defense that co-basing arrangements with the Japanese military be explored, as well as the use of aviation facilities on Okinawa during military contingencies. Soon afterward, **in June 2011, the** Government Accountability Office (**GAO**) released a **report** commissioned by the Subcommittee on Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies, Senate Appropriations Committee. The report **concluded that** the **Department of Defense had neither adequately estimated the costs involved in transforming its military posture in Japan and Guam nor analyzed the alternatives** to existing initiatives.²⁷ **The initial estimate was** for an expense of **\$10.3 billion to move 8,000 Marines and their dependents to Guam, but the GAO reported that the actual costs would be** more than double the DOD estimate at **\$23.9 billion**.²⁸ The cost to DOD for the latest plan, to move roughly 5,000 Marines and their dependents to Guam, has been estimated at \$8.6 billion.

Although there are surely numerous other proposals both sides could bring up, those are the most prominent ones for debaters to worry about.



That brings us to the end of this introduction.

As frequent readers are probably tired of hearing me repeat, remember that this paper is meant only as a foundation for your topic preparation, and that it is critical that you continue conducting research on your own.

Remember also that you can always email completed cases to **Rachel.Stevens@NCPA.org** for a free, confidential case critique! Even the best cases can benefit from a look from another set of eyes. Once you submit them, we'll get them back to you, with personalized comments, as soon as we can.

Good luck, PFers!