



PF Nationals 2014 Pro Analysis

The Public Forum resolution for this year's National competition is **Resolved: NATO should strengthen its relationship with Ukraine in order to deter further Russian aggression.** This topic is large, extremely current, and poses a number of unique challenges. Today, we're going to go over some of the basics, and get started building a pro case fit for National competition.

Clearly, this resolution is ripped directly from world news headlines. This makes the debate timely and exciting, but it also complicates preparation to a significant degree, because the situation you are discussing is still in the process of developing. That means conclusions can be proven wrong at any given moment. The very first thing you should understand as you prep for this topic is there is a real chance that circumstances will change dramatically between now and when you debate. In fact, there's a real chance that circumstances will change *mid-tournament*. It is critical that you keep your eyes on the news. I recommend setting Google News alerts for keywords from the topic, as well as any other countries/actors/concepts you plan to discuss, and checking on them regularly. You should also get comfortable with the idea that you might have to conduct last-minute "surgery" on any cases you write. But you can handle it; you're a top-notch debater. That's why you're going to Nationals!



Simply knowing what's happening in the status quo, however, won't be enough. You will also need to understand how we got there, based on a significant amount of **history**. I truly cannot emphasize enough how important it will be for you to gain a strong grounding in this topic's historical and political context. Unless you understand how and why we arrived at the current situation, as well as all relevant actors' motivations and interests, there is absolutely no way you will be able to discuss the topic intelligently and persuasively. *Please* do not skimp on this part of the research process.

I will give you an abbreviated rundown, but I *strongly* encourage you to do further [background reading](#), using this as a jumping-off point for your search.

[Victor Yanukovich](#) had been the president of Ukraine since 2010. His administration prioritized Ukraine's relationship to Russia over forging stronger ties with the West, withdrawing from numerous potential agreements, under pressure from Moscow. During his presidency, he was also repeatedly accused of corruption, cronyism, and embezzlement. These factors created widespread dissent, which galvanized into large-scale protests. After 3 months of protests, Yanukovich's government cracked down, and the situation became extremely violent. In February of 2014, extended protests finally culminated [Yanukovich's decision to flee](#).

Despite fleeing, Yanukovich did not resign. Several regions, including [Crimea](#), continued to support him, due to the largely pro-Russian make-up of their citizenry. Meanwhile, the leadership of the rest of the country acted to limit presidential powers, and called for a special, early presidential election in May. They also named Oleksandr Turchynov interim president. The election was held on May 25, and [Petro Poroshenko](#) was elected.



On February 28, armed units, [identified by experts as Russian special units](#), and Ukrainian separatists moved to take over Crimea. [Vladimir Putin denied that these forces were Russian troops](#) or that Russia had demanded surrender from Crimea. Putin maintains these people are acting alone, without orders from Moscow. Their actions have been explained as required to protect ethnic Russians living in Crimea (an estimated 59% of the Crimean population), who tended to support ousted president Yanukovich and favor a strong relationship with Moscow.

(Russia does, however, admit that the forces currently built up around the Ukrainian border are Russian troops, although they maintain the troops are only conducting routine military training exercises. Putin has publically stated that these troops are in the process of withdrawing, although evidence of withdrawal has been very limited. This is an ongoing question you should plan to monitor in the lead-up to Nationals.)

On March 16, a referendum was held to determine whether Crimea would remain a territory of Ukraine, or become [annexed](#) by Russia. The reported results were that 97% of Crimeans voted to secede from Ukraine and join Russia. However, this referendum was widely criticized across the globe, because it was seen as occurring under the threat of a Russian military occupation. Therefore, people may not have had a real choice. Many nations spoke out, and the UN passed a resolution (although not unanimously) to declare the referendum invalid. Nevertheless, the annexation proceeded. Crimea is currently subject to Russian, rather than Ukrainian, law. Russian legislators set the date of January 2015 for Crimea's total integration into Russia.



The United States, the European Union, and Canada responded by levying sanctions against certain Russian officials and companies. [Cooperation](#) on a number of issues [has dropped off](#), and West-Russia relations are low, while tensions run high.

Currently, the Ukraine faces continued instability and violent conflict. Separatists have seized control of buildings and territories. Although Russia has claimed that it plans to withdraw its troops from the Ukrainian border, at the time of publishing [tens of thousands](#) of Russian troops reportedly remain encamped along the border. It is widely believed that some of the armed fighters seizing territory for separatists in Ukraine are Russian forces. The United States, Europe, and their allies remain concerned about the possibility of further Russian encroachments on Ukraine and other nations in Eastern Europe. That is where we find ourselves as we approach debates on this resolution.

[Here is a useful timeline](#) of the crisis in Ukraine, which might help to further clarify things for you.

Now that we understand what it is we're debating about generally, let's investigate some of the specific key terms in the resolution.

"NATO" stands for [North Atlantic Treaty Organization](#). It is a multilateral military alliance made up of 28 countries from across North America and Europe. NATO was founded in 1949 for the purpose of mutual defense in the event of an attack on any member state. Article 5 of the North Atlantic treaty mandates that member states treat any attack on one state as an attack on all member states.



During the Cold War, NATO was largely used to counterbalance the Soviet Union. Since the [fall of the Berlin Wall](#) in 1989, it has extended membership to numerous former Soviet states. Because of this, Russia continues to see the expansion of NATO as a threat to its national interest.

“Strengthen its relationship with Ukraine” is an interesting phrase, because it leaves open so many possibilities. First, let’s establish the current state of the relationship, so we may determine what possible methods might “strengthen” it.

The 1994 [Partnership for Peace Framework Document](#) affirmed mutual interests and established an informal pact of cooperation between NATO and 22 states throughout Eastern Europe, including Ukraine. However, Ukraine is not a member of NATO. In 2008, the nation signed the documents requesting membership, but they were stalled by European opposition. In 2010, after becoming president, Yanukovich rescinded Ukraine’s request to join NATO in order to strengthen ties with Russia.

As you can see, the existing relationship between Ukraine and NATO is tenuous. That means there are a number of possible routes to “strengthening” it. Some of the most talked-about options are:

- Offer NATO membership to Ukraine.
- Provide Ukraine with a [security guarantee](#) (a promise to defend them in the event of any further aggression).
- Provide Ukraine with troops/air support/other physical military support.
- Supply Ukrainian forces with weapons and/or non-lethal military assistance (such as body armor).
- Provide Ukraine with financial assistance, such as grants or loans.
- Assist Ukraine with intelligence, military training, or other non-physical support.



Of course, this is PF, so pro teams don't have to advocate a plan. Regardless, debates will go much more easily for you if you can convince your judge that the pro's burden is only to prove that *some* strengthening of the relationship would be good, rather than a requirement to defend *all possible routes* to strengthening. Then, you can wiggle out of con offense by saying "we don't defend that [strategy A] should be done, only that *SOME STRATEGY* that should be done *exists*." You can support this interpretation of the resolution by pointing out that debates in which the pro was responsible for defending all possible methods of strengthening relations with Ukraine would be essentially unwinnable for the pro side, since there are an infinite number of stupid ideas that one could suggest would "strengthen the relationship" (such as "give Ukraine all NATO's money"). That said, don't try to get too cute. If the con presses you on it, and you're unable to come up with even one possible strategy that you're willing to defend as a good idea, you will look dumb and probably lose. It is true that PF doesn't demand you defend a policy plan, but if you try to wiggle out of every policy example that your opponents present, eventually your judge will conclude that there is no defensible example of the resolution. As the pro, that means you will probably lose.

The resolitional phrase "**in order to deter**" is more complex than you might initially think. To break it down: "in order to" means "as a means to" or "with the purpose of" and "deter" means "discourage." Notice the difference between "with the purpose of discouraging" and "preventing." According to this interpretation, the pro is not necessarily required to win that any relationship-strengthening that occurs will actually succeed in preventing further Russian aggression. In order to meet their burden, pros only need to win that the relationship-strengthening "should" occur-- for whatever reason. The resolution does not say "NATO should prevent Russian aggression by strengthening its relationship with Ukraine," it says "in order to deter," meaning deterrence only needs to be the *intent*, not the ultimate *effect*. In most debates, this won't matter, because the pro will choose to attempt to win the debate by winning that Russian aggression is bad and NATO prevents it. However, it is important for you to recognize that



this is not strictly required by the resolution. For example, the pro could technically concede a con argument that NATO cannot ultimately stop continued Russian aggression, but win that stronger NATO-Ukraine ties would still be net beneficial for other reasons (say, strengthening support for international law).

“Further Russian aggression” is yet another phrase in this resolution that is more complicated than it might appear. “Further” implies that some degree of “Russian aggression” has already taken place. However, “aggression” has a very precise, specific meaning in international law. You can see the lengthy legal definition of “aggression” used by the United Nations [here](#). Some con teams may choose to argue that Russian actions have so far fallen short of truly constituting “aggression.” While a military occupation of a foreign nation’s territory certainly meets the criteria, as does a forcible annexation, teams advancing this argument will follow Putin’s narrative that forces present during the referendum were private and not deployed by the Russian government. They will also claim the annexation was democratic, voluntary, and legal. The consensus of Western powers is that this is incorrect, but you will need to be prepared to win that argument. Don’t get caught off-guard!

So, to recap, the pro side will want to argue that they are responsible for defending one (or more) NATO strategy, which must strengthen Ukraine-NATO ties beyond the status quo, and be net beneficial to the status quo.

Another important general note, which hopefully goes without saying, is that any evidence you cite in your cases needs to be really, *really* recent. Because relevant evidence needs to consider the current



situation, you should really not be reading any cards from before 2014. The only exception would be generic impact cards (e.g. “great power wars go nuclear”), but even then, newer is better.

Now, let’s look at a few core pro arguments.

First, most pros will want to argue that **without deterrence, Russia will continue its expansionism**. This could mean annexing more of Ukraine, land grabs throughout former Soviet nations, and/or even more global aggression. The argument is simple and intuitive: if there are no consequences to annexing territory, why wouldn’t Putin just keep on doing it? Thus, it is necessary to implement disincentives.

Here is **evidence** that says absent deterrence, Russian expansionism will continue in violation in international law in order to “rally the base” in Russia, distract citizens from the floundering Russian economy, and keep Putin in power:

(Emily Sherwin, Deutsche Welle (Germany’s international broadcaster), “Russia shelves economics for power play,” <http://www.dw.de/russia-shelves-economics-for-power-play/a-17537824>, Feb 2 2014)

He explains that Putin saw the annexation of Crimea as "a way to mobilize uneducated lower classes in Russia, [...] mobilize higher ratings through short-term public euphoria."



Referring to the pro-Western protests that took place over several months in Kyiv, he added that "in the events that took place in Kyiv, [Putin] saw a major threat because Russian society could see that they could then replicate this chain of events in Moscow. So in a way he tried to kill two birds with one stone: erase a major political alternative and at the same time mobilize internally."

Zaslavskiy warns that Putin might need further "boost projects" similar to the annexation of Crimea if he wants to continue distracting the population from the problems of an economy the analyst labels in "stagnation or decline." Such projects, Zaslavskiy adds, are "a question of the political survival of the regime" and Putin wouldn't stop at much, including international law, to do preserve his power.

Evidence stating that Russia seeks to annex more parts of Ukraine:

(Peter Boone & Simon Johnson, chairman of the charity Effective Intervention/research associate at the Center for Economic Performance at the London School of Economics/nonresident senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics & professor at M.I.T. Sloan School of Management/former chief economist at the International Monetary Fund, Economix Blog, New York Times, "The Economics of Limiting Russia's Expansion," http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/03/20/the-economics-of-limiting-russias-expansion/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0, March 20 2014)

There is no doubt that Russia may seek to annex more parts of Ukraine. Russian military intervention is possible, but the Crimean strategy has proven much easier. Time and momentum



are on Russia's side, so Mr. Putin can be patient. If Ukraine's eastern and southern regions continue to flounder while Russia grows richer, it is only a matter of time before large separatist movements will develop in these areas.

Russia will make a success of Crimea as an example for others: pensions, government wages and other incomes can roughly double to meet Russian averages. The experience of debate and referendums in Quebec, Scotland, Catalonia and other regions all point to plausible democratic routes to exit that Russia can encourage.

Evidence arguing that, absent deterrence, there will be continued Russian expansion throughout former Soviet states:

(Wulf Wilde, Deutsche Welle (Germany's international broadcaster), "Blueprint for Russian expansionism," <http://www.dw.de/blueprint-for-russian-expansionism/a-17487876>, March 11 2014)

Mike Rogers, chairman of the US Committee on Intelligence, has come to the same conclusion. He believes Putin wants to strengthen and expand the buffer zone around Russia.

"His next target will be the Republic of Moldova, and other regions will follow," he said during a television interview. In the light of the developments in Ukraine, the fear of Russian intervention has increased in Chisinau, the Moldovan capital.



Recent events in southern Moldova are adding to those worries. In February, the autonomous region of Gagauzia voted by an overwhelming 98.5-percent majority for a tariff union with Russia. That result recalls the Soviet era, and observers don't rule out that Moscow was involved.

But if Gagauzia asks Moscow for military protection, the Crimea crisis could become the blueprint for an expansionist Russian policy there.

For former Soviet Republics, there's another warning sign: Russia is considering a law which would ease access to Russian citizenship for the Russian-speaking populations of the former Soviet satellite states.

For Latvian political researcher Andirs Spruds from the n-ost Network for Reporting on Eastern Europe, the international community cannot be inactive when it comes to Russia's actions in Crimea, since doing so would only encourage Russia to "defend" the Russian-speaking population. Its motto, he says: "Nobody reacts - then we'll occupy the next country."

An emboldened and expansionist Russia offers internal links to numerous impact scenarios. Russia is America's foremost great power rival, so, as you can imagine, there is no shortage of evidence out there detailing countless potential problems stemming from an increase in Russian power. This is easy research, so I'll mostly leave it to you to conduct independently.

One possible impact, though, is **escalation to a great power war**. Basically, tensions between the United States and/or other Western powers and Russia will become so intense that warfare will become seen



as necessary. Since we are talking about nations with huge militaries and nuclear arsenals, this impact has the potential to become very big.

It's unlikely, but not unthinkable. Recently, a senior Kremlin-backed broadcaster publically said Russia was still "[capable of turning the United States into radioactive ash.](#)" Clearly, tensions are running high. Numerous commentators have described the status quo as the largest breakdown in West-Russia relations since the Cold War. However, there have been no official government statements threatening war at this time.

Here is **evidence** saying this war goes nuclear and results in extinction:

(Seth Baum, Executive Director at the Global Catastrophic Risk Institute, Huffington Post Politics Blog, "Best And Worst Case Scenarios for Ukraine Crisis: World Peace And Nuclear War," http://www.huffingtonpost.com/seth-baum/best-and-worst-case-scena_b_4915315.html, May 7 2014)

Here's the short version: The best case scenario has the Ukraine crisis being resolved diplomatically through increased Russia-Europe cooperation, which would be a big step towards world peace. The worst case scenario has the crisis escalating into nuclear war between the United States and Russia, causing human extinction.

Let's start with the worst case scenario, nuclear war involving the American and Russian arsenals. How bad would that be? Put it this way: Recent analysis finds that a "limited" India-Pakistan nuclear war could kill two billion people via agricultural declines from nuclear winter. This "limited" war involves just 100 nuclear



weapons. The U.S. and Russia combine to possess about 16,700 nuclear weapons. Humanity may not survive the aftermath of a U.S.-Russia nuclear war.

It seems rather unlikely that the U.S. and Russia would end up in nuclear war over Ukraine. Sure, they have opposing positions, but neither side has anywhere near enough at stake to justify such extraordinary measures. Instead, it seems a lot more likely that the whole crisis will get resolved with a minimum of deaths. However, the story has already taken some surprising plot twists. We cannot rule out the possibility of it ending in direct nuclear war.

A nuclear war could also occur *inadvertently*, i.e. when a false alarm is misinterpreted as real, and nuclear weapons are launched in what is believed to be a counterattack. There have been several alarmingly close calls of inadvertent U.S.-Russia nuclear war over the years. Perhaps the most relevant is the 1995 Norwegian rocket incident. A rocket carrying scientific equipment was launched off northern Norway. Russia detected the rocket on its radar and interpreted it as a nuclear attack. Its own nuclear forces were put on alert and Boris Yeltsin presented the question of whether to launch Russia's nuclear weapons in response. Fortunately, Yeltsin and the Russian General Staff apparently sensed it was a false alarm and declined to launch. Still, the disturbing lesson from this incident is that nuclear war could begin even during periods of calm.

With the Ukraine crisis, the situation today is not calm. It is even more tense than last year, when the United States was considering military intervention in Syria. By coincidence, Israel had a pre-scheduled ballistic missile defense test during that brief period. Despite the tensions, Israel conducted its test, launching two missiles from the Mediterranean towards Israel. Russian radar again picked up the launch, initially suspecting it was the start of military action before Israel set the record straight. This incident could have escalated, especially because the U.S. and Russia had opposing positions on Syria. Fortunately, the confusion was quickly resolved and no escalation occurred.

This big extinction impact might seem attractive to you, but there's an important caveat—most con teams will make arguments that increased NATO involvement makes Russia feel threatened and creates backlash. There is plenty of good evidence claiming this is the most likely scenario for escalation. There is a strong chance that you are on the wrong side of this question, so I would recommend avoiding it, unless you're certain that your opponents' strategy takes a different direction.



It's also important to keep in mind that if you want to build your case around the idea that Russian expansionism must be contained, you *must* be prepared to win both the argument that (1) Russia seeks to continue expansion and (2) strengthening NATO's relationship with Ukraine stops that. If you lose either of these arguments, you will lose any impacts stemming from Russian expansion.

Another option is to not argue that Russia will proceed with unbridled expansionism, but instead seeks only to annex more of Ukraine (and/or maybe some of other weak, former Soviet states). This more modest claim is easily defensible, considering the ongoing violence and instability in regions of Ukraine and continued presence of Russian forces near the border. Your impacts then stem from the symbolic and/or soft power implications of this victory for Russia.

Here is **evidence** that says Ukraine is the linchpin of the Russian political strategy of "Eurasianism," an illiberal, anti-democratic, anti-American vision of soft power, which threatens to undermine the democratic order and cause totalitarianism:

(Ingo Mannteufel, Head of the Department for Europe and Russia, Deutsche Welle (Germany's international broadcaster), "Opinion: Putin's dangerous Eurasian idea,"

<http://www.dw.de/opinion-putins-dangerous- Eurasian-idea/a-17670509>, May 29 2014)

In any case, without Ukraine, the Eurasian Economic Union project for the post-Soviet region is economically dead in the water. That was - and is - the reason behind Russia's aggressive Ukraine policy in recent months.



Lastly, we must not forget that even the loyalty of Belarus and Kazakhstan to the Eurasian integration project has its limits.

Kazakhstan's primary motive for joining the Eurasian Economic Union is not to subjugate itself to Moscow, but to strengthen Russian ties as a counterweight to growing Chinese influence in Kazakhstan. A similar "seesaw policy" - this time between Russia and the EU - is the basis of the Belarusian position.

No: The emerging Eurasian Economic Union is not a new Soviet Union. Nor is it a threat to the "old" European Union.

Rather, the newly-emerging single market could ultimately provide better economic opportunities for EU companies. And in the event of real economic progress, the socio-economic situation could improve for people in the region.

Europeans, therefore, cannot be against Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia joining forces to create a single market.

Eurasianism: the new threat to Europe

A far different judgment, however, should be made with regard to the Eurasian ideology that has markedly gained in political significance in Russia since Putin returned to the presidency, and which is now being woven into the Eurasian integration project.

The linguistic monstrosity known as "Eurasianism" and its individual ideological components will, like it or not, shape the European political debate over the coming decades. In truth, this is already the case.

This is because Europe's increasingly strong right-wing populist movements with their anti-liberal, xenophobic, homophobic, anti-American views correspond exactly to the Eurasian ideology being propagated in Russia.

Eurasianism was developed in 1920 by Russian emigrants who combined in their ideology elements of anti-liberalism, nationalism and anti-Semitism. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, these concepts once again found their way into Russian discourse. Until a few years ago they were marginal views, held by political crackpots and conspiracy theorists.

However, in Putin's remarks and policies since 2011/2012, echoes of Eurasianism have become increasingly apparent. It is therefore unsurprising that Putin speaks so positively about right-wing populist politicians and parties like Marine Le Pen's National Front.



Eurasianism is not a Russian rejection of Europe, as is often erroneously thought. It's the concept of another Europe - namely, an anti-liberal and anti-American one.

This - and not the project of a Eurasian Economic Union - is the real threat to a liberal and democratic Europe. These far-reaching implications have yet to be grasped by the citizens of the old continent.

Europe would do well to wake up from the post-Cold-War euphoria that has prevailed since the end of the 20th century, and to adjust both politically and militarily to a new totalitarian challenge in the 21st.

You may also want to argue that continued instability in Ukraine causes problems. The internal link here is not that Russia is necessarily bad, but rather just that instability and chaos inherently tend to breed violence.

Here is **evidence** that instability in Ukraine causes European instability, border conflicts, and chaos.

(Alois Berger, Deutsche Welle (Germany's international broadcaster), "Ukraine: Battling over an economic midget," <http://www.dw.de/ukraine-battling-over-an-economic-midget/a-17537970>, April 2 2014)

Europe's interest in Ukraine, says Lambsdorff, can be summarized as follows: Stability, no border conflicts, no waves of refugees. EU members Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania and the Baltic states are pressing Brussels to bring Ukraine as close to the EU as possible.



For Berlin, London and Paris, Kyiv may be far away, but for the EU's eastern European members Russia's actions and the situation in Ukraine are deeply unsettling. "If the country collapses, controlled immigration would morph into chaos and that cannot be in Europe's interest," Lambsdorff warned.

Next, we're going to cover a couple of possible routes for argumentation that are based on **credibility**. These arguments are particularly strategic, because they do not necessarily require you to win that strengthening the NATO-Ukraine relationship actually directly solves the crisis in Ukraine. Instead, you are arguing that NATO just needs to do *something* in order to demonstrate that it will not passively tolerate this kind of behavior and create the global perception that there are consequences to aggression. This is key to the legitimacy of NATO and other international organizations, as well as American power and leadership, international respect for norms of national sovereignty, and global nuclear non-proliferation efforts. Each of these represents a potential internal link to multiple persuasive impact scenarios.



Here is **evidence** that responding to the Ukraine crisis is key to NATO's credibility:

(James A. Lyons, former commander in chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet and senior U.S. military representative to the United Nations, Washington Times, "Russian bear eats Obama's lunch on Ukraine," <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/apr/8/lyons-putins-provocation/#ixzz337hMUCn6>, April 8 2014)

Mr. Putin has been able to capitalize on events in Ukraine to advance his agenda with little fear of any military opposition. President Obama has made it clear that responding with military force is "beneath" the way he thinks the handling of territorial disputes in the 21st century should be resolved. I am sure this elitist view was well received in China, North Korea, Iran and Cuba, as well as among many of our other potential enemies.

Working through the rhetoric, there is a larger issue that must be addressed; namely, the relevancy of NATO. Since its inception, NATO has been a defensive alliance. While Ukraine is not a member of NATO, other former Warsaw Pact countries, including Poland and the Baltic states, are, and have to be concerned with the uncontested annexation of Crimea.

Further, the abrogation of the 1994 Budapest Agreement raises more questions. In the pact, not only Russia, but the United States and the United Kingdom — both NATO members — guaranteed Ukraine's sovereignty if it gave up its nuclear weapons.

How did the United States and the United Kingdom plan to meet their obligation under this agreement? It is a matter of credibility. So far, we have turned down Ukraine's request for military equipment so it could legitimately protect its sovereignty.



In Mr. Obama's way of thinking, if arms were transferred to the "victim," Mr. Putin might view such action as provocative. Therefore, the leader of NATO and the free world, transferred field rations, called MREs. How comforting for our friends as well as our potential enemies.

Even though Russia has become a key energy supplier for Germany and the West European grid, its economy is extremely vulnerable to the external demand for its in-ground resources. Compounding that problem is the inherent weakness of its economy, plus its declining Slavic population and a rapidly rising Muslim populace.

Many European Union countries rely on Russia for approximately 30 percent of their energy requirements. Nonetheless, if NATO is to remain relevant, it needs to reassert its fundamental principles and take action that will send an unmistakable message that it will defend itself as well as its newest members.

Such action does not require deploying NATO forces to Ukraine. However, requests for military equipment should be granted so Ukraine can be seen as having a capability to defend its sovereignty.

Key to demonstrating NATO's determination and solidarity is the execution of visible confidence-building measures. This should include key defensive as well as offensive elements to dissuade Mr. Putin from any follow-on military aggression.

NATO should deploy the latest offensive weapons — F-22s, AWACS, Global Hawks, F-15E, B-2s and Eurofighter Typhoons — and defensive systems such as Patriot and PAC-3 batteries, to carefully selected NATO areas. At least one carrier battle group should be maintained in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Once forces are in place, they need to be exercised in a way that clearly shows NATO solidarity. These exercises also need to include a theaterwide command-and-control exercise. NATO ground forces should also be incorporated as part of the overall exercise program.

The key to demonstrating NATO's determination and solidarity will not be found in the Saul Alinsky playbook, nor will it be accomplished by "leading from behind." It will require Mr. Obama to measure up to meet Mr. Putin's challenge by displaying the necessary leadership NATO deserves. The consequences for failure in meeting this challenge will loom large in the future.



Here is **evidence** saying the United States and Europe must act together cohesively (NATO would be the most relevant body to perform this kind of action) in order to enforce respect for national sovereignty and demonstrate their continued global leadership:

(Ulrich Speck, visiting scholar at Carnegie Europe in Brussels focusing on European foreign policy, Carnegie Europe, "Ukraine Crisis: Who Will Blink First?," <http://carnegieeurope.eu/2014/04/28/ukraine-crisis-who-will-blink-first-vladimir-putin-or-west/h9fd>, April 28 2014)

American leaders aren't motivated solely by their concern over eastern Europe and Russia reasserting itself as a more aggressive and expansionist power. The U.S. also wants to assert key norms of international order -- namely territorial integrity and the principle to change borders only with the consent of all parties.

Ukraine is also a welcome opportunity to signal to allies and rivals alike that America is not retrenching from its global engagements. The impact of the Ukraine crisis on China and the various territorial conflicts with its neighbors will also loom very large on the minds of policy makers in Washington.

But whatever the differences among U.S. and EU leaders, the more they act in concert, the better chance they have to achieve their goal: beating back Moscow's attempt to undermine Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity.



Here is **evidence** that concludes a NATO response is urgently needed to deter Russian mischief globally and prevent war on the European continent (this evidence is good because it also suggests NATO can solve, but the more important warrant is perception-based):

(David Frum, political author & CNN contributor, CNN Opinion, "U.S. giving Putin green light in Ukraine?," <http://www.cnn.com/2014/04/14/opinion/frum-ukraine/>, April 14 2014)

Europe outside the Balkans has known profound peace since 1991. Even the murderous wars in the former Yugoslavia, atrocious as they were, never threatened the general European peace. The Russians' actions in Ukraine do threaten the general peace. Russia is using military force -- as opposed to its usual tool kit of corruption, intimidation, and no-return-address assassination - - to reclaim former Soviet-occupied territory. In Ukraine, Russia has launched a war of reconquest. It's very hard to predict where that war will stop.

President Obama was very wrong in his speech in Brussels on March 26 to suggest that the United States had no national interest in Ukraine. What's at stake in Ukraine is the peace and stability of the European continent, an issue over which the United States fought two world wars. Yet the president has signaled to Russia that it need not fear any very robust U.S. or NATO response to its depredations in Ukraine.

More from the March 26 speech: "Of course, Ukraine is not a member of NATO -- in part because of its close and complex history with Russia. Nor will Russia be dislodged from Crimea or deterred from further escalation by military force."

When a president announces that he does not think a foreign aggressor's actions can be deterred, what message does that foreign aggressor hear? "Green light!" Unsurprisingly, Russia is driving right through that green light. The U.S. response? Over the weekend, the White House



announced that Vice President Joe Biden will visit Ukraine on April 22, or not for another 10 days. Ten days from now, Putin could be standing under a "Mission Accomplished" banner in Kharkiv.

Every supposed benefit we receive from Obama's famed Russia "reset" is disintegrating before our eyes. News is arriving of another Syrian chemical attack, in the village of Kfar Zeita, 125 miles northeast of Damascus. Syria still holds most of the chemical warfare arsenal that was supposed to have been entirely surrendered to Russia by February 5. Russia has announced plans to bust up the international sanctions regime against Iran with purchases of 500,000 barrels of Iranian oil a day, potentially nearly doubling Iran's oil exports.

This is a rampage of mischief, far beyond one remote region of southeast Europe. And yet even as the threat to peace intensifies, the Western leaders and Western alliances charged with keeping the peace dither, fidget, and hem and haw.

The most urgent necessity now: deploy teams of NATO observers to the cities that are targets of Russian activity in eastern Ukraine. NATO needs eyes and ears on the ground -- and Russia must confront that it is fomenting an international crisis.

NATO needs rapidly to expand its permanent presence with the exposed eastern members of the alliance, especially the three Baltic republics. Such a move would violate the terms of the 1997 agreement with Russia on NATO expansion, which is precisely why it's an apt response to Russia's violation of the 1994 agreement on Ukraine's territorial integrity.



Finally, here is **evidence** arguing that NATO must come to Ukraine's aid in order to ensure nations do not feel the need to acquire nuclear weapons in order to protect their sovereignty. Otherwise, safety guarantees in exchange for nonproliferation (like what was promised to Ukraine in 1994) will seem hollow:

(Kingston Reif, director of nuclear nonproliferation at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, "Ukraine and the future of nonproliferation," <http://thebulletin.org/ukraine-and-future-nonproliferation7021>, April 3 2014)

The more interesting and difficult-to-answer question about the Ukraine crisis, though, is whether and how Russia's Crimean land grab might impact other states' decisions on whether to acquire nuclear weapons.

In the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, Kiev received assurances—though not a military guarantee—from the United States, the United Kingdom, and Russia that in return for surrendering all former Soviet nuclear weapons, Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity would be respected. Now that Russia has run roughshod over these assurances, will North Korea's resolve to maintain and expand its nuclear arsenal be strengthened? Will Iran, now engaged in negotiations with the West on constraining its nuclear capabilities, be less likely to agree to stringent constraints on its nuclear weapons capability in return for a package of incentives that could include a US security assurance? And might US allies begin to question whether they can rely on Washington's guarantees of protection—and come to see possessing nuclear weapons as more attractive?

Many observers have answered yes to these questions, but the impact of the current crisis on nonproliferation is complex.



For one thing, much will depend on reactions. The United States is not going to war with Russia over Ukraine. However, failing to respond at all to Russia’s blatant violation of international law would send the dangerous signal that states that reject nuclear weapons, or give them up as Ukraine did in return for security assurances, can’t count on outside assistance or support in the face of aggression. Meaningful political, diplomatic, and economic assistance and limited military aid are necessary to support Ukraine, punish Russia, deter future acts of aggression against other US allies and partners, and uphold the credibility of security assurances as a nonproliferation tool—even if it doesn’t reverse Moscow’s illegal annexation.

In my opinion, this argument about the survival of global nonproliferation efforts is one of your strongest options as the pro on this topic. Because Ukraine was specifically offered a security assurance in exchange for giving up their nukes, it is very persuasive to argue that reneging on this would make other nations skeptical of accepting such deals in the future. There are lots and lots of impacts to increased global proliferation, including arms races, nuclear accidents, weapons theft by terrorist cells, miscalculation or accidental launch, as well as full-scale nuclear war.

As I mentioned above, arguments premised on credibility do not necessarily require you to win that the action of strengthening the relationship itself will be successful at resolving the Ukrainian crisis or preventing some further Russian aggression. Instead, you are arguing that just the act of appearing to care (and not just “rolling over”) ensures the survival of critical international norms and institutions. This is strategically valuable, because it allows you to concede numerous likely con arguments. However, the best cases will begin with both types of arguments, and shed down to just credibility *only if* it becomes necessary. Remember, diversity of offense options is (almost always) your friend.



That should get you started with this admittedly very challenging topic. You should now be ready to write a high-quality pro case. Don't forget to thank Debate Central when you win Nationals! ;)

Of course, it is important to remember that this topic is huge and likely to change in the weeks leading up to the tournament. This guide is only meant as an introduction to help you get started. If you want to do well, you absolutely should keep your eyes on the news, stay up-to-date, and get creative with your strategizing!

Don't forget that you can always email completed cases to **Rachel.Stevens@NCPA.org** for a free, confidential case critique.

Good luck!