

Cuban Oil AFF – NCPA

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1ac

Plan

The United States federal government should authorize the licensing of American oil companies to participate in the development of Cuba's energy resources.

Solvency

The plan is key to US-Cuban energy cooperation---solves overall relations and regional stability. Failure to act allows other international actors to get involved.

Jonathan **Benjamin-Alvadar** (PhD, Professor of Political Science at University of Nebraska at Omaha, Director of the Intelligence Community Centers of Academic Excellence Program at UNO, Treasurer of the American Political Science Association) **2010** "Cuba's Energy Future: Strategic Approaches to Cooperation")

Oil exploration is an inherently risky enterprise; there are always trade-offs between negatives and positives relating to energy security, environmental integrity, and geostrategic considerations. **The consensus** arising from the studies and the analyses in this book **is that the creation of mutually beneficial trade and investment opportunities between the United States and Cuba is long overdue**. Throughout most of the twentieth century, Cuban infrastructure and economic development were direct beneficiaries of commercial relations with the United States. This relationship was instrumental in providing Cuba with access to advanced technologies and the signs of modernity that were unparalleled in Latin America and far beyond.¶ Once again, **the United States is presented with an opportunity that might serve as the basis of a new relationship between the United States and Cuba. It holds out the possibility of enhancing the stability and development of a region** that is wrestling with questions of how and when it too might benefit from engagement with a global economic development model. **The question is whether the United States chooses to be at the center, or to leave Cuba to seek**

some alternate path toward its goals.¶ Ironically, **Cuban officials have invited American oil companies to participate in developing their offshore oil and natural gas reserves. American oil companies possess the capital, technology, and operational know-how to explore, produce, and refine these resources in a safe and responsible manner. Yet they remain on the sidelines because of** our almost five-decades-old unilateral political **and economic embargo. The United States can end this impasse by licensing**

American oil companies to participate in the development of Cuba's energy resources. By seizing the initiative on Cuba policy, the United States will be strategically positioned to play an important role in the future of the island, thereby giving Cubans a better chance for a stable, prosperous, and democratic future. The creation of stable and transparent commercial relations in the energy sector

will bolster state capacity in Cuba while **enhancing U.S. geostrategic interests**, and can help Cuba's future leaders avoid illicit business practices, **minimize the influence of narco-trafficking enterprises, and stanch the outflow of illegal**

immigrants to the United States.¶ If U.S. companies are allowed to contribute to the development of Cuba's hydrocarbon reserves, as well as the development of alternative and renewable energy (solar, wind, and biofuels), **it will give the United States the opportunity to engage Cuba's future leaders to carry out long-overdue economic reforms and development that will perhaps pave the way to a more open and representative society while helping to promote Cuba as a stable partner and leader in the region** and beyond.¶ Under no circumstances is

this meant to suggest that the United States should come to dominate energy development policy in Cuba. The United States certainly has a role to play, but unlike its past relationship with Cuba, its interaction and cooperation will be predicated on its ability to accept, at a minimum, that Cuba will be the dominant partner in potential commercial ventures, and an equal partner in future diplomatic and interstate relations.

Without a doubt Cuban government actors are wary of the possibility of being dominated by the "colossus of the North," but as **Cuba's energy policymakers** face the daunting reality of their nation's energy future, it is abundantly clear that they **possess the willingness and the capacity to assiduously pursue sound policy objectives and initiatives that begin to address the island's immediate and long-term challenges**. In the end, this course of action will have direct and tangible benefits for the people of Cuba, its neighbors, and beyond.

Cuba will say yes to US ventures – they prefer US assistance due to technological lead. Plan is a catalyst to the normalization of US-Cuban relations and overall regional stability

Jonathan **Benjamin-Alvarado** (PhD, Professor of Political Science at University of Nebraska at Omaha, Director of the Intelligence Community Centers of Academic Excellence Program at UNO, Treasurer of the American Political Science Association) **2006** “The Current Status and Future Prospects for Oil Exploration in Cuba: A Special Report for the Cuban Research Institute, Florida International University,” <http://cri.fiu.edu/research/commissioned-reports/oil-cuba-alvarado.pdf>)

Why is it important to clarify the current status of Cuban energy in the face of a continuing opposition by the United States to anything resembling what can be construed as “good news” for the Castro regime? Obviously, **because up until this point it hasn’t cost the United States much if anything. The current policy continues to clearly place at the forefront the sanctity and utility of a comprehensive economic and political embargo** in the hopes that it helps **to foment a change in regime** and a peaceful transition to a democratic system of governance and a complimentary market economy. **As energy security concerns continue to percolate up to an increasingly important status in the realm of national security objectives we may begin to see the erosion of the hard position against the Cuban regime regardless of its leadership.** The overview of the Cuban energy developments clearly and unambiguously reveals that **the Castro regime has every intention of continuing to promote design and implement energy development policies** that will benefit Cuba for generations to come. **Cuba is sparing no effort** by instituting bottom-up and top-down policy initiatives **to meet this challenge. It has significantly increased its international cooperation in the energy sector** and continues to enhance its efforts to ensure energy security in these most uncertain of times. But it stands to reason that no matter how successful these efforts are, they will come up short. Two factors may alter this present situation. First, Cuba may indeed realize a bonanza from the offshore tracts that will allow it to possibly address its many energy challenges, from increasing oil production and refining capacity, to improving the nation’s energy infrastructure, ensuring a stable energy future. Second, and no less significant, is the possibility of normalization of trade relations with the United States. This is important not only because it will allow direct foreign investment, technology transfer and information sharing between these neighboring states but it possibly enhances the energy security of both states, and hence, the region, realized through a division of labor and dispersion of resources that serve as a hedge against natural disaster and market disruptions. Moreover, all states could derive benefit from the public information campaigns to promote energy efficiency and conservation presently being promoted in Cuba in the face of diminishing energy stocks and uncertain global markets. Ultimately, and only after normalization, the task still falls to the Cuban government, but the cost will necessarily be spread through a number of sources that are predominately American because of strategic interests, proximity and affinity. **It suffices to say that the requisite investment and assistance will have a distinct American tinge to it, inasmuch as American corporations, U.S. government agencies, and international financial institutions, of which the U.S. is a major contributor, will play important roles in the funding of the effort to revitalize the Cuban energy sector.** **Cuban officials** are not averse and perhaps **would prefer that the U.S. be its major partner in this effort owing to the fact that most if not all of the cutting-edge technology in energy, oil and gas comes from the United States. It is remarkable that the Cuban energy sector is as vibrant as it presently is, absent the type of infrastructural investment that is available to most developing states, in large part because of the American economic embargo.** Finally, **the cost is significant** and it stands to reason that the longer one waits to address the challenge at hand the higher the cost of modernizing the energy sector. **For this reason alone, the American role in assisting Cuba in this effort will be significant** and every day that the task is put off, it increases the long-term cost of the effort. **This should serve as an obvious point of entry into cooperation with the Cuban government and perhaps can serve as a catalyst for promoting confidence, trust and cooperation in this critical issue area across the region.**

China ADV

Now is the time to engage Cuba – recent Cuban economic reforms are on the brink, provide unique opportunity for engagement

Ted Piccone (Senior Fellow and Deputy Director, Foreign Policy) 3/18/2013 “Time to bet on Cuba”, <http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2013/03/18-cuba-piccone>

Cuba's efforts to “update” its socialist system through a series of **economic reforms just got** more **complicated**. **The death of** Venezuela's Hugo **Chávez**, its principal benefactor, **could** seriously **disrupt** what is already **a precarious process of** maintaining top-down political control while **liberalizing** elements of **the economy**. Raúl Castro's announcement that he will step down in five years and the emergence of younger leaders born after the 1959 revolution add further uncertainty to the island's future. ¶ **These new circumstances offer** President **Obama a rare opportunity to turn** the page of history from an outdated Cold War approach to Cuba **to a new era of** constructive **engagement**. In his second term in office, **he should** place a big bet by **investing political capital in defrosting relations, an approach that will advance U.S. interests** in a stable, prosperous and democratic Cuba. ¶ **Under Castro, the Cuban government has undertaken important reforms to modernize and liberalize the economy**. Cubans are now permitted to buy and sell property, open their own businesses, hire employees and enter into co-ops, with state-owned enterprises on a more equal footing. The updating of the Soviet-style economic system is a gradual and highly controlled process. But **the recent legal emergence of** formal, **small-scale private businesses** (cuentapropistas) **that can now compete on a more equal footing with state-owned enterprises opens a window into a profound shift in thinking** already **under way on the island**. **The reforms also offer new opportunities for U.S. engagement.** ¶ Castro's loosening of the apron strings extends beyond the economy. In January, the Cuban government lifted exit controls for most citizens, which is likely to accelerate the process of reconciliation within the Cuban diaspora. It could also result in a swift uptick of Cubans departing for the United States, demanding a reconsideration of U.S. migration policy to manage the increase. The gradual handoff of power to a next generation of more pragmatic party and military leaders who will determine the pace and scope of the reform process is yet further evidence that the Castro generation is looking forward to securing a viable legacy. ¶ **The U.S. approach to Cuba has likewise undergone important changes since Obama took office**. Since the expansion of travel and remittances in 2009, hundreds of thousands of the 1.8 million Cuban Americans living in the United States have sent more than \$2 billion to relatives there, providing important fuel to the burgeoning private sector and empowering citizens to be less dependent on the Cuban state. ¶ **Much more**, however, **could be done**. In his second term, Obama has a wealth of policy options available to him through executive authority that would reframe U.S. support for the Cuban people and advance U.S. national interests. ¶ In his second term, the president can (and should): ¶ Appoint a special envoy to open a discrete dialogue with Havana without preconditions to discuss such issues as migration, travel, counterterrorism and counternarcotics, energy and the environment, and trade and investment. Such talks could result in provisions that strengthen border security, protect Florida from oil spills, break down the walls of communication that prevent our diplomats from traveling outside Havana and help U.S. businesses export more goods, and thereby create jobs. ¶ Authorize financial and technical assistance to support burgeoning small businesses and permit trade in goods and services with certified independent entrepreneurs. ¶ Expand the list of exports licensed for sale to Cuba, including school and art supplies, water and food preparation systems and telecommunications equipment. ¶ Grant general licenses for journalists, researchers, humanitarian organizations and others to facilitate people-to-people exchanges. ¶ Remove Cuba from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, where it does not belong, allowing a greater share of U.S.-sourced components and services in products that enter Cuban commerce. ¶ This list is not exhaustive; the president can take any number of unilateral steps to improve relations and increase U.S. support to the Cuban people, as mandated by Congress. He can also expect significant pushback from a well-organized and vocal minority of elected officials who are increasingly out of step with their constituencies on this issue. (In the 2012 election, Obama's share of the Cuban-American vote increased by 10 points in Miami-Dade county.) He can win the argument, however, by demonstrating that these measures are in the spirit of the congressional mandate to encourage a free and prosperous Cuba. ¶ **The trend toward reform in Cuba is evident and suggests that an inflection point is approaching. Now is the time to employ a new paradigm by opening a long overdue direct dialogue with our next-door neighbor** and thereby test the willingness of the Cuban government to engage constructively, including on the case of U.S. citizen Alan Gross. By invoking his executive authority to expand trade, travel and communications with the Cuban people, Obama can continue to help them make the transition from subjects to citizens. The moment has come to rise above historical grievances and extend that outstretched hand he so eloquently promised just four years ago.

As Cuba open up market for offshore drilling China will enter the market IF the US does not – plan key to open the US-Cuban oil market

Boston Globe 2/9 (“Cuba’s reforms pave way for new US policy, too”, 2013,

<http://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/editorials/2013/02/09/cuba-reform-create-opportunity-drag-policy-into-century/xER2NTTXGxsdLej0miHwFM/story.html>)

Relations between the United States and Cuba have been stuck since the United States imposed a full economic embargo in 1962, and during the election season neither President Obama nor Mitt Romney signaled much desire to change the status quo. Yet **while Americans have been looking elsewhere, significant change has come to Cuba. The communist government** of the ruling Castro brothers, Fidel and Raul, **is in the midst of a slow experiment to promote economic entrepreneurship**. Late last year, **Cuba instituted reforms** to its immigration policies **that allow Cubans to travel abroad freely** and allow those who have emigrated or fled to return home. **These changes, and the beginning of Obama’s second term, create an unusual opportunity to acknowledge Cuba’s gestures and respond in a substantive way.** Rather than simply extend policies that, in five decades, have failed to dislodge the Castros, the **Obama administration has a chance to drag US policy into the 21st century.** The Cuban-American population, which has historically opposed any loosening of US policy, is no longer monolithic. Supporting greater contact with friends, family, and the Cuban economy now animates a younger generation of Florida voters. **Because of this trend, Obama** — who performed nearly as well with Cuban-American voters as Romney — **has more maneuvering room politically.** The first step would be to end the silly claim, reinstated by the Obama administration last summer, that Cuba remains a “state sponsor of terrorism.” The administration argued that Cuba harbored members of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC. It has, but the FARC and Colombia are now in negotiations; those peace talks are supported by the Obama White House in order to end a bloody civil war. By depoliticizing the Cuba portfolio, **the United States could** then begin to **lessen trade restrictions**, starting with promoting cultural exchanges; ending the travel ban; **and** eventually **allowing for trade in oil, gas, and other commodities.** Over time, billions of dollars in new trade between the two nations will benefit both. This would include boosts to US farm companies while helping Cubans. **Direct relations would also further US national security and environmental interests; as Cuba opens up, other countries will sweep in to seek influence, as China has already done. Especially as Cuba increasingly promotes offshore drilling** and other maritime exploration, **the United States must improve communication** with Havana. Currently, even though the United States and Cuba are separated by a narrow channel, **the two countries have no bilateral communications to ensure safety standards for their mutual protection from oil spills.** Secretary of State John Kerry should make Cuba a focus of his first months in office. Unfortunately, his successor as chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is Robert Menendez of New Jersey, a son of Cuban immigrants who has opposed the administration’s efforts to ease relations. Menendez will need to be convinced that he can help Cubans more by resetting American policy. Absent military intervention, **there are very few opportunities for a president to dramatically alter relations** with a historic foe; Obama has taken such advantage of a disorientingly rapid liberalization by Burma’s military rulers. **Raul Castro’s recent decision** to lift travel restrictions on Cuban citizens is similarly momentous — and **signals that the timing is ripe for a new diplomatic agenda with Cuba.**

The plan critical for US influence in Latin America and prevents Chinese expansion

Jonathan **Benjamin-Alvarado** (PhD, Professor of Political Science at University of Nebraska at Omaha, Director of the Intelligence Community Centers of Academic Excellence Program at UNO, Treasurer of the American Political Science Association) **2006** “The Current Status and Future Prospects for Oil Exploration in Cuba: A Special Report for the Cuban Research Institute, Florida International University,” <http://cri.fiu.edu/research/commissioned-reports/oil-cuba-alvarado.pdf>)

In the period **since the announcement that it had discovered offshore oil reserves off of the northwest coast of Cuba, the Castro regime,** its energy development plans and its growing list of international partners **have garnered increased interest from American policy analysts, corporate oil interests and a widening number of U.S. government officials regarding the scope and direction of the Cuban oil boom,** and how this might alter the standing embargo against the Castro regime.² Specifically, the questions have centered on the size and potential of the oil reserves and the possibility of American involvement in both the private and public domain. This special report is an attempt to clarify the current conditions

of Cuban oil and gas development schemes and their impact on longer term U.S. interests as they pertain to energy security, the diversification of strategic energy resources especially those related to oil refining, and the role that cooperation in this arena may be beneficial after the eventual normalization of relations between these two countries. At first glance, listed below are the important factors to consider in assessing these prospects:

1. Since 1990, Cuba has increased its domestic oil production to a level where it now accounts for 95 percent of the fuel used to produce electricity for the island.
2. Cuba is enjoying its Venezuelan bonanza – a “virtually” guaranteed supply of oil imports amounting to 85,000 barrels of oil daily, mostly in the form of refined petroleum products; gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel.
3. The discovery of a sizable oil field off the northwest coast of Cuba estimated to be approximately half of the oilfields of the Alaska National Wildlife Reserve (ANWR).
4. The growing interest and investment of oil exploration companies from Canada, China, Spain, Brazil, India and Norway potentially resulting in hundreds of millions of dollars in investment and significant transfers of cutting-edge technology to Cuba.
5. The attempt by the Cuban government to increase efficiency in the consumption of electricity and to promote an island-wide comprehensive program of energy conservation.
6. To improve the integrity of Cuba’s national electrical grid (la sistema de electricidad nacional – SEN) by shutting down inefficient plants, improving the national grid for transmission and delivery, and installing remote micro-electrical generation facilities to offset the impact of disruptions of service due to hurricanes and other catastrophes.

Given that there are no formal diplomatic of economic relations between the governments of the United States and Cuba, the level of interest has grown significantly in the 3 years **due primarily to** three reasons in the following interest areas: energy security interests; broader regional strategic; and purely economic interests. **First, the energy security interests in the potential of Cuban oil** – although it really would not minimize the immediacy of an American energy crisis – **is seen as possible** if only partial **remedy to energy supply concerns**. **Second, as Cuba, in part because of the increasing number of oil partnerships furthers its diplomatic and economic ties to with countries like Venezuela, China, Brazil** and members of the European Union **it may prove to provide Cuba for a sufficient buffer against U.S. opposition as it solidifies its economic and diplomatic role in the region. This is important inasmuch as there is a de facto trend in the Americas that clearly disavows and attempts to minimize the influence of the United States in the region,** and with the growing demands on the world economy by China, **it stands to reason that Cuba may assume an increasing stature that almost potentially lessens the presence of American influence in Cuban and hence regional affairs. Finally,** and **as demonstrated by the presence of American oil interests in the** February 2006 **U.S.- Cuban Energy Summit** in Mexico City, **there may be interest in cooperating in joint venture projects,** and by extension **assisting in the long-term development in Cuba’s oil industry.** To accomplish this task the report seeks to lay out some national security policy considerations applying strategic thought to what I will term “Post-Oil” Cuba – a Cuba that has a small but vibrant and growing oil and gas production capacity with extensive relations with a number of partners, and an increasingly positive outlook toward addressing energy and economic development questions that have plagued the Castro regime since the Cuban Revolution.³ The primary consideration is to determine the present state of Cuban energy and what possibilities exist that would be available to American foreign policy decision makers and business interests as the relations with Cuba evolve over the coming years.⁴ **This is important because any realistic appraisal of how Cuba is to take advantage of its oil bonanza involves the United States.** Previous research in this area has clearly laid out the scope and objectives of Cuban energy development schemes in the period since the demise of Cuba’s favorable trade arrangements with the former Soviet Union. Recently, and **as a result of the oil discovery and Cuba’s energy arrangement with** the government of Hugo Chavez in **Venezuela there is renewed interest in Havana’s energy policies.** Most of that analysis has been focused on concrete possibilities where there can be cooperation in the energy field between these two neighbors. Specifically, **the work has looked at areas for the convergence of energy interests as they apply to the near- and long-term energy development scenarios facing both countries.** Myers Jaffe and Soligo have addressed this possibility by looking at the potential to increase diversification and dispersion of energy resources. This is an important consideration when one takes into consideration that well over one-third of all oil refining capacity resides on or near the Houston shipping channel. The potential negative impact on America’s refining capacity following Hurricane Rita made a significant impression on oil industry analysts for the necessity of diversifying the location of these vital national resources. **The potential of viewing Cuba as a “staging area” for American oil storage and refining is plausible because of the proximity of the island.** The also becomes more attractive because of the growing climatic concerns over the uncertain security of oil resources in the Gulf region as clearly demonstrated by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005. While it is true that Venezuela has initiated an investment of \$1 billion dollars to bring the Cienfuegos refinery online, **there are** still many other **possibilities open and available to American companies,** as well as a growing number of foreign firms.⁶ Additionally, Venezuela remains the fourth largest importer of oil to the United States and one can surmise that the existing trade arrangements between the U.S. and Venezuela will remain intact, the evolution of the Bolivarian revolution under Chavez and a growing Chinese presence in the region notwithstanding. Additionally, **pursuing such a path would allow United States policymakers to take advantage of what Cuba has to offer** in the following areas: **domestic technical capabilities**; continuing human

capital development; **strategic positioning in the Caribbean, and an improved diplomatic stature.** Cuba, by any measure, **possesses a largely untapped technical capacity** owing to advanced training and education in the core mathematic and scientific areas. This was clearly demonstrated by its attempt to develop a nuclear energy capability in the 1980s and 1990s whereby thousands of Cubans pursued highly technical career paths leaving Cuba with among the highest ratios of scientists and engineers to the general population in all of the Americas. **Moreover,** the foundation of **Cuba's vaunted public education system remains intact and** increased investment under various scenarios suggests that **Cuba will continue to produce a well educated workforce that will be critical to its future economic vitality.** This raises an important consideration that being the role that Cuba will play in the region in the 21st century. It suffices to say that **Cuba remains the strategically important state by virtue of its geographical location** alone, **in efforts against drug and human trafficking and related national and regional security matters. The extent to which a stable Cuban government has cooperated with the U.S. in drug interdiction efforts** in the past **suggests that the results from improved diplomatic relations** between neighbors **would** have the effect of **improving national security concerns related to terrorist activity,** illicit weapons transfers and the like. Ultimately, **a successful normalization of relations between the U.S. and Cuba** in these areas **may well enhance and stabilize regional relations that could possibly lessen (or at a minimum, balance) fears of a Chinese incursion in hemispheric affairs.** To lessen those fears it may be useful to review the present structure of joint-venture projects in the energy sector in Cuba to ascertain the feasibility and possible success of such an undertaking become available to American firms. Moreover, it is interesting to note that U.S. firms in the agriculture sector have successfully negotiated and consummated sales to Cuba totaling more than \$1 billion dollars over the past four years under conditions that are less than optimal circumstances but have well-served the commercial interests of all parties involved.

US influence in the region key to crowd out China

Alan Dowd (Senior Fellow with the American Security Council Foundation) 2012 "Crisis in the America's," http://www.ascfusa.org/content_pages/view/crisisinamericas)

Focused on military operations in the Middle East, nuclear threats in Iran and North Korea, and the global threat of terrorism, **U.S. policymakers have neglected a growing challenge right here in the Western Hemisphere: the expanding influence and reach of China.** Eyeing energy resources to keep its economy humming, **China is engaged in a flurry of investing and spending in Latin America.** In Costa Rica, China is funding a \$1.24-billion upgrade of the country's oil refinery; bankrolling an \$83-million soccer stadium; backing infrastructure and telecommunications improvements; and pouring millions into a new police academy. In Colombia, China is planning a massive "dry canal" to link the country's Pacific and Atlantic coasts by rail. At either terminus, there will be Chinese ports; in between, there will be Chinese assembly facilities, logistics operations and distribution plants; and on the Pacific side, there will be dedicated berths to ship Colombian coal outbound to China. In mid-January, a Chinese-built oil rig arrived in Cuba to begin drilling in Cuba's swath of the Gulf of Mexico. Reuters reports that Spanish, Russian, Malaysian and Norwegian firms will use the rig to extract Cuban oil. For now, China is focusing on onshore oil extraction in Cuba. New offshore discoveries will soon catapult Brazil into a top-five global oil producer. With some 38 billion barrels of recoverable oil off its coast, Brazil expects to pump 4.9 million barrels per day by 2020, as the Washington Times reports, and China has used generous loans to position itself as the prime beneficiary of Brazilian oil. China's state-run oil and banking giants have inked technology-transfer, chemical, energy and real-estate deals with Brazil. Plus, as the Times details, China came to the rescue of Brazil's main oil company when it sought financing for its massive drilling plans, pouring \$10 billion into the project. A study in Joint Force Quarterly (JFQ) adds that Beijing plunked down \$3.1 billion for a slice of Brazil's vast offshore oil fields. The JFQ study reveals just how deep and wide Beijing is spreading its financial influence in Latin America: \$28 billion in loans to Venezuela; a \$16.3-billion commitment to develop Venezuelan oil reserves; \$1 billion for Ecuadorian oil; \$4.4 billion to develop Peruvian mines; \$10 billion to help Argentina modernize its rail system; \$3.1 billion to purchase Argentina's petroleum company outright. The New York Times adds that Beijing has lent Ecuador \$1 billion to build a hydroelectric plant. There is good and bad to Beijing's increased interest and investment in the Western Hemisphere. Investment fuels development, and much of Latin America is happily accelerating development in the economic, trade, technology and infrastructure spheres. But **China's riches come with strings.** For instance, in exchange for Chinese development funds and loans, **Venezuela agreed to increase oil shipments to China** from 380,000 barrels per day to one million barrels per day. It's worth noting that the Congressional Research Service has reported concerns in Washington that Hugo Chavez might try to supplant his U.S. market with China. Given that Venezuela pumps an average of 1.5 million barrels of oil per day for the U.S.—or about 11 percent of net oil imports—the results would be devastating for the U.S. **That brings us to the security dimension of China's checkbook diplomacy** in the Western Hemisphere. Officials with the U.S. Southern Command conceded as early as 2006 that **Beijing had "approached every country in our area of responsibility" and provided military exchanges, aid or training** to Ecuador, Jamaica, Bolivia, Cuba, Chile and Venezuela. The JFQ study adds that **China has "an important and growing presence in the region's military institutions."** Most Latin American nations, including Mexico, "send officers to professional military education courses in the PRC." In Ecuador, Venezuela and Bolivia, **Beijing has begun to sell "sophisticated hardware...such as radars**

and K-8 and MA-60 aircraft.” The JFQ report concludes, ominously, that **Chinese defense firms “are likely to leverage their experience and a growing track record for their goods to expand their market share in the region,** with the secondary consequence being that those **purchasers will become more reliant** on the associated Chinese logistics, maintenance, and training infrastructures that support those products.”¶ Put it all together, and **the southern flank of the United States is exposed to a range of new security challenges.**¶ To be sure, much of this is a function of China’s desire to secure oil markets. But there’s more at work here than China’s thirst for oil. Like a global chess match, China is probing Latin America and sending a message that just as Washington has trade and military ties in China’s neighborhood, **China is developing trade and military ties in America’s neighborhood.**¶ **This is a direct challenge to U.S. primacy in the region**—a challenge that must be answered.¶ First, Washington needs to relearn an obvious truth—that China’s rulers do not share America’s values—and needs to shape and conduct its China policy in that context.¶ Beijing has no respect for human rights. Recall that in China, an estimated 3-5 million people are rotting away in laogai slave-labor camps, many of them “guilty” of political dissent or religious activity; democracy activists are rounded up and imprisoned; freedom of speech and religion and assembly do not exist; and internal security forces are given shoot-to-kill orders in dealing with unarmed citizens. Indeed, Beijing viewed the Arab Spring uprisings not as an impetus for political reform, but as reason “to launch its harshest crackdown on dissent in at least a decade,” according to Director of National Intelligence James Clapper.¶ In short, the ends always justify the means in Beijing. And that makes all the difference when it comes to foreign and defense policy. As Reagan counseled during the Cold War, “There is no true international security without respect for human rights.”¶ Second, **the U.S. must stop taking the Western Hemisphere for granted, and** instead must **reengage in its own neighborhood economically,** politically and militarily.¶ **That means no more allowing trade deals**—and the partners counting on them—**to languish.** Plans for a hemispheric free trade zone have faltered and foundered. The **trade-expansion agreements** with Panama and Colombia **were left in limbo** for years, before President Obama finally signed them into law in 2011.¶ **Reengagement means reviving U.S. diplomacy.** The Wall Street Journal reports that due to political wrangling in Washington, the State Department position focused on the Western Hemisphere has been staffed by an interim for nearly a year, while six Western Hemisphere ambassadorial posts (Uruguay, Venezuela, Ecuador, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Barbados) remain empty.¶ Reengagement means reversing plans to slash defense spending. The Joint Forces Command noted in 2008 that China has “a deep respect for U.S. military power.” We cannot overstate how important this has been to keeping the peace. But with the United States in the midst of massive military retrenchment, one wonders how long that reservoir of respect will last.¶ Reengagement also means revitalizing security ties. A good model to follow might be what’s happening in China’s backyard. **To deter China and prevent an accidental war,** the U.S. is reviving its security partnerships all across the Asia-Pacific region. **Perhaps it’s time to do the same in Latin America. We should remember that many Latin American countries**—from Mexico and Panama to Colombia and Chile—**border the Pacific.** Given Beijing’s actions, **it makes sense to bring these Latin American partners** on the Pacific Rim **into the alliance of alliances** that is already stabilizing the Asia-Pacific region.¶ Finally, all of **this needs to be part of a revived Monroe Doctrine.**¶ **Focusing on Chinese encroachment in the Americas,** this “Monroe Doctrine 2.0” **would make it clear to Beijing that the United States** welcomes China’s efforts to conduct trade in the Americas but **discourages any claims of control—implied or explicit—by China over territories, properties or facilities in the Americas.** In addition, Washington should make it clear to Beijing that the American people would look unfavorably upon the sale of Chinese arms or the basing of Chinese advisors or military assets in the Western Hemisphere.¶ In short, what it was true in the 19th and 20th centuries must remain true in the 21st: There is room for only one great power in the Western Hemisphere.

Chinese stronghold in Latin America will trigger a nationalistic land grab for Taiwan

Robbie Fergusson (Researcher at Royal Society for the Arts, Former Conference & Research Assistant at Security Watch) **2012** “The Chinese Challenge to the Monroe Doctrine,” <http://www.e-ir.info/2012/07/23/does-chinese-growth-in-latin-america-threaten-american-interests/>)

Taiwan – domestic, or foreign policy?¶ **China’s goals in the region amount to more than the capture of natural resources. Although** the People’s Republic of **China considers resolution of the Taiwan issue to be a domestic issue, it is with some irony that one of China’s main foreign policy goals is to isolate Taipei internationally.** The PRC and the ROC compete directly for international recognition among all the states in

the world. . **Nowhere is this more evident than in Latin America, where 12 of the 23 nations that still have official diplomatic relations with the ROC reside.**¶ The historical background¶ Following the mainland Communist victory in the Chinese Civil War in 1949, the nationalist Kuomintang retreated to the island of Formosa (Taiwan) where it continued to claim to be the legitimate government of all of China. In June 1950 the United States intervened by placing its 7th fleet in the Taiwan straits to stop a conclusive military resolution to the civil war and slowly the battlefield became primarily political, concerned with legitimacy.¶ When the

United Nations was formed in 1945, the Republic of China (ROC) became one of the five permanent members of the Security Council. This gave the ROC a de facto advantage over the PRC in attaining recognition from other nation states; particularly as the diplomatic clout of the hegemonic United States supported its position as the true representative of the Chinese people, until the rapprochement of the 1970s, when the Nixon administration wished to improve ties with the de facto rulers of China in order to exploit the Sino-Soviet split. UN Resolution 2758 granted the 'China seat' to the PRC at the expense of the ROC who were in effect exiled from the organization, and the famous 1972 visit of President Nixon to China further added legitimacy to the communist regime. All this resulted in a thawing of world opinion, and gradually as the durability and permanence of the PRC regime became ingrained, countries began switching their diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing.¶ The economics of international recognition¶ In the Americas, the PRC had international recognition and longstanding support from ideological allies such as Cuba. However, **the ROC has maintained more diplomatic support in the Americas than any other region, mainly due to the small nature of the states involved and the importance of Taiwanese aid to their economies.** Li notes that "from the late 1980s to the early 1990s, roughly 10 percent of Taiwan's direct foreign investment (FDI) went to Latin America and the Caribbean," [51] highlighting the concerted effort made in the region. **Economic solidarity is increasingly important to the formation of the Taiwan-Latin America relationship, for two reasons. The first is that for Latin American states, the decision of which China to support is less ideological and political** than it ever has been; **which makes the decision a straight up economic zero-sum choice. The second is that Latin America is home to natural resources which are of great significance to the hungry growing economies of the PRC and the ROC** regardless of international recognition.¶ However, while the decision is not political for Latin American countries, **for Taiwan, every country which switches its recognition to the PRC damages its legitimacy as a nation state in the international arena.** The Table below shows the designation of diplomatic recognition in the region in 2008.¶ Countries Recognising the PRC (China) Countries Recognising the ROC (Taiwan) Central America Mexico, Costa Rica El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama Caribbean Antigua & Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Cuba, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Suriname, Trinidad & Tobago Belize, Dominican Republic, Haiti, St Kitts & Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent & the Grenadines South America Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela Paraguay¶ On the other hand, **for the PRC, every state which withdraws its support for the ROC takes it one step closer to being in a position where it can resolve the 'Taiwan issue' unilaterally.** Subsequently, **undermining Taiwan is of the utmost importance to China, and it has taken to 'outbidding' Taiwan in offers of foreign aid,** a strategy made possible by the decline in aid from the defunct Soviet Union, and the West, which is pre occupied with terrorism and the Middle East. Li notes that "the region's leaders have turned to Asia for help to promote trade and financial assistance, and consequently played the PRC and Taiwan against each other." [53] Despite its smaller size, Taiwan has fared remarkably well in this bidding war; focusing its aid investments on infrastructure such as stadiums in St Kitts & Nevis for the Cricket World Cup in 2007.¶ However, even Taiwan's economy can be put under strain by the seemingly relentless stream of foreign aid which has brought only debateable and mild gains to the Taiwanese cause. **This has contributed to the PRC picking off the few remaining supporters of the ROC** – take for example, the Dominican case.¶ In early 2004, Commonwealth of Dominica asked Taipei for a \$58 million aid, which is unrelated to public welfare. The Caribbean nation had relied on Taiwan to develop its agriculture-based economy since 1983. Diplomatic relationship was soon broken after Taipei turned down the request. [54]¶ This incident showcased the fact that in economic terms, the PRC is winning the battle for Latin America.¶ Political strategies of the PRC, **In political terms too; the PRC is in an advantageous position,** thanks in part again to its position within the UN. While it can be argued that China "provides incentives but does not threaten harm to induce countries to defect from recognizing Taiwan," [55] the reality is that the use of force and direct harm are not the only means available to an economic entity as powerful as China. **It refuses to maintain official relations with any state that recognises the ROC; an action which can be quite prohibitive to the country being able to take advantage of the growing Chinese market.** Although Domínguez suggests that the PRC "has not been punitive toward those states that still recognize the Republic of China (Taiwan)," [56] the legitimacy of this claim has to be brought into question – for example "in June 1996, China fought the extension of the UN mission in Haiti, to punish the Caribbean nation for its appeal for UN acceptance of Taiwan." [57] This incident showed that China is prepared to use its global clout to play spoiler and apply indirect pressure on countries to adopt its position. **Similarly, China's experience with one-party rule has taught it the importance of party-to-party relations in addition to state-to-state relations, further cementing the PRC by establishing a relationship based on goodwill and common understanding.** Indeed by the start of 1998 "the CCP had established relations with almost all major political parties in the countries that were Taiwan's diplomatic allies in Latin America," [58] further isolating the ROC.¶ The effect on American interests¶ **Were the ROC to be deserted by its remaining allies in Latin America, the USA would be disadvantaged in attempting to maintain the status quo across the Taiwan Strait.** A Taiwan that was not recognised by any state from the Americas, or Europe (with the exception of the Vatican) would not be seen as a genuine sovereign entity whose defence would be more important than the upkeep of good relations between China and the West. **As China's economic and political position in the world improves vis-à-vis both America and Taiwan, so might its ambitions.** The U.S.A might find itself in a

position where it could no longer withstand the diplomatic pressure to allow the PRC to conclude a settlement on Taiwan, perhaps by force.

Taiwan – China war, draws in the US and causes a global nuclear war

Hunkovic 9 (Lee J, American Military University, “The Chinese-Taiwanese Conflict: Possible Futures of a Confrontation between China, Taiwan and the United States of America”, <http://www.lamp-method.org/eCommons/Hunkovic.pdf>)

A war between China, Taiwan and the United States has the potential to escalate into a nuclear conflict and a third world war, therefore, many countries other than the primary actors could be affected by such a conflict, including Japan, both Koreas, Russia, Australia, India and Great Britain, if they were drawn in to the war, as well as all other countries in the world that participate in the global economy, in which the United States and China are the two most dominant members. If China were able to successfully annex Taiwan, the possibility exists that they could then plan to attack Japan and begin a policy of aggressive expansionism in East and Southeast Asia, as well as the Pacific and even into India, which could in turn create an international standoff and deployment of military forces to contain the threat. In any case, if China and the United States engage in a full-scale conflict, there are few countries in the world that will not be economically and/or militarily affected by it. However, China, Taiwan and United States are the primary actors in this scenario, whose actions will determine its eventual outcome, therefore, other countries will not be considered in this study.

Environment ADV

Offshore oil drilling in the Cuban Basin is inevitable – Without US technical expertise catastrophic oil spills are inevitable

Melissa **Bert** (a military fellow (U.S. Coast Guard) at the Council on Foreign Relations) and Blake **Clayton** (fellow for energy and national security at the Council on Foreign Relations) **2012** “Addressing the Risk of a Cuban Oil Spill”, <http://www.cfr.org/cuba/addressing-risk-cuban-oil-spill/p27515>

The imminent drilling of Cuba's first offshore oil well raises the prospect of a large-scale oil spill in Cuban waters washing onto U.S. shores. Washington should anticipate this possibility by

implementing policies that would help both countries' governments stem and clean up an oil spill effectively.

These policies should ensure that both the U.S. government and the domestic oil industry are operationally and financially ready to deal with any spill that threatens U.S. waters. These policies should be

as minimally disruptive as possible to the country's broader Cuba strategy.¶ The Problem¶ A Chinese-built semisubmersible oil rig leased by Repsol, a Spanish oil company, arrived in Cuban waters in January 2012 to drill Cuba's first exploratory offshore oil well. **Early estimates**

suggest that Cuban offshore oil and natural gas reserves are substantial—somewhere between five billion and twenty billion barrels of oil and upward of eight billion cubic feet of natural gas. Although the United States typically welcomes greater volumes of crude oil coming from countries that are not members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), a surge in Cuban oil

production would complicate the United States' decades-old effort to economically isolate the Castro regime.¶ **Deepwater drilling off**

the Cuban coast also **poses a threat to the United States.** The exploratory well is seventy miles off the Florida coast and lies at a depth of 5,800 feet. The failed Macondo well that triggered the calamitous Deepwater Horizon oil spill in April 2010 had broadly similar features, situated forty-eight miles from shore and approximately five thousand feet below sea level. A spill off Florida's coast could ravage the state's \$57 billion per year tourism industry.¶ **Washington cannot count on the technical know-how of Cuba's**

unseasoned oil industry to address a spill on its own. Oil industry experts doubt that it has a strong understanding of how to prevent an offshore oil spill or stem a deep-water well blowout. Moreover, the site where the first wells will be drilled is a tough one for even seasoned response teams to

operate in. Unlike the calm Gulf of Mexico, the surface currents in the area where Repsol will be drilling move at a brisk three to four knots, which would bring oil from Cuba's offshore wells to the Florida coast within six to ten days. Skimming or burning the oil may not be feasible in such fast-moving water. The most, and possibly only, effective method to respond to a spill would be surface and subsurface dispersants. If dispersants are not applied close to the source within four days after a spill, uncontained oil cannot be dispersed, burnt, or skimmed, which would render standard response technologies like containment booms ineffective.¶ Repsol has been forthcoming in disclosing its spill response plans to U.S. authorities and allowing them to inspect the drilling rig, but the Russian and Chinese companies that are already negotiating with Cuba to lease acreage might not be as cooperative. Had Repsol not volunteered to have the Cuba-bound drilling rig examined by the U.S. Coast Guard and Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement to certify that it met international standards, Washington would have had little legal recourse.¶ **The complexity of U.S.-Cuba relations since the** 1962 trade **embargo complicates even limited**

efforts to put in place a spill response plan. Under U.S. law and with few exceptions, **American companies cannot assist the Cuban government or provide equipment to foreign companies operating in Cuban territory.**¶ Shortfalls in U.S. federal regulations governing commercial liability for oil spills pose a further problem. The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90) does not protect U.S. citizens and property against damages stemming from a blown-out wellhead outside of U.S. territory. In the case of Deepwater Horizon, BP was liable despite being a foreign company because it was operating within the United States. Were any of the wells that Repsol drills to go haywire, the cost of funding a response would fall to the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (OSLTF), which is woefully undercapitalized. OPA 90 limits the OSLTF from paying out more than \$50 million in a fiscal year on oil removal costs, subject to a few exceptions, and requires congressional appropriation to pay out more than \$150 million.¶ The Way Forward¶ As a first step, the United States

should discuss contingency planning for a Cuban oil spill at the regular multiparty talks it holds with Mexico, the Bahamas, Cuba, and others per the Cartagena Convention. The Caribbean Island Oil Pollution Response and Cooperation Plan provides an operational framework under which the United States and Cuba can jointly develop systems for identifying and reporting an oil spill, implement a means of restricting the spread of oil, and identify resources to respond to a spill.¶ Washington should also instruct the U.S. Coast Guard to conduct basic spill response coordination with its counterparts in Cuba. The United States already has operational agreements in place with Mexico, Canada, and several countries in the Caribbean that call for routine exercises, emergency response coordination, and communication protocols. It should strike an agreement with Cuba that is substantively similar but narrower in scope, limited to basic spill-oriented advance coordination and communication. Before that step can be taken, U.S. lawmakers may need to amend the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 to allow for limited, spill-related coordination and communication with the Cuban government.¶ Next, President Barack Obama should issue an export-only industry-wide general license for oil spill response in Cuban waters, effective immediately. Issuing that license does not require congressional authorization. The license should allow offshore oil companies to do vital spill response work in Cuban territory, such as capping a well or drilling a relief well. Oil service companies, such as Halliburton, should be included in the authorization.¶ Finally, Congress should alter existing

oil spill compensation policy. Lawmakers should amend OPA 90 to ensure there is a responsible party for oil spills from a foreign offshore unit that pollutes or threatens to pollute U.S. waters, like there is for vessels. Senator Robert Menendez (D-NJ) and Congressman David Rivera (R-FL) have sponsored such legislation. Lawmakers should eliminate the requirement for the Coast Guard to obtain congressional approval on expenditures above \$150 million for spills of national significance (as defined by the National Response Plan). And President Obama should appoint a commission to determine the appropriate limit of liability cap under OPA 90, balancing the need to compensate victims with the desire to retain strict liability for polluters. There are two other, less essential measures U.S. lawmakers may consider that would enable the country to respond more adeptly to a spill. Installing an early-response system based on acoustic, geophysical, or other technologies in the Straits of Florida would immediately alert the U.S. Coast Guard about a well blowout or other unusual activity. The U.S. Department of Energy should find out from Repsol about the characteristics of Cuban crude oil, which would help U.S. authorities predict how the oil would spread in the case of a well blowout. Defending U.S. interests **An oil well blowout in Cuban waters would almost certainly require a U.S. response. Without changes in current U.S. law,** however, **that response would undoubtedly come far more slowly than is desirable.** The Coast Guard would be barred from deploying highly experienced manpower, specially designed booms, skimming equipment and vessels, and dispersants. **U.S. offshore gas and oil companies would also be barred from using well-capping stacks, remotely operated submersibles, and other vital technologies.** Although a handful of U.S. spill responders hold licenses to work with Repsol, their licenses do not extend to well capping or relief drilling. **The result of a slow response to a Cuban oil spill would be** greater, perhaps **catastrophic,** economic and **environmental damage to Florida and the Southeast.** Efforts to rewrite current law and policy toward Cuba, and encouraging cooperation with its government, could antagonize groups opposed to improved relations with the Castro regime. They might protest any decision allowing U.S. federal agencies to assist Cuba or letting U.S. companies operate in Cuban territory. However, taking sensible steps to prepare for a potential accident at an oil well in Cuban waters would not break new ground or materially alter broader U.S. policy toward Cuba. For years, Washington has worked with Havana on issues of mutual concern. The United States routinely coordinates with Cuba on search and rescue operations in the Straits of Florida as well as to combat illicit drug trafficking and migrant smuggling. During the hurricane season, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) provides Cuba with information on Caribbean storms. The recommendations proposed here are narrowly tailored to the specific challenges that a Cuban oil spill poses to the United States. They would not help the Cuban economy or military. What they would do is protect U.S. territory and property from a potential danger emanating from Cuba. **Cuba will drill for oil in its territorial waters with or without the blessing of the United States. Defending against a potential oil spill requires a modicum of advance coordination and preparation with the Cuban government,** which need not go beyond spill-related matters. **Without taking these precautions, the United States risks a second Deepwater Horizon,** this time from Cuba.

Cuban oil spill will crush marine coastal life throughout Cuba, Florida coastlines, and the Gulf of Mexico – Unique coral reefs and mangroves will be destroyed

Emily A. Peterson, Daniel J. Whittle, J.D. and Douglas N. Rader, Ph.D. December 2012 “Bridging the Gulf, Finding Common Ground on Environmental and Safety Preparedness for Offshore Oil and Gas in Cuba”, http://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/EDF-Bridging_the_Gulf-2012.pdf

If a spill were to occur in Cuban waters, marine and coastal resources of the United States, Cuba, and the Bahamas could be placed at significant risk. Fisheries, coastal tourism, recreation, and other natural resources-based

enterprises and activities in the region could experience adverse impacts on the scale of weeks to years, or even decades. Multiple factors—including the type and amount of oil spilled, the environment in which the oil spilled, and prevailing weather and ocean current conditions—would play key factors in determining the extent and gravity of a spill’s impact.⁴⁵ **In Cuba, marine and coastal habitats**

could suffer substantial long-term harm which could degrade in turn, **entire populations and habitats**

downstream in the U.S. Gulf of Mexico. According to Dr. John W. Tunnell, Jr., **associate director of the**

Harte Research Institute and an expert on the Gulf of Mexico marine environment, the primary three

habitats at risk on Cuba’s North Coast near the area where exploration is occurring are coral reefs,

seagrass beds, and lush mangrove forests.⁴⁶ These habitats are found throughout the region, but in greatest abundance

in the Archipelago Sabana-Camaguey and the Archipelago Los Colorados, where they provide breeding, nursery, and feeding habitats for commercial fish species, including grouper, snapper, and grunts. If chemical dispersants were used as part of the clean-up effort, they could reduce impacts on fauna for which oiling per se is the greatest threat (e.g. birds) but also add additional toxicity, as well as alter the transport and ecological fate of oil constituents moving through the water column and then into the air or back towards the bottom.

Dispersed oil could have greater deleterious effect on Cuba’s coral reefs, which are fragile, slow-growing,

and have low resilience to physical and chemical stresses.⁴⁷ Like salt marshes, coastal mangrove swamps are also difficult to clean up in the aftermath of an oil spill, and mangroves can die within a week to several months as a result of oil exposure.⁴⁸

Reduced from their formerly healthy, vibrant state, such important habitats could lose their ability to support the fisheries and marine life that depend on them.

Collapse of the coral reef ecosystem collapses the biosphere

Robin Kundis Craig (Associate Prof Law, Indiana U School Law) 2003

Biodiversity and ecosystem function arguments for conserving marine ecosystems also exist, just as they do for terrestrial ecosystems, but these arguments have thus far rarely been raised in political debates. For example, besides significant tourism values - the most economically valuable ecosystem service coral reefs provide, worldwide - coral reefs protect against storms and dampen other environmental fluctuations, services worth more than ten times the reefs' value for food production. ⁿ⁸⁵⁶ Waste treatment is another significant, non-

extractive ecosystem function that intact coral reef ecosystems provide. ⁿ⁸⁵⁷ More generally, "ocean

ecosystems play a major role in the global geochemical cycling of all the elements that represent the basic building blocks of living organisms, carbon, nitrogen, oxygen, phosphorus, and sulfur, as well as other less abundant but

necessary elements." ⁿ⁸⁵⁸ In a very real and direct sense, therefore, human degradation of marine ecosystems

impairs the planet's ability to support life. Maintaining biodiversity is often critical to maintaining the functions of marine ecosystems. Current evidence shows that, in general, an ecosystem's ability to keep functioning in the face of

disturbance is strongly dependent on its biodiversity, "indicating that more diverse ecosystems are more stable." ⁿ⁸⁵⁹ Coral reef

ecosystems are particularly dependent on their biodiversity. [*265] Most ecologists agree that the complexity

of interactions and degree of interrelatedness among component species is higher on coral reefs than in any

other marine environment. This implies that the ecosystem functioning that produces the most highly valued components is also

complex and that many otherwise insignificant species have strong effects on sustaining the rest of the reef system. ⁿ⁸⁶⁰ Thus,

maintaining and restoring the biodiversity of marine ecosystems is critical to maintaining and restoring the ecosystem services that they provide. Non-use biodiversity values for marine ecosystems have been calculated in the wake of

marine disasters, like the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska. ⁿ⁸⁶¹ Similar calculations could derive preservation values for marine wilderness.

However, economic value, or economic value equivalents, should not be "the sole or even primary justification for conservation of ocean

ecosystems. Ethical arguments also have considerable force and merit." ⁿ⁸⁶² At the forefront of such arguments should be a recognition of

how little we know about the sea - and about the actual effect of human activities on marine ecosystems. The United States has traditionally

failed to protect marine ecosystems because it was difficult to detect anthropogenic harm to the oceans, but we now know that such harm is

occurring - even though we are not completely sure about causation or about how to fix every problem. Ecosystems like the NWHI

coral reef ecosystem should inspire lawmakers and policymakers to admit that most of the time we really do not know what we

are doing to the sea and hence should be preserving marine wilderness whenever we can - especially when the United States

has within its territory relatively pristine marine ecosystems that may be unique in the world. We may not know much about the sea, but we do

know this much: if we kill the ocean we kill ourselves, and we will take most of the biosphere with us.

Case Extension

Solvency

Solved regional influence

Licensing American companies to develop Cuban offshore resources leads to effective drilling and increased influence in the region

Vicki **Huddleston** (deputy assistant secretary of defense for Africa at the Department of Defense, visiting fellow at Brookings and co-director of the Brookings Project on U.S. Policy Toward a Cuba in Transition from 2007 to 2009) **and** Carlos **Pascual** (U.S. ambassador to Mexico, He was vice president and director of Foreign Policy at Brookings from 2006 to 2009) **2009** "Use "Smart Power" to Help Cubans," <http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2009/02/24-cuba-huddleston>)

Licensing U.S. companies to provide services for the development of Cuban offshore oil and gas would provide benefits to the United States and Cuba. (At this point it should be noted that **the Secretary of Treasury has always had** and continues to have **the authority**—**as embodied in OFAC regulations**—**to license any transaction found to be in the U.S. national interest.** **This power has been used over the past fifteen**

years by various Republican and Democratic administrations **to license a variety of commercial transactions** between the United States and Cuba). The following are some of the reasons we might wish to become engaged in developing Cuba's offshore oil and gas.

First, **if U.S. and other reputable companies are involved in Cuba's offshore oil development it would reduce Cuba's dependence on Venezuela for two-thirds of its oil imports.** Second, **it is preferable that U.S. oil companies with high standards of transparency develop these resources rather than, for example, Russia's notoriously corrupt oligarchy.** Third, **U.S. influence in Cuba is likely to increase if U.S. companies have an economic relationship on the ground.** Fourth, **U.S. companies have the technology and expertise to develop Cuba's offshore oil and gas.**

Exempt Oil

The Secretary of the Treasury can modify the embargo to allow drilling

Vicki **Huddleston** (deputy assistant secretary of defense for Africa at the Department of Defense, visiting fellow at Brookings and co-director of the Brookings Project on U.S. Policy Toward a Cuba in Transition from 2007 to 2009) **and** Carlos **Pascual** (U.S. ambassador to Mexico, He was vice president and director of Foreign Policy at Brookings from 2006 to 2009) **2009** "Use "Smart Power" to Help Cubans," <http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2009/02/24-cuba-huddleston>)

Executive authority¶ **Again and again we hear that the embargo can't be changed** because the Helms-Burton law codified it. Nothing could be further from the truth. Whether you agree or disagree with the current commercial embargo, **the**

president can effectively dismantle it by using his executive authority. Helms-Burton codified the embargo

regulation, but **those regulations provide that "all transactions are prohibited except as specifically**

authorized by the Secretary of the Treasury by means of regulations, rulings, instructions, and

licenses."¶ **This means that the president's power remains unfettered. He can instruct the secretary to extend, revise or modify embargo regulations.** The proof of this statement is that President Bill **Clinton issued new**

regulations for expanded travel and **remittances** in order to help individuals and grow civil society.¶ Obama will have to modify

Office of Foreign Assets Control regulations to fulfill his campaign promise to increase Cuban-American travel and remittances. If he wants to

reproduce the more open conditions in Cuba that led to the "Cuban Spring" of 2002 and Oswaldo Payá's Varela Project, **he could**

reinstate people-to-people and educational travel. By a simple rule change, **he could also speed the entry of**

life-saving medicines from Cuba, rather than subjecting them to delays from cumbersome OFAC licensing procedures.¶ Since 1992, U.S. law -- the Cuban Democracy Act -- has sought to expand access to ideas, knowledge and information by licensing telecommunications

goods and services. Yet, in practice, regulations are so strictly interpreted that the United States in effect is imposing a communications

embargo on Cuba. To lift it, **the president can authorize a general license for the donation and sale of radios, televisions and computers.** In addition, rather than helping Cuban state security keep Yoani Sánchez and others off the Internet, the

Obama administration could make Internet technology readily available so that any barriers to communications would be clearly the fault of

the Cuban government, and not ours.¶ Environmental concerns rate high with the Obama administration. So it might open bilateral discussions,

exchange information and license the provision of scientific equipment to improve the health of the ocean and success of commercial

fisheries.¶ **The United States Geological Survey estimates that the North Cuba Basin holds 5.5 billion**

barrels of oil and 9.8 trillion cubic feet of natural gas reserves. **If the president wishes, he can instruct the secretary**

of the treasury to license U.S. companies to explore, exploit and transport these resources that we

and the region so badly need.¶ Failed policy¶ **After a half-century of failed policy, there is enormous**

support in the Cuban-American community **for initiatives that will improve** the well being and **independence of the**

Cuban people. What they didn't know -- but know now -- is that **there is no reason they can't reach out to the Cuban**

people and still retain the embargo as symbol of their concern about the Cuban government's failure

to live up to international norms of human rights, democracy and transparency.

Say yes

Cuba says yes – empirically true

CDA 11 (Center for Democracy in the Americas, “As Cuba plans to drill in the Gulf of Mexico, U.S. policy poses needless risks to our national interest”, 2011, http://democracyinamericas.org/pdfs/Cuba_Drilling_and_US_Policy.pdf)

6. **Cuba would welcome U.S. investment**. At MINCEX, **the staff discussed the impact of the embargo on Cuba’s access to capital. Ministry staff said the embargo is harmful to Cuba’s ability to attract foreign investments, capital, and technology. Cuban officials repeatedly emphasized that the country is open to any foreign investor, and that Havana would welcome U.S. investment**, subject to the same conditions it places on all foreign investors. According to a senior official in Cuba’s diplomatic corps, **when Cuba decided to drill off-shore in the Gulf of Mexico in the mid-1990s, the first letters sent by Cuba’s government to invite foreign concerns to participate went exclusively to U.S. energy companies. They declined interest, due to the embargo,** and Cuba looked for partners elsewhere.

Cuba wants US oil ventures and exempting oil from the embargo builds overall US-Cuban cooperation – solves relations

Jonathan **Benjamin-Alvadar** (PhD, Professor of Political Science at University of Nebraska at Omaha, Director of the Intelligence Community Centers of Academic Excellence Program at UNO, Treasurer of the American Political Science Association) **2010** “Cuba’s Energy Future: Strategic Approaches to Cooperation”)

Undoubtedly, after fifty years of enmity, **there is a significant lack of trust and confidence between the United States and Cuba.** This is plain from the almost quaint maintenance of a sanctions regime that seeks to isolate Cuba economically and politically but hardly reflects the dramatic changes that have occurred on the island since 1991, not to mention since 2008, when Fidel Castro officially stepped aside as Cuba’s president. Now, **the opportunity to advance relations in the energy arena appears to be ripe.** Since 2004, representatives from American companies, trade organizations, universities, and think tanks have had the opportunity to meet with Cuban energy officials. The scope and objectives of Cuban energy development schemes have been disseminated, dissected, and discussed across a number of settings where the interested parties are now familiar with and well versed in the agendas and opportunities that exist in this arena. In public discussions, **Cuban energy authorities have made it clear that their preferred energy development scenario includes working closely with the U.S. oil and gas industry and using state-of-the-art U.S. oil technologies. The assessment from U.S. energy experts on the technical acumen and capability of Cuban energy officials has been overwhelmingly positive.**⁹ **Should the U.S. government** and the Obama administration see fit to **shift its policy** so as to allow broader participation of American academics and practitioners in the energy field to attend conferences and meet with Cuban energy officials, **it may pave the way to establishing much-needed familiarity and confidence across these communities.**¹¹ **The United States and Cuba will have a unique opportunity** to employ a highly educated and competent cadre of Cuban engineers and technicians **to work in critical areas of the energy sector. This will deploy an underused segment of the Cuban workforce, and allow U.S. oil, construction, and engineering firms to subcontract work** to an emerging class of **Cuban firms** specializing in these areas. **The Cubans have accumulated experience and training from past energy cooperation projects and exchanges in Cuba, Mexico, Venezuela, and other countries in the region.** Anecdotal evidence suggests that these contacts and exchanges have been wildly successful because of the Cubans’ high level of competence and strong work ethic. **The Cubans have gained invaluable knowledge and experience through the operation and construction of energy facilities in collaboration with their joint-venture partners on the island.**¹¹ The United States possesses few options when it comes to balancing the various risks to U.S. energy security and satisfying energy demand, because U.S. energy independence is not attainable, the policy tools available to deal with energy supply disruptions are increasingly inadequate, and the United States needs to articulate a new vision of how best to manage international energy interdependence. In particular, even if the United States were to choose to exploit all of its domestic energy resources, it would remain dependent on oil imports to meet its existing and future demand. The critical need to improve the integrity of the U.S. energy supply requires a much broader, more

flexible view on the quest for resources—a view that does not shun a source from a potential strategic partner for purely political reasons. U.S. decisionmakers must look dispassionately at potential energy partners in terms of the role they might play in meeting political, economic, and geostrategic objectives of U.S. energy security. **The Obama administration** has **signaled that it wants to reinvigorate inter-American cooperation and integration**; a movement toward energy cooperation and development with **Cuba** is consistent with, and **may be central to, that objective**. ¶ The energy-security environment for the United States is at a critical juncture. The productive capacity of two of the United States' largest oil suppliers, Mexico and Venezuela, has declined, and the supporting energy infrastructure in both countries is in need of significant revitalization. The vagaries of the politics in the region, the variability of weather patterns, and the overall dismal state of the global economy create a setting of instability and uncertainty that requires close attention to the national security interests of the United States vis-à-vis energy. Cuba's energy infrastructure, too, is in need of significant repair and modernization (its many energy projects notwithstanding); the price tag is estimated to be in the billions of dollars. Delaying work on many of these projects increases costs, because deterioration of the infrastructure continues and eventually pushes up the cost of renovation and replacement. It also stands to reason that the lion's share of the financial burden of upgrading Cuba's energy infrastructure will fall to the United States, directly and indirectly. **Changes in U.S. policy to allow investment and assistance in Cuba's energy sector are a precondition for international entities to make significant investments**, yet this change implies a large American footprint. **Trade and investment in the energy sector in Cuba have been severely constrained by the conditions of the embargo** placed on the Cuban regime. **These constraints also affect foreign firms** seeking to do business in Cuba **because of the threat of penalties if any of these firms use technology containing more than 10 percent of proscribed U.S. technologies needed for oil and gas exploration and production**. American private investment and U.S. government assistance will constitute a large portion of the needed investment capital to undertake this colossal effort. **The longer that work is delayed, the higher the cost to all the investors, which will then potentially cut into the returns from such undertakings.** ¶ U.S. cooperation with Cuba in energy just may create an opportunity for the United States to improve its relations with Venezuela, if it can demonstrate that it can serve as a partner (or at a minimum, a supporter) of the Petrocaribe energy consortium. **The United States could provide much-needed additional investment capital** in the development of upstream, downstream, and logistical resources **in Cuba that simultaneously addresses Petrocaribe objectives, diversifies regional refining capacity, and adds storage and transit capabilities while enhancing regional cooperation and integration modalities. This does not mean that the United States has to dismantle the nearly fifty-year-old embargo against Cuba, but the United States will have to make special provisions** that create commercial and trade openings for energy development that serve its broad geostrategic and national security goals, as it has in the case of food and medicine sales to Cuba. ¶ This discussion is intended to help distill understanding of U.S. strategic energy policy under a set of shifting political and economic environmental conditions in Cuba and its implications for U.S. foreign policy for the near and long term. Because the policies can be considered works-in-progress, **an understanding of possible outcomes is important to those crafting future policy and making changes in the policymaking milieu.**

ADV China

Engage Now

Now is the key time for the United States to open up engagement opportunities with Cuba – this is critical for broader Latin America relations

Simon Tisdall (writer for the Guardian) 3/5 2013, "Death of Hugo Chávez brings chance of fresh start for US and Latin America" www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/mar/05/hugo-chavez-dead-us-latin-america/print

Hugo Chávez's departure furnishes Barack Obama with an opportunity to repair US ties with Venezuela, but also with other Latin American states whose relations with Washington were adversely affected by Chávez's politics of polarisation and the Bush administration's viscerally unintelligent reaction. In particular, the change of leadership in Caracas could unlock the deadlock over Cuba if the White House can summon the requisite political will. Possibly anticipating a transition, Washington quietly engineered a diplomatic opening with Caracas last November after a lengthy standoff during which ambassadors were withdrawn. Roberta Jacobson, assistant secretary of state for western hemisphere affairs, telephoned Nicolás Maduro, Venezuela's vice-president and Chávez's preferred successor, and discussed, among other things, the restoration of full diplomatic relations. According to US officials, the Venezuelan vice-president offered to exchange ambassadors on the occasion of the beginning of President Barack Obama's second term. Jacobson, in turn, is said to have proposed a step-by-step approach to improve bilateral relations, starting with greater co-operation in counter-narcotics, counter-terrorism and energy issues. Andres Oppenheimer reported in the Miami Herald. There is much ground to make up. "Relations between the United States and Venezuela have ranged from difficult to hostile since Chávez took office in 1999 and began to implement what he calls 21st-century socialism," wrote a former US ambassador to Caracas, Charles Shapiro. "Chávez blamed a failed 2002 coup against him on the United States (not true), nationalised US companies, insulted the president of the United States and blamed 'the empire' – his term for the United States – for every ill ... In foreign affairs, the government actively supports the Assad regime in Syria, rejects sanctions on Iran and generally opposes the US at every turn." Despite such strains, economic self-interest always prevented a complete rupture. The US remained Venezuela's most important trading partner throughout Chávez's presidency, buying nearly half its oil exports. Caracas is the fourth largest supplier of oil to the US. In fact, the US imports more crude oil annually from Mexico and Venezuela than from the entire Persian Gulf. This shared commerce now provides a formidable incentive and a launch platform for a fresh start. Whether the opportunity is grasped depends partly on Maduro, a Chávez loyalist but a reputed pragmatist with close ties to Raúl Castro in Cuba. Yet it depends even more on Obama, whose first term, after a promising start, ended up perpetuating Washington's historical neglect of Latin America. He now has a chance to do better. The political climate seems propitious. Economic and cultural ties are also strengthening dramatically. Trade between the US and Latin America grew by 82% between 1998 and 2009. In 2011 alone, exports and imports rose by a massive 20% in both directions. "We do three times more business with Latin America than with China and twice as much business with Colombia [as] with Russia," an Obama official told Julia Sweig of the US Council on Foreign Relations. Latinos now comprise 15% of the US population; the US is the world's second largest Spanish-speaking country (after Mexico). Despite this convergence, high-level US strategic thinking about the region has continued to lag, Sweig argued. "For the last two decades, US domestic politics have too often driven Washington's Latin America agenda – whether on issues of trade, immigration, drugs, guns or that perennial political albatross, Cuba, long driven by the supposedly crucial 'Cuban vote' in Florida," she said. Obama could change this dynamic if he tried and one way to do it would be to unpick the Cuban problem, which continues to colour the way Latin Americans view Washington. "Having won nearly half of the Cuban American vote in Florida in 2012, a gain of 15 percentage points over 2008, Obama can move quickly on Cuba. If he were to do so, he would find a cautious but willing partner in Raúl Castro, who needs rapprochement with Washington to advance his own reform agenda," Sweig said.

Cuba key Latin America

Modifying embargo regulations can promote successful engagement and increase credibility throughout Latin America – Cuba is a model

Pascual and Huddleston 9 (Carlos – Vice president and Director of Foreign policy – the Brookings Institution, and Vicki – Visiting Fellow, “CUBA: A New policy of Critical and Constructive Engagement”, April, http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/reports/2009/4/cuba/0413_cuba.pdf)

U.S. policy toward Cuba should advance the democratic aspirations of the Cuban people and strengthen U.S. credibility throughout the hemisphere. Our nearly 50-year old policy toward Cuba has failed on both counts: it has resulted in a downward spiral of U.S. influence on the island and has left the United States isolated in the hemisphere and beyond. Our Cuba policy has become a bellwether, indicating the extent to which the United States will act in partnership with the region or unilaterally—and ineffectually. Inevitably, strategic contact and dialogue with the Cuban government will be necessary if the United States seeks to engage the Cuban people. This paper proposes a new goal for U.S. policy toward Cuba: to support the emergence of a Cuban state where the Cuban people determine the political and economic future of their country through democratic means. A great lesson of democracy is that it cannot be imposed; it must come from within; the type of government at the helm of the island’s future will depend on Cubans. Our policy should therefore encompass the political, economic, and diplomatic tools to enable the Cuban people to engage in and direct the politics of their country. This policy will advance the interests of the United States in seeking stable relationships based on common hemispheric values that promote the well-being of each individual and the growth of civil society. To engage the Cuban government and Cuban people effectively, the United States will need to engage with other governments, the private sector, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). In so doing, U.S. policy toward Cuba would reflect the hemisphere’s and our own desire to encourage the Cuban government to adopt international standards of democracy, human rights, and transparency. Engagement does not mean approval of the Cuban government’s policies, nor should it indicate a wish to control internal developments in Cuba; legitimate changes in Cuba will only come from the actions of Cubans. If the United States is to play a positive role in Cuba’s future, it must not indulge in hostile rhetoric nor obstruct a dialogue on issues that would advance democracy, justice, and human rights as well as our broader national interests. Conversely, the policy of seeking to isolate Cuba, rather than achieving its objective, has contributed to undermining the well-being of the Cuban people and to eroding U.S. influence in Cuba and Latin America. It has reinforced the Cuban government’s power over its citizens by increasing their dependence on it for every aspect of their livelihood. By slowing the flow of ideas and information, we have unwittingly helped Cuban state security delay Cuba’s political and economic evolution toward a more open and representative government. And, by too tightly embracing Cuba’s brave dissidents, we have provided the Cuban authorities with an excuse to denounce their legitimate efforts to build a more open society. The Cuban revolution of 1959 is a fact of history that cannot be removed or un-lived, but, over time, Cuba will change. As the Cuban people become inexorably linked to the region and the world, they will themselves come to play a larger role in the way they are governed. Mortality and time—not U.S. sanctions—have already begun the process of change. A new generation of Cuban leaders will replace the Castro brothers and those who fought in the Sierra Maestra. Although Cuba is already undergoing a process of change, the Bush administration’s decision to cling to out-moded tactics of harsh rhetoric and confrontation alienated leaders across the region. Cuba policy should be a pressing issue for the Obama administration because it offers a unique opportunity for the president to transform our relations with the hemisphere. Even a slight shift away from hostility to engagement will permit the United States to work more closely with the region to effectively advance a common agenda toward Cuba. By announcing a policy of critical and constructive engagement at the April Summit of the Americas in Trinidad and Tobago, the president can prove that he has been listening to the region. He can under-line this commitment by removing all restrictions on travel and remittances on Cuban Americans, and engaging in dialogue with the regime, as promised during his campaign. By reciprocally improving our diplomatic relations with Cuba, we will enhance our understanding of the island, its people, and its leaders. However, while these measures will promote understanding, improve the lives of people on the island, and build support for a new relationship between our countries, they are insufficient to ensure the changes needed to result in normal diplomatic relations over time. If the president is to advance U.S. interests and principles, he will need a new policy and a long-term strategic vision for U.S. relations with Cuba. If he is prepared to discard the failed policy of regime change and adopt one of critical and constructive engagement, he and his administration will lay the foundations for a new approach to ward Cuba and the Latin America. Like his predecessors, president **Obama has the authority to substantially modify embargo regulations in order to advance a policy of engagement that would broaden and deepen contacts with the Cuban people and their government. **He has the popular support—domestic and international—to engage Cuba, and, by so doing, to staunch our diminishing influence on the island and recapture the high road in our relations with the hemisphere.****

Oil Key

Offshore drilling is critical for relations – it's strategically important for both countries
Grogg 12 (Patricia – IPS, Citing Luiz Rene Fernandez – Senior Research and Professor at University of Havana specializing in international economics, “CUBA: Oil Drilling Opens Up New Possibilities”, 2/16, <http://www.ipsnews.net/2012/02/cuba-oil-drilling-opens-up-new-possibilities/>)

The search for oil in Cuba's Gulf of Mexico **waters**, launched by the Spanish firm Repsol, **has triggered speculation about future prospects for Cuba** and the possibility of this country one day making the transition from importer to exporter of crude. Moreover, **given its strategic importance for both the United States and Cuba**, some **analysts believe that energy offers a potential area for cooperation that could eventually help pave the way to the normalisation of relations between the two countries.** For the moment, the Cuban authorities and oil industry personnel are

remaining discreetly silent on the subject. CUPET, the state-owned oil company, has limited itself to officially confirming the arrival in the country on Jan. 19 of the Scarabeo 9 oil rig for “the resumption in the coming days of deepwater drilling for oil exploration.” Drilling operations presumably began in late January. According to CUPET, the goal is to continue testing to determine the potential for oil and gas production in Cuba's exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in the Gulf of Mexico. The results of the drilling will contribute to defining that potential. After opening up its economy to foreign investment in 1991, Cuba divided the EEZ, which covers an area of 112,000 sq km, into 59 oil and gas exploration blocks. On Jan. 18, Rafael Tenreiro, director of exploration and production at CUPET, reiterated a previous estimate of a potential 20,000 million barrels in the area. At the launching of the book “Perforación de pozos petroleros marinos” (“Offshore Oil Well Drilling”) by Rolando Fernández, supervisor of the Gulf of Mexico operations group, Tenreiro stated that it was “possible” that Cuba could become an oil exporter. “We have to prepare the country for this good news,” he added, stressing the need for the production of technology and participation in the entire process. In 2011, more than 20 offshore exploration blocks had already been leased to large foreign energy companies, including, in addition to Repsol, StatoilHydro of Norway, ONGC Videsh of India, PETRONAS of Malaysia, PetroVietnam, Gazprom of Russia, Sonangol of Angola the Venezuelan state oil company PDVSA. Reflecting on the potential ramifications should Repsol's exploratory drilling prove successful, university professor Fernando Martirena told IPS that large-scale development of the Cuban oil industry would obviously provide a boost to the government programmes currently underway, since it would represent “a needed injection of fresh foreign currency into a tense national economy.” This scenario, “combined with the package of measures being implemented as a result of the ‘updating’ of the Cuban economic model, will heat up the issue of the blockade,” said Martirena. **Under the U.S. economic embargo** against this Caribbean island

nation, in place for 50 years this month, **U.S. companies are shut out from profiting from a potential oil boom in Cuba.** In Martirena's view, **if the U.S. Congress wants to be pragmatic**, “it **will have to choose between continuing to support the hysterical Cuban-American bloc** that does so much lobbying around the issue of the blockade, **or simply accepting reality – that there is no reason to maintain this policy.**” Cuban-American members of Congress

headed up by the chairwoman of the influential House Foreign Affairs Committee, Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, have attempted to block Repsol's drilling operations in Cuban waters. While they claim that their opposition is based on concerns for the environment and the security of the United States, analysts believe that their motivation is primarily political. Before arriving in Cuban waters, the Scarabeo 9 drilling rig – built in China and assembled in Singapore, and therefore exempt from the prohibitions of the U.S. embargo – successfully passed inspection by personnel from the U.S. Department of the Interior's Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement and the U.S. Coast Guard. CUPET has also vouched that the cutting-edge equipment leased by Repsol for its drilling operations has been duly verified to include the necessary features to guarantee the utmost efficiency and safety. The exploratory drilling is expected to last roughly two and a half months.

“Technically speaking, the chances of a mishap occurring in Cuba's economic area are extremely small, not only because of the precautions taken, but also for purely statistical reasons. This is one drilling rig out of the countless rigs operating outside of Cuban waters” in the Gulf of Mexico, economist Luis René Fernández commented to IPS. An expert on Cuba-U.S. relations, Fernández noted that while there are political risks associated with the issues of security and environmental impacts, there are also experiences that indicate that these “could and should be reduced.” “(Socialist) Venezuela has not stopped supplying oil to the United States, although it has tried to diversify its markets,” he mentioned as an example. He also pointed to the migration accords signed by Havana and Washington and Cuba's purchases of food from U.S. companies despite “all of the restrictions and limitations.” “In these cases, among the reasons for a certain type of communication and collaboration, it always boils down to the importance of geography. **There are common issues in which it is more**

beneficial for both sides to address them directly and even to cooperate. Not doing so could have high costs, not only economic, but also for the environment and security,” he said. Fernández stressed that the U.S. government is not a “unified actor” and that there are different agencies that deal with matters such as energy and the environment. **“There are experts and professionals who fulfil their missions and could have real impacts on the concrete political situation,”** he said, due to geographical proximity but also because **“it is advisable to cooperate in spite of political and ideological differences.”** In his opinion, both countries are moving in the mid term and especially in the long term towards the normalisation of relations, regardless of the particular political circumstances in the United States. **“On the Cuban side, there is a well-known willingness to cooperate** and even to debate, on respectful and equal terms, all of the aspects of the bilateral conflict,” he stressed.

“This could be another important area for cooperation, precisely because of the strategic significance

of energy sources for both the United States and Cuba. Are there risks? Without a doubt. But **the benefits of cooperation** definitely **outweigh** them,” **Fernández concluded.**

China lash out

Effective isolation prompts a military invasion that goes nuclear

Ikegami 8 (Masako Ikegami – Professor and Director of the Center for Pacific Asia Studies (CPAS) at Stockholm University. She holds Doctor of Sociology from University of Tokyo, and a Ph.D. in peace & conflict research from Uppsala University, Sweden. Her research interests include Asian security & confidence building, arms control & disarmament and non-proliferation issues. 3-28-2008, The Jamestown Foundation, Time for Conflict Prevention Across the Taiwan Strait, http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=4822&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=168&no_cache=1)

Indeed, **a cross-Strait conflict is** potentially one of **the most dangerous conflicts involving two major nuclear powers**, in which the risk of escalation, in the worst case, **cannot exclude strategic nuclear exchange**. Thus, it is understandable that many countries make such a statement of “neutrality” or remain bystanders. The location of Taiwan, however, in the midst of the vital sea lines of communications (SLOCs), **any level of armed conflict will inevitably envelop an international affair with global consequences, economically, politically and militarily**. By nature, **a cross-Strait conflict cannot be a limited theatre of war**. Therefore, it would greatly improve conflict prevention if NATO could at a minimum maintain its own version of “strategic ambiguity” to make Beijing’s calculation of using force more difficult, less optimistic, and thereby more prudent [9]. The recent large-scale naval exercise conducted by the United States, Japanese, Australian, Indian and Singaporean navies in September 2007 might have aimed at such a signalling effect toward China. It will also be constructive if Europe, together with other Western countries, were to make Beijing understand that any armed attack on Taiwan would lead to worldwide criticism and boycotts of Chinese products. To leave the issue to Beijing-Taipei bilateral talks is not a solution either. In the 1990s, former Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui secretly sent an envoy to Hong Kong to negotiate with Beijing on cross-Strait political issues but apparently failed to bring any constructive outcomes and, consequently, Lee resorted to declaring the controversial meeting special “state-to-state relations” (BBC, July 20, 2000). Likely, China’s One-China principle and Ma Ying-jeou’s claim of “sovereignty country” would hardly coalesce. Given the power disparity between Beijing and Taipei, any bilateral talks on equal terms are impossible and unrealistic. Given Beijing’s persistence on its old-fashioned sovereignty concept and territorial integrity, any bilateral talks would inevitably end up as a cruel power game, in which **the absorption of Taiwan would be imminent due to its relatively weaker position**. **If Beijing judges that Taiwan is** already weak and **isolated enough to allow for Chinese military operations, Beijing would opt for the use of force to realize its unification aim**. The current co-existence framework in the cross-Strait relationship is unsustainable, because the framework lacks a solid ground in terms of international law, and is instead subject to the change of various variables such as military power parity, international political dynamics, economic mergers, and domestic social-political developments in China and Taiwan. In such unstable circumstances, third-party intervention would be constructive and helpful to create a win-win situation. In this respect, Europe, which has a rich historical experience of transcending national borders through post-modern regional cooperation, could provide much inspiration and creative ideas for China and Taiwan, helping them to find a creative third way-out that both parties can comfortably accept. For instance, Europe could suggest to Beijing that a loose confederation or commonwealth to consolidate the current ambiguous co-existence—neither unification nor independence—would be a feasible peaceful solution acceptable to both sides, as well as the international community. When the U.S.-China co-management only muddles through the cross-Strait problem without leading to any fundamental solution, Europe’s rich experiences of conflict prevention and management could be a new subject worth studying for the related parties in the Asia-Pacific.

US-China escalation

Goes nuclear

Glaser (Professor of Political Science and International Affairs – George Washington University)

March/April 2011 “Will China’s Rise Lead to War?” Foreign Affairs Vol. 9 Iss. 2,

THE PROSPECTS for avoiding intense military competition and war may be good, but growth in China's power may nevertheless require some changes in U.S. foreign policy that Washington will find disagreeable--particularly regarding Taiwan. Although it lost control of Taiwan during the Chinese Civil War more than six decades ago, **China still considers Taiwan to be part of its homeland, and unification remains a key political goal** for Beijing. **China** has made clear that it **will use force if Taiwan declares independence, and** much of **China's** conventional **military buildup** has been dedicated to increasing its ability **to coerce Taiwan** and reducing the United States' ability to intervene. **Because China places such high value on Taiwan** and because the United States and China--whatever they might formally agree to--have such different attitudes regarding the legitimacy of the status quo, **the issue poses special dangers and challenges for the U.S.-Chinese relationship**, placing it in a different category than Japan or South Korea. **A crisis over Taiwan could** fairly **easily escalate to nuclear war, because each step** along the way **might** well **seem rational to the actors involved**. Current U.S. policy is designed to reduce the probability that Taiwan will declare independence and to make clear that the United States will not come to Taiwan's aid if it does. Nevertheless, **the United States would find itself under pressure to protect Taiwan against any sort of attack, no matter how it originated. Given the different interests and perceptions of the various parties and the limited control** Washington has **over Taipei's behavior, a crisis could unfold in which the United States found itself following events** rather than leading them. Such dangers have been around for decades, but ongoing **improvements in China's military capabilities** may **make Beijing more willing to escalate** a Taiwan **crisis**. In addition to its improved conventional capabilities, **China is modernizing its nuclear forces to increase their ability to survive and retaliate following** a large-scale **U.S. attack**. Standard deterrence theory holds that Washington's current ability to destroy most or all of China's nuclear force enhances its bargaining position. China's nuclear **modernization might** remove that check on Chinese action, **leading Beijing to behave more boldly** in future crises than it has in past ones. **A U.S. attempt to** preserve its ability to **defend Taiwan**, meanwhile, **could fuel** a conventional and **nuclear arms race. Enhancements to U.S. offensive targeting capabilities** and strategic ballistic missile defenses **might be interpreted by China as a signal of malign U.S. motives**, leading to further Chinese military efforts and a general poisoning of U.S.-Chinese relations.

Taiwan war – probable

Taiwan crisis is likely this year---draws in the U.S.

Michael **Mazza 1-3**, research fellow in foreign and defense policy at the American Enterprise Institute, 1/3/13, "Four Surprises That Could Rock Asia in 2013," http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/01/03/four_surprises_that_could_rock_asia_in_2012?page=full

Since President **Ma** Ying-jeou **came to power** in 2008, **Taipei and Beijing have improved ties** and deepened their economic integration: cross-strait trade reached \$127.6 billion in 2011, an increase of more than 13 percent from 2010. **Some national security experts misinterpret this trend, thinking that growing economic interdependence will overwhelm factors pushing the two sides apart, and that interdependence will provide Beijing with leverage it can use to compel unification.** But while Taiwan's businesspeople enjoy closer ties with China, **the average Taiwanese voter continues to move toward independence.** Over the last 20 years, the portion of citizens of Taiwan identifying as "Taiwanese" has increased from 17.6 percent of those polled in 1992 to a whopping 53.7 percent today; those identifying as "Chinese" has declined over the same period from 25.5 percent to just 3.1 percent today. **Support for independence has nearly doubled over the last two decades,** from 11.1 percent to 19.6 percent. Support for immediate or eventual unification, meanwhile, has more than halved, from 20 percent in 1992 to 9.8 percent in 2012.¶ **Economic integration is apparently failing to halt what Beijing sees as a troubling trend.** With a cross-strait trade agreement and a slew of other, easier deals already on the books, **Beijing now expects Ma to discuss political issues. But Ma doesn't have the domestic political support to pursue political talks** -- in March 2012, two months after his reelection, 45 percent of those polled said the pace of cross-strait exchanges was "just right," but the share of respondents answering "too fast" had increased to 32.6 percent, from 25.7 percent before the election. **Any Chinese shift toward a more strident Taiwan policy could portend a new crisis in the Taiwan Strait sooner than many expect, as a lack of progress on these issues may buttress hawks in the new Xi Jinping administration.** And **America would surely be dragged in: Even low-level coercive measures** against Taiwan - a top 10 U.S. trading partner and security ally -- **could throw U.S.-China relations into a tailspin.**

Taiwan war – impact calc

Taiwan war outweighs –

A – Faster and more likely – recent Chinese strategy shift

AFP, '10 – Feb 21, <http://www.rumormillnews.com/cgi-bin/archive.cgi?noframes;read=1721>)

BERLIN -- **China is ready to engage in war and even nuclear conflict with the United States should fighting break out over Taiwan**, Der Spiegel magazine reports on the basis of a supposedly-secret Chinese file. "**Document No. 65**", allegedly produced by the military sub-committee of the Chinese Community Party's central committee, **discussed the possible** course of a **war** over the disputed island claimed by China. "**We would have to make a military intervention as early as possible, before the American troops are fully operational**," according to the document cited by the German magazine. Faced with US bombardment of key sites and military installations, the document stressed that China has roughly the same level of conventional forces and would benefit from a fight close to its own territory. While arguing that the US would have little interest in starting a nuclear war over the island, the file said that **Beijing would be ready to turn to its nuclear arsenal** should circumstances demand. "We are ready **to defend every square centimetre of our country**," said the document. Dated August last year, the analysis would appear to have been drafted during a low point in relations between Beijing and Taipei caused by Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui's insistence that his country should enjoy "state-to-state" ties with China. China considers Taiwan a breakaway province and has repeatedly warned that it would use force if necessary to ensure its return to the mainland. -- AFP

B – Scope and size – effects would be global and produce WWII

Hunkovic, '8 (Lee, American Military University, <http://www.lamp-method.org/eCommons/Hunkovic.pdf>)

A war between China, Taiwan and the United States has the potential to escalate into a nuclear conflict and a third world war, therefore, **many countries** other than the primary actors **could be affected** by such a conflict, **including Japan, both Koreas, Russia, Australia, India and Great Britain**, if they were drawn into the war, **as well as all other countries** in the world that participate in the global economy, in which the United States and China are the two most dominant members. If China were able to successfully annex Taiwan, the possibility exists that they could then plan to attack Japan and begin a policy of aggressive expansionism in East and Southeast Asia, as well as the Pacific and even into India, which could in turn create an international standoff and deployment of military forces to contain the threat. In any case, **if China and the United States engage in a full-scale conflict, there are few countries in the world that will not be economically and/or militarily affected by it**. However, China, Taiwan and United States are the primary actors in this scenario, whose actions will determine its eventual outcome, therefore, other countries will not be considered in this study.

US-China war over Taiwan is the most likely scenario for great power nuclear war

Monte R. Bullard, '4. Senior Fellow @ Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies. "Strait Talk : Avoiding a Nuclear War between the United States and China over Taiwan," Online Book, December, <http://cns.mii.edu/straittalk/index.htm>.

War between the United States and China is unthinkable, but not totally impossible. The above scenario, described in more detail in Chapter Four, is conceivable. It **is one of the most likely situations in the world that could bring two mature nuclear powers into direct conflict and cause both sides to contemplate the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The principal effort that has to be undertaken** to prevent war between the United States and China **is to prevent armed conflict between China and Taiwan**. The best policies for preventing armed conflict between China and Taiwan are to reduce the rhetoric and to not increase the arms to establish a deterrence environment. The best policies by all three actors (the US, China and Taiwan) are broad and patient policies that go beyond the military realm and include a more comprehensive and coordinated military, political and economic approach. The title of this book is a bit misleading because it does not focus on the traditional topics of nonproliferation. Instead of focusing on arms control and disarmament subjects like export controls, agreements, treaties and regimes it examines factors that trigger the decisions to enter a conflict that could escalate into nuclear confrontation. The central point is that the

fundamental causes of conflict, not just the various means of controlling nuclear arms, must be considered. It is a slightly different approach to the issue of nonproliferation. It goes to the causes of proliferation rather than the processes of arms control.

ADV Environment

Cuban Drilling = Oil Spill

Drilling causes catastrophic oil spills – US companies can't prevent or mitigate the spill

Allen 12 (Greg – NPR, "U.S. Watches Closely As Oil Drilling Begins Off Cuba", 2/13, <http://www.npr.org/2012/02/13/146635957/u-s-watches-closely-as-oil-drilling-begins-off-cuba>)

There are big plans for oil exploration in the Caribbean, not far off the coast of Florida. A Spanish company recently began drilling in Cuban waters — just 55 miles from Key West. The well is the first of several exploratory wells planned in Cuba and the Bahamas. **The drilling has officials and researchers in Florida scrambling to make plans for how they'll**

respond in case of a spill. The U.S. currently doesn't allow any drilling for oil off its Atlantic coast or in the eastern Gulf of Mexico. One reason is what's at stake. Florida's tourism-based economy depends on its beaches, fishing and clear Caribbean water. Environmental Concerns

The U.S. ban on drilling off of Florida, however, doesn't affect America's Caribbean neighbors. The exploratory well being drilled off of Cuba has many here concerned, including people like Richard **Dodge.**

Dodge is the **dean of Nova Southeastern University's Oceanographic Center** in Dania Beach, near Fort Lauderdale, and what he's really concerned about is coral. At the school, Dodge and his graduate students raise staghorn coral in outdoor saltwater tanks. Live coral grow in the crystal-clear water, some just finger length. "These are relatively new ones that we're starting out," Dodge says. "But over here, these are ones we'll be transplanting to the wild." In another tank, large branches of coral will soon be used to help restore damaged

reefs. **Florida is home to more than three-quarters of the nation's coral reefs** — and they haven't been doing so well. Development and warming oceans have already weakened many. On a map, Dodge points out **the location of what he**

believes is an even bigger potential threat — **the spot where Cuba has approved offshore oil drilling.**

"The site that will be drilled," he says, **"is only about 50 miles from Key West."** The rig drilling off Cuba's northern

coast is operating in water that is more than a mile deep. But it's not the depth that concerns Dodge. **In the case of a blowout, it's**

the operation's proximity to the Gulf Stream. "We're worried that **it could get into that stream fast and**

therefore, within days, **impact our coastal ecosystem** and coastline," Dodge says. **A spill could potentially affect**

hundreds of miles of beaches, mangroves and estuaries from the Keys to Palm Beach. Dodge and other

marine scientists in Florida are asking the federal government to fund research that would help identify the resources most at risk, and develop

guidelines to protect them. Embargo Could Complicate Cleanup Complicating matters is the fact that this **new well is being drilled in**

the waters of a country that's under a strict U.S. embargo. Unless they apply for and receive special

permission from the government, U.S. companies are banned from doing any work on the well —

even if there's a spill.

A2 no drilling

Drilling is inevitable – cuba wants to act and international actors are lining up

Emily A. **Peterson**, Daniel J. **Whittle**, J.D. and Douglas N. **Rader**, Ph.D. December **2012** “Bridging the Gulf, Finding Common Ground on Environmental and Safety Preparedness for Offshore Oil and Gas in Cuba”, http://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/EDF-Bridging_the_Gulf-2012.pdf

In May 2012, the Spanish oil company Repsol announced it had drilled a dry hole during its deepwater exploration in Cuba. After having spent roughly \$150 million on two failed wells in Cuba’s waters (the first being in 2004), **the company revealed it would likely exit the island** and explore more profitable fields such as those in Angola and Brazil. In **August 2012**, Cuba’s state oil company announced that the latest offshore exploration project—a well drilled by **Malaysia’s state-owned Petronas on Cuba’s northwest coast—was also unsuccessful.** **To some, the outcome of three failed wells out of three attempts in Cuban waters may suggest that the threat of a catastrophic offshore spill impacting U.S. waters and the shared ecosystems of the Gulf of Mexico is now moot.** **To the contrary, the issue is salient now more than ever.** Cuba has an existing near-coastal oil industry on its north coast near Matanzas, a near- single-source dependency on imported petroleum from Venezuela, and **has exhibited continued strong interest in developing its own offshore capacity. Several additional foreign oil companies are slated to conduct exploratory deepwater drilling in Cuba** at least through 2013.

US Expertise Key

Drilling inevitable – US involvement and expertise key to prevent oil spill and lays the foundation for cooperative relations

Emily A. Peterson, Daniel J. Whittle, J.D. and Douglas N. Rader, Ph.D. December 2012 “Bridging the Gulf, Finding Common Ground on Environmental and Safety Preparedness for Offshore Oil and Gas in Cuba”, http://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/EDF-Bridging_the_Gulf-2012.pdf

Current U.S. foreign policy on Cuba creates a conspicuous blind spot that is detrimental to the interests of both countries. **The United States government enacted stricter regulations governing deepwater drilling** in U.S. waters **in the aftermath of the Deepwater Horizon** oil spill, and has publicly acknowledged a need to better prepare for a potential major spill in neighboring Cuban waters of the Gulf of Mexico. **Yet U.S. policy still does not do enough to lessen the likelihood of such a spill or to ensure that sufficient resources will be at the ready to respond to a spill in a timely and effective manner.** Beyond their geographical proximity, **Cuba and the United States are tightly interconnected by ocean currents and share ecosystems such that a spill in either country could have profound impacts on** fisheries, tourism, and recreation **in the entire region.** Yet, due to longstanding U.S. economic **sanctions**, international **operators working in Cuba are unable to turn northward to the United States to freely access equipment and expertise in the event of an oil disaster.** The purpose of this report is to present EDF’s position that **direct dialogue and cooperation between the United States and Cuba on environmental and safety matters associated with offshore oil and gas development is the only effective pathway to protect valuable environmental and economic interests in both countries.** Cooperation now on safety and environmental preparedness surrounding offshore oil **can also lay a foundation for broader constructive engagement** on environmental protection and natural resources management **in the future.** Principally, this report addresses U.S. policy toward Cuba and makes recommendations for improving environmental and safety preparedness related to offshore oil exploration and development in Cuba. This report is not intended nor does it purport to serve as a comprehensive analysis of Cuba’s domestic energy strategy, policies, laws, or regulations. Deepwater drilling off the northern coast of Cuba and in many other areas of the Gulf of Mexico poses a potential threat to sensitive and vulnerable marine and coastal ecosystems and to coastal communities. Cuba has a sovereign right to determine whether to exploit oil and gas resources within its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), in the same way other nations do, including Cuba’s neighbors in the Gulf of Mexico, the United States and Mexico. Other Caribbean countries, such as the Bahamas, are also considering offshore oil and gas operations in the future. **The underlying reality is that the Cuban government will continue with its drilling activities, with or without the acquiescence of U.S. policymakers.**

US expertise in Cuban drilling operations is necessary to prevent oil spills

Helman 11 (Christopher – Forbes, “U.S. Should Drop Cuba Embargo For Oil Exploration”, 12/12, <http://www.forbes.com/sites/christopherhelman/2011/12/12/u-s-should-drop-cuba-embargo-for-oil-exploration/>)

In a few months Spanish oil company **Repsol will start drilling for oil off the coast of Cuba**, in a spot just 70 miles south of Key West. Soon Repsol—and its JV partners Norway’s Statoil and India’s ONGC—will be joined by rigs from PetroVietnam, Malaysia’s Petronas and Venezuela’s PDVSA. **But you won’t see any U.S. companies there.** Inexplicably, **the U.S. maintains its economic embargo against the Castro regime. This wrong-headed policy represents a dangerous threat to the environment and a huge missed opportunity to the U.S. oil industry.** **The U.S. embargo will do nothing to prevent oil drilling from taking place in Cuban waters. But it will prevent that work from being done by the most experienced companies** with the highest-quality equipment. Norway’s Statoil is a proven operator with a long history in the North Sea and the Gulf. The rest of those companies are just getting started offshore. A group of U.S. lawmakers in September urged Repsol (ticker: REPLY.PK) to call off its Cuba plans or face the threat of U.S. lawsuits. Repsol wisely called that bluff. At least the Obama administration is doing something to ensure that Repsol’s drilling rig is up to snuff. According to an excellent article from Bloomberg today, Repsol’s Chinese-built Scarabeo 9 rig will soon be boarded by four U.S. inspectors (two from the Coast Guard, two from the Dept. of Interior) who will do what they can to check out the rig and watch some drills. But, according to the article, there will be real limits to what the

inspectors can inspect. They won't get to check the rig's all-important blowout preventor, or the well casing or drilling fluids that are to be used. Though the U.S. inspectors will discuss any concerns they have with Repsol, they will have no enforcement authority. Although the offshore industry's best service companies and parts manufacturers are right here on the U.S. Gulf coast, Repsol will have to train its people and scrounge for spare parts from the rest of the world. But here's something that completely blows my mind. The administration, again, according to the Bloomberg article, has granted some U.S. companies the license to respond to an oil spill were it to occur in Cuban waters. The government won't say how many companies have that license or who they are, but there's at least two of them: Wild Well Control and Helix Energy Solutions Group. Helix plans to stage a subsea containment cap on the U.S. coast so it can quickly respond to any Cuban blowout. Of course it's smart and safe for the U.S. government to put defensive measures in place in the event of a spill, but **the message to the industry is clear: we refuse to give superior U.S. operators the license to drill for oil in Cuba**, but we want to make sure you're ready to clean up any problems. **And the message to Cuba: we're not going to let you use our engineers**, just our janitors. Knowing that a top-notch American clean-up crew is on standby in case of a blowout is not a big incentive for Cuba to keep its own regulators on top of things. **Think about Cuba in relation to U.S. oil adventures in the rest of the world. Even if Cuba really were a tyrannical threat to U.S. interests, there's myriad countries where U.S. oil companies have done business that are no more democratic than Cuba.** They include **Venezuela, Saudi Arabia, Burma, Libya, Equatorial Guinea and Kazakhstan.** The Castros' days as rulers of Cuba are numbered. **The embargo stick hasn't brought regime change, and has only forced Cuba into the arms of autocrats like Venezuela's Hugo Chavez. Better to use the carrot of capitalism to gradually bring Cuba into the U.S. sphere of influence.** **The oil industry is a great place to start.**

Cuba coral key

Cuba is the crown jewel of marine biodiversity

Emily A. Peterson, Daniel J. Whittle, J.D. and Douglas N. Rader, Ph.D. December 2012 “Bridging the Gulf, Finding Common Ground on Environmental and Safety Preparedness for Offshore Oil and Gas in Cuba”, http://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/EDF-Bridging_the_Gulf-2012.pdf

Situated at the convergence point of the Atlantic Ocean, Gulf of Mexico, and Caribbean Sea, Cuba is a biological crown jewel that boasts the largest marine biodiversity in the Caribbean. **The country's**

expanses of mangrove forests, wetlands, seagrass meadows, and coral reefs provide critical spawning areas, feeding grounds, and shelter **for a wide array of marine animals, plants, and organisms. Its location** within

the Caribbean **makes Cuba a prime migratory corridor** and wintering site, particularly given its positioning along the Mississippi and East Atlantic flyways. Cuba provides crucial refueling habitat for 284 bird species that breed in the United States, including warblers, orioles and other song birds, shore birds and wading birds, and raptorial birds.² Cuba's network of wetlands provide extremely important habitat for waterbird species—including flamingos, ibises, cormorants, egrets, and spoonbills—that form in record concentrations not found elsewhere throughout the Caribbean.³ One of these wetlands, the Zapata Swamp on Cuba's southern coast, encompasses over a million acres and represents one of the largest protected areas in the entire Caribbean region. The popular media has often, and mistakenly, characterized Cuba's prized natural environment as “an accidental Eden,” made possible through coincidences “of geography and history.”⁴ Such a perspective fails to recognize or credit the affirmative and, in many cases, progressive environmental policies and programs that Cuba has adopted over the last 20 years. In the mid-1990s, Cuba began adopting a suite of environmental laws and regulations that established environmental protection and sustainability as top policy priorities. Among these are strong new laws on coastal zone conservation and management and the protection of biodiversity and important natural areas. In 1996, the government set aside the Jardines de la Reina (Gardens of the Queen) as a largely no-take fishery reserve, now the largest and one of the most important marine parks in the Caribbean.

The famed archipelago off Cuba's southern coast—home to thriving populations of giant grouper, sharks, sea turtles, and American crocodiles—is **regarded as one of the world's most intact coral reef ecosystems.**⁵ The government has now pledged to protect a full 25 percent of its insular shelf as marine parks or reserves, and appears primed to meet this objective.⁶ **Despite the apparent commitment of Cuban officials to build a body of environmental laws, policies, and regulations, the country's environment is not immune to natural and manmade pressures.** These threats range from global challenges — such as climate change, which is causing ocean acidification, rising seas, and intensifying storms — to more local problems, including management of liquid and solid wastes, soil erosion, deforestation, and pressure to develop pristine coastal areas for tourism and other economic sectors.

Coral impacts

Marine biodiversity is key to human survival

Davidson 3 (Founder – Turtle House Foundation and Award-Winning Journalist, Fire in the Turtle House, p. 47-51)

But surely the Athenians had it backward; it's the land that rests in the lap of the sea. Thalassa, not Gaia, is the guardian of life on the blue planet. A simple, albeit apocalyptic, experiment suggests Thalassa's power. **Destroy all life on land; the ocean creatures will survive** just fine. Given time, they'll even repopulate the land. But **wipe out the organisms that inhabit the oceans and all life on land is doomed.** "Dust to dust," says the Bible, but "water to water" is more like it, for **all life comes from** and returns to **the sea**. Our ocean origins abide within us, our secret marine history. The chemical makeup of our blood is strikingly similar to seawater. Every carbon atom in our body has cycled through the ocean many times. Even the human embryo reveals our watery past. Tiny gill slits form and then fade during our development in the womb. **The ocean is the cradle of life** on our planet, and **it remains the axis of existence, the locus of planetary biodiversity, and the engine of the chemical and hydrological cycles that create and maintain our atmosphere and climate. The astonishing biodiversity is most evident on coral reefs, often called the "rain forests of the sea."** Occupying less than one-quarter of 1 percent of the global ocean, **coral reefs are home to** nearly **a third of all marine** fish species and to as many as nine million **species** in all. But life exists in profusion in every corner of the ocean, right down to the hydrothermal vents on the seafloor (discovered only in 1977), where more than a hundred newly described species thrive around superheated plumes of sulfurous gasses. The abundance of organisms in the ocean isn't surprising given that the sea was, as already mentioned, the crucible of life on Earth. It is the original ecosystem, the environment in which the "primordial soup" of nucleic acids (which can self-replicate, but are not alive) and other molecules made the inexplicable and miraculous leap into life, probably as simple bacteria, close to 3.9 billion years ago. A spectacular burst of new life forms called the Cambrian explosion took place in the oceans some 500 million years ago, an evolutionary experiment that produced countless body forms, the prototypes of virtually all organisms alive today. It wasn't until 100 million years later that the first primitive plants took up residence on terra firma. Another 30 million years passed before the first amphibians climbed out of the ocean. After this head start, it's not surprising that evolution on that newcomer-dry land has never caught up with the diversity of the sea. Of the thirty-three higher-level groupings of animals (called phyla), thirty-two are found in the oceans and just twelve on land.

Florida internal – coral reefs

Spills risk destruction of key ecosystems

Padgett 12 (Tim, “The Oil Off Cuba: Washington and Havana Dance at Arms Length Over Spill Prevention”, 1/27, <http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2105598,00.html>)

On any other occasion that might have raised the ire of the Cubans, who consider Washington their imperialista enemy. But the U.S. examination of the Scarabeo 9, which Repsol agreed to and Cuba abided, was part of an unusual choreography of cooperation between the two countries. Their otherwise bitter cold-war feud (they haven't had diplomatic relations since 1961) is best known for a 50-year-long trade embargo and history's scariest nuclear standoff. Now, **Cuba's commitment to offshore oil exploration** — drilling may start this weekend — **raises a specter that haunts both nations: an oil spill in the Florida Straits like the BP calamity** that tarred the nearby Gulf of Mexico two years ago and left \$40 billion in U.S. damages. **The Straits, an equally vital body of water that's home to some of the world's most precious coral reefs separates Havana and Key West, Florida, by a mere 90 miles.** As a result, the U.S. has tacitly loosened its embargo against Cuba to give firms like Repsol easier access to the U.S. equipment they need to help avoid or contain possible spills. "Preventing drilling off Cuba better protects our interests than preparing for [a disaster] does," U.S. Senator Bill Nelson of Florida tells TIME, noting the U.S. would prefer to stop the Cuban drilling — but can't. "But the two are not mutually exclusive, and that's why we should aim to do both."

A Cuban oil spill destroys multiple marine ecosystems – proximity and modeling prove

ORR 12 (Office of Response and Restoration – National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, “Getting Ready for Offshore Oil Drilling in Cuba and the Bahamas”, 4/27, <http://response.restoration.noaa.gov/about/media/getting-ready-offshore-oil-drilling-cuba-and-bahamas.html>)

For the past year, NOAA and the U.S. Coast Guard have been studying the possible threats that new offshore oil drilling activity near the Florida Straits and the Bahamas pose to Florida. For example, **the proximity of Cuba's oil fields to U.S. waters has raised a lot of concerns** about what would happen if a spill like the 2010 Deepwater Horizon/BP oil well blowout happened. **If a large oil spill did occur in the waters northwest of Cuba, currents in the Florida Straits could carry the oil to U.S. waters and coastal areas in Florida.** However, a number of factors, like winds or currents, would determine where any oil slicks might go. **NOAA's National Ocean Service has more information about** how we're preparing for worst-case scenarios there: **The study focuses on modeling the movement of oil in water to predict where, when, and how oil might reach U.S. shores** given a spill in this region of the ocean. Models help to determine the threat to our coasts from a potential spill by accounting for many different variables, such as the weathering processes of evaporation, dispersion, photo-oxidation, and biodegradation—all of which reduce the amount of oil in the water over time. **Currents and winds also play a role in determining where oil will move in water.** For example, **there are three major currents that would dominate movement of spilled oil near the Florida Straits:** Loop Current, Florida Current, and the Gulf Stream. **If oil did reach U.S. waters, marine and coastal resources in southern Florida could be at risk, including coral reefs and the Florida Keys National Marine Sanctuary,** located north of the Cuban drilling sites. We'll be watching the drilling activity there very carefully. If a spill does happen, NOAA will be ready to share our scientific expertise on oil spill response with the U.S. Coast Guard.

Florida internal – spills

Cuban oil spills collapse Floridian and Gulf of Mexico ecosystems – the plan prevents and mitigates the impact to spills

Sarah **Stephens** (Executive Director of the Center for Democracy in the Americas) and Jake **Colvin** (Vice President for Global Trade Issues at the National Foreign Trade Council) 9/29/**2011** “US-Cuba policy, and the race for oil drilling” <http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/184661-us-cuba-policy-and-the-race-for-oil-drilling>)

To protect the national interest – and for the sake of Florida's beaches and **the Gulf of Mexico's ecosystem – it is time to stop sticking our heels in the sand when it comes to U.S.-Cuba policy.** Before the end of the year, a Chinese-made drilling platform known as Scarabeo 9 is expected to arrive in the Gulf. Once it is there, Cuba and its foreign partners, including Spain's Repsol, will begin using it to drill for oil in waters deeper than Deepwater Horizon's infamous Macondo well. The massive rig, manufactured to comply with U.S.-content restrictions at a cost of \$750 million, will cost Repsol and other companies \$407,000 per day to lease for exploration. They are taking this financial risk because Cuba needs the oil and its partners — Spain, Norway, Russia, India, Vietnam, Malaysia, Canada, Angola, Venezuela, and possibly China — believe that drilling in waters said to contain undiscovered reserves of approximately 5 billion barrels of oil is good business. **In virtually every other country in the world, developments like these would prompt high-level discussions about how to exploit these resources safely** or to anticipate a crisis were a disaster to strike. **Experts who have studied the currents say a spill in Cuban waters would send 90 percent of the oil into the Keys and up the East Coast of Florida.** But the embargo leaves Florida's sensitive coastal resources defenseless. **Due to the fact that the drilling involves Cuba, American companies and workers cannot lend their expertise to what could be a risky operation. U.S. economic sanctions prevent our private sector from helping Cuba drill safely and paralyze the U.S. government,** which ought to be convening bilateral discussions on best practices and **coordinating disaster response. In fact, the U.S. has no emergency response** agreement **with Cuba for oil spills. While some specific licenses have been granted** to permit U.S. firms to conduct limited transactions with Cuba, **current sanctions bar the United States from deploying the kind of clean-up equipment, engineers, spare parts for blow-out prevention, chemical dispersants, and rigs to drill relief wells that would be needed to address an oil crisis involving Cuba.** One welcomed development came earlier this month, when William Reilly, a former head of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and co-chair of the Commission that investigated the Deepwater Horizon disaster, led a group of experts to Cuba to take a look at their plans. While **the administration** has done well giving permission to Mr. Reilly, as well as to other experts, to discuss the problem with Cuban counterparts, it **should move more aggressively to work with the Cuban government to cooperate on plans for safe drilling** and responding to a possible crisis. Rather than moving forward, some in the U.S. Congress would make the problem worse. Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (FL-R), who criticized Mr. Reilly's visit to Cuba as “giving credibility to the regime's dangerous oil-drilling scheme,” has offered legislation to try and stop Repsol from drilling. Rep. Vern Buchanan (FL-R) would deny Repsol the right to drill in U.S. waters if it helped Cuba drill in its waters. Thirty-four members of both parties have written Repsol directly, threatening the company if it drills with Cuba. Yet this tactic can't work. Even if they could deter Repsol from drilling — which is unlikely — they cannot stop Cuba and partners from countries like China, Russia, and Venezuela, from using the rig and searching for oil. At some point, it is likely that drilling will begin and the United States ought to do what it can to prepare for that eventuality. **The U.S. government should facilitate access by Cuba and its drilling partners to the resources they need to drill safely.** President **Obama should instruct the Treasury Department** to issue a blanket general license now that would allow private industry to provide what **oil expert** Jorge Piñon **calls “any conceivable response” in the event of a crisis.**

Off Case

Topicality

Economic Engagement = energy investment

economic engagement includes energy investment

Bradley **Bosserman** (Policy Analyst at NDN and the New Policy Institute) **2012** “Oil And Gas Account For 90% of US Imports from Middle East, US Should Diversify And Strengthen Economic Ties Following Arab Spring”, <http://www.policymic.com/debates/6690/oil-and-gas-account-for-90-of-us-imports-from-middle-east-us-should-diversify-and-strengthen-economic-ties-following-arab-spring>)

US policy should be directed intensely toward the development of human capital, democratic institutions, **broad-based economic opportunities**, and the entrepreneurial culture needed to support a vibrant and democratic political life through out the Middle East and North Africa. Elections are not enough. Not by a long shot. The UN’s Arab Development Report makes clear that the economic changes needed to support these democracies are, in fact, quite revolutionary themselves. Before the Arab Spring, the “dominant form of the social contract in the region [was] one where the population resigns itself to lack of political freedom in exchange for provision of certain services and exemption from or low taxation.” **The hard work** of changing this culture will be done in large part by local stakeholders, but **needs to be supported by a holistic strategy of US economic engagement**. **Currently, Oil and gas account for over 90% of US imports** from the region **and US investment has been largely confined to the energy sector**. **Growing that economic relationship will be essential** for addressing the fact that the next generation of Arab leaders and citizens have yet to realize the gains of globalization. Over 50% of the population in Arab countries is under the age of 30, yet they suffer the highest unemployment rate in the world, breeding discontent and frustration. Their energy needs to be channeled into productive economic opportunities so that they can support their families and develop a real stake is building and maintaining liberal, democratic societies.

Economic Engagement = offshore drilling

Economic engagement includes cooperative offshore energy production – it's predictable – the government includes it

Dan Sullivan (Former Assistant Secretary for Economic, Energy and Business Affairs) 2007 "Economic Engagement: Building the U.S.-Azerbaijan Relationship", <http://2001-2009.state.gov/e/eeb/rls/rm/2007/91369.htm>

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SULLIVAN: Thank you very much Mr. Semed Seyidov for your kind introduction. Great to be back in Azerbaijan. Each time I visit Baku I feel the energy of a changing, growing and modernizing economy. I can actually see changes that have taken place since my last visit in February – new roads, bridges and buildings all around the city. Clearly Baku is taking its place as a key regional economic hub. The Azerbaijani economy is taking off, and the country's oil and gas revenues have the potential to transform the country and the lives of the people here. The United States has deep and long-term interests in the Caspian region. We are committed particularly to helping ensure Azerbaijan's prosperity, independence, and sovereignty. And we fully support President Aliyev's commitment to making Azerbaijan a modern, secular, democratic, and market-oriented state. Azerbaijan's key role in global energy security, our important cooperation on regional security, and the country's strategic position as the natural gateway between Europe and Central Asia make it an essential partner for the United States. Over the

past year, due in large part to the intensive efforts of our Ambassador and your officials, **we have intensified our engagement with**

Azerbaijan across three critical areas: 1) democracy and democratic reform; 2) security cooperation; and 3) energy cooperation and economic reform. Now, **my Bureau, as the Assistant Secretary of State for**

Economic, Energy, and Business Affairs, focus on the third area – energy and economic cooperation but

we it's important to recognize that all three of these areas are absolutely very interconnected. We look for progress in all three because progress in each of these three areas reinforces progress in the others and we believe that these three areas moving forward will lead to lasting security, stability, and prosperity that all citizens desire and deserve. Energy Cooperation So let me first talk about the critical area of energy cooperation between our two countries. We have a well-established history of cooperation and trust in the field of energy. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline – which as you know, is one of the most modern, state of the art pipelines in the world – is a symbol and testament to that critical cooperation. Azerbaijan's regional leadership was essential to bringing the BTC vision to reality. We are building on this tradition of close cooperation in the energy field. This past March, my boss at the State Department Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Foreign Minister Mammadyarov signed a memorandum of understanding formally establishing the U.S.-Azerbaijan Energy Dialogue. I co-chair this Dialogue and we had very constructive meetings to further advance our common energy security goals in this area. What are these goals? Well, as we announced today, during the signing of a U.S. Trade and Development Agency grant that will go to SOCAR. **We believe we are now embarked on the next**

stage of Caspian Energy development, which would entail a number of things: 1) **enhanced production of oil**

and gas in Azerbaijan's offshore sector; 2) continued natural gas exports to Georgia and Turkey, and initial exports to Greece and Italy; 3)

further work on the Nabucco pipeline project, with Azerbaijan's and perhaps Central Asia's gas moving to markets in Central Europe, and 4) the emergence of Azerbaijan as an oil and gas transit country, as Azerbaijan continues its outreach to Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. Azerbaijan's continued leadership will be essential to achieve these goals, as we continue cooperation between the U.S. and Azerbaijan, as well as working to deepen the cooperation between Azerbaijan and our European allies and the European Commission. The **commencement of the next phase of Caspian energy development, we believe has already begun.** As I mentioned, today we signed a rather large feasibility study to construct an oil and gas pipeline connecting Central Asia to Azerbaijan. This is a big and important step and it is the beginning of many good things to come in terms of the next phase of Caspian energy development. We believe the opportunities in this sector are great and can lead to lasting opportunity for the people of the region. Now is the time to seize these opportunities.

Politics

Shielding – executive action

Normal means is executive licensing – shields the link

Pascual and Huddleston 9 (Carlos – Vice president and Director of Foreign policy – the Brookings Institution, and Vicki – Visiting Fellow, “CUBA: A New policy of Critical and Constructive Engagement”, April, http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/reports/2009/4/cuba/0413_cuba.pdf)

Given the strong sentiments and expectations that Cuba engenders, it would be preferable for the

Executive Branch to proceed discreetly.

The president might first announce the principles he hopes to achieve in Cuba through a policy of engagement that promotes human rights, the well-being of the Cuban people, and the growth of civil society. **To carry out**

the president’s vision, the Secretary of the Treasury will then have the responsibility to write and

publish the changes to the Cuban Assets Control regulations by licensing activities designed to

achieve these ends. The Secretary of State can quietly accomplish many diplomatic initiatives on a reciprocal basis

without any need to publicize them.

This quiet diplomacy might be complemented by a refusal to engage in what some refer to as megaphone diplomacy, in which our governments trade in - sults across the Straits of Florida, and which only contributes to making the United States appear to be a bully.

The Treasury department can do the plan without congress – shields the link

Cave 12 (Damien – NYT, “Easing of Restraints in Cuba Renews Debate on U.S. Embargo”, 11/19, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/20/world/americas/changes-in-cuba-create-support-for-easing-embargo.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0)

In Washington, Mr. Gross is seen as the main impediment to an easing of the embargo, but **there are also limits to what the president could do without Congressional action.**

The 1992 Cuban Democracy Act conditioned the waiving of sanctions on the introduction of democratic changes inside Cuba. The 1996 Helms-Burton Act also requires that the embargo remain until Cuba has a transitional or democratically elected government. **Obama administration officials say they have not given up, and could**

move if the president decides to act on his own. Officials say that **under the Treasury Department’s**

licensing and regulation-writing authority, there is room for significant modification. Following the legal

logic of Mr. Obama’s changes in 2009, **further expansions in travel are possible along with new allowances for investment or imports and exports, especially if narrowly applied** to Cuban businesses.

Shielding – oil lobbies

oil loves the plan and lobby for it---determines Congressional sentiment

Sadowski 11 – Richard Sadowski 11, J.D., Hofstra University School of Law, Fall 2011, “IN THIS ISSUE: NATURAL RESOURCE CONFLICT: CUBAN OFFSHORE DRILLING: PREPARATION AND PREVENTION WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE UNITED STATES' EMBARGO,” Sustainable Development Law & Policy, 12 Sustainable Dev. L. & Pol'y 37, p. lexis

A U.S. Geological Survey estimates that Cuba's offshore oil fields hold at least four and a half billion barrels of recoverable oil and ten trillion cubic feet of natural gas. n29 Cupet, the state-owned Cuban energy company, insists that actual reserves are double that of the U.S. estimate. n30 One estimate indicates that Cuba could be producing 525,000 barrels of oil per day. n31 Given this vast resource, Cuba has already leased offshore oil exploration blocks to operators from Spain, Norway, and India. n32 **Offshore oil discoveries in Cuba are placing increasing pressure for the United States to end the embargo.** First, **U.S. energy companies are eager to compete for access to Cuban oil reserves.** n33 [*38] Secondly, **fears of a Cuban oil spill are argued to warrant U.S. investment and technology.** n34 Finally, the concern over Cuban offshore drilling renews cries that the embargo is largely a failure and harms human rights. ¶ ECONOMICS: U.S. COMPANIES WANT IN ¶ **For U.S. companies, the embargo creates concern that they will lose out on an opportunity to develop a nearby resource.** n35 **Oil companies have a long history of utilizing political pressure for self-serving purposes.** n36 **American politicians, ever fearful of high energy costs, are especially susceptible to oil-lobby pressures.** n37 This dynamic was exemplified in 2008, when then-Vice President Dick **Cheney told** the board of directors of **the U.S. Chamber of Commerce** that **"oil is being drilled right now sixty miles off the coast of Florida. But we're not doing it, the Chinese are,** in cooperation with the Cuban government. **Even the communists have figured out that a good answer to high prices is more supply"** n38 ¶ **This pressure for U.S. investment in oil is exacerbated by America's expected increase in consumption rates.** n39 **Oil company stocks are valued in large part on access to reserves.** n40 Thus, **more leases, including those in Cuban waters, equal higher stock valuation.** n41 **"The last thing that American energy companies want is to be trapped on the sidelines by sanctions while European, Canadian and Latin American rivals are free to develop new oil resources on the doorstep of the United States."** n42

Drilling lobbyists support the plan – generates GOP support and shields the links

Kraus 10 (Clifford – NYT, “Drilling Plans Off Cuba Stir Fears of Impact on Gulf”, 9/30, <http://naturalresources.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=209452>)

New Mexico's governor, Bill **Richardson, a Democrat who regularly visits Cuba, said Cuba's offshore drilling plans are a “potential inroad” for loosening the embargo.** During a recent humanitarian trip to Cuba, he said, **he bumped into a number of American drilling contractors – “all Republicans who could eventually convince the Congress to make the embargo flexible in this area of oil spills.”**

Link turn – china hate

Anti-Chinese opposition generates GOP support

Bolstad 8 (Erika, "GOP claim about Chinese oil drilling off Cuba is untrue", 6/11, <http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2008/06/11/40776/gop-claim-about-chinese-oil-drilling.html#.UZwkw8rSmp4>)

Why, ask some Republicans, should the United States be thwarted from drilling in its own territory **when just 50 miles off the Florida coastline the Chinese government is drilling for oil under Cuban leases?** Yet no one can prove that the Chinese are drilling anywhere off Cuba's shoreline. The China-Cuba connection is "akin to urban legend," said Sen. Mel Martinez, a Republican from Florida who opposes drilling off the coast of his state but who backs exploration in ANWR. "China is not drilling in Cuba's Gulf of Mexico waters, period," said Jorge Pinon, an energy fellow with the Center for Hemispheric Policy at the University of Miami and an expert in oil exploration in the Gulf of Mexico. Martinez cited Pinon's research when he took to the Senate floor Wednesday to set the record straight. Even so, **the Chinese-drilling-in-Cuba legend has gained momentum and has been swept up in Republican arguments to open up more** U.S. territory to domestic **production.** Vice President Dick Cheney, in a speech Wednesday to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, picked up the refrain. Cheney quoted a column by George Will, who wrote last week that **"drilling is under way 60 miles off Florida. The drilling is being done by China, in cooperation with Cuba, which is drilling closer to South Florida than U.S. companies are."** In his speech, Cheney described the Chinese as being "in cooperation with the Cuban government. Even the communists have figured out that a good answer to higher prices means more supply." "But Congress says no to drilling in ANWR, no to drilling on the East Coast, no to drilling on the West Coast," Cheney added. The office of House Minority Leader John Boehner defended the GOP drilling claims. "A 2006 New York Times story highlights lease agreements negotiated between Cuba and China and the fact that China was planning to drill in the Florida Strait off the coast of Cuba," said spokesman Michael Steel. The China-Cuba connection also appeared in an editorial Monday in Investor's Business Daily, which wrote that "the U.S. Congress has voted consistently to keep 85 percent of America's offshore oil and gas off-limits, while China and Cuba drill 60 miles from Key West, Fla."

Err affirmative – Policymakers support the plan because of China – that outweighs the link

Franks 11 (Jeff, "China to play major role in Cuban oil development", 6/8, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/08/cuba-china-oil-idUSN08140650201106>)

The prospect of Cuban drilling has touched off opposition from Florida lawmakers who say it threatens the state's environment and helps the Cuban government so hated by many in Miami, the center of the Cuban exile community. They have filed bills in Washington attempting to thwart the drilling by punishing foreign companies and individuals who take part in Cuba's exploration. **U.S. oil companies cannot work in Cuba due to the longstanding U.S. trade embargo** against the island. Repsol representatives met with U.S. Interior Secretary Ken Salazar last week to assure him they have solid safety plans in place should there be a blowout like that at the BP well last year off the Louisiana coast. "It sounds as if the (U.S.) administration is trying to figure out how to work cooperatively with Repsol, and that is definitely in the U.S. national interest," said Cuba expert Phil Peters at the Lexington Institute think tank in Arlington, Virginia. **"Florida wants high standards of environmental protection** in the gulf and Florida also doesn't want the U.S. to talk to Cuba. You can't have it both ways," he said. **Chinese involvement in Cuban waters would add a new element to the U.S. debate** over relations with Cuba. Former Vice President Dick Cheney mistakenly said in 2008 that China was drilling in Cuban waters 60 miles (96 km) from Florida, and used it to argue the U.S. should step up its own drilling. But **China's presence also might be used by lawmakers** who want to justify a hard line against Cuba's exploration plans. In 2005, the Chinese National Offshore Corp. tried to buy California-based oil company Unocal, but **there was strong opposition in the U.S. Congress** on grounds of national security. CNOOC withdrew its bid and China learned a lesson, Pinon said. **"China learned how sensitive this country is to China's activities,"** he said. **"China is a good political whipping boy."**

Link turn – oil revenue

Only drilling in U.S. waters link-turns politics---the possibility of revenues being shared with states is key to bipart

Coral **Davenport 13**, energy & environment correspondent, National Journal, 2/5/13, “Breakthrough Nears on Tapping Offshore Energy Supply,” <http://www.nationaljournal.com/congress/breakthrough-nears-on-tapping-offshore-energy-supply-20130205>

In a season of political gridlock, a breakthrough could be near on legislation to promote energy production off the nation’s coastlines. A bipartisan energy bill now being crafted in the Senate could hit a sweet spot between expanding offshore oil and gas drilling, which many Republicans want, and creating

incentives for new offshore wind and tidal power, which many Democrats want. **It could also create a new source of revenue for the nation’s 24 coastal states—a tempting prospect for many cash-strapped state governments.**

The bill is being written by Sen. Lisa Murkowski of Alaska, the top Republican on the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee, along with Democratic Sens. Mary Landrieu of Louisiana and Ron Wyden of Oregon, the new chairman the Senate Energy panel. Energy has emerged in recent years as a hot-button political and economic issue, as the nation suffered from record-high gasoline prices in 2008, reeled from the Gulf of Mexico oil spill in 2010, and clashed over how to tackle the controversial problem of climate change. But it’s been five years since Congress has actually passed a comprehensive energy bill. Indeed, **the high-profile politicization of energy issues has often appeared to make it more difficult to actually write and pass energy policy.** The Murkowski-Landrieu-Wyden bill has the potential break that logjam—and to allow both Democrats and Republicans to actually claim that they are moving an “all-of-the-above” energy bill. Both sides spent 2012

touting that energy slogan on the campaign trail. The new bill relies on an old idea with some fresh tweaks. **Its central proposal is to allow coastal states to receive a share of the money generated when energy—of any kind—is produced in federally owned waters off their shores.**

Currently, with one exception, when an oil or gas company drills offshore in federal waters, it must pay a hefty 18.75 percent of the value of the fuel that it produces to the federal government. Last year, offshore drilling royalties sent \$5.2 billion flowing to the Treasury. In 2006, Landrieu sponsored a bill that would have opened up new portions of the Gulf of Mexico for drilling and sent 37.5 percent of the money set aside for the U.S. government to Gulf Coast states instead of the Treasury. The idea was that the money would be used to help the Gulf Coast rebuild and restore its coastal wetlands after the devastation of Hurricane Katrina. **Now Landrieu and Murkowski, whose own home state also relies heavily on the oil**

industry, want to apply that revenue-sharing formula to the entire U.S. coastline. The idea is that **it would**

create an alluring incentive for states to open up their coasts for drilling, knowing that along with oil and gas rigs, they’d get a new revenue stream — as much as an estimated \$500 million a year. **There has actually**

long been strong bipartisan support in Congress for the idea of revenue-sharing. In 2006, Landrieu’s bill

passed the Senate on an overwhelming vote of 71-25. For years, the biggest obstacle to revenue-sharing legislation was former Senate Energy and Natural Resources Chairman Jeff Bingaman, D-N.M., who retired from Congress last year. Bingaman fiercely opposed revenue-sharing as a concept that would divert much-needed federal revenue to state coffers. But Wyden, the new Energy chairman, hails from a coastal state that could benefit from the proposal. His idea is to write the bill in such a way that it would also promote renewable energy and environmental conservation. **It would allow states to take in a percentage of revenue from generating electricity with**

offshore wind farms, and it would set aside a portion of that money for environmental restoration

and conservation. “There’s an opportunity to **knit together a coalition** of people interested in federal

lands and federal waters, of people interested in job creation and protecting the environment,”

Wyden told National Journal.

A2 cuba lobby – it's weak sauce

Cuba lobby weak – it's all a bluff

William **LeoGrande** 4/21/2013 "The Cuban Chill",

<http://www.registerguard.com/rg/opinion/29740770-78/cuba-lobby-policy-china-political.html.csp>

Likewise, **the Cuba Lobby has blocked a sensible policy toward Cuba for half a century, with growing damage to U.S. relations with Latin America. When a courageous U.S. president finally decides to defy the Cuba Lobby** with a stroke as bold as Nixon's trip to China, **she or he will discover that the Cuba Lobby no longer has the political clout it once had.** **The strategic importance of repairing the United States' frayed relations with Latin America has come to outweigh the political risk of reconciliation with Havana.**

Russia Disad

Russia 2ac – impact turn

Increased Cuba-Russia relations causes war

Paul Richter (Staff Writer for New York Times) 2008 “Moscow-Havana ties worry U.S.”

<http://articles.latimes.com/2008/sep/01/world/fg-usrussia1>

But at a time when Russia has intervened forcefully in Georgia and is extending the global reach of its rebuilt military, some senior officials fear it may not be only bluster.

“Russia “has strategic ties to Cuba again, or at least, that’s where they’re going.”

a senior U.S. official said recently, speaking, like others, on condition of anonymity because of the sensitive implications of the assessments. The officials said they doubted the Russians would risk stationing nuclear bombers on Cuba. But **some believe that Moscow might seek to restore its once-energetic intelligence cooperation with Havana, and to resume limited military cooperation,**

possibly including refueling stops for aircraft and warships. In the current environment, **such contacts would make U.S. officials uneasy, serving as a reminder of a military relationship between Havana and Moscow**

that stretched from the Cuban Revolution in 1959 until a weakened, post-Soviet Russia finally closed a massive electronic intelligence complex in Lourdes near Havana in 2001.

One senior military officer said **a return of Russian ships or planes could force additional U.S. deployments in the region.**

But the Bush administration and Pentagon declined to comment publicly on the implications. **“It is very Cold War retro,”**

said a government official. **“The topic could be reminiscent of the Cuban missile crisis, and that is a chapter that people don’t want to**

revisit.” The Russian Defense Ministry dismissed a report in the newspaper Izvestia in July that quoted an unidentified Russian official as saying the government intended to begin basing Tupolev Tu-160 Blackjack and Tupolev Tu-95 Bear nuclear bombers in Cuba.

However, the report was taken seriously enough in Washington that **Gen. Norton A. Schwartz, the new Air Force chief of staff, said during his**

Senate confirmation hearing at the time that sending the bombers would cross a “red line in the

sand.”

US engagement with Cuba crowds out Russia

Stephen Blank (Research Professor of National Security Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute of the

U.S. Army War College) 2009 “Russia in Latin America: Geopolitical Games in the US’s Neighborhood,”

The only way in which Russian policy truly threatens the US and Latin America is its military and intelligence support for Chavez and similar leaders. This support is passed on to insurgents while strengthening Chavez and his allies.

Adequate responses to such threats are inherently economic and political, and only military as a last resort.

Washington can do much more to facilitate security in Latin America: regenerating its own economy;

simultaneously opening up trade markets and eliminating barriers to Latin American exports; enhancing multilateralism and interoperability

among defense forces as requested by Latin American militaries; and **beginning the normalization of Cuba.**

Havana is no longer the threat it was, Venezuela has claimed that dubious honor. **Rehabilitating Cuba, given that Castro’s days**

are clearly numbered, would take the air out of Chavez’s balloon; it is quite clear that **Havana would**

probably welcome a path towards better relations with the US, especially the economic benefits they would inevitably

bring. **A policy with a more symbolically important impact upon Latin America is currently difficult to**

imagine. Nonetheless, there should be no illusion that the security problems that plague this region are easily overcome, quite the

opposite. But that is all the more reason why **the US cannot ignore the area and let it drift to Moscow,** Tehran, and Beijing

for want of a better alternative. **That outcome would only confirm once again that in world politics, there is no**

such thing as benign neglect. Instead neglect is malign and **engenders negative results** for the negligent state along with

those neglected. **The policies of the Bush administration allowed Russia to gain a foothold in Latin**

American politics, a result of Washington’s negligence. **under President Obama, the US should reverse those**

outcomes and demonstrate what liberal democracy in action can truly accomplish.

Russian expansion spurs a new Cold War and proxy conflicts

Walter Walle (Research Associate at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs) **2012** "Russia Turns to the South for Military and Economic Alliances," <http://www.coha.org/russia-turns-to-the-south-for-military-and-economic-alliances/>)

Quite clearly, **Russia's interest in Latin America is escalating**. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, argued in his article, "The New Stage of Development of Russian-Latin American Relations," that there is great attractiveness in establishing bilateral relations, especially when three of the top twenty emerging economies -Mexico, Brazil and Argentina- are in Latin America.[23] Lavrov has also stated that the Russian Federation has an interest in joining the Inter-American Development Bank, perhaps a move to better accommodate Russian interests in the region, while at the same time neutralizing American influence.¶ Demonstrably, **Russia has been developing cooperative relationships with prominent organizational bodies** of the region, such as the OAS (Organization of American States), and has ratified visa-free travel agreements with countries like Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru, Brazil, Chile, and Argentina. In his article, Lavrov argues that Russia's intention behind quests for partnerships is the establishment of non-ideologized relationships with Latin American countries, relationships that could be of mutual benefit to all parties involved.¶ However, **the Russian stance on Latin America ultimately may be cause for apprehension. The establishment of** bilateral, cordial relations between Russia and Latin American countries could evolve to a **proxy, neo-Cold War scenario**. **If the situation in the regions worsens, some countries would be funded and supported by the U.S., while others, including several members of Latin America's "New Left", would become the major beneficiaries of Moscow. An analogy of such practice is the Georgia** – Russia crisis that surfaced in August of 2008. During this brief war, the U.S. sent military aid to Georgia[24] on warships to territory Russia considers its "backyard" (i.e. the Caucasus and the Black Sea), infuriating Moscow. A month after the conflict erupted, ostensibly in retaliation, Russia sent two Tu-160 bombers to conduct military exercises with Washington's least favorite nation in Latin America: Venezuela[25]. More importantly, in November of 2008 **Moscow conducted war games with Caracas**, in which a small Russian fleet was sent to the Caribbean to participate in joint naval maneuvers with the Venezuelan navy.[26] **This was a powerful symbolic act: as it was the first time that Russian warships had visited the Caribbean since the Cuban Missile Crisis.**¶ **In the wake of the post-Georgia conflict, such joint military maneuvers between Russia and Venezuela were revitalized, and helped to build up the tensions between Washington and Moscow, sending strong signals of a Cold War revival.** Furthermore, in the aftermath of the declarations of independence by the breakaway regions of Georgia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Venezuela[27] and Nicaragua[28] were alone among Latin American countries in recognizing the independence of the new republics.

That causes miscalculation

Jose **Orozco** (Correspondent for Christian Science Monitor) **2008** "Cold war echo: Russian military maneuvers with Venezuela," <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/2008/0912/p01s05-woam.html>)

The last time a Russian Navy ship plied the azure waters of the Caribbean for major joint maneuvers with an anti-US country was during the cold war.¶ But in a move out of Cuban leader Fidel Castro's historical playbook, Venezuela's Hugo Chávez announced this week that his nation will host four Russian warships and 1,000 troops in November for joint military exercises.¶ That was followed Wednesday by the arrival in Venezuela of two Russian long-range bombers.¶ **Although Latin American leaders so far have shrugged off the moves as another act of bravado** in Mr. Chávez's push against what he calls "Yankee hegemony," **some diplomats and US officials see the potential for real trouble.**¶ The US typically ignores the leftist leader's angry tirades, and is playing down the news.¶ Still, **an extensive military relationship between Venezuela and Russia could heighten tensions and signal the start of a new regional cold war.**¶ **This is a risky step that could provoke the US.**" says retired Navy Vice Admiral and former Vice Minister of Defense Rafael Huizi Clavier. "Any incident, any error, could bring problems." This week, Russia announced that it will send a naval squadron, including the nuclear-powered missile cruiser Peter the Great, as well as long-range patrol planes for the upcoming joint exercises with Venezuela.

Extinction

Ira **Helfand** (past presidents of Physicians for Social Responsibility) and John O **Pastore** (past presidents of Physicians for Social Responsibility) March 31, **2009**, "U.S.-Russia nuclear war still a

threat", http://www.projo.com/opinion/contributors/content/CT_pastoreline_03-31-09_EODSCAO_v15.bbdf23.html]

President Obama and Russian President Dimitri Medvedev are scheduled to meet on Wednesday in London during the G-20 summit. They must not let the current economic crisis keep them from focusing on one of **the greatest threats confronting humanity: the danger of nuclear war.** Since the end of the Cold War, many have acted as though the danger of nuclear war has ended. It has not. **There remain in the world more than 20,000 nuclear weapons.** Alarming, **more than 2,000 of these weapons in the U.S. and Russian arsenals remain on ready-alert status,** commonly known as **hair-trigger alert.** **They can be fired within five minutes and reach targets in the other country 30 minutes later.** **Just one of these weapons can destroy a city. A war involving a substantial number would cause devastation on a scale unprecedented in human history.** A study conducted by Physicians for Social Responsibility in 2002 showed that if only 500 of the Russian weapons on high alert exploded over our cities, **100 million Americans would die in the first 30 minutes.** An attack of **this** magnitude also **would destroy the entire economic, communications and transportation infrastructure on which we all depend. Those who survived the initial attack would inhabit a nightmare landscape** with huge swaths of the country **blanketed with radioactive fallout and epidemic diseases rampant.** They would have no food, no fuel, no electricity, no medicine, and certainly no organized health care. In the following months it is likely the vast majority of the U.S. population would die. Recent studies by the eminent climatologists Toon and Robock have shown that such a war would have a huge and immediate impact on climate world wide. **If all of the warheads in the U.S. and Russian strategic arsenals were drawn into the conflict, the firestorms they caused would loft 180 million tons of soot and debris into the upper atmosphere — blotting out the sun. Temperatures across the globe would fall an average of 18 degrees Fahrenheit to levels not seen on earth since the depth of the last ice age, 18,000 years ago. Agriculture would stop, eco-systems would collapse, and many species, including perhaps our own, would become extinct.** It is common to discuss nuclear war as a low-probability event. But is this true? **We know of five occasions during the last 30 years when either the U.S. or Russia believed it was under attack and prepared a counter-attack.** The most recent of these near misses occurred after the end of the Cold War on Jan. 25, 1995, when the Russians mistook a U.S. weather rocket launched from Norway for a possible attack. Jan. 25, 1995, was an ordinary day with no major crisis involving the U.S. and Russia. But, unknown to almost every inhabitant on the planet, a misunderstanding led to the potential for a nuclear war. The ready alert status of nuclear weapons that existed in 1995 remains in place today.

Cuba/Russia Rapprochement = war

Cuba-Russia relations are increasing and will cause war

Inter-American Dialogue 12 (U.S. based think tank for policy analysis, exchange, and communication on issues in Western Hemisphere affairs, "Are External Tensions Entangling Latin American Countries?" http://www.cepr.net/documents/CEPR_News/LAA120810.pdf)

A Stephen Johnson, senior fellow and director of the Americas Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies: **"It may or may not be true that Russia's government is seeking to build resupply bases for its navy in Cuba,** Vietnam and the Seychelles islands. While **Russian navy officials say 'da,'** the foreign ministry says 'nyet.' Similar talk of establishing bases elsewhere, such as Venezuela, has not materialized. In any case, it would not present a direct threat unless such a facility became an entry point for hostile arms similar to the nuclear-tipped missiles that provoked the 1962 crisis. Like any other state, Russia can strike diplomatic agreements to base military units in other countries. On the other hand, it would be a challenge. First, **it would rekindle a military relationship that ended when Russia transferred its signals intelligence facility at Lourdes to the Cuban government in 2002.** A new base might be a shot in the arm to the Cuban economy, helping the Castro brothers hang on to aspects of their old command economy without going cold turkey for market reforms. **A base could also serve as a hub for military weapons sales to other Latin American nations when the region needs help in fighting transnational crime.** The Soviet Union fell more than 20 years ago, but **Russia still has large military industries and needs to sell arms more than washing machines. Its prime customers would, like Cuba, be in the Bolivarian alliance. Second, a Russian navy station in Cuba might complicate U.S. politics,** specifically any plans a U.S. administration might have to hand back Guantanamo Naval Base in the near future, for which Cuba's current government refuses to cash our rent checks. **At a time when U.S. Northern and Southern Commands are gearing more toward military support for civilian law enforcement** missions, **it would reintroduce a strategic deterrence component** into joint exercises and training. That might not be a bad thing, but **it would argue for more U.S. defense spending on the Western Hemisphere.** All of which seems to argue that recent threat trends in the Americas are not very predictive and that certain **old alliances won't go easily into the sunset.**"[¶] A Stephen Wilkinson, chairman of the International Institute for the Study of Cuba: **"Russia is in military talks with Cuba for three reasons. One is economic,** related to Russian investment in Cuban nickel and oil and the need to guarantee protection of these investments. **Another factor is geostrategic. Recent events in Syria have confirmed Russian fears of the long-term strategic aims of the United States.** **The Russians are very aware that the United States and Western Europe have been supporting the rebels** in Syria **and they see this as an indirect attack upon their interests** as Assad provides them with a naval base at Tartus, on the Mediterranean. **The third reason is possibly rather more personal, Vladimir Putin has turned his face against Washington** since his recent re-election because he perceived a U.S. hand in **organizing the protests** against him. From Cuba's point of view, **having a Russian military base would be a guarantee of security** since it would mean that U.S. military action against it would be less likely. **If Washington would not wish for Havana to have such an ally, it ought to reconsider its own policy toward the island.** At present, the embargo, and especially **the Helms Burton Law, makes it sensible for the Cuban government to seek alliances** with as many powers as possible in order to protect itself. U.S. military presence in Latin America has grown in recent years. There are now 24 bases including two new ones in Chile and Argentina. Seven bases in Colombia are being expanded. The justification for this expansion is the war on drugs and for humanitarian intervention purposes. However, it should come as no surprise that this is not the way that Cuba or its closest allies such as Hugo Chávez or Evo Morales view them. They see the bases as potential threats to their independence and sovereignty and a sign that Washington's hegemonic designs on the region are very much alive."[¶] A Wayne S. Smith, senior fellow and director of the Cuba Project at the Center for International Policy: **"Given the history of the 1962 U.S.-Soviet missile crisis, for the Russians now to propose exploring with the Cubans the setting up of naval bases on the island would seem a rather maladroit idea.** The United States made it clear in 1962 that **the positioning of offensive nuclear missiles on the island was unacceptable and demanded that they be withdrawn. The world has never been so close to an all out nuclear war.** Fortunately, both Kennedy and Khrushchev showed themselves to be sensible men. They reached an understanding under which Khrushchev agreed to withdraw the missiles and Kennedy gave assurances that the United States would not invade Cuba. Subsequently, without informing the United States, the Soviets began building a submarine base

on the island, but when it was made clear to them that the United States would consider this a violation of the Kennedy-Khrushchev understanding of 1962, work on the base was quietly halted and never resumed. **The United States should of course oppose the positioning of Russian bases in Cuba today**, as should the other countries of the hemisphere. **They** would serve no reasonable purpose and **could only unnecessarily add to tensions.** The United States has not increased its military presence in Latin America. There is no reason for the Russians to do so."