

## Afghanistan Affirmative – Counter-Narcotics

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**\*\*OVERVIEW\*\***

## **Background on Opium Production in Afghanistan**

The Soviet Union invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 destabilized much of the country. Many warlords took over areas wrecked by Soviet troops and began looking for new ways to fund their rule. They quickly began cultivating opium for export.

The opium trade grew until the mid 1990s when the Taliban rose to power and enforced a prohibition on opium cultivation through brutal means such as beatings and beheadings. They maintained this prohibition until the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan after the September 11<sup>th</sup> terrorist attacks in 2001.

The United States continued the war on drugs and appropriated approximately \$2.9 billion in regular and supplemental counternarcotics foreign assistance and defense funding for programs designed to eradicate narcotics, largely opium, from Afghanistan from 2001 through 2009.

Since this time, the opium trade in Afghanistan has surged dramatically, now accounting for the source of over 90 percent of the world's illicit opium market despite the U.S. war on narcotics in the country. It is known that a large amount of the revenue from opium goes to fund insurgent elements in the country; however, there is much controversy over the U.S. counter-narcotic mission in the region.

Many argue the results from counternarcotics programs in Afghanistan have not justified the massive costs. According to Ted G. Carpenter of the CATO Institute, "these antidrug efforts may fatally undermine the far more important anti-terrorism campaign in Afghanistan." He bases his observation on a number of key observations:

- The growing of opium poppies is a huge part of Afghanistan's economy—roughly half of the country's annual gross domestic product.
- As long as the United States and other drug consuming countries pursue a prohibitionist strategy, a massive black market premium exists that will make the cultivation of drug crops far more lucrative than competing crops in Afghanistan or any other drug source country.
- For many Afghan farmers, growing opium poppies is the difference between prosperity and destitution. There is a serious risk that they will turn against the United States and the U.S.-supported government of President Hamid Karzai if Washington and Kabul pursue vigorous anti-drug programs.
- Regional warlords who have helped the United States combat al-Qaeda and Taliban forces derive substantial profits from the drug trade. They use those revenues to pay the militias that keep them in power.

Not only is there no clear link between the counter-narcotic missions led by the United States and a decline in opium production, but it is also believed that the missions actually fund the insurgency by wiping out lower level farmers, while consolidating the power and profit in the hands of the strongest and well connected warlords, who are well positioned enough to avoid or withstand having their operations disrupted.

Lower level farmers often continue to cultivate opium out of sheer necessity. Poverty is often the controlling factor in an Afghan farmer's decision to grow opium poppies. It is a crop which can grow in a variety of climate conditions, and require little water, a large comparative advantage in the hot deserts of Afghanistan.

The Taliban now even encourages opium production by providing equipment to farmers, picking up the farmers' harvest, thus preventing them from having to transport their crop and through other means.

Debaters can argue that the U.S. counter-narcotics mission has failed to address the core issues of poverty and necessity inherent in many lower level farmers' decision to produce opium. Until this is addressed, many believe that the issue is an unwinnable one for the United States.

## Debating This Case

This case decreases military deployment by ending all counter-narcotics missions in Afghanistan. This case has two primary advantages. The first is an advantage that pertains to the insurgency in Afghanistan. The second pertains to the perception of government legitimacy in Afghanistan.

**Insurgency Advantage:** This advantage argues that counter-narcotics policy aids the insurgency by wiping out weaker farmers, while consolidating power in the hands of the most ruthless warlords, who either are a part of the Taliban or who aid the Taliban. A continued or revived insurgency in Afghanistan would further destabilize the region, eventually spilling into Central Asia and Pakistan. A second portion of this advantage deals with the perception of U.S. leadership. The continued failing of the counter-insurgency mission in Afghanistan hurts the image of the United States, which leads other countries to rise up and become more belligerent either regionally, or against the United States in particular. Affirmatives can argue that the perception of U.S. leadership is also crucial to deterring terrorist attacks.

**Corruption Advantage:** The corruption advantage argues that the criminalization of opium cultivation by counter-narcotics efforts encourages warlords to pay off government officials so that these officials turn a blind eye to the opium trade. The evidence in this file argues that this corruption both hinders the effectiveness of government and contributes to a negative perception of the government that will cause domestic tensions and could spark a civil war that spreads to India and Pakistan.

**Tips:** It's important when reading this case to keep in mind the issue of uniqueness. Much of the negative offense will assume that the counter-narcotic mission is actually achieving the desired goal. As an affirmative team reading this case, you must always be in control of this portion of the debate. If the negative cannot win that the mission is currently effective, then they will have a much, much harder time generating offense that applies to the case.





**\*\*1AC\*\***

## 1AC – Inherency [1/1]

Contention 1 is Inherency.

**Obama's has altered the U.S. counter-narcotics strategy, increasing corruption and funding for the insurgency.**

**Center on International Cooperation, June 2010** ["Drug Production and Trafficking, Counterdrug Policies, and Security and Governance in Afghanistan," NYU Center on International Cooperation, available at: <http://www.cic.nyu.edu/>]

**This report** by Jonathan Caulkins, Mark Kleiman, and Jonathan Kulick **contributes to the ongoing debate about counter-narcotics policies in Afghanistan**, and in relation to counter-insurgency operations **by adding a heretofore missing element—applied economic analysis** of the effect of counter-narcotics policies. It does so **by applying** to a stylized depiction of the Afghan situation **a standard model that economists and policy analysts have applied to a large range of policy areas**. The authors were reluctant to make policy recommendations, as they recognize that their necessarily simplified model of Afghanistan does not take into account fine-grained realities. **The overall conclusion—that counter-narcotics policy in the context of a weak state facing violent challengers is likely to aggravate rather than alleviate insurgency, corruption, and criminal violence—opposes much that has been written** on the subject. **Previous critiques** of official counter-narcotics policies in Afghanistan, including those published by CIC, **focused on the counter-productive political and economic effects of the Bush administration's press for poppy eradication and recommended a focus on alternative livelihoods and high-level interdiction**.<sup>1</sup> The **Obama** administration **has largely adopted this policy**. This report's critique, however, is more radical. At the risk of oversimplification, its main points are: 1. **Global production of heroin and opiates will remain concentrated in Afghanistan for the foreseeable future regardless of counter-narcotics efforts, other things being equal, because Afghanistan is by far the lowest cost producer and has invested a great deal of social capital in illicit transnational networks**. Unless another potential producer suffers a political crisis making illegality cheaper to sustain, or demand declines, Afghanistan will remain the main producer meeting the global demand. 2. **All feasible attempts at suppression or reduction of the opiates industry in Afghanistan under present conditions will result, other things being equal, in increasing the economic size of the industry, and therefore increasing the rents and taxes accruing to insurgents and corrupt officials**. This applies equally to crop eradication, interdiction, and alternative livelihood programs. **Therefore counter-narcotics programming increases rather than decreases both violent insurgency and official corruption**. If counter-narcotics policies are effectively targeted at pro-insurgency traffickers, they may be able to reduce insurgency by enabling pro-government traffickers and corrupt officials to enjoy a monopoly. 3. **Interdiction and law enforcement strengthen those actors best placed to use illicit power and violence to avoid interdiction** and law enforcement, thus leading to concentration of the industry on the one hand and empowerment of insurgents on the other. Again, it may be possible to target counter-narcotics specifically against the insurgency by selective enforcement that effectively tolerates pro-government traffickers and corrupt officials. 4. **Alternative livelihood programs targeted at insurgent controlled areas to reduce the resource base of the insurgency contribute directly to funding the insurgency through taxes levied** by the insurgents on the alternative livelihood programs.

## **1AC – Plan [1/1]**

**The United States federal government should substantially reduce its police presence in Afghanistan by ending all counter-narcotics missions in Afghanistan.**

## 1AC – Insurgency Advantage

Contention \_\_ is the Insurgency.

**Current reformed counter-narcotics policy massively increases insurgency and violence via protection payments, consolidation, and revenue.**

**Caulkins, et al. June 2010** [Jonathan P. Caulkins, Mark A.R. Kleiman, Jonathan D. Kulick, Caulkins is a professor of operations research and public policy at Carnegie Mellon University, Kleiman is a professor of public policy at the UCLA school of public affairs, and Kulick is the Director of studies at the Georgia Foundation of Strategic and International Studies, ["Drug Production and Trafficking, Counterdrug Policies, and Security and Governance in Afghanistan," NYU Center on International Cooperation, available at: <http://www.cic.nyu.edu/>]

**There are at least two reasons to fear that increasing drug control will increase not only the total criminal revenues from trafficking, but also the share that goes to insurgents. The first is simply that the division of trafficking profits among trafficking groups and those who provide services to them or collect extortion payments from them is determined by a very complicated and dynamic political- economic balancing. Stirring the pot can have effects that are hard to predict.** Since, currently, insurgents seem to capture only a small share of the roughly \$3 billion in potential trafficking-related revenues (counting cross- border smuggling revenues), randomly redistributing revenue shares could make things much worse. **Highly strategic market interventions might possibly reduce insurgents' share of the pie still further. However, a recurring theme in the history of drug markets is that they often respond to interventions in unexpected ways.** Thus a degree of humility may be appropriate when contemplating clever strategies for re-engineering drug- market conditions. Second, a line of reasoning suggests that **tougher drug control generally is more likely to shift market share toward rather than away from insurgents.**<sup>38</sup> The drug traffic in Afghanistan is not centralized; it involves many competing organizations, farmers and growing areas, and export routes. **In addition to extracting "taxes" on poppy growing and other drug-market activities in areas they control, insurgent groups can become more directly involved in the traffic by selling protection services** to traffickers, deploying their capacity for intimidation and corruption to shelter the traffickers' activities from enforcement. **The per-unit value of that protection increases with the level of enforcement activity;**<sup>39</sup> the total value of the protection depends on the effect of enforcement on quantity produced as well. Increased enforcement is necessarily concentrated in areas under government control; thus **the success of the campaign against poppy growing in most of Afghan territory has concentrated production in insurgent-held areas. Consequently, more enforcement tends to produce higher total revenues, an increased share of the illicit take for purveyors of protection, and a diminished share of activity in areas under government control.** All three of these effects will tend to increase financial flows to insurgents, so the natural tendency of drug-suppression activity is to aid the insurgency rather than to suppress it. **The recent decision to reduce poppy eradication efforts reflects this logic,** as well as the fact that eradication constitutes a financial disaster for some farmers whose crops get hit, leaving them hostile to the government and its allies. **But the economic logic applies with equal force to higher-level enforcement efforts (interdiction)** aimed at processing, exporting, and money laundering. **It also applies to efforts to reduce poppy cultivation via incentive payments or efforts to provide better licit opportunities for rural households.**

## 1AC – Insurgency Advantage [2/6]

**Interdiction fails and increases extremism in the region. The United States can win the war in Afghanistan or the war on drugs, but not both.**

**Carpenter & Rittgers '9** [Ted Galen Carpenter is vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, is the author of eight books on international affairs, including Smart Power: Toward a Prudent Foreign Policy for America (2008). David H. Rittgers is a legal policy analyst at the Cato Institute, "Fight Drugs or Terrorists — But Not Both", March 6, [http://www.cato.org/pub\\_display.php?pub\\_id=10027](http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=10027)]

**A proposed directive** by General John Craddock, Nato's top commander, **to target opium traffickers and "facilitators" in Afghanistan has provoked considerable opposition within the alliance.** That resistance is warranted, since **Craddock's proposal is a spectacularly bad idea. Implementing this proposal would greatly complicate Nato's mission in Afghanistan by driving Afghans into the arms of the Taliban and al-Qaida. US and Nato leaders need to understand that they can wage the war against radical Islamic terrorists in Afghanistan or wage a war on narcotics — but they can't do both with any prospect of success. The opium trade is a huge part — better than one-third — of the country's economy. Attempts to suppress it will provoke fierce opposition.** Worse yet, **opium grows best in the southern provinces populated by Pashtuns, a people traditionally hostile to a strong central government and any foreign troop presence. These same provinces produced the Taliban and more easily revert to supporting fundamentalist militias than their** Tajik, Uzbek and Hazara **neighbours** to the north. Alternatives to opium offer little hope. More than 90% of the world's opium comes from Afghanistan. Taking on opium in Afghanistan means taking on the world's demand for opium. **Opium purchases for medicinal uses and substitute crop programmes with wheat, saffron and pomegranates will not stanch the demand for illicit drug production.** In fact, reducing the illegal harvest with these efforts only makes the black-market prices rise and encourages farmers to grow more. **If the Cold War taught us anything, it is that you cannot fight economics.** Proponents of a crackdown argue that a vigorous eradication effort is needed to dry up the funds flowing to the Taliban and al-Qaida. Those groups do benefit from the drug trade, but they are hardly the only ones. A UN report estimates that **more than 500,000 Afghan families are involved in drug commerce. Given the network of extended families and clans in Afghanistan, it is likely that at least 35% of the country's population has a stake in the drug trade.** Furthermore, **Nato forces rely on opium-poppy farmers to provide information on the movement of enemy forces. Escalating the counter-narcotics effort risks alienating these crucial intelligence sources.** Equally important, many of President Hamid Karzai's key political allies also profit from trafficking. These allies include regional warlords who backed the Taliban when that faction was in power, switching sides only when it was clear that the US-led military offensive in late 2001 was going to succeed. Targeting such traffickers is virtually guaranteed to cause them to switch sides yet again. **Targeting drug traffickers also makes it impossible to achieve any "awakening" on par with the American success in Sunni areas of Iraq.** We cannot fund local militias to keep the Taliban out. These militias already pay themselves from drug profits. These same drug profits will keep them loyal to Nato's enemies as long as the alliance remains committed to destroying their livelihood. **Nato leaders need to keep their priorities straight. The principal objective is to defeat radical Islamic terrorists. The drug war is a dangerous distraction from that goal.** Recognising that security interests sometimes trump other objectives would hardly be unprecedented. For example, US officials eased their pressure on Peru's government regarding the drug-eradication issue in the early 1990s, when Lima concluded it was more important to induce farmers involved in the cocaine trade to abandon their alliance with the Maoist Shining Path guerrillas. The **Obama** administration **should adopt a similarly pragmatic policy in Afghanistan and look the other way regarding drug trafficking. Alienating crucial Afghan factions in a vain attempt to disrupt the flow of drug revenues to the Taliban and al-Qaida is a strategy that is far too dangerous. This war is too important to sacrifice on the altar of drug-war orthodoxy.**

## 1AC – Insurgency Advantage [3/6]

**The internal link is massive – counter-narcotics consolidate power in the hands of the most violent groups.**

**Caulkins, et al. June 2010** [Jonathan P. Caulkins, Mark A.R. Kleiman, Jonathan D. Kulick, Caulkins is a professor of operations research and public policy at Carnegie Mellon University, Kleiman is a professor of public policy at the UCLA school of public affairs, and Kulick is the Director of studies at the Georgia Foundation of Strategic and International Studies, [“Drug Production and Trafficking, Counterdrug Policies, and Security and Governance in Afghanistan,” NYU Center on International Cooperation, available at: <http://www.cic.nyu.edu/>]

Moreover, insofar as the **IAGs have a competitive advantage over drug traffickers without armed backing** or political clout **in being better able to deploy violence** and corrupt influence **in defense of their activities,** **increased enforcement tends to increase the relative value of that advantage. For example, increased border security is more likely to be a problem for small-scale smugglers than it is for the smuggling enterprise affiliated with a warlord army** or a former (or current) army or police commander’s gang. Small-scale operators who are not entirely deterred by increased enforcement have three choices: they can accept increased arrests and seizures as a cost of doing business, change their operations in more or less expensive and inconvenient ways to evade enforcement, or offer bribes to officials and other power brokers. **IAGs**, with their private armies, have a fourth option: they **can use violence** or the threat of violence to intimidate enforcement agencies. (This tactic can be combined with bribery, especially where traffickers have political as well as military muscle.) If increased enforcement raises costs for **IAGs** and the traffickers they protect less than it raises costs for competing trafficking organizations, **the result will be larger profits and greater market share for the warlords.**

**And, this overwhelms all other gains – counter-narcotics programs gut the effectiveness of counter-insurgency.**

**Goodhand, 2009**

[Johnathan, Conflict and Development Studies in the Department of Development Studies at SOAS, University of London, “Bandits, Borderlands, and Opium Wars: Afghan State Building Viewed From the Margins,” [www.diiis.dk/graphics/.../WP2009-26\\_bandits\\_borderlands\\_opiumwars.pdf](http://www.diiis.dk/graphics/.../WP2009-26_bandits_borderlands_opiumwars.pdf)]

In parallel with the political transition, there has been a significant growth in the drug economy driven by a range of micro and macro factors. First, the Taliban’s opium ban caused a tenfold increase in prices, which in turn created strong incentives for more wealthy farmers to allocate land to poppy. These factors were reinforced by the end of a drought, which meant an increased availability of wheat and a freeing up of internal and external markets (Mansfield, 2007). Second, the CIA’s policy of providing several hundred million dollars to commanders, in order to buy their support in the ‘war on terror’, had the effect of flooding the money market. The Afghan currency halved against the dollar in two months. This rapid deflation created incentives to unload US dollars into other currencies or other profitable investments. Since the US offensive occurred during poppy planting season, dollars were quickly recycled into loans to farmers to finance next spring’s poppy crop. Third, **coalition forces initially adopted a laissez-faire policy towards drugs, born out of the strong tension between counter-insurgency and counter-narcotics objectives. Counter-insurgency efforts require good local allies and intelligence, and local warlords are unlikely to provide either support or intelligence to those who are destroying their businesses** (Felbab-Brown, 2005). Fourth, **unlike previous phases of the conflict, when opium was essentially a licit commodity, its criminalisation had the effect of keeping prices high because of the associated ‘risk premium’ and forcing those involved in the opium industry to look for protection beyond the state – and there is no shortage in Afghanistan of non-state ‘specialists in violence’.** Consequently, **military entrepreneurs have been able to generate political capital (and revenue) by providing protection to the peasantry and traffickers from state-led counter-narcotics efforts.** Furthermore disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programmes had the effect of pushing many mid- to low-level commanders into a closer relationship with the opium industry (Shaw, 2006). Unlike the more senior regional strongmen, they did not have the option of a transition into politics.

## 1AC – Insurgency Advantage [4/6]

We will isolate three major impacts –

First – Central Asian Stability.

**Afghan conflict spills into Central Asia.**

**Szayna and Oliker '03**

(Thomas S., and Olga, Political Scientists – RAND, Faultlines of Conflict in Central Asia and the South Caucasus, [http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph\\_reports/2005/RAND\\_MR1598.sum.pdf](http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/2005/RAND_MR1598.sum.pdf))

The situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as the troop presence of U.S., Russian, and other forces in the region may serve to catalyze state failure in a number of ways, perhaps making significant conflict more proximate than it might otherwise have been. Refugee flows into the region could strain the treasuries and stretch the capacities of states to deal with the influx. They can also potentially be a mechanism for countergovernment forces to acquire new recruits and assistance. This is of particular concern given the history of Al Qaeda and Taliban support to insurgent groups in Central Asia, as well as the ethnic links and overlaps between Afghanistan and the Central Asian states. To date, the rise of insurgencies linked to radical Islam has either caused or provided an excuse for the leadership in several states to become increasingly authoritarian, in many ways aggravating rather than alleviating the risk of social unrest, and it is entirely plausible that this trend will continue. Moreover, if the U.S.-Russian relationship improves, Russian officials may take advantage of the opportunity, combined with U.S. preoccupation with its counterterror campaign, to take actions in Georgia and Azerbaijan that these states will perceive as aggressive. Meanwhile, U.S. forces in the region may be viewed as targets by combatants in the Afghanistan war and by insurgent efforts against the Central Asian governments. The situation in Afghanistan will almost certainly have an impact on the faultlines in Central Asia and possibly those in the South Caucasus. While it remains too early to predict just what that impact might be, regardless of the situation in Afghanistan, there remains excellent reason to believe that over the next 15 years separatists will continue to strive to attain independence (as in Georgia) and insurgency forces to take power (as in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan). This could spread from the countries where we see it currently to possibly affect Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan. It could also result in responses by states that see a neighboring insurgency as a threat, and by others that pursue insurgents beyond their own borders. Insofar as U.S. forces stay involved in the region, it could draw the United States into these Central Asian and South Caucasus conflicts.

**This is the most probable scenario for escalation to global nuclear war**

**Blank '99** (Stephen, Professor of Research – Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Oil and Geopolitics in the Caspian Region)

Past experience suggests Moscow will even threaten a Third World War if there is Turkish intervention in the Transcaucasus and the 1997 Russo-Armenian Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance and the 1994 Turkish-Azerbaijani Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation suggest just such a possibility. Conceivably, the two larger states could then be dragged in to rescue their allies from defeat. The Russo-Armenian treaty is a virtual bilateral military alliance against Baku, in that it reaffirms Russia's lasting military presence in Armenia, commits Armenia not to join NATO, and could justify further fighting in Nagorno-Karabakh or further military pressure against Azerbaijan that will impede energy exploration and marketing. It also reconfirms Russia's determination to resist an expanded U.S. presence and remain the exclusive regional hegemon. Thus, many structural conditions for conventional war or protracted ethnic conflict where third parties intervene now exist in the Transcaucasus. Many Third World conflicts generated by local structural factors have great potential for unintended escalation. Big powers often fear obliged to rescue their proxies and protégés. One or another big power may fail to grasp the stakes for the other side since interests here are not as clear as in Europe. Hence, commitments involving the use of nuclear weapons or perhaps even conventional war to prevent defeat of a client are not well established or clear as in Europe. For instance, in 1993 Turkish noises about intervening in the Karabakh War on behalf of Azerbaijan induced Russian leaders to threaten a nuclear war in such a case. This confirms the observations of Jim Hoagland, the international correspondent of the Washington Post, that "future wars involving Europe and America as allies will be fought either over resources in chaotic Third World locations or in ethnic upheavals on the southern fringe of Europe and Russia." Unfortunately, many such causes for conflict prevail across the Transcaspien. Precisely because Turkey is a NATO ally but probably could not prevail in a long war against Russia, or if it could conceivably trigger a potential nuclear blow (not a small possibility given the erratic nature of Russia's declared nuclear strategies), the danger of major war is higher here than almost anywhere else in the CIS or the so-called arc of crisis from the Balkans to China.

## 1AC – Insurgency Advantage [5/6]

### Second is Leadership.

### The perception of mass insurgency destroys the credibility of U.S. global leadership and encourages challengers.

Weinstein '04 (Dr. Michael A., Power and Interest News Report, 11-12,

[http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view\\_printable&report\\_id=235&language\\_id=1](http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_printable&report_id=235&language_id=1))

**The persistence of insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq, which has hampered rebuilding efforts** in both countries and blocked their emergence as credible democracies, **diverts U.S. resources and attention from other interests and** -- as long as progress is slow or nonexistent -- **sends the message that Washington remains vulnerable**. The recent election of Hamid Karzai to Afghanistan's presidency has not changed that country's political situation; power outside Kabul remains in the hands of warlords, the drug trade remains the major support of the country's economy, and the Taliban insurgency continues. In Iraq, Washington counts on elections in January 2005 for a constitutional assembly to provide legitimacy for the state-building process, but at present that goal seems unlikely to be achieved. Washington for the foreseeable future will be tied down managing the consequences of its earlier interventions. **If Washington decides to retreat -- more likely from Iraq than from Afghanistan -- its loss of power will be confirmed, encouraging other powers to test its resolve elsewhere**. Only in the unlikely case that Washington manages to stabilize Afghanistan and Iraq in the short term will other powers think twice about probing U.S. vulnerabilities. In South America, Brazil will attempt to secure a foothold for the Mercosur customs union and beat back Washington's efforts to extend the N.A.F.T.A. formula south. In East Asia, China will push for regional hegemony and is likely to put pressure on Taiwan and to try to draw Southeast Asian states into its sphere of influence. Beijing can also be expected to drag its feet on North Korean denuclearization and to continue to oppose sanctions on Iran over its nuclear program. Russia will attempt to increase its influence over the states on its periphery that were formerly Soviet republics. Moscow will try to strengthen ties in Central Asia, the Transcaucasus and Eastern Europe (Belarus and Ukraine), and to fend off Washington's inroads into those areas. The European Union, with the Franco-German combine at its heart, will continue its moves to assimilate its Eastern European members and extend its sphere of influence to the entire Mediterranean basin through trade agreements. In each of these regions, Washington will face tests leading to the possibility of an overload of challenges and a decreased likelihood that any one of them will be handled with sufficient attention and resources. Within the general scenario, Islamic revolution remains a disturbing factor. If there is another major attack within the United States, Washington's security policy will fall into disarray and the population will suffer a traumatic loss of confidence that will adversely affect the economy and will open the possibility of a legitimization crisis or a burst of ultra-nationalism. Even if there is not another event like the September 11 attacks, homeland security and the international adjustments that are necessary to serve it will divert attention and resources from other challenges. The geostrategic constraints on Washington are exacerbated by the financial limits posed by the budget deficit and the possibilities of a precipitous decline in the dollar and rising raw materials prices. How much the United States will be able to spend to protect the interests perceived by its leaders remains an open question. It is widely acknowledged that post-war nation building has been underfunded in Afghanistan and Iraq, and that major increases in expenditures are unlikely. Most generally, Washington is faced with the choice of rebuilding U.S. power or slowly retreating to an undisputed regional power base in North America. It is not clear that the Bush administration will have the resolve or the resources to rebuild its military and intelligence apparatus, and restore its alliance structure. During the first term of George W. Bush, Washington was the initiator in world affairs, attempting to carry through a unilateralist program that, if successful, would have made the United States a permanent superpower protecting globalized capitalism to its advantage. In Bush's second term, Washington will primarily be a responder, because it is mired in the failures of the unilateralist thrust. The image of decisive military superiority has been replaced by a sense of U.S. limitations, and massive budget surpluses have given way to the prospect of continued large deficits. Reinforcing Factors from the Election As the Bush administration attempts to deal with persisting problems resulting in great part from actions taken during the President's first term, it will face difficulties that follow from the need to satisfy the constituencies that made for the Republican victory. The election confirmed that the American public does not share a consensus on foreign policy and, indeed, is polarized. It is also polarized on economic and social issues, along similar axes, creating a situation in which any new policies proposed by the administration are likely to be met with domestic opposition and at the very least partial support. Besides being a drag on foreign policy initiatives, polarization also affects Washington's international posture by the attention and commitment that the administration will have to give to the domestic battles that it will fight in congress in order to push a legislative agenda that will satisfy its constituencies. During his campaign and in his post-election press conference, Bush committed his administration to ambitious policy initiatives to take steps in the direction of privatizing Social Security and to reform the tax code radically. Both of those plans, along with tort reform and extension of tax cuts, will generate fierce conflicts in congress and quickly exhaust the President's "political capital" available to win support on other issues. The vision of an "ownership society," in which government regulations and entitlements are dismantled or scaled back, is the domestic equivalent of neo-conservative foreign policy; it is a utopian view with little chance of success. If the administration seriously pursues its plans, it will be preoccupied domestically and, consequently, will devote less attention to world affairs. Focus on domestic politics will be increased by the need to satisfy social conservative constituencies by appointing judges favorable to their positions on "moral values." Here again, there will be strong opposition if appointments are perceived by Democrats and moderate Republicans as too ideologically favorable to the religious right. Protracted battles over judgeships -- whether successful or not -- would further diminish Bush's political capital for foreign policy initiatives by heating up partisanship. It is possible that the administration will not pursue its agenda aggressively and will seek compromises, but that is not likely because of pressures within the Republican Party. The same constituencies that voted in Bush elected a Republican congress, and its members face reelection contests and the consequent need to satisfy their bases. Since Bush cannot serve a third term, Republican officeholders can no longer depend on his popularity to help carry them to victory. They also do not have a unifying leader with a political strategy to coordinate diverse constituencies. The combination of the lame-duck effect and the strategy void will drive Republicans to depend on their particular constituencies and press their claims assertively. The administration will be under pressure to push its domestic agenda vigorously at the same time that the various Republican factions fight for control of the party and Democrats move to exploit any weaknesses that appear. It is likely that Republican loyalty to Bush will be strained, further decreasing the administration's latitude and forcing it to bargain for support. The Republican majority is less solid than it might seem on the surface and includes factions that are at odds with administration foreign policy. Conclusion Persistent and emerging political conditions all point in the direction of drift and reactivity in U.S. foreign and security policy -- the election has intensified tendencies that were already present. There is little chance that a new security doctrine will be created in the short term and that a coherent political strategy will influence Republican politics. Lack of public consensus will inhibit foreign policy initiatives, whether unilateralist or multilateralist. Washington's operative foreign policy is likely to be damage control. **As Washington drifts, the rest of the world will test it, probing for weaknesses.**

Under steady pressure from many sides, **the Bush administration will be drawn toward retrenchment, retreat and eventually retraction in international affairs**. The scenario of American empire has faded into memory and the prospect that the U.S. will eventually become a dominant regional power with some global reach becomes more probable.



## 1AC – Insurgency Advantage [6/6]

### U.S. leadership is key to prevent global war

#### Khalilzad '95

(Zalmay, RAND Corporation, Losing The Moment? Washington Quarterly, Vol 18, No 2, p. 84)

Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values -- democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system.

### Third is terrorism.

### Intelligence gathering is key to effective war on terror.

#### Yoo '06 (John, Prof Law – UC Berkeley Law, 91 Cornell L. Rev. 573, January, Lexis)

The unconventional nature of the war with al Qaeda makes important military interests more acute because of the need to interrogate enemy combatants for information about future attacks. Unlike enemies in previous wars, al Qaeda is a stateless network of religious extremists who do not obey the laws of war, who hide among peaceful populations, and who seek to launch surprise attacks on civilian [\*587] targets with the aim of causing massive casualties. They have no armed forces in the field, no territory to defend, no populace to protect, and no fear of killing themselves in their attacks. The front line is not solely a traditional battlefield, and the primary means of conducting the war includes the efforts of military, law enforcement, and intelligence officers to stop attacks before they occur. Information is an indispensable primary weapon in the conflict against this new kind of enemy, and intelligence gathered from captured operatives is perhaps the most effective means of preventing future terrorist attacks upon U.S. territory.

### The impact is extinction.

#### Alexander '03

(Yonah, Prof, Dir – Inter-University for Terrorism Studies, Washington Times, 8-28, Lexis)

Unlike their historical counterparts, contemporary terrorists have introduced a new scale of violence in terms of conventional and unconventional threats and impact. The internationalization and brutalization of current and future terrorism make it clear we have entered an Age of Super Terrorism [e.g. biological, chemical, radiological, nuclear and cyber] with its serious implications concerning national, regional and global security concerns. Two myths in particular must be debunked immediately if an effective counterterrorism "best practices" strategy can be developed [e.g., strengthening international cooperation]. The first illusion is that terrorism can be greatly reduced, if not eliminated completely, provided the root causes of conflicts - political, social and economic - are addressed. The conventional illusion is that terrorism must be justified by oppressed people seeking to achieve their goals and consequently the argument advanced by "freedom fighters" anywhere, "give me liberty and I will give you death," should be tolerated if not glorified. This traditional rationalization of "sacred" violence often conceals that the real purpose of terrorist groups is to gain political power through the barrel of the gun, in violation of fundamental human rights of the noncombatant segment of societies. For instance, Palestinians religious movements [e.g., Hamas, Islamic Jihad] and secular entities [such as Fatah's Tanzim and Aqsa Martyr Brigades]] wish not only to resolve national grievances [such as Jewish settlements, right of return, Jerusalem] but primarily to destroy the Jewish state. Similarly, Osama bin Laden's international network not only opposes the presence of American military in the Arabian Peninsula and Iraq, but its stated objective is to "unite all Muslims and establish a government that follows the rule of the Caliphs." The second myth is that strong action against terrorist infrastructure [leaders, recruitment, funding, propaganda, training, weapons, operational command and control] will only increase terrorism. The argument here is that law-enforcement efforts and military retaliation inevitably will fuel more brutal acts of violent revenge. Clearly, if this perception continues to prevail, particularly in democratic societies, there is the danger it will paralyze governments and thereby encourage further terrorist attacks. In sum, past experience provides useful lessons for a realistic future strategy. The prudent application of force has been demonstrated to be an effective tool for short- and long-term deterrence of terrorism. For example, Israel's targeted killing of Mohammed Sider, the Hebron commander of the Islamic Jihad, defused a "ticking bomb." The assassination of Ismail Abu Shanab - a top Hamas leader in the Gaza Strip who was directly responsible for several suicide bombings including the latest bus attack in Jerusalem - disrupted potential terrorist operations. Similarly, the U.S. military operation in Iraq eliminated Saddam Hussein's regime as a state sponsor of terror. Thus, it behooves those countries victimized by terrorism to understand a cardinal message communicated by Winston Churchill to the House of Commons on May 13, 1940: "Victory at all costs, victory in spite of terror, victory however long and hard the road may be: For without victory, there is no survival."

## 1AC – Corruption Advantage [1/2]

**Contention \_\_ is Corruption.**

**Counter-narcotics guts the effectiveness of anti-corruption programs – creates huge incentive to accept payoffs.**

**Caulkins, et al. June 2010** [Jonathan P. Caulkins, Mark A.R. Kleiman, Jonathan D. Kulick, Caulkins is a professor of operations research and public policy at Carnegie Mellon University, Kleiman is a professor of public policy at the UCLA school of public affairs, and Kulick is the Director of studies at the Georgia Foundation of Strategic and International Studies, [“Drug Production and Trafficking, Counterdrug Policies, and Security and Governance in Afghanistan,” NYU Center on International Cooperation, available at: <http://www.cic.nyu.edu/>]

**While anticorruption efforts can help counter-narcotics enforcement efforts, the converse is less likely to be the case. The greater the enforcement pressure, the greater the benefits enforcement officials can confer on traffickers by turning a blind eye to their activities and by interfering with the activities of their competitors.**<sup>42</sup> (Again, as with traffickers’ profits, this is true under the conditions that we believe obtain in Afghanistan; if enforcement were perfect, then there would be no opportunity for corruption.) If enforcement is to be stepped up, the need for better-trained, better-disciplined, and better-paid counter-narcotics police becomes all the greater. **The fact that honest drug-law enforcement relies heavily on information from some participants in the illicit traffic to make cases against other participants—including competitors informing on one another to achieve competitive advantage—makes it all the more difficult for officials running anticorruption efforts to distinguish honest from corrupt enforcement activity.**

**This destroys government legitimacy – We’ll isolate several internal links.**

**First is capacity. Corruption saps it at all levels.**

**Caulkins, et al. June 2010** [Jonathan P. Caulkins, Mark A.R. Kleiman, Jonathan D. Kulick, Caulkins is a professor of operations research and public policy at Carnegie Mellon University, Kleiman is a professor of public policy at the UCLA school of public affairs, and Kulick is the Director of studies at the Georgia Foundation of Strategic and International Studies, [“Drug Production and Trafficking, Counterdrug Policies, and Security and Governance in Afghanistan,” NYU Center on International Cooperation, available at: <http://www.cic.nyu.edu/>]

**The legally recognized government of Afghanistan has limited capacities** to enforce its will on the nation. The central government has no meaningful control over large sections of the country, including insurgent-held areas and nominally loyal areas under the sway of the leaders of localized armed political groups, often referred to as “warlords.” Much of the functional governance activity at the local level is informal, conducted neither by well-defined entities with local sovereignty (as in a federal republic) nor by administrative departments accountable to Kabul, but by traditional kin-group structures. Local, tribal, and ethnic identities—sometimes lumped together as “valleyism”—compete with the nation in defining the loyalties of individuals and families. Moreover, **corruption constitutes a limit on capacity at both national and local levels; Transparency International places Afghanistan among the five most corrupt countries in the world.**<sup>15</sup>

**Second is lack of diligence, lack of mobility, and lack of public support.**

**Caulkins, et al. June 2010** [Jonathan P. Caulkins, Mark A.R. Kleiman, Jonathan D. Kulick, Caulkins is a professor of operations research and public policy at Carnegie Mellon University, Kleiman is a professor of public policy at the UCLA school of public affairs, and Kulick is the Director of studies at the Georgia Foundation of Strategic and International Studies, [“Drug Production and Trafficking, Counterdrug Policies, and Security and Governance in Afghanistan,” NYU Center on International Cooperation, available at: <http://www.cic.nyu.edu/>]

**Corruption creates several different kinds of problems. Corrupt officials may be less diligent, even on matters where they are not paid for malfeasance, than honest officials would be. And the money from corruption can flow up the chain from officials to those who appoint them, in effect closing off the path to public service to those unwilling to channel cash to their superiors** and helping to extend corruption further into important decision-making processes. **Moreover, the reputation for corruption saps public support for the government, especially when it is believed—rightly or wrongly—that some competing power centers are more nearly honest** than the lawful government.

## 1AC – Corruption Advantage [2/2]

### **Perception of government illegitimacy ignites civil war which spills over to India and Pakistan, sparking nuclear war and insecurity of weapons facilities.**

#### **Khan '03**

(Zillur R., Prof U Wisconsin Oshkosh, World Affairs, 6-22, Lexis)

The collapse of the Taliban regime followed by the formation of a coalition government headed by Hamid Karzai, a Pashtun tribal chief and a former minister in the pre-Taliban government with American and Russian support, could help to restore minimal order needed for political stability. **If the fragile coalition government proves unfit for the complex task of intertribal cooperation for peace, the subsequent intertribal war could balkanize Afghanistan** into Non-Pashtun North and Pashtun South, reviving the late charismatic Pashtun leader, Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan's vision of Pashtunistan (Land of the Pashtuns) carved out of the Northwest Frontier Province of Pakistan and southern half of Afghanistan. **Besides destabilizing Pakistan and Afghanistan, such a geopolitical change would adversely affect the stability of northern India. Such a global antiterrorist campaign would be construed by Muslims** (as is currently perceived by many Muslims) **as the West's war against Islam**. It could draw support from Islamic radical groups from the Middle East, Iran, and Indonesia as well as from within India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh in their holy war against perceived surrogates of the West, including India (which has the second largest Muslim population after Indonesia). As suggested by the recent incarceration of three retired Pakisani nuclear weapons scientists for their alleged connection with Osama bin Laden and the Talibans, a possible **breakdown of security of nuclear weapons facilities could become a fertile ground for international terrorists** (Allison, 2001). **Uncertainties about nuclear weapons research and storage facilities would tend to make a conventional war more dangerous**, forcing the military decision makers to face the crucial choice of whether or when to shift gears to a nuclear deterrence mode. A second strike capability or the lack of it could become the deciding factor, the implication being that **if a conventional battle is about to be won or lost** in any sector of the war zone, **there is a high probability of deployment of nuclear weapons**.

### **India-Pakistan conflict causes nuclear winter**

#### **Fai '01**

(Ghulam Nabi, Executive Director, Kashmiri American Council, Washington Times, 7-8)

**The foreign policy of the United States in South Asia should move** from the lackadaisical and distant (with India crowned with a unilateral veto power) **to aggressive involvement** at the vortex. **The most dangerous place on the planet is Kashmir**, a disputed territory convulsed and illegally occupied for more than 53 years and **sandwiched between nuclear-capable India and Pakistan. It has ignited two wars** between the estranged South Asian rivals in 1948 and 1965, **and a third could trigger nuclear volleys and a nuclear winter threatening the entire globe**. The United States would enjoy no sanctuary. This apocalyptic vision is no idiosyncratic view. The director of central intelligence, the Defense Department, and world experts generally place Kashmir at the peak of their nuclear worries. Both India and Pakistan are racing like thoroughbreds to bolster their nuclear arsenals and advanced delivery vehicles. Their defense budgets are climbing despite widespread misery amongst their populations. Neither country has initialed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, or indicated an inclination to ratify an impending Fissile Material/Cut-off Convention. **The boiling witches' brew in Kashmir should propel the United States to assertive facilitation or mediation of Kashmir negotiations**. The impending July 14-16 summit in New Delhi between President Musharraf and Indian Prime Minister A. B. Vajpayee featuring Kashmir on the agenda does not justify complacency.

## 1AC – Solvency [1/3]

**The U.S. drug war in Afghanistan is alienating the pro-western factions, fueling terrorism and instability. A new strategy which shifts away from controlling the market is key.**

**Carpenter '8**

[Ted Galen Carpenter, vice president for defense and foreign-policy studies at the Cato Institute, is the author of eight books on international affairs, including Smart Power: Toward a Prudent Foreign Policy for America, "Afghanistan's Drug Problem", Dec 5, [http://www.cato.org/pub\\_display.php?pub\\_id=9824](http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=9824)]

**General James Jones**, President-elect Obama's choice as national-security adviser, **said** earlier this week **that a more "comprehensive" strategy was needed to defeat the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. Part of his comprehensive approach would be to intensify the campaign against the illegal drug trade. That would be a disastrous mistake.** The opium trade is such a huge part of Afghanistan's economy, that efforts to eradicate it would alienate millions of Afghans and play into the hands of the terrorists. Under pressure from Washington, President Hamid Karzai has already called on the Afghan people to wage war against narcotics with the same determination and ferocity that they resisted the Soviet occupation in the 1980s. **Given the economic and social realities in Afghanistan, that is an unrealistic and potentially very dangerous objective.** Despite the comments of General Jones, **there has long been skepticism in U.S. and NATO military circles about the wisdom of pursuing a vigorous war on drugs in Afghanistan. Commanders correctly believe that such an effort complicates their primary mission: eradicating al-Qaeda and Taliban forces.** There is little doubt that al-Qaeda and other anti-government elements profit from the drug trade. What drug warriors refuse to acknowledge is that **the connection between drug trafficking and terrorism is a direct result of making drugs illegal,** thereby **creating an enormous black-market premium.** Not surprisingly, **terrorist groups in Afghanistan and other countries are quick to exploit such a vast source of potential funding. Absent a worldwide prohibitionist policy, the profit margins in drug trafficking would be a tiny fraction of their current levels, and terrorist groups would have to seek other sources of revenue.** In any case, **the United States faces a dilemma if it conducts a vigorous drug-eradication campaign in Afghanistan** in an effort to dry up the funds flowing to al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Those are not the only factions involved in drug trafficking. **Evidence has emerged that officials in Karzai's government,** perhaps even the president's brother, **are also recipients of largesse from the narcotics trade.** Even more important, **many of Karzai's political allies are warlords who control the drug commerce in their respective regions. They use the resulting revenues to pay the militias that keep them in power in their fiefdoms and give them national political clout.** Some of these individuals backed the Taliban when that faction was in power, switching sides only when the United States launched its military offensive in Afghanistan in October 2001. **Antidrug campaigns might cause them to change their allegiance yet again.** In addition to the need to placate cooperative warlords, **the U.S.-led coalition relies on poppy growers as spies for information on movements of Taliban and al-Qaeda units. Disrupting the opium crop alienates those vital sources of information. The drug trade is a crucial part of Afghanistan's economy. Afghanistan accounts for more than 90 percent of the world's opium supply, and opium poppies are now grown in most provinces. The trade is roughly one-third of the country's entire gross domestic product.** According to the United Nations, some **five hundred nine thousand Afghan families are involved in opium poppy cultivation.** Even measured on a nuclear-family basis, **that translates into about 14 percent of Afghanistan's population.** Given the role of extended families and clans in Afghan society, the number of people affected is much greater than that. Indeed, **it is likely that at least 35 percent of the population is involved directly or indirectly in the drug trade.** For many of those people, **opium poppy crops and other aspects of drug commerce are the difference between modest prosperity (by Afghan standards) and destitution. They do not look kindly on efforts to destroy their livelihood.** Despite those daunting economic factors, the **Bush** administration has **put increased pressure on the Karzai government to crack down on the drug trade, and** the incoming **Obama** administration apparently **intends to continue that strategy.** The Afghan regime is responding cautiously, trying to convince Washington that it is serious about dealing with the problem without launching a full-blown antidrug crusade that will alienate large segments of the population. It has tried to achieve that balance by focusing on high-profile raids against drug-processing labs—mostly those that are not controlled by warlords friendly to the Kabul government. Afghan officials have been especially adamant in opposing the aerial spraying of poppy fields—a strategy that Washington has successfully pushed allied governments in Colombia and other South American drug-source countries to do. Washington's pressure on Karzai is myopic. The Taliban and their al-Qaeda allies are rapidly regaining strength, especially in Helmand and Kandahar provinces, perhaps not coincidentally the areas of the most vigorous antidrug campaigns. **If zealous American drug warriors alienate hundreds of thousands of Afghan farmers, the Karzai government's hold on power could become even more precarious. Washington would then face the unpalatable choice of risking the reemergence of chaos in Afghanistan,** including the prospect that radical Islamists might regain power, **or sending more U.S. troops** to stabilize the situation beyond the reinforcements already contemplated for 2009. U.S. officials need to keep their priorities straight. **Our mortal enemy is al-Qaeda and the Taliban regime that made Afghanistan into a sanctuary for that terrorist**

## 1AC – Solvency [2/3]

**organization. The drug war is a dangerous distraction in the campaign to destroy those forces.** Recognizing that security considerations sometimes trump other objectives would hardly be an unprecedented move by Washington. U.S. agencies quietly ignored drug-trafficking activities of anticommunist factions in Central America during the 1980s when the primary goal was to keep those countries out of the Soviet orbit. In the early 1990s, the United States also eased its pressure on Peru's government regarding the drug-eradication issue when President Alberto Fujimori concluded that a higher priority had to be given to winning coca farmers away from the Maoist Shining Path guerrilla movement. The **Obama** administration **should adopt a similar pragmatic policy in Afghanistan and look the other way regarding the drug-trafficking activities of friendly warlords.** And above all, **the U.S. military must not become the enemy of Afghan farmers whose livelihood depends on opium-poppy cultivation.** True, some of the funds from the drug trade will find their way into the coffers of the Taliban and al-Qaeda. That is an inevitable side effect of a global prohibitionist policy that creates such an enormous profit from illegal drugs. But **alienating pro-Western Afghan factions in an effort to disrupt the flow of revenue to the Islamic radicals is too high a price to pay.** General Jones should reconsider his views.

### **Cutting back on counter-narcotics enforcement solves corruption.**

**Caulkins, et al. June 2010** [Jonathan P. Caulkins, Mark A.R. Kleiman, Jonathan D. Kulick, Caulkins is a professor of operations research and public policy at Carnegie Mellon University, Kleiman is a professor of public policy at the UCLA school of public affairs, and Kulick is the Director of studies at the Georgia Foundation of Strategic and International Studies, ["Drug Production and Trafficking, Counterdrug Policies, and Security and Governance in Afghanistan," NYU Center on International Cooperation, available at: <http://www.cic.nyu.edu/>]

**The value to traffickers of corrupting enforcement agents**—an activity described as currently inseparable from most drug-trafficking in Afghanistan—**can be reduced** in at least two conceptually distinct ways. **Simply cutting back on the level of enforcement effort will tend not only to reduce the total monetary value of the drug traffic but also to reduce the share of total revenues that corrupt enforcement agents can extract.** The alternative approach is to multiply the number of agencies whose officials have investigative and arrest powers over any given trafficker, thus reducing the capacity of any one agent or agency to provide a "license" to traffic. That strategy is harder to pursue with prosecutors and judges, as the courts are more hierarchical and less conducive to overlapping jurisdiction than law enforcement agencies.<sup>43</sup>

### **Ending counter-narcotics solves insurgency and corruption by denying illicit groups political platform.**

#### **Brands, 2010**

[Hal, Defense analyst in Washington, "Book Reviews: Shooting Up: Counter-Insurgency and the War on Drugs," [http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/item/2010/0103/book/book\\_brands\\_shooting.html](http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/item/2010/0103/book/book_brands_shooting.html)]

Felbab-Brown develops this argument in a relatively slender book of six chapters—an introduction, a conclusion, a theoretical chapter, and three case studies. The theoretical chapter lays out Felbab-Brown's "political capital model" of **insurgent participation in illicit economies.** This participation typically **brings insurgent groups substantial material and military gains, by allowing them to purchase better weapons, pay better salaries, and conduct more ambitious operations.** Even more important, illicit trade allows the insurgents to derive greater political power. **Narcotics-funded insurgent groups can put poor peasants to work and distribute food and essential services in areas where there is little government presence. "Unlike ideology, which typically promises hard-to-deliver benefits sometime in the future,"** Felbab-Brown writes, **"sponsorship of the illicit economy allows belligerents to deliver immediate benefits** to the population." Moreover, where the locals are wound up in illicit economies—as in the coca fields of the Andes—the insurgents can position themselves as defenders of local customs and economies by protecting them from government eradication campaigns. This creates a dilemma for policy-makers. **Crop eradication is often unsuccessful or counterproductive, and by destroying the population's livelihood, it can create new recruits for the guerrillas. Interdiction—disrupting illicit economies further down the distribution chain—can be more effective, but it is extremely expensive and difficult to carry out. From a pure counter-insurgency perspective, the best choice may be either to ignore the illicit economy** or to attempt to license the production of the forbidden good. **These strategies have little impact on the narcotics trade, but they mitigate the harm done to civilians and thus lessen the chance the insurgents can derive political gains** from their involvement in the drug trade.

## 1AC – Solvency [3/3]

And, none of your disads are unique – U.S. is moving away from harsh counter-narcotics strategies.

### **Berger 2010**

Matthew, <http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=50112>, “U.S. Taking New Tack on Afghan Poppies”

The U.S. strategy over the past several years of eradicating illicit crops in order to cut off funding for insurgents has therefore proved counterproductive, according to the Barack Obama administration. Its new counter-narcotics strategy, first announced last summer, will move away from eradication and, instead take a "whole-of-government approach." This shift is part of the regional stabilisation strategy unveiled by the U.S. State Department last week, which outlines a plan based around improving the agricultural sector and governance of Afghanistan, largely through the deployment of more civilian experts to act as advisors. The new approach, says the strategy, "emphasises interdiction, instead of eradication, and has two core goals: (1) to counter the insurgency-narcotics nexus and reduce funding to the Taliban and other anti-Afghan Government forces; and (2) to alleviate the corruption-narcotics nexus and strengthen ties between the Afghan people and their government."



# **\*\*INSURGENCY ADVANTAGE\*\***



## Now Key – 2010

**2010 is key – Afghanistan insurgency is at the tipping point.**

**Smith, 2010**

[Mark S., Associated Press – Correspondent, June 26, “Obama, Brit Leader: Afghanistan in critical period,”  
<http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5isOFwdbq0tsqatW6vJpkDRTI1gMgD9GJ5FH80>]

TORONTO — President Barack Obama and British Prime Minister David Cameron say **it is critical to get the Afghanistan war right this year.** Speaking to reporters Saturday after their first meeting since Cameron took power, the two leaders said their nations have the right strategy in Afghanistan. Obama said at a meeting of industrial and developing nations in Toronto that "**this period that we are in is going to be critical.**" Cameron said "we're giving it everything we can to get it right this year." **With a resurgent Taliban and major U.S.-led offensives planned, the nine-year-old war is considered at a tipping point.**

## Instability Now

**Violence massively increasing now.**

**VOA, 6-24**

[2010, "Deadliest Month for International Troops in Afghanistan,"  
<http://www1.voanews.com/english/news/asia/Deadliest-Month-for-International-Troops-in-Afghanistan-97060264.html>

**June has become the deadliest month for** international troops in **Afghanistan** since the conflict began. News agencies who track U.S. and NATO casualty announcements say **at least 79 troops have died this month.** NATO said Thursday that four troops died in southern Afghanistan late Wednesday. Britain said the soldiers died when their vehicle crashed near Gereshk in Helmand province. **On Wednesday, NATO announced the deaths of four troops in bomb explosions** in southern, eastern and western Afghanistan. Australia's defense minister said Wednesday his country could begin withdrawing its troops from Afghanistan in two years. John Faulkner said Australian troops could see their mission to train Afghan forces change to what he called an "overwatch role," allowing Afghans to take control of security. Australia has about 1,500 troops in Afghanistan, most of them in Uruzgan province. Sixteen Australian troops have died since the country joined the U.S.-led mission to defeat the Taliban in 2001. **Militants have been increasing attacks** ahead of a planned military effort by NATO to clear southern Kandahar city and surrounding areas of Taliban insurgents. **In eastern Nangarhar province, police say a roadside bombing targeted a parliamentary candidate** on Wednesday and killed one person and wounded the candidate. **In another roadside bombing, Afghanistan's Interior Ministry said seven security guards working for a private construction firm were killed** when their vehicle hit a bomb in Uruzgan province Wednesday.

## **Eradication = Instability/Terror**

### **U.S. antidrug efforts may fatally undermine the far more important anti-terror campaign. Carpenter, 2k4**

[Ted Galen, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, Cato Foreign Policy Briefing No. 84, November 10, "How the Drug War in Afghanistan Undermines America's War on Terror," <online> <http://www.cato.org/pubs/fpbriefs/fpb84.pdf>]

There is a growing tension between two U.S. objectives in Afghanistan. The most important objective is—or at least should be—the eradication of the remaining Al Qaeda and Taliban forces in that country. But the United States and its coalition partners are now also emphasizing the eradication of Afghanistan's drug trade. These antidrug efforts may fatally undermine the far more important anti-terrorism campaign. Like it or not, the growing of opium poppies (the source of heroin) is a huge part of Afghanistan's economy—roughly half of the country's annual gross domestic product. As long as the United States and other drug consuming countries pursue a prohibitionist strategy, a massive black market premium exists that will make the cultivation of drug crops far more lucrative than competing crops in Afghanistan or any other drug source country. For many Afghan farmers, growing opium poppies is the difference between prosperity and destitution. There is a serious risk that they will turn against the United States and the U.S.-supported government of President Hamid Karzai if Washington and Kabul pursue vigorous anti-drug programs. In addition, regional warlords who have helped the United States combat Al Qaeda and Taliban forces derive substantial profits from the drug trade. They use those revenues to pay the militias that keep them in power. A drug eradication campaign could easily drive important warlords into alliance with America's terrorist adversaries. Even those Americans who oppose drug legalization and endorse the drug war as a matter of general policy should recognize that an exception needs to be made in the case of Afghanistan. At the very least, U.S. officials should be willing to look the other way regarding the opium crop and recognize that the fight against radical Islamic terrorists must have a higher priority than anti-drug measures.

## **Counter-Narcotics = Insurgency 2AC Link Booster**

**Counter-narcotics strengthen the insurgency by consolidating power in money in the hands of the most violent actors.**

**Center on International Cooperation, June 2010** ["Drug Production and Trafficking, Counterdrug Policies, and Security and Governance in Afghanistan," NYU Center on International Cooperation, available at: <http://www.cic.nyu.edu/>]

The authors' third point regarding the likely targets of interdiction and law enforcement also appears valid. **Attempts at enforcement through a weak state privilege the most effective corrupt and violent actors and lead to consolidation of the industry. That is has been borne out on the ground in Afghanistan.** Additionally, insurgency and corrupt officials are integrated with each other through the tribal structure. Members of the same extended family or clan can be in the government and the insurgency, and coordinate for maximum collective profit.

## CN = Insurgency

**CN concentrates funding on the most violent insurgents – protection payments.**

**Center on International Cooperation, June 2010** [“Drug Production and Trafficking, Counterdrug Policies, and Security and Governance in Afghanistan,” NYU Center on International Cooperation, available at: <http://www.cic.nyu.edu/>]

At present, insurgents appear to be capturing only a small share of those trafficking revenues. If new policies cause a redistribution of gains among the various market participants—farmers, ordinary criminals, corrupt officials, warlords, and insurgents—that redistribution could well increase rather than reduce insurgents’ share. More effective enforcement, by increasing the risks traffickers face, also increases the value of buying protection against enforcement, in the form of either violence or corruption. So successful CN efforts, unless strategically designed, would have the natural effect of further enriching insurgents, warlords, and corrupt officials. These pessimistic conclusions apply not just to crop eradication but also to enforcement aimed at collection, refining, and exporting activities, and even to development efforts insofar as they make it more expensive to produce opium and refine heroin in Afghanistan.

**More evidence.**

**Goodhand, 2009**

[Johnathan, Conflict and Development Studies in the Department of Development Studies at SOAS, University of London, “Bandits, Borderlands, and Opium Wars: Afghan State Building Viewed From the Margins,” [www.diiis.dk/graphics/.../WP2009-26\\_bandits\\_borderlands\\_opiumwars.pdf](http://www.diiis.dk/graphics/.../WP2009-26_bandits_borderlands_opiumwars.pdf)]

In parallel with the political transition, there has been a significant growth in the drug economy driven by a range of micro and macro factors. First, the Taliban’s opium ban caused a tenfold increase in prices, which in turn created strong incentives for more wealthy farmers to allocate land to poppy. These factors were reinforced by the end of a drought, which meant an increased availability of wheat and a freeing up of internal and external markets (Mansfield, 2007). Second, the CIA’s policy of providing several hundred million dollars to commanders, in order to buy their support in the ‘war on terror’, had the effect of flooding the money market. The Afghan currency halved against the dollar in two months. This rapid deflation created incentives to unload US dollars into other currencies or other profitable investments. Since the US offensive occurred during poppy planting season, dollars were quickly recycled into loans to farmers to finance next spring’s poppy crop. Third, coalition forces initially adopted a laissez-faire policy towards drugs, born out of the strong tension between counter-insurgency and counter-narcotics objectives. Counter-insurgency efforts require good local allies and intelligence, and local warlords are unlikely to provide either support or intelligence to those who are destroying their businesses (Felbab-Brown, 2005). Fourth, unlike previous phases of the conflict, when opium was essentially a licit commodity, its criminalisation had the effect of keeping prices high because of the associated ‘risk premium’ and forcing those involved in the opium industry to look for protection beyond the state – and there is no shortage in Afghanistan of non-state ‘specialists in violence’. Consequently, military entrepreneurs have been able to generate political capital (and revenue) by providing protection to the peasantry and traffickers from state-led counter-narcotics efforts. Furthermore disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programmes had the effect of pushing many mid- to low-level commanders into a closer relationship with the opium industry (Shaw, 2006). Unlike the more senior regional strongmen, they did not have the option of a transition into politics.

## **Taxation = Insurgency**

**Taxation and protection fees massively increase Taliban activity.**

**Berger, 2010**

[Matthew, staff writer at IPS, "U.S. Taking New Tack on Afghan Poppies," <http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=50112>]

**Though opiates are banned by Islamic law, taxing poppy cultivation and protecting smuggling rings brings the Taliban 70 to 100 million dollars a year, according to an August report from CRS, which they say is as much as half of their income. Ninety percent of illicit opium in the world now comes from Afghanistan.** Cultivation surged in 2006 and 2007, according to the report, and though it has dropped off a bit in the past couple of years, many attribute this to an overproduction that has outpaced global demand.

## CN = South Shift

**CN pushes the insurgency South.**

**Caulkins, Kleiman, and Kulick, June 2010** [Jonathan P. Caulkins, Mark A.R. Kleiman, Jonathan D. Kulick, Caulkins is a professor of operations research and public policy at Carnegie Mellon University, Kleiman is a professor of public policy at the UCLA school of public affairs, and Kulick is the Director of studies at the Georgia Foundation of Strategic and International Studies, ["Drug Production and Trafficking, Counterdrug Policies, and Security and Governance in Afghanistan," NYU Center on International Cooperation, available at: <http://www.cic.nyu.edu/>]

**Successful efforts to reduce cultivation in the north have pushed most of the poppy production into the southern parts of the country, where the insurgency is stronger,**<sup>27</sup> However, **southern-produced opium and heroin still flows out across Afghanistan's northern border,**<sup>28</sup> so at least some of the Taliban's nominal political rivals must be helping to export the heroin made from poppies whose production enriches the insurgency. It seems unlikely that they can be persuaded to do otherwise in the absence of alternative, non-Taliban-linked sources of opiates for export.

## Internal – Hearts/Minds

### **Poppy suppression loses hearts and minds – creates anti-American sentiment.**

#### **Sahoo, 2010**

[March 3, Sanada, Staff writer at the new Jersey Newsroom, “Heroin drug trade a growing industry in Afghanistan,” <http://www.newjerseynewsroom.com/international/heroin-drug-trade-a-growing-industry-in-afghanistan>]

**Under Obama, Washington**, which currently has some 70,000 troops deployed against the Taliban in Afghanistan, **has shifted from poppy eradication to a greater emphasis on interdiction and rural development, primarily to avoid antagonizing local farmers**, Felbab-Brown said. **But the ongoing counter-insurgency operation centered on Marja** in Helmand Province, a major poppy-production region, **has included the confiscation of poppy seeds discovered by troops during house searches. “And that is generating political capital for the Taliban,” Felbab-Brown said, noting that the some farmers have complained to reporters that the Taliban had let them grow and sell poppy.** “How we handle post-Marja operation will decide a lot,” she said. **“If we equate good governance with poppy suppression before legal livelihoods are available, we can lose the majority of the population.”**

#### **More evidence.**

#### **Lekic, 2010**

[Slobodan, staff writer at AP, March 24, “U.S., allies tolerate Afghan opium farms lest troops lose popular support,” [http://www.cleveland.com/world/index.ssf/2010/03/us\\_allies\\_hesitate\\_to\\_uproot\\_a.html](http://www.cleveland.com/world/index.ssf/2010/03/us_allies_hesitate_to_uproot_a.html)]

MARJAH, Afghanistan - **Curbing the Taliban's multimillion dollar opium poppy business was a major goal of a military operation to seize this former insurgent stronghold.** With the town in NATO hands, the **Marines face a conundrum: If they destroy the crops and curb the trade, they lose the support of the population** — a problem for which they have no easy solution. U.S., Afghan and NATO forces that stormed Marjah in February were ordered to seize large opium stashes but leave farmers' poppy fields alone. **Destroying crops and farmers' livelihood would undermine the broader goal of winning the support of a population that long embraced the Taliban over an ineffective Afghan government.**



## **Insurgency = Terror/Pakistan/Afghanistan**

**Increased insurgency destabilizes Pakistan and Afghanistan and creates strong global terrorist networks.**

**Abreu, 2010**

[January 8, Sean, contributing author at Suite 101, "The insurgency in Afghanistan: Understanding the Nature of the Threat," [http://modern-war.suite101.com/article.cfm/the\\_insurgency\\_in\\_afghanistan](http://modern-war.suite101.com/article.cfm/the_insurgency_in_afghanistan)]

**The Taliban is not an Afghan problem alone, and it's not a simple insurgency crossing the Pakistan border and striking in Afghanistan. The movement shows signs of being a political-military alliance that coordinates a combination of insurgency activities with terrorist tactics, and conducts elaborate information and publicity operations to recruit and gain Muslim support for their cause around the world. Their efforts threaten the security and stability of Afghanistan and Pakistan.** Their goal is to see the birth of an Islamic emirate rise out of the embers of the two ruined nations.

## Spillover 2AC

### **Afghan conflict spills over to Central Asia**

#### **Starr '05**

(S. Frederick, Chair – Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, Foreign Affairs, July/August, Lexis)

In relations among states, success does not necessarily breed success. In both Afghanistan and the rest of Central Asia, the United States is at a crossroads and must either move forward or fall back. If it chooses disinterest or passivity the cost will be enormous. **Afghanistan will sink backward and again become a field of fierce geopolitical competition. Other countries of Central Asia will either be drawn into its destructive vortex or seek refuge at whatever cost, most likely in the arms of Russia or China. This will seed fresh rounds of instability as nationalists throughout the region fight for their waning sovereignties, as they did for years after 1917. Development will halt.**

### **Afghanistan conflict spills over to Central Asia.**

#### **Lal, Rand, 2k6**

[Rollie, Rand Corporation, "Central Asia and Its Asian Neighbors. Security and Commerce at the Crossroads." [http://stinet.dtic.mil/cgi-bin\\_/GetTRDoc?AD=A450305&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf](http://stinet.dtic.mil/cgi-bin_/GetTRDoc?AD=A450305&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf) ]

**The Asian states neighboring Central Asia have historic links and strong interests in the region. China, Iran, Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan are critical players in the security and economic issues that will determine the future of Central Asia and affect U.S. interests in the region. All of these states are of importance to the United States, whether due to the war on terrorism, economic ties, arms control, nonproliferation, or other reasons.**

China, Iran, and India have all aggressively sought to build trade ties to and through Central Asia, and China and India have also invigorated security cooperation. But **regional states are concerned about the situation in Afghanistan, which they fear might lead to a spillover of conflict** onto their soil, and they also fear the possibility of Pakistani activity and influence, which has led them to keep that state at arm's length. China has indicated that security is a primary interest in the region through its initiative in establishing the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) with Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Russia (pp. 6–7). Concerns regarding China's Muslim Uighur separatists, as well as concerns of U.S. encirclement, underpin China's efforts to promote regional security cooperation (pp. 4–6, 9–10). China has also moved aggressively to expand its economic interests in the region through commodity trade and agreements to import oil via pipeline from Kazakhstan (pp. 7–8). Iran has a similar perspective toward its Central Asian neighbors. Stability in Afghanistan lies at the heart of Iran's concerns, as the Taliban has historically been anathema to Iran (p. 12). Iran maintains that an international, United Nations-led military presence should remain in Afghanistan to prevent a deterioration of the security situation (pp. 11–12). However, U.S. presence there and in Central Asia creates concern in

Iran that U.S. intentions are to surround and isolate Iran rather than enhance regional security (p. 16). **To increase its leverage in the region, Iran is developing economic links with each country in Central Asia.** Transport links are another important initiative, with routes being developed via Afghanistan, connecting Iranian ports and landlocked Uzbekistan (pp. 13–16). India shares Iran's concerns regarding the threat of militants based in Afghanistan. However, India welcomes U.S. presence in the region as a stabilizing influence (p. 34). Economic ties are growing, and India is developing transport and energy links to the region via Iran and Afghanistan (pp. 33–34). The Central Asian states have close relations with India dating to the years of the Soviet Union and the Afghan war, a history that negatively affects their relations with Pakistan. Pakistan's relations with Central Asia suffer from lingering memories in the region of Pakistan's role in supporting the Taliban and Islamic militancy in general. Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan all remain suspicious of Pakistan's regional intentions, and trade with Pakistan has been weak as a result (p. 25). **The establishment of the Karzai government in Kabul has been a blow to Pakistan's regional security strategy.** Whereas the Taliban regime would have been friendly to Pakistan's interests, the current government is more open to ties with India (p. 23). Although Pakistan is moving to overcome its regional reputation, robust cooperation will take time and effort (p. 26). **Afghanistan remains critical to the future of Central Asia and its neighbors, as instability in Afghanistan has the potential to destabilize the region** (pp. 19–20). A potent combination of drugs, weapons, and militants traverse Afghanistan and cross into Central Asia and beyond. **Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan fear that Islamic militants trained in Afghanistan may slip back across their borders** (p. 20). Iran remains apprehensive that hostile, anti-Shia elements may take control of Afghanistan, putting Iranian security at risk (p. 12).

## More Central Asia Impacts

### **Nuclear war.**

Dr. M. Ehsan **Ahrari**, Professor of National Security and Strategy of the Joint and Combined Warfighting School at the Armed Forces Staff College, 8/1/'11 (www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/Pubs/display.cfm?pubID=112) South and **Central Asia constitute a part of the world where** a well-designed **American strategy might help avoid** crises or **catastrophe. The U.S.** military would provide only one component of such a strategy, and a secondary one at that, but **has an important role to play** through engagement activities and regional confidence-building. **Insecurity has led** the **states** of the region **to seek weapons of mass destruction**, missiles, and conventional arms. It has also led them toward policies which undercut the security of their neighbors. If **such activities continue, the result could be increased terrorism, humanitarian disasters**, continued low-level conflict **and** potentially **even** major regional war or **a thermonuclear exchange**. A shift away from this pattern could allow the states of the region to become solid economic and political partners for the United States, thus representing a gain for all concerned.

### **Conflict in Central Asia escalates, setting the globe ablaze.**

#### **Tsepkalov '98**

(Valery V., Belarussian Ambassador to the U.S., Foreign Affairs, March/April, Lexis)

But abetting the continuing destabilization of Eurasia is not in the West's interests. NATO enlargement has not consolidated anti-Western forces in the region, as some Western experts had feared, but it has encouraged the division of Eurasia and the shattering of the Russian Federation. There will likely be further attempts at secession, although not necessarily according to the bloody model of Chechnya. **Central Asia and the Caucasus are rife with flash points that could ignite several nations and draw in outside powers.** And with regional destabilization and the slackening of central control, **the nuclear threat is perhaps greater now than during the Cold War.** [Continues...] The **scramble for the spoils of the Soviet heritage could cause serious conflict between major geopolitical players** and threaten the very foundations of established security systems. When a tenant in a building falls ill or dies, if the tenants in the other apartments begin knocking down walls to expand their own space, they could end up destroying the entire building. Any "world order" is stable only when everyone knows his place in it and there is sufficient collective and individual power, and the willingness to use it, to maintain the whole. **The challenge for Europe and the world in the post-Soviet space is averting further disintegration and keeping disorder and conflict from spilling out of the region and setting the globe ablaze.** It is clearly to the West's advantage to promote certain kinds of regional integration in Eurasia. The rapid rise of any player, especially China or Iran, or a radical Islamic revolution could harm Western interests. Western unity would be shaken if one or more of its own, whether Germany, Turkey, or Japan, tried to secure its own zone of influence. The **intervention of NATO** forces in future conflicts in the region, probably at the request of the parties involved, **could cause further disintegration, perhaps resulting in loss of control over weapons of mass destruction.**

## 2AC Impact Calculus – Central Asia War

**A. Magnitude- even a 1 percent risk is bigger than the aff.**

**Art '03 (Robert J., Prof IR – Brandeis U., A Grand Strategy for America, p. 212-3)**

Fourth and finally, great-power wars are highly destructive, not only to the participants and their immediate neighbors, but also to world order and stability. Today, they may be low-probability events, but their costs may be extremely high. In this regard, we should treat Eurasian great-power wars the same way we do NBC terrorism, and the same way we treated the possibility of a general nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War: we should take multiple measures to prevent them and to limit them if they should break out. Great-power wars are potentially too destructive not to do everything possible to avert them; great-power peace should be over-determined, not left to chance.

**B. Probability- Central Asian war is the most probable impact.**

**Blank '00 (Stephen, Prof Research – Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, “U.S. Military Engagement with Transcaucasia and Central Asia”, [www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub113.pdf](http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub113.pdf))**

Washington's burgeoning military-political-economic involvement seeks, inter alia, to demonstrate the U.S. ability to project military power even into this region or for that matter, into Ukraine where NATO recently held exercises that clearly originated as an anti-Russian scenario. Secretary of Defense William Cohen has discussed strengthening U.S.-Azerbaijani military cooperation and even training the Azerbaijani army, certainly alarming Armenia and Russia. 69 And Washington is also training Georgia's new Coast Guard. 70 However, Washington's well-known ambivalence about committing force to Third World ethno-political conflicts suggests that U.S. military power will not be easily committed to saving its economic investment. But this ambivalence about committing forces and the dangerous situation, where Turkey is allied to Azerbaijan and Armenia is bound to Russia, create the potential for wider and more protracted regional conflicts among local forces. In that connection, Azerbaijan and Georgia's growing efforts to secure NATO's lasting involvement in the region, coupled with Russia's determination to exclude other rivals, foster a polarization along very traditional lines. 71 In 1993 Moscow even threatened World War III to deter Turkish intervention on behalf of Azerbaijan. Yet the new Russo-Armenian Treaty and Azeri-Turkish treaty suggest that Russia and Turkey could be dragged into a confrontation to rescue their allies from defeat. 72 Thus many of the conditions for conventional war or protracted ethnic conflict in which third parties intervene are present in the Transcaucasus. For example, many Third World conflicts generated by local structural factors have a great potential for unintended escalation. Big powers often feel obliged to rescue their lesser proteges and proxies. One or another big power may fail to grasp the other side's stakes since interests here are not as clear as in Europe. Hence commitments involving the use of nuclear weapons to prevent a client's defeat are not as well established or apparent. Clarity about the nature of the threat could prevent the kind of rapid and almost uncontrolled escalation we saw in 1993 when Turkish noises about intervening on behalf of Azerbaijan led Russian leaders to threaten a nuclear war in that case. 73 Precisely because Turkey is a NATO ally, Russian nuclear threats could trigger a potential nuclear blow (not a small possibility given the erratic nature of Russia's declared nuclear strategies). The real threat of a Russian nuclear strike against Turkey to defend Moscow's interests and forces in the Transcaucasus makes the danger of major war there higher than almost everywhere else. As Richard Betts has observed, The greatest danger lies in areas where (1) the potential for serious instability is high; (2) both superpowers perceive vital interests; (3) neither recognizes that the other's perceived interest or commitment is as great as its own; (4) both have the capability to inject conventional forces; and, (5) neither has willing proxies capable of settling the situation.

## Intelligence Key to WoT

### **Lack of intelligence collapses deterrence, causing nuclear terrorism**

#### **Rothberg '97**

(Barry L., 8 Duke J. Comp. & Int'l L. 79, Fall, Lexis)

**Intelligence is of critical importance in combating nuclear terror. The United States needs as much information as it can get.** How much fissile material do proliferators have? How much can they get their hands on? Will they pass materials to sub-national actors? What about Russian supplies and weapons? Which terrorist groups have been trying to acquire nuclear weapons? Do stolen Russian warheads have adequate security lockouts, or can terrorists operate them at will? Are Russian officers amenable to selling warheads? Which officers, at which facilities? How much money would it take to buy a warhead? The access codes? Some surplus plutonium? These and other **questions must be answered, so that when** [\*116] **Washington gets a nuclear threat, its credibility can be accurately assessed.** The CIA and FBI are hard at work on the issue, <sup>252</sup> but also involved is the Department of Energy's Z Division, based at the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory in California. <sup>253</sup> Z Division analysts handle the most sensitive nuclear proliferation intelligence available. Z Division has studied the link between the Russian Mafia and the nuclear black market, as well as the possibility that some Russian-controlled nuclear weapons held in Ukraine were appropriated by officers loyal to Kiev. <sup>254</sup> Most importantly, **there is the issue of deterrence. In the event of a nuclear detonation, tracing the bomb to its origin will require some good intelligence work. If the bomb cannot be traced, the United States cannot retaliate. If terrorists think (rightly or wrongly) that American intelligence capabilities are lacking, they will be more likely to strike, being less fearful of retaliation. Inadequate intelligence will severely handicap the United States in its efforts to deal with nuclear terror in a crisis situation.**

### **Intelligence focuses efforts, making up for shortfalls in other defenses**

#### **Levi '06**

(Michael A., Fellow – Council on Foreign Relations, CQ Testimony, 7-27, Lexis)

**Intelligence can also multiply the effectiveness of radiation detection. If we know** or strongly suspect that **terrorists have** acquired nuclear weapons or significant amounts of **nuclear materials, a surged response is possible.** Such detection begins at the source of nuclear materials and weapons. For over a decade, the United States has been helping other countries install systems for protecting their nuclear weapons and materials (so-called MPC&A systems). If terrorists acquire materials or weapons, MPC&A systems will in many cases provide warning, allowing a surged response to any ensuing attempt at nuclear smuggling. The United States should attempt to secure agreements with facilities that receive MPC&A assistance, requiring that they promptly share warning information. DNDO is already tackling this challenge, and should be strongly supported by other parts of the U.S. government. It would be wise to go beyond this and develop protocols and agreements for sharing warnings of theft, including from facilities secured without U.S. assistance.

## Nuclear Terrorism Impact

### Global nuclear war results

#### Mishra '99

(H.B., Lecturer – Christian Medical College & Hospital, Terrorism: Threat to Peace and Harmony, p. 56-7)

**Nuclear terrorism could** even **spark full-scale nuclear war between states**. Such a war could involve the entire spectrum of nuclear-conflict possibilities, ranging from a nuclear attack upon a non-nuclear state to system-wide nuclear war. How might such far-reaching consequences of nuclear terrorism come about? Perhaps the most likely way would involve a terrorist nuclear assault against a state by terrorists hosted in another state. For example, consider the following scenario: Early in the 1990s, Israel and its Arab-state neighbours finally stand ready to conclude a comprehensive, multilateral peace settlement. With a bilateral treaty between Israel and Egypt already many years old, only the interests of the Palestinians—as defined by the PLO—seem to have been left out. On the eve of the proposed signing of the peace agreement, half a dozen crude nuclear explosives in the one-kiloton range detonate in as many Israeli cities. Public grief over the many thousands dead and maimed is matched only by the outcry for revenge. In response to the public mood, the government of Israel initiates selected strikes against terrorist strongholds in Lebanon, whereupon Lebanese Shiite forces and Syria retaliate against Israel. Before long, the entire region is ablaze, conflict has escalated to nuclear forms, and all countries in the area have suffered unprecedented destruction. Of course, such a scenario is fraught with the makings of even wider destruction. How would the United States react to the situation in the Middle East? What would be the Soviet response? It is certainly conceivable **that a chain reaction of interstate nuclear conflict could ensure**, one **that would** ultimately **involve** the superpowers or even **every nuclear-weapons state on the planet**.

## CN Kills Intelligence

**Eradication switches allegiance of warlords towards the insurgents AND eradication guts intelligence against the insurgency by turning spies against the U.S.**

**Carpenter, 2k4**

[Ted Galen, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, Cato Foreign Policy Briefing No. 84, November 10, "How the Drug War in Afghanistan Undermines America's War on Terror," <online> <http://www.cato.org/pubs/fpbriefs/fpb84.pdf>]

In any case, the United States faces a serious dilemma if it conducts a vigorous drug eradication campaign in Afghanistan in an effort to dry up the funds flowing to Al Qaeda and the Taliban. Those are clearly not the only factions involved in drug trafficking. Many of Karzai's political allies are warlords who control the drug trade in their respective regions. Some of these individuals backed the Taliban when that faction was in power, switching sides only when the United States launched its military offensive in Afghanistan in October 2001. There is a serious risk that an anti-drug campaign might cause them to change their allegiance yet again. Even the pro-drug-war Washington Times conceded that "a number of heavily armed Tajik tribal leaders that have not been hostile to U.S. forces could lash out if their drug interests are directly and aggressively challenged."<sup>20</sup> In addition to the need to placate cooperative warlords, the U.S.-led coalition relies on poppy growers to spy on movements of Taliban remnants and Al Qaeda units. Disrupting the opium crop might alienate those crucial sources of information.<sup>21</sup>

**Counter-narcotics destroys intelligence gathering.**

**Felbab-Brown '05**

(Vanda, PhD Candidate – MIT and Fellow – Belfer Center at Harvard U., Washington Quarterly, Autumn)  
Eradication drives the local population into the hands of regional warlords, even if they now call themselves politicians or have secure government jobs, strengthening the centrifugal forces that historically have weakened Afghanistan as a state. Local warlords can capitalize on popular discontent with eradication by claiming something such as "the evil Karzai government, having sold out to the foreign infidels, is impoverishing the rural people and forcing them into semi-slavery." Predictably, the Afghan government eradication teams that actually attempted to carry out their orders, rather than simply accepting bribes, have frequently met with armed resistance from peasants, even in the restricted and relatively safe areas where they have been deployed. Although the new Pentagon policy of supporting counternarcotics operations is meant to avoid alienating the local population by not involving the U.S. military directly in eradication, it will put U.S. soldiers in the position of fighting against local peasants who violently resist counternarcotics operations. The favorable image of the U.S. military in Afghanistan will be destroyed if U.S. soldiers are forced to return fire at a mob of armed, angry villagers. Wider cooperation and intelligence provision will fall apart rapidly.

## Instability Kills Leadership

**Afghani failure crushes U.S. global credibility and destabilizes Central Asia.**

**Wisner '03**

(Frank III, Co-Chair – Independent Study Group Report on Afghanistan, CFR, 6-23,  
<http://www.cfr.org/publication.html?id=6069>)

The Afghanistan report says that the United States should lend more support to Karzai's transitional government and that more vigorous military, diplomatic, and economic measures are needed to bolster the government's hand. Can these proposals be implemented? These are proposals that the United States can, but more importantly, must accomplish. **If Afghanistan goes badly**, if the Karzai regime fails, if the constitutional preparations don't go forward, if the elections are not held in 2004, **it is a huge black eye for the United States**. Moreover, **if the country re-descends into anarchy** and drug [production], **we will pay a major price**. What price? It will be **measured in terms of our credibility** as a peacekeeper in a very troubled age, **our ability to build coalitions** in the war against terror, **our ability to act as a force for stability and a mobilizer of sympathetic international attention**. **It's going to be a major setback for NATO**, if [the peacekeeping mission, which NATO will assume command of in August,] fails. [U.S.] failure in Afghanistan will mean it will be even harder to exit Iraq because the United States will be stalked by the ghost of failure in Afghanistan. And **[Afghanistan's] descent into chaos would mean real questions of stability in a troubled region; failure** in Afghanistan **is going to mean an outbreak of unsettling rivalries that will affect the United States**.



## CMR Add-On

### **A. Forcing U.S. troops to engage in eradication efforts destroys relations between the military and their civilian superiors in the Defense Department**

**Carpenter, 2k4** [Ted Galen, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, Cato Foreign Policy Briefing No. 84, November 10, "How the Drug War in Afghanistan Undermines America's War on Terror," <online> <http://www.cato.org/pubs/fpbriefs/fpb84.pdf>]

An especially troubling indicator came in August 2004 when Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld stated that drug eradication in Afghanistan was a high priority of the Bush administration and indicated that the United States and its coalition partners were in the process of formulating a "master plan" for dealing with the problem.<sup>1</sup> "The danger a large drug trade poses in this country is too serious to ignore," Rumsfeld said. "The inevitable result is to corrupt the government and way of life, and that would be most unfortunate."<sup>2</sup> The secretary skirted the issue of what specific role U.S. troops would play in the intensified drug eradication effort. It soon became clear that **U.S. military commanders in Afghanistan were less than thrilled at the prospect of becoming glorified narcotics cops.** Less than a week after Rumsfeld's statement, Maj. Gen. Eric T. Olson, the commander of Combined Task Force 76 in Kandahar, stated bluntly that "at this point in time, U.S. troops will not be involved in counterdrug or counternarcotics operations at all."<sup>3</sup> **Olson** seemed to be out of step with his boss, but **his comments reflect the longstanding reluctance of U.S. military personnel to complicate their mission of eradicating the remaining Al Qaeda and Taliban forces by becoming entangled in** the complex issue of **drug trafficking.** Drug eradication "wasn't high on the list" admitted a Green Beret officer in 2003. "We pressured the warlords not to engage in the activity, but with all the opium in their caches, we knew . . . that they were not going to let it rot."<sup>4</sup> The official U.S. military policy has been to destroy drug processing facilities (not crops) only if they are discovered "incidental to military operations and if the mission permits."<sup>5</sup> German troops, operating in Afghanistan as part of a NATO peacekeeping force, have adopted an even more laissez-faire attitude. They maintain a small garrison in the town of Kunduz, which lies in the middle of opium country, but the garrison's orders have been to refrain from interfering with the drug trade.<sup>6</sup> Teresita **Schaffer, a former U.S. diplomat** who now directs the South Asia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, **agrees that the U.S. military has been unenthusiastic about anti-drug missions from the moment it entered Afghanistan** in the autumn of 2001. **"They feel it's a bottomless pit, and they don't want to put a bottomless supply of troops in Afghanistan."**<sup>9</sup> Schaffer also noted, though, that the military had initially resisted other attempts to broaden its mission in Afghanistan, and yet ended up adopting those expanded roles within a few months. For example, the military command insisted that it would not take part in nation-building activities and would not try to maintain security on the country's farflung road network. It has since embarked on both projects. That same pattern now seems to be happening with the drug issue.

### **B. Breakdown of CMR leads to global conflict and guts foreign policy effectiveness**

**Cohen, 1997** [Eliot A. Cohen, professor of strategic studies at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University. For his work as the director of the Gulf War Air Power Survey in 1991-93, he received the U.S. Air Force's highest civilian decoration, "Civil-military relations - Are U.S. Forces Overstretched?," ORBIS, Spring 1997, [http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\\_m0365/is\\_n2\\_v41/ai\\_19416332/pg\\_1](http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0365/is_n2_v41/ai_19416332/pg_1)]

Left uncorrected, the trends in American civil-military relations could breed certain pathologies. **The most serious possibility is that of a dramatic civil-military split during a crisis involving the use of force. In the recent past, such tensions did not result in open division;** for example, Franklin Roosevelt insisted that the United States invade North Africa in 1942, though the chiefs of both the army and the navy vigorously opposed such a course, favoring instead a buildup in England and an invasion of the continent in 1943. Back then it was inconceivable that a senior military officer would leak word of such a split to the media, where it would have reverberated loudly and destructively. To be sure, from time to time individual officers broke the vow of professional silence to protest a course of action, but in these isolated cases the officers paid the accepted price of termination of their careers. **In the modern environment, such cases might no longer be isolated.** Thus, **presidents** might **try to shape U.S. strategy so that it complies with military opinion, and rarely** in the annals of statecraft **has military opinion** alone **been an adequate guide to sound foreign policy choices.** Had Lincoln followed the advice of his senior military advisors there is a good chance that the Union would have fallen. Had Roosevelt deferred to General George C. Marshall and Admiral Ernest J. King there might well have been a gory debacle on the shores of France in 1943. **Had** Harry S **Truman heeded the advice of his** theater **commander** in the Far East (and it should be remembered that the Joint Chiefs generally counseled support of the man on the spot) **there might have been a third world war.** Throughout much of its history, the U.S. military was remarkably politicized by contemporary standards. One commander of the army, Winfield Scott, even ran for president while in uniform, and others (Leonard Wood, for example) have made no secret of their political views and aspirations. But until 1940, and with the exception of periods of outright warfare, the military was a negligible force in American life, and America was not a central force in international politics. That has changed. Despite the near halving of the defense budget from its high in the 1980s, it remains a significant portion of the federal budget, and the military continues to employ millions of Americans. More important, **civil-military relations in the United States now** no longer **affect** merely the closet-room politics of Washington, but **the relations of countries around the world. American choices about the use of force, the shrewdness of American strategy, the soundness of American tactics, and the will of American leaders have global consequences. What might have been petty squabbles in bygone years are now magnified into quarrels of a far larger scale,** and conceivably **with far more grievous consequences.** To ignore the problem would neglect one of the cardinal purposes of the federal government: "to provide for the common defense" in a world in which security cannot be taken for granted.

## Mideast War Add-On

### **Instability in Afghanistan spills over to cause Middle East war.**

#### **Watt and Temko, '7**

[Nicholas and Ned Temko, The Observer, 7.15]

Britain's most senior generals have issued a blunt warning to Downing Street that the military campaign in **Afghanistan is facing a catastrophic failure**, a development **that could lead to an Islamist government seizing power in** neighbouring **Pakistan**. Amid fears that London and Washington are taking their eye off Afghanistan as they grapple with Iraq, the generals have told Number 10 that the collapse of the government in Afghanistan, headed by Hamid Karzai, would present a grave threat to the security of Britain. Lord Inge, the former chief of the defence staff, highlighted their fears in public last week when he warned of a 'strategic failure' in Afghanistan. The Observer understands that Inge was speaking with the direct authority of the general staff when he made an intervention in a House of Lords debate. **'The situation in Afghanistan is much worse than many people recognise.'** Inge told peers. 'We need to face up to that issue, the consequence of strategic failure in Afghanistan and what that would mean for Nato... We need to recognise that the situation - in my view, and I have recently been in Afghanistan - is much, much more serious than people want to recognise.' Inge's remarks reflect the fears of serving generals that the government is so overwhelmed by Iraq that it is in danger of losing sight of the threat of failure in Afghanistan. One source, who is familiar with the fears of the senior officers, told The Observer: 'If you talk privately to the generals they are very very worried. You heard it in Inge's speech. Inge said we are failing and remember Inge speaks for the generals.' Inge made a point in the Lords of endorsing a speech by Lord Ashdown, the former Liberal Democrat leader, who painted a bleak picture during the debate. Ashdown told The Observer that Afghanistan presented a graver threat than Iraq. **'The consequences of failure in Afghanistan are far greater than in Iraq,' he said. 'If we fail in Afghanistan then Pakistan goes down. The security problems for Britain would be massively multiplied. I think you could not then stop a widening regional war that would start off in warlordism but it would become essentially a war in the end between Sunni and Shia right across the Middle East.'** 'Mao Zedong used to refer to the First and Second World Wars as the European civil wars. **You can have a regional civil war.** That is what you might begin to see. **It will be catastrophic for Nato.** The damage done to Nato in Afghanistan would be as great as the damage done to the UN in Bosnia. **That could have a severe impact on the Atlantic relationship and maybe even damage the American security guarantee for Europe.'**

#### **That goes nuclear.**

John **Steinbach**, Hiroshima/Nagasaki Peace Committee, March 2002,

<http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/02.03/0331steinbachisraeli.htm>

Meanwhile, the existence of an arsenal of mass destruction in such an unstable region in turn has serious implications for future arms control and disarmament negotiations, and even the threat of nuclear war. Seymour Hersh warns, **"Should war break out in the Middle East again,... or should any Arab nation fire missiles against Israel, as the Iraqis did, a nuclear escalation, once unthinkable except as a last resort, would now be a strong probability."**<sup>(41)</sup> and Ezer Weissman, Israel's current President said **"The nuclear issue is gaining momentum (and the) next war will not be conventional."**<sup>(42)</sup> Russia and before it the Soviet Union has long been a major (if not the major) target of Israeli nukes. It is widely reported that the principal purpose of Jonathan Pollard's spying for Israel was to furnish satellite images of Soviet targets and other super sensitive data relating to U.S. nuclear targeting strategy. <sup>(43)</sup> (Since launching its own satellite in 1988, Israel no longer needs U.S. spy secrets.) Israeli nukes aimed at the Russian heartland seriously complicate disarmament and arms control negotiations and, at the very least, the unilateral possession of nuclear weapons by Israel is enormously destabilizing, and dramatically lowers the threshold for their actual use, if not for all out nuclear war. In the words of Mark Gaffney, "... if the familiar pattern (Israel refining its weapons of mass destruction with U.S. complicity) is not reversed soon - for whatever reason - the **deepening Middle East conflict could trigger a world conflagration.**

## NATO Add-On

### **Instability in Afghanistan destroys credibility NATO.**

#### **Watt and Temko, '7**

[Nicholas and Ned Temko, The Observer, 7.15]

Britain's most senior generals have issued a blunt warning to Downing Street that the military campaign in Afghanistan is facing a catastrophic failure, a development that could lead to an Islamist government seizing power in neighbouring Pakistan. Amid fears that London and Washington are taking their eye off Afghanistan as they grapple with Iraq, the generals have told Number 10 that the collapse of the government in Afghanistan, headed by Hamid Karzai, would present a grave threat to the security of Britain. Lord Inge, the former chief of the defence staff, highlighted their fears in public last week when he warned of a 'strategic failure' in Afghanistan. The Observer understands that Inge was speaking with the direct authority of the general staff when he made an intervention in a House of Lords debate. **'The situation in Afghanistan is much worse than many people recognise.'** Inge told peers. 'We need to face up to that issue, the consequence of strategic failure in Afghanistan and what that would mean for Nato... We need to recognise that the situation - in my view, and I have recently been in Afghanistan - is much, much more serious than people want to recognise.' Inge's remarks reflect the fears of serving generals that the government is so overwhelmed by Iraq that it is in danger of losing sight of the threat of failure in Afghanistan. One source, who is familiar with the fears of the senior officers, told The Observer: 'If you talk privately to the generals they are very very worried. You heard it in Inge's speech. Inge said we are failing and remember Inge speaks for the generals.' Inge made a point in the Lords of endorsing a speech by Lord Ashdown, the former Liberal Democrat leader, who painted a bleak picture during the debate. Ashdown told The Observer that Afghanistan presented a graver threat than Iraq. **'The consequences of failure in Afghanistan are far greater than in Iraq,' he said. 'If we fail in Afghanistan then Pakistan goes down. The security problems for Britain would be massively multiplied. I think you could not then stop a widening regional war that would start off in warlordism but it would become essentially a war in the end between Sunni and Shia right across the Middle East.'** 'Mao Zedong used to refer to the First and Second World Wars as the European civil wars. **You can have a regional civil war.** That is what you might begin to see. **It will be catastrophic for Nato.** The damage done to Nato in Afghanistan would be as great as the damage done to the UN in Bosnia. **That could have a severe impact on the Atlantic relationship and maybe even damage the American security guarantee for Europe.'**

### **Preserving NATO is key to avert multiple scenarios of nuclear war.**

#### **Duffield '94**

(John, Assistant Prof Government and Foreign Affairs – U Virginia, Political Science Quarterly, "NATO'S Functions After the Cold War", Vol. 109, No. 5)

Initial analyses of NATO's future prospects overlooked at least three important factors that have helped to ensure the alliance's enduring relevance. First, they underestimated the extent to which **external threats** sufficient to help **justify the preservation of the alliance** would continue to exist. In fact, NATO still serves to secure its members against a number of actual or potential dangers emanating from outside their territory. **These include not only** the residual threat posed by **Russian military power, but** also the relatively new concerns raised by **conflicts in neighboring regions.** Second, the **pessimists failed to consider NATO's** capacity for **institutional adaptation.** Since the end of the cold war, the alliance has begun to develop two important new functions. **NATO is** increasingly seen as having a significant role to play in **containing and controlling** militarized **conflicts in Central and Eastern Europe.** And, at a deeper level, **it works to prevent such conflicts from arising** at all by actively promoting stability within the former Soviet bloc. Above all, NATO pessimists overlooked the valuable intra-alliance functions that the alliance has always performed and that remain relevant after the cold war. Most importantly, NATO has helped stabilize Western Europe, whose states had often been bitter rivals in the past. By damping the security dilemma and providing an institutional mechanism for the development of common security policies, **NATO has contributed to making the use of force in** relations among the countries of **the region virtually inconceivable.** In all these ways, NATO clearly serves the interests of its European members. But even the United States has a significant stake in preserving a peaceful and prosperous Europe. In addition to strong transatlantic historical and cultural ties, American economic interests in Europe - as a leading market for U.S. products, as a source of valuable imports, and as the host for considerable direct foreign investment by American companies - remain substantial. If history is any guide, moreover, **the United States could easily be drawn into a future major war in Europe, the consequences of which would likely be even more devastating than those of the past, given the existence of nuclear weapons.**

**\*\*\* Drugs Adv**

## Counter-Narcotics = Bigger Industry

**Counter-insurgency enlarges the drug economy.**

**Center on International Cooperation, June 2010** ["Drug Production and Trafficking, Counterdrug Policies, and Security and Governance in Afghanistan," NYU Center on International Cooperation, available at: <http://www.cic.nyu.edu/>]

The analysis by Caulkins et al. shows that the existing drug policy regime places us in a bind. Any feasible level of enforcement in Afghanistan tends to enlarge the size of the opium economy and privilege violent actors of one sort or another. There are alternatives to the drug economy, but as long as the global demand remains and no other potential producer state displaces Afghanistan, the drug economy will likely mutate around Afghanistan, and no "counter-narcotics" policies focused solely on Afghanistan can affect it.

**\*\*\*Government Credibility Adv**

## Corruption Kills Government

**Corruption destroys government support.**

**Caulkins, Kleiman, and Kulick, June 2010** [Jonathan P. Caulkins, Mark A.R. Kleiman, Jonathan D. Kulick, Caulkins is a professor of operations research and public policy at Carnegie Mellon University, Kleiman is a professor of public policy at the UCLA school of public affairs, and Kulick is the Director of studies at the Georgia Foundation of Strategic and International Studies, ["Drug Production and Trafficking, Counterdrug Policies, and Security and Governance in Afghanistan," NYU Center on International Cooperation, available at: <http://www.cic.nyu.edu/>]

**Corruption creates several different kinds of problems. Corrupt officials may be less diligent, even on matters where they are not paid for malfeasance, than honest officials would be. And the money from corruption can flow up the chain from officials to those who appoint them, in effect closing off the path to public service to those unwilling to channel cash to their superiors** and helping to extend corruption further into important decision-making processes. **Moreover, the reputation for corruption saps public support for the government, especially when it is believed—rightly or wrongly—that some competing power centers are more** nearly **honest** than the lawful government.

## Corruption Bad

**Corruption destroys the government at all levels.**

**Caulkins, Kleiman, and Kulick, June 2010** [Jonathan P. Caulkins, Mark A.R. Kleiman, Jonathan D. Kulick, Caulkins is a professor of operations research and public policy at Carnegie Mellon University, Kleiman is a professor of public policy at the UCLA school of public affairs, and Kulick is the Director of studies at the Georgia Foundation of Strategic and International Studies, ["Drug Production and Trafficking, Counterdrug Policies, and Security and Governance in Afghanistan," NYU Center on International Cooperation, available at: <http://www.cic.nyu.edu/>]

**The legally recognized government of Afghanistan has limited capacities** to enforce its will on the nation. The central government has no meaningful control over large sections of the country, including insurgent-held areas and nominally loyal areas under the sway of the leaders of localized armed political groups, often referred to as "warlords." Much of the functional governance activity at the local level is informal, conducted neither by well-defined entities with local sovereignty (as in a federal republic) nor by administrative departments accountable to Kabul, but by traditional kin-group structures. Local, tribal, and ethnic identities—sometimes lumped together as "valleyism"—compete with the nation in defining the loyalties of individuals and families. Moreover, **corruption constitutes a limit on capacity at both national and local levels; Transparency International places Afghanistan among the five most corrupt countries in the world.**<sup>15</sup>



## Corruption = Vital Internal Link

**Successfully combating corruption is key to the success of ALL OTHER military and development initiatives.**

**Motlagh, 2007**

[Jason, Deputy Foreign Editor at United Press International, "Reform and Function: Rebuilding Afghanistan won't be possible without efforts to keep corruption in check." American Prospect, February 15, [http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=reform\\_and\\_function](http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=reform_and_function)]

In the shadow of the Iraq enterprise, **Taliban insurgents in Afghanistan have mounted a brazen comeback** that is expected to escalate this year. They are convinced that a sustained, low-intensity campaign will eventually triumph over the wandering Western attention span. Washington has moved to compensate, promising \$8.6 billion for security and another \$2 billion for development. This is a significant boost, considering that Afghanistan has received less aid per capita than any other recent post-conflict state undergoing reconstruction. But lackluster U.S.-led efforts deserve only part of the blame. **Today it is no secret that systemic corruption plagues the Afghan government, from top to bottom. Without serious institutional reform** in Kabul, Washington's shotgun **attempt to secure the country with another kind of surge may instead only fuel the popular discontent on which the Taliban trades.** With billions more American taxpayer dollars now in the pipeline: U.S. and European officials have conceded that at least half of all Western aid does not reach those who need it. Between 2002 and 2005, the U.S. Agency for International Development spent over \$3.5 billion on sectors ranging from infrastructure to agriculture, but former Interior Minister Ali Jalali estimates that only 30 percent was ultimately spent on aid projects. Meanwhile, President Hamid Karzai's Anti- and Bribery Office has been operating for over two years with a staff of some 140 people, and has yet to obtain a single conviction. One need look no further than the streets of Kabul for evidence of high-level graft, where incongruously lavish homes equipped with generators interrupt otherwise drab neighborhoods beset by rolling electrical blackouts. One Afghan minister told me off-the-record on a recent trip that **everyone inside the system knows whose hands are sticky in the booming drug trade** -- but to break ranks and name names poses too grave a risk. The Afghan government's ability to siphon foreign aid money pales next to the stakes members have in the country's top export. **Last year, Afghanistan boasted a record poppy harvest that accounted for 90 percent of heroin on the global market** -- and at least 50 percent of gross domestic product. **This increase came despite a heavy-handed eradication campaign,** initiated at Washington's command, that failed to cut back production. **What it did instead was push scores of farmers with no viable alternative into the arms of the Taliban.** A damning new World Bank report says razing crops in one area typically precipitates growth elsewhere; and a comeback usually occurs at any rate once authorities have moved on to other pastures. Government graft has further undercut efforts to combat opium production, according to the report, allowing politically connected traffickers to profit from higher demand. So lucrative is the industry that a number of crooked officials are known to have forged alliances of convenience with anti-government elements. **Drug-related corruption is most problematic** at the district level. Police chief posts in poppy-growing districts with \$60 a month salary are said to have gone to bidders paying as much as \$100,000. Officials then extract heavy bribes from wealthier producers to turn their backs, while poorer farmers are forced into debt once their crops are destroyed by anti-drug teams. In some cases, farmers must replant poppies to pay outstanding debts; in others, officials on the take have been known to drive out competing cartels in exchange for kickbacks. "Money put into [poppy eradication] so far has been thrown away," Robert Templar, Asia Program director for the International Crisis Group (ICG), told the Prospect. In the absence of viable alternatives, the drug trade "an enormous, almost insoluble problem, and remain absolutely corrosive to efforts to build up institutions." As a result, the Karzai government now faces a crisis of legitimacy. According to the largest-ever opinion survey finance by the USAID, one-fifth fewer Afghans now believe the country is moving in the right direction compared to those polled after the 2004 elections. -- was cited as one of the top grievances against the state among those polled. The degree of mistrust is especially troublesome in the south, where NATO forces this past summer fought battalion-sized Taliban units. British Commander General David Roberts figures that up to 70 percent of the population in that region is "on the fence" over whether to support the Taliban or the government. Not surprisingly, violence was worst last year in Helmand province, home to 42 percent of the country's total poppy cultivation. Drug cartels operate with impunity in the region, giving a cut of profits to Taliban commanders in exchange for protection, which in turn allows them to pay militants about four times what Afghan national army troops earn. Farmers, already lacking government support, stand to make more than six times what they receive for crops like wheat. If any rehabilitation of the Afghan government -- and by extension, a reversal of the deteriorating state of security -- will happen, it must start at the top. The Interior Ministry, responsible for appointing police and other administrative posts throughout the country, is an ill-reputed bastion of corrupt leadership. Under pressure, the government has set up an internal mechanism to filter appointees. Yet it will prove difficult to find and sustain decent candidates on a meager salary when they are faced with the constant temptation of easy drug profits and the threat of a gathering insurgency. Still, an overhaul of the ministry is critical, and could be part of a broader Karzai-led initiative to meet international standards of transparency as required by the Afghanistan Compact. The ICG has recommended requiring officials to declare annual assets, whereupon they are reviewed by the national assembly and made available to the public; they also suggest a monthly presidential review of efforts with the heads of anti- agencies and legal action when necessary, without regard to status. To kick off a serious reform effort, an anti- drive might involve the high-profile prosecution of a few marquee offenders to send a loud statement that a new policy is in effect. This would then reshuffle district police and administrative officials that are loathed for their predatory ways. Afghanistan's highly centralized system has to date hindered integration efforts at the provincial level; in terms of vetting officials in the seat of power, this may prove to be an advantage. One concern is that some officials are ex-warlords with large followings that Karzai has reluctantly appeased with high posts to ensure the government remains intact. However, the head of the state anti- department argues that making an example of the corrupt "will not undercut but strengthen, like removing the dead leaves." Before this can take place, real judicial reform must be pursued. Frustration over corrupt courts throughout the country has led some tribal leaders to demand a return to strict Islamic law, or sharia. According to Barnett Rubin, an Afghan expert at New York University, "Enforcement by the government of the decisions of Islamic courts has always constituted a basic pillar of the state's legitimacy in Afghanistan, and the failure to do so is turning religious leaders ... against the government." Some Afghans cite the 1996-2001 Taliban reign as a harsh but effective period of justice. A new Supreme Court was sworn in last August, but it will take many years to train and staff the legal system. In the meantime, the government might try and find ways to better integrate customary judicial practices, with some sort of oversight mechanism, in order to connect influential religious leaders to the center. **The drug problem needs to be dealt with in concert with institutional reform, but not in such a way that undermines stability in the country.** More should be spent on targeting drug trafficking networks that operate with impunity in lawless areas, rather than a Columbia-style counter-narcotics policy that hits desperate farmers the hardest. Eradication programs that do continue should meanwhile be focused on areas where the poor have other economic options. "Efforts to discourage farmers from planting opium poppy should be concentrated in localities where land, water, and access to markets are such that alternative livelihoods are already available," says Alastair McKechnie, World Bank Country Director for Afghanistan. To his credit, President Karzai appears to have recognized that dogged anti-drug measures are backfiring. He announced last month that this year's poppy crop -- due to be harvested in two months -- would not be chemically sprayed. Rebuilding Afghanistan was never going to be a turn-key affair, and will demand time, patience, and lots of money. The Bush administration handicapped the project early on by going for "a quick, cheap war followed by a quick, cheap peace," the ICG reports, diverting critical resources and manpower to Iraq. Even under the recent U.S. commitment, security spending trumps development 4-to-1, when the former largely depends on the latter. But the country's fate is not a lost cause, yet. Billions in aid pledges, coupled with the appointment of an American 4-star general to head up international security forces, at least suggests the United States has made Afghanistan a long-term strategic priority; it remains to be seen if it will be long enough. Reform is a critical first step to improve the odds. **The Taliban grows stronger by the day,** but counter-insurgency strategists still make the mistake of overwhelmingly focusing on ways to combat militants, at a time when what is needed is to salvage the public confidence that will ultimately decide the country's outcome. **Disillusioned people in the backcountry must be won over.** And this is not going to happen when the average Afghani lives on less than \$200 a year, while many officials get richer at their expense. **Fundamental institutional change would mean that now-skeptical foreign donors would become more likely to contribute to Afghan reconstruction in the decades ahead. More importantly, it would allow frustrated Afghans to finally accept the rule of law enforced by a government deserving of their trust.**

## Strong Central Government Key

**Central government legitimacy is vital to all other reconstruction efforts.**

**Robichaud '06**

(Carl, Program Officer, The Century Foundation, "Donor Promises and Afghan Realities", 2-3, <http://www.tcf.org/list.asp?type=NC&pubid=1204>)

**Afghanistan's problems are a symptom of a single key issue: the nation's government is exceedingly weak, over-centralized, and incapable** of providing security, collecting taxes, or delivering services, especially in the provinces where people need them most. **This is a big reason the Taliban are stronger today than at any point** since they were ousted. Strongmen, smugglers, and narcotics traffickers have

consolidated their fiefdoms and used September elections to further entrench themselves. **Reconstruction and economic growth have been confined** to a few urban areas and Afghans continue to experience some of the worst poverty and health standards in the world. Before the conference, Rice had promised "a significant new contribution to Afghan development" but in London it became clear that no increase was planned: the \$1.1 billion in development assistance proposed for next year is the same amount the United States gave last year. There may still be time to correct the course, but donors will need to boost their aid dramatically and make the development of Afghan capacities their top priority.

**Reconstructing a fractured society is a monumental task which requires** substantial resources and **an approach that balances security and development.**

A RAND study, which cites per capita aid flows in the early years of nation-building, is illustrative: relative successes were achieved in Bosnia (\$679 per capita), Kosovo (\$526), and East Timor (\$233). On the other side of the coin is Afghanistan, which received a scant \$57 per capita. The two previous donor conferences (2002 in Tokyo and 2004 in Berlin) delivered less than half of the \$28 billion promised, and of that only \$4 billion went to rebuilding projects. (During this period, drug revenues overshadowed reconstruction funds by a two-to-one margin, tilting power further toward criminals and strongmen.) Could donors have afforded to bring Afghan funding out of the cellar? The irony here is that there was significant money being spent in Afghanistan—it was just going toward a narrow but expensive military campaign against the Taliban and al Qaeda. Experts warned that Afghanistan could not be stabilized without sufficient reconstruction aid or provincial security, but the administration preferred to restrict its engagement and to focus its efforts through the Pentagon. Since 2001, according to the Congressional Research Service, the United States allocated \$66.5 billion dollars to the Department of Defense—more than ten times U.S. combined spending (\$5.7 billion) on reconstruction, humanitarian aid, economic assistance, and training for Afghan security forces. **Every initiative, from counterterrorism**

**to counternarcotics, from human rights to girls' education, is contingent upon strengthening the Afghan**

**state.** The plan to rebuild the Afghan national army to 70,000 troops and the police force to 62,000, for example, is only realistic if the Afghan government dramatically increases revenues—after all, armed men are only "security forces" when they receive salaries. Yet billions are funneled to security forces even as programs to expand the economy and strengthen the government's anemic tax-collection are shortchanged. Major counternarcotics spending will go to waste without realistic investments in legal reform and alternative livelihoods. Elections, on which hundreds of millions were spent, will prove meaningless unless elected officials, including those in the provinces, can deliver services to their constituents. The London Conference was a critical opportunity for donors to right their course, and they did, in principle, put the Afghan government in the driver's seat by focusing on a national development strategy that reflects Afghan priorities. But the moment of truth will come when it's time to honor these pledges and fully support the priorities of the Afghan people. It will take a paradigm shift, for example, to phase out a distribution system that undermines the government by channeling three-quarters of aid through outside contractors and NGOs. Despite its many problems, Afghanistan has come a long way in four years, and a timely investment could help it to harness a skilled diaspora, favorable trade location, and competitive investment climate to achieve strong economic growth. The planned

NATO expansion could provide a transformative boost in security. But **unless current trends are reversed, Afghanistan's future may well be governed by narcotics traffickers and militia leaders, many of whom subscribe to the same ideology of radical Islam as the Taliban and al Qaeda. If so, the United States will have won every military battle and still lost the war.**

## Pakistani Coup → Russia/China/US War

**Afghani government collapse triggers regional conflagration and ignites US/Russia/China tension.**

**Morgan '07**

[Stephen John, Former Member of British Labour Party Executive Committee, "Better another Taliban Afghanistan, than a Taliban NUCLEAR Pakistan!?" <http://www.electricarticles.com/display.aspx?id=639>]

However events may prove him sorely wrong. Indeed, his policy could completely backfire upon him. As the war intensifies, he has no guarantees that the current autonomy may yet burgeon into a separatist movement. Appetite comes with eating, as they say. Moreover, should the Taliban fail to re-conquer all of Afghanistan, as looks likely, but captures at least half of the country, then a Taliban Pashtun caliphate could be established which would act as a magnet to separatist Pashtuns in Pakistan. Then, **the likely break up of Afghanistan along ethnic lines, could, indeed, lead the way to the break up of Pakistan,** as well. **Strong centrifugal forces have always bedevilled the stability and unity of Pakistan, and, in the context of the new world situation, the country could be faced with civil wars and popular fundamentalist uprisings,** probably **including a military-fundamentalist coup d'état.** Fundamentalism is deeply rooted in Pakistan society. The fact that in the year following 9/11, the most popular name given to male children born that year was "Osama" (not a Pakistani name) is a small indication of the mood. **Given the weakening base of the traditional, secular opposition parties, conditions would be ripe** for a coup d'état by the fundamentalist wing of the Army and ISI, leaning on the radicalised masses to take power. Some form of radical, military Islamic regime, where legal powers would shift to Islamic courts and forms of sharia law would be likely. Although, even then, this might not take place outside of a protracted crisis of upheaval and civil war conditions, **mixing fundamentalist movements with nationalist uprisings and sectarian violence** between the Sunni and minority Shia populations. The nightmare that is now Iraq would take on gothic proportions across the continent. The prophesy of an arc of civil war over Lebanon, Palestine and Iraq would spread to south Asia, stretching from Pakistan to Palestine, through Afghanistan into Iraq and up to the Mediterranean coast. Undoubtedly, **this would also spill over into India** both with regards to the Muslim community and Kashmir. **Border clashes,** terrorist attacks, sectarian pogroms and insurgency **would break out.** A new war, and possibly **nuclear war,** between Pakistan and India **could no be ruled out.** Atomic Al Qaeda Should Pakistan break down completely, a Taliban-style government with strong Al Qaeda influence is a real possibility. **Such deep chaos would,** of course, **open a "Pandora's box" for the region and the world.** **With the possibility of unstable clerical and military fundamentalist elements being in control of the Pakistan nuclear arsenal,** not only their **use against** India, but **Israel becomes a possibility,** as well as the acquisition of nuclear and other deadly weapons secrets by Al Qaeda. Invading Pakistan would not be an option for America. Therefore a nuclear war would now again become a real strategic possibility. This would bring a shift in the tectonic plates of global relations. **It could usher in a new Cold War with China and Russia pitted against the US.**

**Extinction – most probable scenario.**

Nick **Bostrum**, PhD Philosophy – Oxford U., Existential Risks, 2002, <http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html>

**A much greater existential risk emerged with the build-up of nuclear arsenals in the US and the USSR. An all-out nuclear war was a possibility with both a substantial probability and with consequences** that might have been persistent enough **to qualify as global and terminal.** There was a real worry among those best acquainted with the information available at the time that **a nuclear Armageddon would occur and that it might annihilate our species or permanently destroy human civilization.**[4] **Russia and the US retain large nuclear arsenals that could be used in a future confrontation,** either accidentally or deliberately. There is also a risk that other states may one day build up large nuclear arsenals. **Note however that a smaller nuclear exchange,** between India and Pakistan for instance, **is not an existential risk, since it would not destroy or thwart humankind's potential permanently.** Such a war might however be a local terminal risk for the cities most likely to be targeted. Unfortunately, we shall see that nuclear Armageddon and comet or asteroid strikes are mere preludes to the existential risks that we will encounter in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

# **\*\*SOLVENCY\*\***

## Plan Solves Opium

**Stabilization first allows opium to be solved in the long run.**

### **Brands, 2010**

[Hal, Defense analyst in Washington, "Book Reviews: Shooting Up: Counter-Insurgency and the War on Drugs," [http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/item/2010/0103/book/book\\_brands\\_shooting.html](http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/item/2010/0103/book/book_brands_shooting.html)]

Felbab-Brown proposes several alternative strategies. She lays out steps that might, in certain conditions, make more political sense in a counter-insurgency context (such as licensing production of poppies or coca leaves). She also proposes ideas (such as weakening the coercive and corruptive power of criminal groups) that are eminently reasonable, if easier said than done. But her most important recommendation relates to what governments shouldn't do: namely, that **attacking the drug trade may have to be delayed until the conflict has effectively been won militarily. Only then, when the insurgency is defeated and the government can focus its energies on alternative development programs, will eradication initiatives be successful.**

**\*\*2AC's\*\***

## A2: “But it worked in \_\_\_\_\_”

### **Limited gains in counter-narcotics aren’t generalizable – only make poppy production more profitable elsewhere in Afghanistan.**

**Caulkins, Kleiman, and Kulick, June 2010** [Jonathan P. Caulkins, Mark A.R. Kleiman, Jonathan D. Kulick, Caulkins is a professor of operations research and public policy at Carnegie Mellon University, Kleiman is a professor of public policy at the UCLA school of public affairs, and Kulick is the Director of studies at the Georgia Foundation of Strategic and International Studies, [“Drug Production and Trafficking, Counterdrug Policies, and Security and Governance in Afghanistan,” NYU Center on International Cooperation, available at: <http://www.cic.nyu.edu/>]

An anonymous reviewer questioned the assumption that “price is king,” arguing that the cost of opiate production is not just an economic cost dependent on factors of production, but an overall cost that includes security, corruption, and other overhead costs. Consequently, **the drug economy can be and has been eliminated from whole areas or provinces by improvements in security, governance, and other economic opportunity**, even if opiate production would earn more money. **This line of argument is valid** as far as it goes – opium poppy cultivation can be eliminated from regions or provinces without providing another crop offering the same gross revenues per hectare. A comparison of the cost and benefits of opiate production, whether between two jurisdictions to determine comparative advantage, or between opiate production and another activity, must include on the cost side both the conventionally calculated cost of the factors of production and the additional costs imposed by criminality, such as protection payments, risk of punishment, and insecurity. Therefore overall improvements in security and economic opportunity can lead to a decline of illicit activities, even if the licit activities are not equally profitable in a purely monetary sense. **It does not follow, however, that one can generalize from successes in some regions of Afghanistan to the entire country. Such a generalization may entail a fallacy of composition, a logical error defined as inferring the characteristics of the whole from the characteristics of a part. Elimination of cultivation and associated activity in part of the country will lead to an increase in prices that will eventually make production profitable somewhere else. Under current conditions, that place is likely to be another part of Afghanistan** for the following reasons: • **Global demand for an addictive product remains relatively inelastic with respect to price, so short-term price increases due to suppression of production will not reduce demand**; demand is likely to remain at or close to current levels. Heroin and the raw materials required for its production, including raw opium, will continue to be produced in sufficient quantity to meet demand – as the authors note, **“the question is where—not whether— illegal opiates will be produced to meet this demand.”** • **Production and trade in heroin remains a crime. Consequently, the location of production will be determined by a combination of comparative advantage and the presence of social capital in criminal or illicit networks.** • **The effectiveness of criminal law enforcement remains variable among jurisdictions, both among and within states. Insecure environments in which state authority is contested and geographically limited provides a relatively permissive environment for large-scale illicit activities**, including drug production. **Afghanistan, for now, has an insuperable comparative advantage over all other countries in both the conventional cost of production of heroin and opiates and the low cost of evading or blocking law enforcement**; therefore, for the foreseeable future, the global production of heroin and opiates will be concentrated in Afghanistan. This will change only when either another country becomes a low-cost (in all senses) center of production or Afghanistan develops sufficiently economically or politically so that it raises costs of the factors of production as well as of evading or defying law enforcement above potential competitors. **Therefore counter-narcotics policy in Afghanistan alone may move production around Afghanistan – to relatively more insecure areas – but cannot sustainably decrease the size of the opiate industry in the country.** This was demonstrated during the 2000-2001 ban on poppy cultivation. The Taliban stopped poppy cultivation when the price was \$40-\$60/kg; under political pressure the next year and facing prices of \$400-\$600/kg, they rescinded the ban. By that time, however, almost nobody supported them against the pro-drug dealing warlords aligned with the United States and its coalition allies. The locus of production moved to the territory controlled by the warlords.

## A2: Alternate Livelihoods Good

**Taxation offsets alternate livelihood benefits so they don't work as subsidies.**

**Caulkins, Kleiman, and Kulick, June 2010** [Jonathan P. Caulkins, Mark A.R. Kleiman, Jonathan D. Kulick, Caulkins is a professor of operations research and public policy at Carnegie Mellon University, Kleiman is a professor of public policy at the UCLA school of public affairs, and Kulick is the Director of studies at the Georgia Foundation of Strategic and International Studies, ["Drug Production and Trafficking, Counterdrug Policies, and Security and Governance in Afghanistan," NYU Center on International Cooperation, available at: <http://www.cic.nyu.edu/>]

**That alternative livelihood programs directly fund the insurgency via taxation – the fourth conclusion – was confirmed in Zhari** district, Kandahar, in April 2010. According to press reports, **US troops in Zhari wanted to refurbish an irrigation canal** in the village of Senjaray. The elders finally agreed, but only after they went to Quetta to clear the project with the Taliban leadership. **The Taliban approved the project on the condition that the elders pay them 50 percent of the wages the United States would pay.**<sup>2</sup> The example underscores that, **although U.S. COIN doctrine in practice equates control of territory with control over population, NATO forces can "clear" territory without gaining control over the population, which still fears the Taliban enough to pay taxes.**

**Plan will overemphasize wheat – won't solve, job creation.**

**Berger, 2010**

[Matthew, staff writer at IPS, "U.S. Taking New Tack on Afghan Poppies," <http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=50112>]

**"A good policy requires** not just the right strategies – which I think we're about to have – but also **adaptability**," she said. **Felbab-Brown has specific concerns about some of the operational aspects.** In order to encourage a move away from poppy cultivation, **the U.S. has tried to distribute wheat** seeds to farmers in Afghanistan, but Felbab-Brown says **there has been an overemphasis on wheat, which requires one-tenth the labour required for poppy** cultivation, as a replacement crop. **Encouraging other crops that, like poppies, are high in value and labour-intensiveness – such as fruits, nuts and vegetables – would be much better** for rural development in Afghanistan, she says. **Quite simply the opium trade in Afghanistan today provides jobs and these jobs go far beyond cultivation; we have to understand that,"** explains Chamberlain. She contends that **any counter-narcotics strategy has to focus on job creation. Suppressing the drug trade through forced eradication therefore allows belligerents** – in Afghanistan and elsewhere – **to pick up political capital** and legitimacy in the eyes of the poor, Felbab-Brown argues in her book. **This makes the population unwilling to deliver intelligence on those belligerent groups,** among other negative side effects. **This problem** of political capital going to insurgents **is "particularly pernicious for illicit economies that are labor-intensive and where country is poor,"** she said Monday.



## A2: Corruption Assistance CP

**Anti-corruption efforts fail unless CN is banned.**

**Caulkins, Kleiman, and Kulick, June 2010** [Jonathan P. Caulkins, Mark A.R. Kleiman, Jonathan D. Kulick, Caulkins is a professor of operations research and public policy at Carnegie Mellon University, Kleiman is a professor of public policy at the UCLA school of public affairs, and Kulick is the Director of studies at the Georgia Foundation of Strategic and International Studies, ["Drug Production and Trafficking, Counterdrug Policies, and Security and Governance in Afghanistan," NYU Center on International Cooperation, available at: <http://www.cic.nyu.edu/>]

**While anticorruption efforts can help counter-narcotics enforcement efforts, the converse is less likely to be the case. The greater the enforcement pressure, the greater the benefits enforcement officials can confer on traffickers by turning a blind eye to their activities and by interfering with the activities of their competitors.**<sup>42</sup> (Again, as with traffickers' profits, this is true under the conditions that we believe obtain in Afghanistan; if enforcement were perfect, then there would be no opportunity for corruption.) If enforcement is to be stepped up, the need for better-trained, better-disciplined, and better-paid counter-narcotics police becomes all the greater. **The fact that honest drug-law enforcement relies heavily on information from some participants in the illicit traffic to make cases against other participants—including competitors informing on one another to achieve competitive advantage—makes it all the more difficult for officials running anticorruption efforts to distinguish honest from corrupt enforcement activity.**

## A2: Counter-Narcotics Good

**Their argument puts the cart before the horse – strong central government is vital to all other reconstruction, including successful counter-narcotics.**

### **Robichaud '06**

(Carl, Program Officer, The Century Foundation, “Donor Promises and Afghan Realities”, 2-3, <http://www.tcf.org/list.asp?type=NC&pubid=1204>)

**Afghanistan’s problems are a symptom of a single key issue: the nation’s government is exceedingly weak, over-centralized, and incapable** of providing security, collecting taxes, or delivering services, especially in the provinces where people need them most. **This is a big reason the Taliban are stronger today than at any point** since they were ousted. Strongmen, smugglers, and narcotics traffickers have

consolidated their fiefdoms and used September elections to further entrench themselves. **Reconstruction and economic growth have been confined** to a few urban areas and Afghans continue to experience some of the worst poverty and health standards in the world. Before the conference, Rice had promised “a significant new contribution to Afghan development” but in London it became clear that no increase was planned: the \$1.1 billion in development assistance proposed for next year is the same amount the United States gave last year. There may still be time to correct the course, but donors will need to boost their aid dramatically and make the development of Afghan capacities their top priority.

**Reconstructing a fractured society is a monumental task which requires** substantial resources and **an approach that balances security and development**.

A RAND study, which cites per capita aid flows in the early years of nation-building, is illustrative: relative successes were achieved in Bosnia (\$679 per capita), Kosovo (\$526), and East Timor (\$233). On the other side of the coin is Afghanistan, which received a scant \$57 per capita. The two previous donor conferences (2002 in Tokyo and 2004 in Berlin) delivered less than half of the \$28 billion promised, and of that only \$4 billion went to rebuilding projects. (During this period, drug revenues overshadowed reconstruction funds by a two-to-one margin, tilting power further toward criminals and strongmen.) Could donors have afforded to bring Afghan funding out of the cellar? The irony here is that there was significant money being spent in Afghanistan—it was just going toward a narrow but expensive military campaign against the Taliban and al Qaeda. Experts warned that Afghanistan could not be stabilized without sufficient reconstruction aid or provincial security, but the administration preferred to restrict its engagement and to focus its efforts through the Pentagon. Since 2001, according to the Congressional Research Service, the United States allocated \$66.5 billion dollars to the Department of Defense—more than ten times U.S. combined

spending (\$5.7 billion) on reconstruction, humanitarian aid, economic assistance, and training for Afghan security forces. **Every initiative, from counterterrorism to counternarcotics, from human rights to girls’ education, is contingent upon strengthening the Afghan**

**state**. The plan to rebuild the Afghan national army to 70,000 troops and the police force to 62,000, for example, is only realistic if the Afghan government dramatically increases revenues—after all, armed men are only “security forces” when they receive salaries. Yet billions are funneled to security forces even as programs to expand the economy and strengthen the government’s anemic tax-collection are shortchanged. Major counternarcotics spending will go to waste without realistic investments in legal reform and alternative livelihoods. Elections, on which hundreds of millions were spent, will prove meaningless unless elected officials, including those in the provinces, can deliver services to their constituents. The London Conference was a critical opportunity for donors to right their course, and they did, in principle, put the Afghan government in the driver’s seat by focusing on a national development strategy that reflects Afghan priorities. But the moment of truth will come when it’s time to honor these pledges and fully support the priorities of the Afghan people. It will take a paradigm shift, for example, to phase out a distribution system that undermines the government by channeling three-quarters of aid through outside contractors and NGOs. Despite its many problems, Afghanistan has come a long way in four years, and a timely investment could help it to harness a skilled diaspora, favorable trade location, and competitive investment climate to achieve strong economic growth. The planned

NATO expansion could provide a transformative boost in security. But **unless current trends are reversed, Afghanistan’s future may well be governed by narcotics traffickers and militia leaders, many of whom subscribe to the same ideology of radical Islam as the Taliban and al Qaeda. If so, the United States will have won every military battle and still lost the war.**

### **Eradication fails – 3 reasons**

#### **The Senlis Council, 2k6**

[The Senlis Council is an international policy think tank with offices in Kabul, London, Paris, Brussels, Ottawa and Rio. The Council’s work encompasses foreign policy, security, development and counter-narcotics policies and aims to provide innovative analysis and proposals within these areas, “Afghanistan Five Years Later: The Return of the Taliban,” Spring/Summer 2006,

[http://www.senliscouncil.net/modules/publications/014\\_publication/documents/5y\\_chapter\\_03](http://www.senliscouncil.net/modules/publications/014_publication/documents/5y_chapter_03)]

As a drug-supply reduction tool, eradication has three main weaknesses. **First, without sustainable and competitive alternatives** already in place, **eradication has grave implications on poppy-reliant rural economies. Afghanistan’s extreme and deeply entrenched poverty generates** and maintains **the need for poppy** cultivation. As such, the impact of eradication is felt most acutely by the most impoverished elements in Afghan society, namely, resource-poor farmers and labourers. **Another major weakness of eradication is that it tends to force farm-gate prices to rise, which in turn creates strong incentives for farmers to continue cultivating opium poppy whilst also attracting newcomers to the industry.** **Further, successful eradication**, in terms of decreasing the areas of cultivated poppy, **depends heavily on local government and other local power-holders. Yet in Afghanistan these powerholders are often either linked to the illegal opium economy, or lack the credibility necessary to effectively influence** farmers’ communities and **farmers’ behaviour.**

## A2: Counter-Narcotics Good

### **Opium production is inevitable, localizing it Afghanistan allows for regulatory policies Nadelmann, 2k7**

[Ethan Nadelmann is executive director of the Drug Policy Alliance and co-author of Policing the Globe: Criminalization and Crime Control in International Relations, "Let Afghanistan Grow the World's Opium Supply," AlterNet, August 31, 2007, <http://www.alternet.org/story/61144/>]

Or, given that **farmers are going to produce opium -- somehow, somewhere -- so long as the global demand for heroin persists,** maybe **the world is better off,** all things considered, **with** 90 percent of **it coming from Afghanistan.** Think of international drug control as a global vice control challenge, and the opium growing regions of the country as the equivalent of a "red light" zone. **The United States, NATO and the Karzai government could then focus on "regulating" the illicit market** and manipulating the participants **with the objective of advancing broader political and economic objectives.** They might even find ways to tax the illicit trade.

### **Even if we destroyed all of Afghanistan's opium, the problem can only get worse Nadelmann, 2k7**

[Ethan Nadelmann is executive director of the Drug Policy Alliance and co-author of Policing the Globe: Criminalization and Crime Control in International Relations, "Let Afghanistan Grow the World's Opium Supply," AlterNet, August 31, 2007, <http://www.alternet.org/story/61144/>]

But **imagine if the entire crop could be eliminated by a natural disaster** such as a drought or blight. **The United States, NATO and the Karzai government would be blameless** -- although no doubt many Afghans would blame the CIA -- a reasonable suspicion given support in some U.S. circles for researching and employing biological warfare in the form of mycoherbicides. **The Taliban would suffer** doubly, losing both revenue and political advantage. And the United States and NATO could follow up emergency assistance with investment in alternative agriculture and economic development without having to compete with black market opium. Outside Afghanistan, **heroin would become scarcer and more expensive;** fewer people would start to use; and more addicts would seek treatment. Seems like an ideal scenario, right? **Think again. Within Afghanistan, the principal beneficiaries would be the warlords** and other black market entrepreneurs **whose stockpiles of opium would shoot up in value.** Millions of Afghan peasants would flock to cities ill prepared for them, with all sorts of attendant social problems. And **many would eagerly return to their farms next year to start growing opium again, utilizing guerrilla farming methods to escape intensified eradication efforts. But now they'd be competing with poor farmers elsewhere in the world** -- in Central Asia, Latin America or even Africa -- **attracted by the temporarily high return on opium.** This is, after all, a global commodities market like any other. And outside Afghanistan? **Higher heroin prices typically translate into higher rates of crime by addicts working to support their habits. They also invite more cost-effective but dangerous means of consumption,** such as switching from smoking to injecting heroin, **which translates into higher rates of HIV.** And **many drug users will simply switch to pharmaceutical opioids** or stimulants like cocaine and methamphetamine. All things considered, wiping out opium in Afghanistan would yield far fewer benefits than is commonly assumed.

## A2: NATO

### Turn --- Afghan instability collapses the alliance

#### Ullman '07

(Harlan, Senior Advisor – CSIS, The National Interest, March/April, Lexis)

IN ITS nearly sixty years of existence, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (**NATO**) **has often found itself in jeopardy. That is the case today.** And Afghanistan is not the only cause célèbre. NATO, of course, is one of history's great survivors. From Suez in 1956 to the Euromissile crisis 25 years later, and through the Vietnam and (so far) Iraq debacles, the alliance has persevered and often thrived. Following the September 11 attacks, NATO invoked for the first time Article 5, considering an attack on one an attack on all. NATO went to war against global terror, and in 2006 it assumed full responsibility for the UN International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. Imagine what NATO's founding fathers would think if they awakened today. NATO's first prolonged ground-combat operations did not take place along the inner-German border against Soviet forces, but in

faraway Afghanistan. So, much has changed for the better. However, **NATO's future very much hangs in the balance over Afghanistan** and other critical and unresolved issues that linger from the Cold War. Some argue that all alliances ultimately erode and NATO's time may now have come. That is a profoundly mistaken view and, as I argue, **NATO has never been more important to promoting stability and security.**

**However, for NATO to remain vibrant and** effective, each of the 26 members must be willing to agree to and act on a better defined, clearer and more convincing vision and set of purposes to handle the challenges, dangers and uncertainties of the coming decade. This in turn will demand major changes in forces, capabilities, command structures and rules of engagement—rather than empty promises and ill-defined commitments. Several realities must inform NATO's thinking. First, NATO has never fully answered the central post-Cold War question of how to sustain a military alliance formed to counter a military threat that no longer exists. Nor has NATO learned how to deal with a Russia many fear is turning against the West, even though the NATO-Russia Council was one mechanism created to facilitate greater integration. Second, the nature of the threats and dangers to NATO and the world at large has profoundly changed. Jihadi extremism—frequently dismissed as "terrorism" or limited to Al-Qaeda—is an amalgam of ideas and ideologies, wrapped in a perverted interpretation of Islam that seeks political power. It is focused in the Arab and Muslim worlds, where the recruiting base of desperate, humiliated and disenfranchised people numbers in the hundreds of millions. The United States and Europe, of course, are targets as well. Third, energy, environment and infrastructure protection are now much higher priorities than they were during the Cold War. Fourth, NATO members have questioned and challenged America's leadership over the Iraq War and its aftermath. A large majority of Europeans hold (to put it politely) an unflattering view of George W. Bush and of the interventionist neoconservative agenda they believe is being imposed either on target states in the Middle East or, de facto, on the alliance. Writing off America until January 2009 is an understandable reaction, albeit one that assumes two years isn't too long to wait. Fifth, China and India are now important geo-economic players. Whether Asia will replace Europe as the center of geopolitics is a pregnant question but one with a long gestation period. Irrespective, Asia is surely a more dominant region than it was during the Cold War. Sixth, the proliferation of multilateral institutions and non-governmental organizations—from the UN to the WTO to the G-8 to the EU—competes with and challenges NATO. The EU in particular, with its own military structure, overlaps with NATO. So far the two institutions have been complementary, though that is by no means assured in perpetuity. During the ground-breaking 2002 summit in Prague, NATO affirmed its commitment to "transformation" and created the NATO Response Force (NRF). The NRF was designed to give NATO an "expeditionary capability", meaning the capability of deploying outside the traditional European theater. Unfortunately, the last two summits—in Istanbul in 2004 and in Riga in November 2006—were not nearly as productive. Riga offered an opportunity to ensure success in Afghanistan. But unfortunately that was left off the agenda. Where, then, might NATO be headed? As the past is prologue, history is a good starting point. NATO: Nearly Twenty Years of Transformation IN THE wake of the Soviet Union's collapse, NATO began a continuing review of strategic concepts that led to an expansion of membership and creation of new means for establishing partnerships, cooperation and dialogue. The Clinton Administration immediately proposed extending the alliance eastward. The Partnership for Peace (PFP) was created, and ultimately the alliance grew from 19 to 26 members. New partnerships, including the Mediterranean Dialogue, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative and the NATO-Russia Council followed. NATO's 1999 Strategic Concept described a security environment that remains largely valid today. Instability, terrorism, Weapons of Mass Destruction and the flow of vital resources became the new rationale for the alliance, replacing the defunct Soviet threat. The Prague Summit of 2002 helped institutionalize the major changes. First, Prague committed the alliance to "transformation", an invention of the Bush Administration. In essence, transformation meant continuous re-evaluation of strategy, tactics and capabilities to stay ahead of a "thinking, agile and adaptive enemy"—against whom the Bush Administration had declared a War on Terror. Second, NATO committed to establishing a NATO Response Force (NRF) of up to 25,000 troops, readily deployable and sustainable for at least thirty days without resupply. Three aspects of the NRF merit special attention, as they reflect a profound shift in the alliance's missions. NRF capabilities were "expeditionary", which meant highly mobile and not locked into Cold War-era static defenses. Second, these forces were designed to operate outside NATO's traditional security boundaries in Europe. Finally, the supporting command-and-control structure of the North Atlantic Council (including rules of engagement) had to be changed to permit short-notice response and decision-making to cope with terror and WMD. This represented a fundamental shift away from the Cold War's purposely cumbersome bureaucracy, designed to keep field commanders from taking premature actions that risked nuclear war. Prague was as dramatic a departure as any in NATO's history. But despite rhetorical support, most member states have not realigned military capability with the promised commitment to cope with out of area operations. As a consequence, the last NATO commander, Marine General James Jones, publicly and repeatedly called for NATO to honor its obligations in Afghanistan where NATO is 2,500 soldiers—and many helicopters and airlifts—short because states have not deployed the promised forces and equipment. That said, the NRF has been fully stood up and is in place. NATO in Afghanistan **NATO HAS bet its future on**

**Afghanistan. By accepting responsibility** for ISAF and, more importantly, by sending troops as part of the alliance, **NATO made a huge, breathtaking and irreversible commitment. Should the mission fail** and Afghanistan not be stabilized, **the uproar will be deafening.** The alliance is not needed for the defense of Europe and did not work in distant lands. So what is its worth? **NATO could dissipate over that. Adverse conditions in Afghanistan are reversible and, if action is taken now, amenable to political solutions. With appropriate political action, effective stabilization and reconstruction can follow.**

Afghanistan, unlike Iraq, is largely a tribal society with low levels of religious war. Soviet occupation devastated the country and dismantled its effective irrigation system. As a result, poppy cultivation, which requires little water, now accounts for 50 to 60 percent of the national GDP. Approximately 80 percent of the population cannot read or write, so it is difficult to jump-start business to combat unemployment. Eleven non-NATO states have military forces and other assets in the country. Although the UN sponsors the ISAF mandate, no one authority coordinates the reconstruction. Italy has taken responsibility for the legal system, Germany for the police, Britain for counter-narcotics, Japan for demobilization and the United States for the military. The United States succeeded in training 15,000 army soldiers. But the other four projects have floundered so far. In large part, decentralized authority has made it very difficult to encourage, cajole or coerce outside states to carry out these responsibilities. This also applies to the many NGOs operating in Afghanistan. Regarding the legal system, prosecuting attorneys in Kabul—essential for rooting out corruption—receive about sixty euros per month. A minimum of 200 euros is needed simply to live in the capital. Police have not been trained in sufficient numbers. Counter-narcotics pose profoundly difficult choices. Spraying to destroy the poppy crops, in addition to creating long-term health problems, deprives a large measure of the population of its livelihood. Many unemployed farmers are already easy recruiting targets for the Taliban. But no alternatives have yet been found. The porous border with Pakistan remains problematic. The Taliban enjoys safety and support in Pakistan. While more of a nuisance than a strategic threat for the moment, the Taliban is gaining strength. Unless progress is made in the political, economic and social areas, Afghan public support for the government will crumble. If opposition becomes widespread, NATO will face a military danger resembling that of the Soviets—who fought not only the Taliban but the Afghan people, and lost. The Iraq Study Group (ISG) concluded that conditions in Iraq were "grave and deteriorating." They could easily have been referring to Afghanistan. Outgoing British General David Richards, who commanded ISAF in Afghanistan, believed that at year's end the alliance had three to six months to win hearts and minds. Because concerns about Iraq have dominated the U.S. foreign policy debate, Afghanistan is a largely invisible war. In the run-up to the Riga summit, then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld asked NATO's since-retired commander, General Jones, for a memo to the president on what was needed to prevail in Afghanistan. Whether the president even saw the memo is unclear. By one account, National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley was given a copy. Regardless, the administration has taken no action. The distinctions between Iraq and Afghanistan are at least two-fold. First, Afghanistan is repairable, for the moment. Second, a regional solution is not crucial in Afghanistan, though over time NATO must address the Pakistan situation. Solutions for Afghanistan are inherently political and organizational. Yes, on the military side, a relatively modest investment of troops and equipment is needed. Yes, member states must loosen their so-called national caveats, or restrictions on their forces' employment in battle, so more troops can be engaged in the fighting. But if NATO does not address the larger political challenges—and time is running out, with new poppy crops planted and the Taliban regrouping—it will lose this opportunity. First, a high commissioner must be appointed to ramrod and oversee the effectiveness of the civil reforms undertaken by outside states. This commissioner would have authority over the building of functioning legal, judiciary and police systems, and support President Karzai in creating an effective government. Second, the efforts of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) must be integrated, coordinated and supported with senior mentors and other capabilities necessary to complete the missions. Last, a comprehensive development and agricultural reform plan must be implemented. None of these steps requires much additional personnel or money. Turning Napoleon on his head, sometimes God is on the side of the smallest battalions. Yet the solutions are political, not military. Riga: Failure, Façade or Placeholder? THE RIGA Summit began November 27, 2006. At its core was a working dinner on Wednesday, November 28, followed by a 9 a.m. to noon meeting the next day. Five-or-so hours was all the time heads of state spent on the world's most important alliance. For the United States, the congressional elections, the pending ISG report and Bush's meeting with Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki obscured the summit. Indeed, Iraq overshadowed every other issue. Approval of the Comprehensive Political Guidance and Summit Declaration was pro forma. Nations agreed to the goal of preparing and equipping 40 percent of their ground forces for expeditionary operations and committed to deploying 8 percent of those forces to current operations at any given time. The alliance agreed to buy four C-17s for a logistics lift. And without completely abandoning national caveats, states conceded that forces could loosen rules of engagement when lives were at risk. As with the Istanbul Summit, Riga ducked the major issues. The 40 percent goal was accepted in principle but not in fact. At the last minute after the United States assigned 2,500 American troops to plug the shortage, the NRF was finally certified operational. But the summit did not alter command structures and authorities that allowed the NRF to deploy on short notice. Finally, while the summit approved some force increases for Afghanistan, only about 85 percent of the required forces will be on station. Seeing the summit as one inning in a baseball game, it would be scored as no runs, no hits and a few errors. Whether NATO gets another turn at bat will largely depend on Afghanistan. An emergency meeting of NATO foreign ministers on Afghanistan is

planned for late January 2007. Keeping NATO Vibrant **AFGHANISTAN WILL make or break the alliance.** And only the United States possesses the dynamic leadership to convince NATO to make the crucial changes essential for stabilizing Afghanistan. Unless President Bush acts, chances are Afghans will turn against NATO and the central government in 2007. **If a broader insurgency ensues, NATO casualties will grow.** With more dead or wounded soldiers, **domestic opinion within NATO will demand troop withdrawals.** Should member states capitulate, it is unlikely the United States can pick up the slack. **If a shattered** or fundamentalist- or warlord-controlled **Afghanistan followed, NATO will have failed. That failure might not end the alliance, but it will certainly erode its viability.**

## T Cards

### **Counter-narcotics is policing.**

#### **Wood, 2010**

[March 9, David, Chief Military Correspondent at Politics Daily, "GAO: In Afghanistan's Counter-Drug Campaign, the Police Are a Problem," <http://www.politicsdaily.com/2010/03/09/gao-in-afghanistans-counter-drug-campaign-the-police-are-the/>]

The other war in Afghanistan isn't going all that well, either. The Government Accountability Office (GAO), the investigative arm of Congress, reports Tuesday that almost half of the new police recruits test positive for drug use. That's not good, considering that the police are in charge of the eradication of poppies, whose golf ball-size pods of sap are refined into raw heroin.

## T Cards

### **Counternarcotics is a joint policing mission.**

#### **Charles, '04**

(Robert, Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Efforts, "Afghanistan: Counternarcotics and Rule of Law Programs,")

Narcotics **On the narcotics front**, tied like a ball-and-chain to security, justice, and economic development, we stand in the darkness of a long shadow. We and the Afghans can see the way forward, and there is increased urgency to the mission, but there remain challenges. President Karzai and other Afghan officials have said that drug trafficking and the corruption it breeds may be the biggest threat to Afghanistan's long-term security and democratic future. There is a bit of an M.C. Escher drawing here...and we are the staircase.... Without security, crucial eradication **efforts**, led by the British, **central to the Afghan Government, and balanced on U.S. support** cannot rise to the necessary level to deter heroin poppy cultivation. Without tackling eradication, as well as heroin lab and warehouse destruction with a vengeance -- without a "full throttle-up" way of looking at stopping narcotics -- the overall security situation will not get better fast. The "exit strategy," therefore, **involves not only more and better police**, timely elections, wider economic development and a reliable justice sector, but a unified, all-out effort to rob the forces of instability and terror of the money they gain through heroin production. Due to the need for more security around eradication, and the recent growth of heroin labs, we expect measurements of the 2004 poppy crop -- which will be released in the next few weeks by the CIA's Counter Narcotics Center and the UN Office of Drugs and Crime -- to show yet another year-on-year increase. We need to work harder at lashing-up all Afghan and Coalition counternarcotics efforts, while boosting legitimate investment and economic development. The Administration is intent on giving counternarcotics greater priority in terms of our work in Afghanistan and is undertaking a process to determine how best to ramp up our efforts.

## CN Fails

Counter -narcotics can't solve, only hurts battle against the insurgency.

### Hwang 09

(Inyoung, reporter at Medill News Service, Afghanistan: Is counternarcotics undermining counterinsurgency?m June 09, <http://news.medill.northwestern.edu/washington/news.aspx?id=133849>)

**As the drug trade strengthened the Taliban, U.S. officials sought to fight it. But they ran into obstacles because of the widespread corruption in the country and the argument that counternarcotics operations would distract military attention from the higher counterinsurgency mission. The biggest risk in U.S. efforts to end the opium trade is alienating Afghan peasants who often turn to the Taliban to protect their poppy farms. "We're driving them into the arms of the Taliban and Al Qaeda and sacrificing the broader mission," Carpenter said. A landlocked country, stricken by decades of conflict, Afghanistan has a GDP per capita of \$800, according to CIA figures, placing it in the bottom rung of poor countries. The country's GDP in 2008 was \$23 billion, excluding opium production. But opium is a key product and export for the country's economy, and some claim fighting the drug trade only targets Afghan farmers by depriving them of their livelihood. Carpenter said it's not coincidental that the Taliban and Al Qaeda have their greatest influence in Helmand and Kandahar because residents who depend on the drug trade "bitterly resent the Afghan government, NATO forces and U.S. presence" for trying to curb poppy cultivation. "One-third of the Afghan population is involved in some way with the drug trade," he said.**

## CN Fails

### Glaze 07

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**The security situation in much of Afghanistan is simply inadequate to carry out an effective counternarcotics campaign.** While some regions of Afghanistan are relatively stable and free of violence, other **regions**, including the southern provinces, **have had marked increases in violence directed at the Karzai government, as well as NATO and U.S. troops.** The total number of direct attacks by insurgents increased to 4,542 in 2006 from 1,558 in 2005.<sup>57</sup> In addition, the number of roadside bombs more than doubled to 1,677 in 2006 from 783 a year earlier, while suicide bombings increased five-fold to 139.<sup>58</sup> Many of these incidents were related to the eradication campaign.<sup>59</sup> To counter anti-government elements, NATO and U.S. forces have stepped up the number of kinetic attacks. In the last 6 months of 2006, U.S. forces conducted over 2,000 air strikes, killing hundreds of insurgents and Taliban fighters along with many innocent civilians.<sup>60</sup> **In June 2006, President Karzai expressed his concern regarding the security situation and the escalation in violence:** "It is not acceptable that in all this fighting, Afghans are dying. In the past 3 to 4 weeks, 500 to 600 Afghans were killed. Even if they are Taliban, they are sons of this land."<sup>61</sup> Security voids in Afghanistan are being filled by insurgents, criminals, corrupt officials, and terrorists, many of whom employ the opium trade for funding. The Taliban have helped fill the security void left by the weak central government by providing Afghan citizens an alternative source of security. While most **Afghan citizens** were happy to see the Taliban fall, many of them **are now disillusioned with U.S. and NATO forces for failing to restore security or to improve their quality of life.** In addition, **many Afghans are upset with U.S. and NATO forces for what they consider to be excessive collateral damage from the fighting and bombing.** As a result, **more and more Afghans are turning to the Taliban to meet their security needs.**